











This thesis has been submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for a postgraduate degree 
(e.g. PhD, MPhil, DClinPsychol) at the University of Edinburgh. Please note the following 
terms and conditions of use: 
• This work is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights, which are 
retained by the thesis author, unless otherwise stated. 
• A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without 
prior permission or charge. 
• This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining 
permission in writing from the author. 
• The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or 
medium without the formal permission of the author. 
• When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, 
awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given. 
 
The Political Church and the Profane State
in


















A Thesis submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Edinburgh.
2013
Declaration
I composed this thesis, the work is my own. No part of this thesis has been submitted




Contemporary political and public theology is predominantly statist, with a view of
the state as the solver of human problems, and with the church urging the state to do
more to bring about social justice and peace. This practice of politics as statecraft has
been forcefully challenged by a number of recent theologians, such as those within
the theological movement known as Radical Orthodoxy. Against such a backdrop,
this thesis examines the work of two of Radical Orthodoxy’s most political writers:
John Milbank and William Cavanaugh. Their characterization of the state, as based
in nominalist philosophy and violence, is highly negative. This negative assessment
renders statist theologies and the practice of statecraft profane and deeply problematic
for Christians. They prefer instead to see the church as the only true politics. Yet this
move places their ecclesial and sacramental politics in the overall modern movement
of the politicization of Christianity. This thesis argues that the state is neither sacred
nor profane, but if accepted as mundane, it is something that can be freely engaged
with by the church as part of its overall witness to politics and society. In order to
outline and assess the political theology of Milbank and Cavanaugh three biblical and
doctrinal lenses – creation, preservation, and redemption – are used to judge their
work. From the viewpoint of creation we see where Milbank and Cavanaugh find
the origins of the state in comparison with other theological positions. This carries
through to the commonly held view that the state is in the order of preservation,
as an ordinance of God preserving human society from the chaos caused by human
sinfulness. Finally, in redemption we see how in both Milbank and Cavanaugh the
state becomes an anti-redeemer in competition with the political salvation found in
the church and voluntary associations. The thesis concludes by drawing on the work
of Jacques Ellul in advocating the desacralization of the state from being either sacred
or profane. Such a perspective enables the Church to freely engage in statecraft as just
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A Note on the Text
The ‘state’
I have followed the modern convention of spelling ‘state’ with a lower case ‘s’. In
quotations from other authors I have preserved the spelling of ‘state’ as it appears
in the original form, which in older texts sometimes has ‘State’. In this regard I
differ from the practice of David Runciman, the only contemporary author I have
encountered that deals with the problem of the spelling of ‘state’.1 My practice
harmonizes with Ludwig von Mises who suggested that liberals, unlike totalitarian
statists, do not spell ‘state’ with a capital ‘s’.2
Gendered language
I have avoided gender exclusive language in my writing. I have not, however, altered
other authors’ words, but preserved their original expression.
Scripture
The NRSV translation has been for all English bible quotations and citations unless
otherwise stated. In the body of the text names of biblical books appear in full. In the
few quotations from other authors that include a scripture citation I have amended
the scripture reference style for consistency and indexing purposes.
1. David Runciman, Pluralism and the Personality of the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1997), xiii.
2. Ludwig von Mises, Omnipotent Government: The Rise of the Total State and Total War (New Haven:




In the vibrant field of political theology, the state remains a central concept around
which debates turn. One’s attitude to the state can have one condemned as a
Constantinian, an anarchist, or as an apologist for violence. As a work of political
theology, this thesis focuses on theological understandings of the state in North
Atlantic theology from the late nineteenth century to today. But this is not a discussion
of an abstract concept of the state, but rather how a theological assessment of the state
relates to the church’s engagement with the state.
As discussed in the following chapters, this period was characterised by the rise
of a very favourable disposition among many theologians toward the state. This
attitude is characterized by the notion that the state is the principal means to bring
about a more virtuous, peaceful, and just society. However, this view of the state
within political theology has come in for hard criticism, with some of the most strident
coming from the movement known as Radical Orthodoxy. The focus here is on two
of the movement’s most political voices: John Milbank and William Cavanaugh. As a
work of critical reception of their political theologies, the primary goal here is to place
their political theologies of state and church in an historical and theological context
and provide an assessment of their theological soundness. A secondary goal is to
develop a new way of assessing their work using a doctrinal framework derived from
an understanding of God’s work as Creator, Preserver, and Redeemer. Using this
approach highlights why Milbank and Cavanaugh hold to a high political ecclesiology
and a low, or ‘profane’, view of the state. One of the implications of their political
theologies is a diminished respect for engagement with the state as a legitimate politics
for the church to engage in. The logic at work here is that the theological assessment
of the state correlates directly to one’s evaluation of the church’s practice of engaging
with the state. In arguing against a judgment of the state as either sacred or profane,
which is the position of Milbank and Cavanaugh, the position here follows this same
logic, and argues that if the state can be properly understood as mundane, then this
judgment permits a considered engagement of the church with the state.
1
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The next two sections of this chapter offer brief overall introductions to John Mil-
bank and William Cavanaugh. Following those are definitional and methodological
sections. First, the key terms of ‘politics’ and ‘state’ are defined as they are used
throughout and distinguished from one another, as they must be in order to make
sense of Milbank and Cavanaugh. The methodological framework is then outlined.
In order to assess the political theologies of Milbank and Cavanaugh, a doctrinal
framework has been developed that uses creation, preservation, and redemption as
touchstones for relating the state to the work of God. Intersecting this framework is a
scale of value from sacred to profane. Throughout Scripture plays an important part
in discerning the shape of these doctrines and in offering reflection on the state and
civil authorities from a biblical perspective.
Introducing John Milbank
Anglo-Catholic John Milbank is one of the most prominent Anglophone theologians
working today. His corpus covers many topics, but have as their primary overarching
agenda the recovery of theology as the queen of the sciences. His Radical Orthodoxy
project is neither reformist nor apologetic (there being no one for theology to apologize
to), but, rather, an assertive movement for the recovery of true theology, including
political theology.
Milbank did his doctoral studies on Giambattista Vico at the University of
Birmingham under Leon Pompa.1 His early work was nurtured by adherents to
English Christian Socialism. The history of the Christendom Trust records that ‘Mr
John Milbank was appointed as Reckitt Fellow, to start work in October 1984.’2
Milbank was also active in Kenneth Leech’s Jubilee Group.3 At the time, these
groups were engaged with Thatcherism and were active in publishing on the church’s
response to the New Right. As a Christian socialist, Milbank was hardly impressed
with the rise of the New Right and what it did to undermine many institutions of
society, such as trade unions. Milbank’s most famous work, Theology and Social Theory,
1. John Milbank, “The Priority of the Made: Giambattista Vico and the Analogy of Creation” (PhD
diss., University of Birmingham, 1986). This was published as John Milbank, The Religious Dimension
in the Thought of Giambattista Vico, 1668–1744: Part 1: The Early Metaphysics, Studies in the History of
Philosophy (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen, 1991); The Religious Dimension in the Thought of Giambattista Vico,
1668–1744: Part 2: Language, Law and History, Studies in the History of Philosophy (Lewiston: Edwin
Mellen, 1992).
2. See Martin Jarrett-Kerr, “Twenty Years of the Christendom Trust: An historical account, guide and
commentary by a founder member,” <http://www.mbreckitttrust.org/jarrettkerr.html> (accessed
April 23, 2013). The Trust is now known as the ‘MB Reckitt Trust’ after its founder Maurice Reckitt, an
Anglo-Catholic Christian Socialist.
3. See Michael Johnston, “Where Two or Three are Gathered: A Christian Socialist Family Tree,”
<http : / / web . archive . org / web / 20110611134534 / http : / / www . anglocatholicsocialism . org /
familytree.html> (accessed April 23, 2013).
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dedicated in part to the Christendom Trust, was written as a response to Thatcherism
and its economic and political rationalism.4
Milbank’s was an unusual response to Thatcher, with a philosophical depth
lacking in others, and with no reference to Thatcher herself.5 More common Christian
responses favoured statecraft and ‘prophetic’ critique, which generally assumed the
validity of the market/state nexus for addressing questions of policy delivery, leaving
unquestioned the ontology of the state and its inherent nature. While leftist liberals
detected a bald-faced lie in the Thatcherite axiom that ‘there is no alternative,’ Milbank
believed that this was honest, since it is the essential nature of the modern state to
move in this direction. But Milbank does not believe that any alternative to neo-liberal
politics can be found in the Labour Party or the secular Left – it can only be found in
Christian socialism.
It is important to understand what kind of socialist Milbank is. He is certainly not a
Fabian socialist (known for its state socialism and heavy involvement in Labour party
politics), and many of Milbank’s favoured Christian socialists were not fans of the
Fabians either. Milbank rejects state socialism and instead wishes to find something
useful in other socialist and political traditions, especially English Christian socialists:
we need to take the risk of thinking in an altogether new way that
will take up the traditions of socialism less wedded to progress, histor-
ical inevitability, materialism, and the state, and put them into debate
with conservative anti-capitalist thematics and the traditions of classical
and biblical political thought which may allow us to see the inherent
restrictions of the parameters of modern social, political, and economic
reflection.6
It is a purpose of this thesis to examine whether Milbank’s desire to think such
new thoughts is successful, or whether he merely restates forgotten voices from
the Christian socialist tradition, especially from English pluralist and distributist
traditions.
Another purpose of this thesis is to piece together Milbank’s writing about the state
and how he understands Christian politics in relation to the state. This is necessary
because, while Milbank often mentions the state, he does not directly address it in
detail or systematically, but underlying much of his writing on political matters there
is an implicit theology of the state as part of the secular. Among his concerns is
the coercive, violent, and disciplinary state, and its eventual overcoming in peaceful
4. John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006),
v, xi. All references to this work are to the second edition unless otherwise specified.
5. Elsewhere Milbank is more explicit about the negative influence of Thatcher. See John Milbank,
“Religion, Culture, and Anarchy: The Attack on the Arnoldian Vision,” in The Future of Love: Essays in
Political Theology (London: SCM Press, 2009), 26.
6. John Milbank, “Liberality versus Liberalism,” in The Future of Love: Essays in Political Theology
(London: SCM Press, 2009), 242.
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Christian socialism. At the root of this are several related topics – the ontology of
violence, state sovereignty as an outcome of this, and Christian socialism as its remedy.
Milbank has a two-fold task in his ‘political’ theology. Milbank seeks first to
diagnose the malaise and illness that vex modern life: ‘My desire is merely to
undermine not only the sacral aura, but also its long-extended shadow – the secular
legitimacy – of coercive power. And to insist that salvation is precisely, out of this
political domain which constantly reproduces “original” sin.’7 He then attempts to
provide a cure for the ills of modernity in Christian socialism, built in a recovered
theological tradition: ‘I stand on the whole within that tradition of non-statist
Christian Socialism which regards modern statism as involving the support of the
very rich, a guarantee of their finances, and an enabling additional support through
“welfare” of their dispossessed workforce.’8
Milbank’s aim – to dissolve formal distinctions between Athens and Jerusalem and
develop a synthesis of the two – is not only testified to in Radical Orthodoxy’s strong
interest in philosophy, but also opens space for interested philosophers for dialogue.
Milbank’s work has also come to the attention of contemporary philosophers, most
notably Slavoj Žižek.9 John D. Caputo is another philosopher, albeit with strong
theological inclinations, who has been in dialogue with Milbank.10 Charles Taylor
warms to Radical Orthodoxy in his A Secular Age.11 Milbank has also come to the
notice of anthropologists and political theorists, which signals their awareness of the
re-emergence of theology as being an increasing unavoidable dialogue partner in their
own disciplines.12
Milbank’s works have received an unparalleled critical response in contemporary
theology. Several volumes have been devoted to responding to Radical Orthodoxy
and several journals have devoted special issues to his theology.13 Besides these vol-
7. John Milbank, “An Essay against Secular Order,” Journal of Religious Ethics 15, no. 2 (1987): 220.
8. John Milbank, “Preface,” in The Future of Love: Essays in Political Theology (London: SCM Press, 2009),
xvi–xvii.
9. Witness their collaboration and debates in these texts: John Milbank, Slavoj Žižek, and
Creston Davis with Catherine Pickstock, Paul’s New Moment: Continental Philosophy and the Future of
Christian Theology (Grand Rapids: Brazos, 2010); Slavoj Žižek and John Milbank, The Monstrosity of Christ:
Paradox or Dialectic? Ed. Creston Davis, Short Circuits (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2009); Creston Davis,
John Milbank, and Slavoj Žižek, eds., Theology and the Political: The New Debate (Durham: Duke University
Press, 2005).
10. John D. Caputo, Mark Dooley, and Michael J. Scanlon, eds., Questioning God (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 2001).
11. Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007),
295, 774, 851. Milbank notes Taylor’s observation of his work with appreciation: John Milbank, “The
grandeur of reason and the perversity of rationalism: Radical Orthodoxy’s first decade,” in The Radical
Orthodoxy Reader, ed. John Milbank and Simon Oliver (Oxford: Routledge, 2009), 383-384.
12. On anthropology see Joel Robbins, “Anthropology and Theology: An Awkward Relationship?”
Anthropological Quarterly 79, no. 2 (2006): 285–294; and Fenella Cannell, “Introduction: The Anthropology
of Christianity,” in The Anthropology of Christianity, ed. Fenella Cannell (Durham: Duke University Press,
2006).
13. The key volumes are: Laurence Paul Hemming, ed., Radical Orthodoxy? – A Catholic Enquiry
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000); James K. A. Smith and James H. Olthuis, eds., Radical Orthodoxy and
the Reformed Tradition: Creation, Covenant, and Participation (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2005);
Chapter 1. Introduction 5
umes, numerous other critical and supportive works have been published, showing
that Milbank and Radical Orthodoxy cannot be ignored. Radical Orthodoxy is an
influential theological movement in and of itself, and has had an impressive impact
on many other theologians and theological sub-disciplines, which is not surprising
given its agenda to encompass the totality of human thought. Furthermore, Milbank
has had direct and formational influence on his students, notably Catherine Pickstock
and Phillip Blond, with substantial influence on other older scholars, such as Stanley
Hauerwas, all of whom have advanced the Radical Orthodoxy agenda.14
Milbank is a contentious theologian. Much of the critical literature is in the form
of ‘Yes, but . . .’ format. An example of this is Duncan Forrester’s assessment that
Radical Orthodoxy was ‘sending shock waves of excitement throughout the Anglo-
American theological scene’, while not offering much in terms of ‘social, political and
economic radicalism’ flowing from their orthodoxy.15 Less appreciative is Ronald
Preston’s assessment: ‘I think Milbank’s position is very dangerous as the basis of
a Christian social theology.’16 Milbank’s international reception has generally been
mixed. He is hardly known in Germany, while Theology and Social Theory was only
published in French in 2010.17
Many scholars, in reviewing Milbank’s works, have been critical of his readings
and use of his sources. Is Milbank’s comprehension of Durkheim ‘flatly mistaken’
and ‘hysterical’ and expounded ‘without proof’, as Ivan Strenski thinks it is?18
David Bentley Hart finds Milbank’s deployment of Heidegger ‘idiosyncratic and
inspissated’, yet valuable, once altered.19 Both Clayton Crockett and David Toole
Wayne J. Hankey and Douglas Hedley, eds., Deconstructing Radical Orthodoxy: Postmodern Theology,
Rhetoric and Truth (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005); Rosemary Radford Ruether and Marion Grau, eds.,
Interpreting the Postmodern: Responses to “Radical Orthodoxy” (New York: T&T Clark, 2006); Adrian Pabst
and Christoph Schneider, eds., Encounter Between Eastern Orthodoxy and Radical Orthodoxy: Transfiguring
the World Through the Word (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009); Chris K. Huebner and Tripp York, eds., The Gift
of Difference: Radical Orthodoxy, Radical Reformation, with a foreword by John Milbank (Winnipeg: CMU
Press, 2010). The journal issues are: New Blackfriars (June 1992), Modern Theology (October 1992), Arachne
2:1 (1995), Philosophy and Theology 16:1 (2004) and 9:3/4 (1996), Journal of Religious Ethics (Summer 2004),
The Conrad Grebel Review (Spring 2005).
14. On the influence of Hauerwas on Radical Orthodoxy see Christopher McMahon, “Theology and the
Redemptive Mission of the Church: A Catholic Response to Milbank’s Challenge,” The Heythrop Journal
51, no. 5 (September 2010): 781, 782, 792.
15. Duncan B. Forrester, Truthful Action: Explorations in Practical Theology (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2000),
162.
16. Ronald H. Preston, “A Theological Response to Sociology,” in Sociology, Theology and the Curriculum,
ed. Leslie J. Francis (London: Cassell, 1999), 56.
17. John Milbank, Théologie et théorie sociale: Au-delà de la raison séculière, trans. Pascale Robin (Paris:
Cerf, 2010). Works introducing Milbank and Radical Orthodoxy to French readers include Denis Sureau,
Pour une Nouvelle Théologie Politique (Paris: Parole et Silence, 2008) and Adrian Pabst and Olivier-Thomas
Venard, Radical Orthodoxy: Pour une révolution théologique, with a foreword by Grégory Solari (Genève:
Ad Solem, 2004).
18. Ivan Strenski, Theology and the First Theory of Sacrifice (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 183–185.
19. David Bentley Hart, The Beauty of the Infinite: The Aesthetics of Christian Truth (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 2003), 42.
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claim Milbank misreads Deleuze.20 Jeffrey Stout has questions about Milbank’s
reading of Samuel Taylor Coleridge and joins David M. Craig in being very critical
of Milbank’s reading of John Ruskin.21 Gavin Hyman thinks Milbank oversimplifies
Nietzsche.22 Romand Coles also has misgivings about Milbank’s take on Nietzsche
and Derrida.23 Nicholas Lash argues that Milbank mishandles Karl Rahner and
Gutiérrez.24 Numerous people have found Milbank’s reading of Aquinas to be
idiosyncratic.25 Daniel Franklin Pilario also thinks that Milbank misinterprets Hans
Blumenberg.26 Joseph W. H. Lough thinks ‘Marxian social theory’ is misunderstood
by Milbank.27 Milbank and his critics will get further attention in later chapters, we
now turn William Cavanaugh.
Introducing William Cavanaugh
William Cavanaugh is an American Catholic theologian who earned a PhD from Duke
University under Stanley Hauerwas. His doctoral work was a study of the church’s
politics in Chile under the Pinochet regime, published as Torture and Eucharist.28
Cavanaugh continues to have a close relationship with Hauerwas, being one of
several of Hauerwas’s former students devoting attention to filling out and extending
Hauerwas’ ideas in complementary work. Cavanaugh’s work makes concrete some
of the speculations of his mentor about the relationship between the church as the
Body of Christ and politics, with many of the themes found in Cavanaugh already
present in Hauerwas’s essay, “What Could It Mean for the Church to Be Christ’s
Body?”29 Furthermore, Cavanaugh and Hauerwas each contributed to the Blackwell
20. Clayton Crockett, A Theology of the Sublime (London: Routledge, 2001), 33; David Toole, Waiting for
Godot in Sarajevo: Theological Reflections on Nihilism, Tragedy, and Apocalypse, Radical Traditions (London:
SCM Press, 2001), 77–79.
21. Jeffrey Stout, Democracy and Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 105–106; David
M. Craig, “Naves and Nukes: John Ruskin as “Augustinian” Social Theorist?” Journal of Religious Ethics
32, no. 2 (2004): 325–356.
22. Gavin Hyman, “John Milbank and Nihilism: A Metaphysical (Mis)Reading?” Literature and Theology
14, no. 4 (December 2000): 107–111.
23. Romand Coles, “Storied Others and the Possibilities of Caritas: Milbank and Neo-Nietzschean
Ethics,” Modern Theology 8, no. 4 (1992): 331–351.
24. Nicholas Lash, “Not Exactly Politics of Power?” Modern Theology 8, no. 4 (1992): 353–364.
25. See John Marenbon, “Aquinas, Radical Orthodoxy and the Importance of Truth,” in Deconstructing
Radical Orthodoxy: Postmodern Theology, Rhetoric and Truth, ed. Wayne J. Hankey and Douglas Hedley
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), 49–63; Daniel Franklin E. Pilario, Back to the Rough Grounds of Praxis:
Exploring Theological Method with Pierre Bourdieu (Leuven: Peeters, 2006), 397–414. Ivana Noble, Theological
Interpretation of Culture in Post-Communist Context: Central and East European Search for Roots (Farnham:
Ashgate, 2010), 58.
26. Pilario, Back to the Rough Grounds of Praxis, 473, 480–483.
27. See Joseph W. H. Lough, Weber and the Persistence of Religion: Social Theory, Capitalism and the Sublime
(London: Routledge, 2004), 104.
28. William T. Cavanaugh, Torture and Eucharist in Pinochet’s Chile, PhD, Duke University, 1996.
29. Stanley Hauerwas, “What Could It Mean for the Church to Be Christ’s Body? A Question without
a Clear Answer,” in In Good Company: The Church as Polis (University of Notre Dame Press, 1995), 19–31.
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Companion that the other one edited.30 Like Cavanaugh, Hauerwas is no fan of
the state and has scattered throughout his works negative comments about the state
such as this, ‘the idolatry most convenient to us all remains the presumed primacy
of the nation-state.’31 He, like Cavanaugh, describes his politics as ‘anarchistic,’ and
challenges the mainstream definition of ‘politics.’32 In more recent works, Hauerwas
has cited at length, and with approval, Cavanaugh’s view of the state,33 although
Hauerwas seems to allow more space for the positive rôle of the state than does
Cavanaugh.34 Yet they find common ground in locating, inside the church, the true
politics (as opposed to the parody of politics found in the state) and practices that are
learned by following the example of others.35 But their emphasis is slightly different
and complementary, with Hauerwas focusing on ecclesial ethics and Cavanaugh
having an ecclesial politics, as a subset of this.
Cavanaugh contributed the primary ‘political’ contribution to manifesto Radical
Orthodoxy, in which he names his basic political orientation as anarchist.36 To the
uninitiated, Cavanaugh’s ‘Christian anarchism’ is an oxymoron, or at least puzzling.
Yet, in claiming it for his political theological project, Cavanaugh places himself in a
minority Christian tradition that is opposed to the state and its claims of legitimacy.
‘By it,’ Cavanaugh writes, ‘I do not mean no government, but rather no state.’37
Specifically, his ‘anarchism’ is to be taken in its literal meaning, and ‘not in the sense
that it proposes chaos, but in that it challenges the false order of the state.’38
Cavanaugh’s Christian anarchism rejects the state, and advances the notion of the
church as a body of Christ as a political body, which embodies true politics in its own
right. As Cavanaugh describes it, the church’s ‘true politics’ takes places in the ‘true’
church, which is also the true bearer of meaning in history. This is a sacramental
30. William T. Cavanaugh, “Discerning: Politics and Reconciliation,” in The Blackwell Companion to
Christian Ethics, ed. Stanley Hauerwas and Samuel Wells (Malden: Blackwell, 2004), 196–208; Stanley
Hauerwas, “Dietrich Bonhoeffer,” in The Blackwell Companion to Political Theology, ed. Peter Scott and
William T. Cavanaugh (Malden: Blackwell, 2007), 136–149.
31. Stanley Hauerwas, “The Church in a Divided World: The Interpretative Power of the Christian
Story,” in A Community of Character: Toward a Constructive Christian Social Ethic (Notre Dame: University
of Notre Dame Press, 1981), 110.
32. Stanley Hauerwas, Dispatches from the Front: Theological Engagements with the Secular (Durham: Duke
University Press, 1995), 10.
33. See, for instance, Stanley Hauerwas, The State of the University: Academic Knowledges and the
Knowledge of God (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 62–63, 65.
34. Hauerwas: ‘Yet I have not denied the place of the state—even the coercive state—as part of God’s
“order.” Rather, what I have refused in the name of an autonomous created order is to legitimate the state
as an end in and of itself.’ Stanley Hauerwas, “Why the “Sectarian Temptation" Is a Misrepresentation:
A Response to James Gustafson,” in The Hauerwas Reader, ed. John Berkman and Michael Cartwright
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2001), 107.
35. See William T. Cavanaugh, Theopolitical Imagination: Discovering the Liturgy as a Political Act in an Age
of Global Consumerism (London: T&T Clark, 2002); Stanley Hauerwas, “The Politics of the Church: How
We Lay Bricks and Make Disciples,” in After Christendom?: How the Church Is to Behave If Freedom, Justice,
and a Christian Nation Are Bad Ideas (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1991), 93–111.
36. William T. Cavanaugh, “The City: Beyond Secular Parodies,” in Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology,
ed. John Milbank, Graham Ward, and Catherine Pickstock (London: Blackwell, 1999), 182.
37. Ibid., 182.
38. Ibid., 194.
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political ecclesiology, which sees the Eucharist as the pivotal Christian practice and
the centre of the church’s true politics of reconciliation. For Cavanaugh, this notion of
the church must be rediscovered, since in modernity we saw the fall of the church. By
‘church’, Cavanaugh has a notion of the church in an ideal form as the ekklesia, which
may or may not bear resemblances to actual churches.
A key theme in Cavanaugh is that both church and state have developed their
own answers to the problem of reunifying humanity from its present fragmentation.
For the state, this is part of its origins. Offering a revisionist history of the state,
Cavanaugh sees the state develop through war and the privatization of faith. The
state’s will for birth and growth suppresses the church and sets up the opposition
between church and state that typifies his theology. Given his genetic account of
the state, Cavanaugh’s state becomes, in his theology, the Antichrist – something
of profane origins and in competition with the body of Christ. This is upheld in
Cavanaugh’s theology by his selective use of secular political theory.
By taking Cavanaugh’s sacramental political ecclesiology and warring state to-
gether, we can understand Cavanaugh working largely through the perspective
provided by the following two antimetaboles. Firstly, with respect to the profane state:
‘War made the state, and the state made war.’39 Secondly, regarding the church, is the
view associated with Henri de Lubac that, as the Eucharist makes the church, the
church makes the Eucharist.40 What connects these two statements are the contrasts
within them. War and the state are based in violence and division, while the church
and Eucharist are unifying. They also mirror each other in that a ritual (war or
Eucharist) forms a political body (state or church), so the church is political through
the Eucharist, making a social body that rivals the state.
Cavanaugh builds a political theology from the negation of the legitimacy of the
state, leaving the church as the only ‘true’ political body. In making the case that
the state is profane, he offers a compelling and seductive case that the state is good
for nothing (or very little) and is, rather, the embodiment of evil in the modern
world. While this has been done before within the Christian tradition, other Christian
anarchists have used Scripture to argue their case. Cavanaugh is unique in that he
primarily offers historical and theoretical reasons as the basis of his critique of the
39. Charles Tilly, “Reflections on the History of European State-Making,” in The Formation of National
States in Western Europe, ed. Charles Tilly (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 42.
40. A clear statement of this does not appear in de Lubac, see Rustin E. Brian, “Corpus Mysticum:
The Eucharist and the Church in the Middle Ages – By Henri Cardinal de Lubac,” International Journal
of Systematic Theology 12, no. 4 (October 2010): 496. Cavanaugh cites Raniero Cantalamessa as saying:
‘the Eucharist makes the Church by making the Church Eucharist!’ William T. Cavanaugh, Torture and
Eucharist: Theology, Politics, and the Body of Christ (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 232. In his encyclical letter
Ecclesia de Eucharistia Pope John Paul II this idea is rendered, ‘the Eucharist builds the Church and the
Church makes the Eucharist’ Pope John Paul II, “Ecclesia de Eucharistia,” Vatican, April 17, 2003, <http:
//www.vatican.va/holy_father/special_features/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_20030417
_ecclesia_eucharistia_en.html> (accessed April 23, 2013), § 26.
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state, and sacraments as the way forward into the true politics grounded solely in the
church.
Amongst theologians, Cavanaugh’s published work has had a mixed reception.
In some quarters his ideas have received widespread acceptance and endorsement,
while at the same time several critics have taken issue with the conclusions he makes.
Criticisms have typically been at specific points of doctrinal departure, without an
overall assessment of Cavanaugh’s work.41 One critic, Mary Doak, finds that the
‘anarchic oppositionalism’ of William Cavanaugh and Daniel Bell depends on an
unrealistic view of human nature, and that the church, as a polis, is not perfect.42
Randall S. Rosenberg writes that Cavanaugh is too negative about ethical possibilities
of modernity, and that, by using Charles Taylor’s notion of a ‘Ricci reading of
modernity’, we can develop a more nuanced understanding of what is beneficial
in modern culture.43 Christopher J. Insole has also made a study of Cavanaugh,44
with his most penetrating critique being the suggestion that Cavanaugh needs the
absolutist state (that Insole claims he builds up through the selective use of a dubious
range of sources) to advocate for the opposite in the church. Charles T. Mathewes,
in positively reviewing Torture and Eucharist, remarks that Cavanaugh had an easy
target in Pinochet’s Chile, with torture not being what threatens Americans.45 Keith
Watkins welcomes Cavanaugh’s work, but he questions how, in Cavanaugh’s terms,
Christians can ever participate in the state. He also questions whether Protestants
can make sense of Cavanaugh’s heavily Eucharistic ecclesiology.46 Jonathan Chaplin
gives two cheers for Cavanaugh’s critique of modern politics, withholding one for
Cavanaugh’s poor treatment of two issues. First, in his treatment of the contractarian
tradition, he conflates the libertarian Locke with the more absolutist Thomas Hobbes
and Rousseau.47 Second, Chaplin takes Cavanaugh to task over his account of the
41. A short overarching critique can be found in Matthew A. Shadle, “Cavanaugh on the Church and
the Modern State: An Appraisal,” Horizons 37, no. 2 (2010): 246–270.
42. Mary Doak, “The Politics of Radical Orthodoxy: A Catholic Critique,” Theological Studies 68, no. 2
(2007): 384; also Reclaiming Narrative for Public Theology (New York: State University of New York Press,
2004).
43. Randall S. Rosenberg, “The Catholic Imagination and Modernity: William Cavanaugh’s
Theopolitical Imagination and Charles Taylor’s Modern Social Imagination,” The Heythrop Journal 48,
no. 6 (2007): 911–931.
44. Christopher J. Insole, “Discerning the Theopolitical: A Response to Cavanaugh’s Reimagining of
Political Space,” Political Theology 7, no. 3 (2006): 323–335.
45. Charles T. Mathewes, “Book Review: Torture and Eucharist: Theology, Politics, and the Body of Christ,”
Modern Theology 16, no. 3 (2000): 401. Yet Cavanaugh has shown how torture shapes the American
political imagination in “Telling the Truth about Ourselves: Torture and Eucharist in the U.S. Popular
Imagination,” The Other Journal, May 8, 2009, <http://theotherjournal.com/2009/05/08/telling-
the-truth-about-ourselves-torture-and-eucharist-in-the-u-s-popular-imaginat/> (accessed
April 23, 2013).
46. Keith Watkins, “The Church as Contrast Society: A Review Essay,” Encounter 67, no. 1 (2006): 87–99.
47. Jonathan Chaplin, “Suspended Communities or Covenanted Communities?: Reformed Reflections
on the Social Thought of Radical Orthodoxy,” in Radical Orthodoxy and the Reformed Tradition: Creation,
Covenant, and Participation, ed. James K. A. Smith and James H. Olthuis (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic,
2005), 162–163.
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centralized state.48 In the following assessment of Cavanaugh, these critics will be
drawn on where useful.
While Cavanaugh has clearly studied and utilized political theory, political theory
has not returned the favour to the same extent, although reviews of his book Myth
of Religious Violence show that the implications of his work are starting to be noted
in political science and international relations.49 Some attention has been given to
him in other disciplines. In religious studies, Stout tackles Cavanaugh’s central
thesis in Democracy and Tradition.50 Cavanaugh is also starting to be noticed among
international relations scholars who study the rôle of religion between states.51 In
social anthropology, the work of theologians has been examined for their claims about
the fundamental ontologies of violence and society. Milbank and Cavanaugh are, for
example, both discussed in a recent article by Joel Robbins.52
In the following chapters, Cavanaugh will be criticized from the perspectives
outlined later in this introduction.
Understanding ‘Politics’ and the ‘State’
In discussing the political theologies of Milbank and Cavanaugh, the emphasis will
fall on how they view ‘politics’ and the ‘state’. Distinguishing between these terms is
important for two reasons. First, politics and the state developed separately. Second,
it is possible to have a high view of politics and a low view of the state. This is seen in
the work of many political theologians, including Milbank and Cavanaugh, who are
trying to develop a non-statist political theology. This distinction will be important
in the next chapter, which will consider the politicization of theology. It is imperative
that these contested terms are clearly defined before proceeding to further discussion.
Politics
When defining ‘politics’, one comes up against the many uses the term has.53 A
common feature of contemporary definitions is that ‘politics’ is often understood to be
that which pertains to the state. D. D. Raphael, for instance, writes that ‘the political
48. Chaplin, “Suspended Communities or Covenanted Communities?,” 164–166.
49. See A. Alexander Stummvoll, “Demythologising Religious Violence,” European Political Science 9,
no. 4 (December 2010): 515–523 and Scott M. Thomas, “The myth of religious violence: secular ideology
and the roots of modern conflict,” International Affairs 86, no. 3 (May 2010): 774–776.
50. Stout, Democracy and Tradition, 101.
51. See Fabio Petito and Pavlos Hatzopoulos, eds., Religion in International Relations: The Return From
Exile (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, The Politics of Secularism in
International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).
52. Robbins, “Anthropology and Theology.”
53. Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” in The Vocation Lectures: “Science as a Vocation", “Politics as a
Vocation", ed. David Owen and Tracy B. Strong, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2004),
32.
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is whatever concerns the State’.54 Similarly, Jacques Ellul, the French Reformed lay
theologian defines politics as follows: ‘political matter [sic] (“le politique”) is the
domain and sphere of public interests created and represented by the state. Politics
(“la politique”) is action relative to this domain, the conduct of political groups, and
any influence exercised on that conduct.’55 Such views have been described as ‘politics
as statecraft’.56
That politics is defined as statecraft is a symptom of a limited, perhaps ‘statist’
(see definition on page 16), political imagination. In order to understand the
political theologies of Milbank and Cavanaugh, the definition of ‘politics’ must be
distinguished from the concept of ‘state’. ‘Politics’ is understood here in a broader
way than just the state; it takes place in families, churches, unions, and other organs
of society that remain outside the state. Some writers have acknowledged that politics
includes these things, but have included them as part of the state. An example is the
Marxist Nicos Poulantzas, who makes everything political part of the state:
the system of the State is composed of several apparatuses or institutions
of which certain have a principally repressive role, in the strong sense, and
others a principally ideological role. The former constitute the repressive
apparatus of the State, that is to say the State apparatus in the classical
Marxist sense of the term (government, army, police, tribunals and admin-
istration). The latter constitute the ideological apparatuses of the State,
such as the Church, the political parties, the unions (with the exception
of course, of the revolutionary party or trade union organizations), the
schools, the mass media (newspapers, radio, television), and, from a
certain point of view, the family.57
Poulantzas’s solution to the problem of the definition of ‘state’ does not permit
a definition of politics outside the state, nor does it permit an understanding of the
state as independent of other associations. In the following discussion, on the other
hand, and in broad agreement with Milbank and Cavanaugh, ‘politics’ is defined
in such a way as to preserve its application to non-statist societies, referring here to
the regulation and governance of human societies (including the family, associations,
churches and nations) in order to preserve them so that it can achieve certain goals.58
54. D. D. Raphael, Problems of Political Philosophy, Revised (London: Macmillan, 1976), 27.
55. Jacques Ellul, The Political Illusion, 1st American, trans. Konrad Kellen (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1967), 3n1. Ellul’s italics. Also see 15n6 where Ellul’s approves of Weber’s limited definition of politics as
‘the leadership, or the exercise of influence on the leadership, of a political organization, in other words a
state.’ This can be found in Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” 32.
56. Daniel M. Bell Jr., “State and Civil Society,” in The Blackwell Companion to Political Theology (Malden:
Blackwell, 2007), 423. Another critic of this view is Tony Skillen, “The Statist Conception of Politics,”
Radical Philosophy 2 (Summer 1972): 2.
57. Nicos Poulantzas, “The Problem of the Capitalist State,” New Left Review 58, no. 1 (1969): 77.
58. This definition roughly follows Graeme C. Moodie, “Politics is about government,” in What is
Politics?: The Activity and Its Study, ed. Adrian Leftwich (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984), 19–32.
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It is important to note here that ‘governance’ is distinguished from the ‘Government’,
which is often used as a synonym for the state in contemporary English.59 But in its
general sense, ‘politics as governance’ is a universal human phenomenon, and exists
in all societies that make collective decisions and carry them out, even if they do not
have something identifiable as a state. Applying this definition of ‘politics’ to ‘political
theology’ would make this term mean theological reflection on the nature of politics
and how God relates to human societies, including the society of the church.
This definition of ‘politics’ is in agreement with Milbank and Cavanaugh, in
defining it without reference to the state. The title of the present work refers to the
political church of Milbank and Cavanaugh. What do they mean by ‘political’, when
they say that the church is political? Milbank is highly critical of modern politics,
which, reflecting his anti-voluntarism, he sees defined ‘as a field of pure power’60,
or ‘concerned with creation, or the institution of a new, secular space.’61 But, as a
constructive political theologian, one might expect a clearer definition from him. An
explicit statement of what Milbank means by ‘politics’ remains elusive, but we can
get an idea of his meaning of ‘politics’ from other indirect statements. For example,
in an essay on Matthew Arnold, Milbank suggests that the early Church promoted
‘a new community of primal allegiance and primary nurture—the Church—outside
the political state.’62 The Church is a ‘universal society’ distinct from the polis.63 In
fact, Milbank thinks that Paul, ‘in speaking of ecclesia, proposes a new sort of polis
which can counteract and even eventually subsume the Roman empire.’64 In this way,
Milbank makes the church the true polis.
Cavanaugh defines the ‘political’ in his introduction to The Blackwell Companion to
Political Theology: ‘The political is broadly understood as the use of structural power
to organize a society or community of people.’65 Because Cavanaugh believes that the
church is a community of people, the church has it own politics outside the state.
Indeed, for Cavanaugh, the church is the ‘true’ politics.66 As seen in Chapter 3,
Cavanaugh shows how both church and state offer different solutions to the political
problem of disunity. This discussion highlights how Cavanaugh sees the politics of
the state and the politics of church as different and in competition.
59. Christopher W. Morris, An Essay on the Modern State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2002), 20–22.
60. Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 10.
61. Ibid., 26.
62. Milbank, “Religion, Culture, and Anarchy,” 33.
63. Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 99.
64. Milbank, “Liberality versus Liberalism,” 253.
65. Peter Scott and William T. Cavanaugh, “Introduction,” in The Blackwell Companion to Political
Theology, ed. Peter Scott and William T. Cavanaugh (Malden: Blackwell, 2007), 2–4.
66. Cavanaugh, “The City,” 185–186.
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The ‘State’
Since this discussion is also focussed on Milbank’s and Cavanaugh’s views about the
state, it is essential to define this term. The remainder of this section will examine how
Milbank and Cavanaugh view the modern state, and propose a working definition
for this work. One important parameter for this discussion is that, since Milbank
and Cavanaugh work and mostly write about the USA and Britain, there is a North
Atlantic focus, limited to Western Europe and North America.
The modern state can be claimed to be something different from the civil authori-
ties that preceded it. Accepting this discontinuity would make it difficult to apply the
terminology and political theories across the obscure barrier between pre-modern civil
authorities and modern states. Furthermore, it would make it difficult to apply pre-
modern theological reflections (from Scripture, the Church Fathers, and mediaeval
theologians) on civil authorities to modern politics. A solution to this problem is to
locate, instead, continuity between the earliest civil authorities and our contemporary
ones. This would rely on what these political structures have in common. Here, the
common ground is taken as the functions of the state to administer justice, preserve
civil order, and provide for some goods in common (such as education, economic
administration, and infrastructure) within a defined territory.67 Locating common
tasks of the state across time should not be taken as an attempt to disguise the
differences between the civil authorities of antiquity and those of today. But using
the word ‘state’ as a form of shorthand for what these civil authorities have in
common can provide a way of talking about what is shared across time from antiquity
onward.68
Milbank and Cavanaugh are primarily concerned with the modern state, and, as
Chapter 3 shows, they advocate a type of discontinuity between pre-modern political
authorities and the modern state. Their description and evaluation of the modern state
relies heavily on Max Weber. Weber, as is commonly claimed, proposed a definition
of the state in this sentence:
Nowadays, in contrast, we must say that the state is the form of human
community that (successfully) lays claim to the monopoly of legitimate
physical violence within a particular territory—and this idea of “territory”
is an essential defining feature.69
However, this definition is controversial because some consider it inadequate as a
‘definition’, while others, who accept that it is a definition, find it deficient. Rather
than recognize Weber’s definition as a definition, Christopher W. Morris calls it a
67. This solution is also favoured by Alexander Passerin d’Entrèves, The Notion of the State: An
Introduction to Political Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), 28–35.
68. Ibid., 34.
69. Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” 33.
Chapter 1. Introduction 14
‘Weberian attribute’ rather than as a complete definition in itself.70 But Weber’s
attribute or definition is really made up of several components: legitimacy, violence,
monopolised force, and territory.71
A problem with Weber’s definition is that it is typified by the state’s means, which
have come to be understood as primarily violent or forceful. Even though this
attribute of force accurately applies to the modern state, to focus one’s attention on
a single attribute among many, is to reduce the state to one characteristic, giving
it a one dimensional character.72 A shortcoming of Weber’s focus on the means of
the state is that it provides for no comprehension of the ends of the state. Weber
ruled out defining the state by its ends, since ‘there is no conceivable end which some
political association has not at some time pursued.’73 Nor does he accept defining
the state by its ‘activities’, since, ‘There is almost no task that a political organization
has not undertaken at one time or another.’74 By locating the means specific to the
state, Weber thought he had found what was unique about the modern state. But
the definition merely shifts the identification of the state to what is legitimate.75 How
does the violence of the state become legitimate? In the history of reflection on the
political authorities, legitimacy is rarely derived solely from the means of the state;
also brought into play are the state’s origins, tasks and ends.
Despite the shortcoming of Weber’s ‘definition’, it remains important for the reason
that it has been adopted by many modern political theologians as the basis for their
denunciation of the state. Milbank and Cavanaugh are among them.76 This is often
because, as will be shown later, violence is seen to be both the means of the state (as it
is for Weber) and the foundation of the state.77
Weber’s definition of the state, as already shown, is limited to the means of the
state. This raises a couple of important questions. Firstly, by focusing on what
the state does, attention is diverted away from what the state is. This ontological
question, of what the state is, will be discussed further in Chapter 3. Second, Weber’s
attention to the means of the state makes his definition a descriptive definition, being
a definition aimed at describing something as it appears. Such definitions can claim
70. Morris, An Essay on the Modern State, 295.
71. This observation comes from John Hoffman, “Sovereignty,” in The Impact of Feminism on Political
Concepts and Debates, ed. Georgina Blakeley and Valerie Bryson (Manchester and New York: Manchester
University Press, 2007), 44–45.
72. Adopting Weber’s definition risks reducing the concerns of the state to violence, making any
positive evaluation of the state difficult to comprehend by those opposed to violence. See, for instance,
Johanna Kantola, “Book Reviews: John Hoffman. Soverignity. Buckingham: Open University Press, 1998,
ISBN 0-335-19789-2.” International Feminist Journal of Politics 3, no. 1 (2001): 150–151.
73. Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus
Wittich, trans. Ephraim Fischoff et al., vol. 1 (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), 55.
74. Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” 33.
75. See Stuart Hall, “The state in question,” in The Idea of the Modern State (Milton Keynes: Open
University Press, 1984), 16–17.
76. See, for instance, Cavanaugh, Torture and Eucharist, 5.
77. Making such a link being provenance and essence is rejected in Oliver O’Donovan, The Ways of
Judgment (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005), 140–141.
Chapter 1. Introduction 15
objectivity, although choosing one definition over another is rarely without some bias.
By contrast, a normative definition is more inclined to contain value judgments. With
respect to the state, this would include a focus on the ends and tasks of the state, rather
than just its means.
In the history of Christian political thought it has been more common to define or
to identify the state normatively through the ends and tasks of the state. Representa-
tive of this approach is Calvin’s statement of the purpose of government:
Yet civil government has as its appointed end, so long as we live among
men, to cherish and protect the outward worship of God, to defend sound
doctrine of piety and the position of the church, to adjust our life to
the society of men, to form our social behavior to civil righteousness,
to reconcile us with one another, and to promote general peace and
tranquillity.78
Some might object that such normative statements about the tasks of the state are
not strictly definitions because they do not offer a clear statement of what the word
‘state’ means. Nevertheless, these normative definitions have been useful, not only in
judging the validity of the tasks and ends adopted by states, but also in assessing the
means that they use.
For the purposes of this work, the state is defined as follows:
The state is a set of institutions under the control of a legitimate govern-
ment, and which are endowed by law with force and other means in order
to administer justice and provide for social order and common goods for
the people within a defined territory.79
This definition aims to combine the means and tasks of the state, while providing
for a notion of legitimacy. This is normative in so far as the following discussion aims
to have a mundane understanding of the state (this is discussed below on page 16).
This is obviously a more positive definition of the state than Weber’s is held to be by
Milbank and Cavanaugh. Where the word ‘state’ appears in the text of the present
work, the context should make clear what is meant by state at each point.
Statism, Anti-Statism, and the Political Imagination
The Western world has changed dramatically since the nineteenth century, not least
in its political make-up. The rise and fall of European territories and empires can
78. John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, ed. John T. McNeill, trans. Ford Lewis Battles, Library
of Christian Classics (London: SCM Press, 1961), § XX.2.
79. This formulation draws on the definitions of R. M. MacIver, The Modern State (Oxford University
Press: London, 1964), 22, and David Copp, “The Idea of a Legitimate State,” Philosophy & Public Affairs
28, no. 1 (1999): 7.
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be easily seen by comparing political maps from 1800 to 2000. The changes are
not merely the formation of new boundaries between sovereign states, but also the
strengthening of these boundaries and the concentration of state sovereignty within
their territories. These political and material changes of recent centuries have been
reflected in changes in how citizens see themselves in relationship to states. The rise
of the modern state saw its increased control over individual lives and its intrusion
into new areas of community life. There are physical realities here, but the rise of the
state also transformed the political imagination, altering how we think of our societies
and how they are governed. The effects of these changes are discussed in more detail
in Chapter 2. Introduced here are two forms of political imagination that have grown
alongside the rise of the modern state, namely statism and anti-statism.
What is meant by ‘political imagination’ here? This phrase (or ‘political imag-
inary’80) does not mean that politics is a realm of make-believe. Rather, the term
describes how people think about the nature and task of political societies, how
politics are imagined to operate, and how it is thought society is best ordered and
improved. A range of political imaginaries exist, some will be conservative, believing
that the staus quo is preferable, others will imagine new political futures. The
concept implies that we need not accept the so-called givens of contemporary political
discourse and suggests that we can re-imagine our political problems, associations,
sources, and other things in order to make things anew. There are other ways
politics can be developed and enacted, but they needed to be imagined before they
can be realized. For example, a non-statist politics needs to imagine that social
order and social change can be achieved without the state’s involvement. Even the
current dominance of the state once existed more in the imagination than in reality, as
Cavanaugh suggests: ‘Modern politics was not discovered but imagined, invented.’81
Statism82is a political imaginary held by those who imagine that a more just,
peaceful, free, and prosperous society can only be brought about by giving the
state greatly increased powers over a nation’s social, economic, and political life.
Such a position grants the autonomous modern state powers to intrude into the
lives of individuals, families, trade unions, churches, businesses, and other human
institutions. In practice, statists not only cannot imagine society being ordered without
the state, they see the state as the sole practical means by which society can be
managed and improved. In its strongest form, statism requires a belief that there are
no limits to the good the state can bring. But to try to implement total state control of
society results in totalitarianism, such as seen in Nazi Germany or in the Soviet Union.
However, not everyone who grants a rôle to the state in the provision of justice and
order is by definition a statist. One can uphold a positive rôle for the state without
80. ‘Imaginary’ here follows the usage of Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries (Durham: Duke
University Press, 2004), 23.
81. Cavanaugh, Theopolitical Imagination, 2.
82. Some use étatism from the French état. For example, see Mises, Omnipotent Government, 5, 44.
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slipping into statism. The line between legitimate state action and statism is crossed
where the sovereignty of other institutions of social and economic life are transgressed
by the state in an assertive expansion of the scope of its own sovereignty. So statism
can be avoided where the sovereignty of the state is limited and where the sovereignty
of other human institutions can still be asserted.
Where the statist imaginary is prevalent the state becomes difficult to question
since it becomes a presupposition of political discourse.83 Under such circumstances,
which political philosopher Jens Bartelson believes exist in the West today, ‘we simply
seem to lack the intellectual resources necessary to conceive of a political order beyond
or without the state, since the state has been present for long enough for the concept to
confine our political imaginations.’84 That statism is prevalent has become a puzzle,
even if few recognize it as such:
The significant question is: Why do a large number of people come
to believe that only through increased state intervention can justice be
achieved? To a great extent this belief is due to the overwhelming
acceptance of the state as the source of value and law. Society not only
looks for solutions within the paradigm defined by the state, but also finds
it difficult to consider the view that statism is at the heart of the problem.85
In addition to the answer provided in this quote, it might also be that statism, as
Bartelson suggests, has colonized people’s political imaginations. Further answers
will be discussed in the next chapter, but the question is one that Milbank and
Cavanaugh would also consider important in considering the rôle of the state in
society.
Milbank and Cavanaugh both oppose statism, and for this reason they can be
described as anti-statists. Anti-statism comes in several degrees, with the most
extreme anti-statists being those anarchists who oppose all states; the less extreme
being classical liberals who believe in a minimal state.86 If statists place all their hopes
for social improvement in the state, anarchists believe that any faith in the state is
misplaced. Therefore, anti-statism, or anarchism, which finds no value in the state,
is the opposite of statism, which finds all value in the state. But this is a special type
of opposition. Paul Thomas holds that Marx was opposed to both ‘the étatist and
the anarchist’ believing that they ‘have in common a certain specific form of false
83. Jens Bartelson, The Critique of the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 5.
84. Ibid., 1–2. Here Bartelson is commenting on Hedley Bull’s notion that the ‘vitality of the states
system’ depends in part on the ‘tyranny of the concepts and normative principles associated with it’.
The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, 1st ed. (London: Macmillan, 1977). Also see
Crispin Sartwell, Against the State: An Introduction to Anarchist Political Theory (Albany: State University
of New York Press, 2008), 38.
85. William Marina, “Egalitarianism and Empire,” in The Politicization of Society, ed. Kenneth S.
Templeton Jr. (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1979), 141.
86. For a graphic depiction of this scale of statism see Ronald H. Nash, Social Justice and the Christian
Church (Lanham: University Press of America, 1990), 17.
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consciousness’ or even ‘a type of idolatry.’87 While the statist (such as Bruno Bauer) is
too sanguine about the state, the anarchist (such as Proudhon) is too hostile.88
What the statist and the anti-statist share is the perspective that one’s evaluation
of the state will correspond with how one relates to it. To clarify this point, Dietrich
Bonhoeffer’s exegesis of 1 Corinthians 7:23 is helpful:
“Do not become slaves of human masters!” This would happen in
two different ways. First, it may take place through a rebellion against
and overthrow of the established order. Second, it may come about by
investing the current order with a religious significance.89
Bonhoeffer published these words in 1937 during his conflict with the German
Reich Church. In this passage, consonant with the overall thrust of his work, he
is concerned that the totalitarian Nazi government not be justified on the basis of
theology (especially as an order of creation, a point discussed further in Chapter 3),
but neither should Christians be overly hostile to government. Bonhoeffer follows the
above quotation with an exhortation to obedience to the authorities. In his reading of
Romans 13 that forms a part of this discussion, Bonhoeffer finds St Paul saying that it
is irrelevant to ‘justify or condemn an authority of this world’.90
In general, Bonhoeffer identifies two related approaches by which one is bound
or enslaved to the state. The first approach describes those who wish to overthrow
the state. In this group are revolutionaries of all kinds who think the current order
is corrupt and inhumane. This is a negative enslavement of opposition, whereby one
becomes attached to the state in one’s opposition to it. The second group are those
who sacralize the present order. The first group thinks the state profane; the second
group thinks the state sacred.
Furthermore, Bonhoeffer’s quote implies that there is a way of not being a slave to
human masters. By condemning both extremes, Bonhoeffer must have imagined that
we could exist in a condition of non-slavery. The position advocated here proposes
one way this might occur through a third, more neutral, view: the state as mundane,
or as a mere instrument. This position requires showing that the state is neither sacred,
nor profane. In practice this is done by desacralizing and deprofanizing the state from
either extreme so that it can sit in between as mundane.
This basic schema provides a way of analysing the contemporary political theolo-
gies of John Milbank and William Cavanaugh. As opponents of the established order,
both Milbank and Cavanaugh write about the evils of the state, and propose that true
87. Paul Thomas, Karl Marx and the Anarchists (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980), 56. Here
Thomas relies on Karl Marx, “‘On the Jewish Question’,” in Marx: Early Political Writings, ed. Joseph
O’Malley and Richard A. Davis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 28–56.
88. Thomas, Karl Marx and the Anarchists, 57.
89. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Discipleship, ed. Geffrey B. Kelly and John D. Godsey, trans. Barbara Green and
Reinhard Krauss (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2003), 239.
90. Ibid., 241.
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politics exists solely in the church. In the light of Bonhoeffer’s analysis, the following
chapters will consider how Milbank and Cavanaugh rebel against the present order
by making the state appear profane.
The Sacred, the Mundane, and the Profane
The title of this dissertation refers to the ‘political’ and the ‘profane’ as two adjectives
associated with the ‘church’ and ‘state’. This usage should not be taken to suggest that
these form a pair. ‘Profane’ is usually paired with ‘sacred’, with the political being of a
different order. The position taken here is that the church should be wary of adopting
any notion of sacred or profane politics, recalling Bonhoeffer’s anxiety that judging the
political in such ways can lead to bondage to unchristian ideologies.91
The terminology of sacred/profane became popular in the field of religion with
Émile Durkheim, who proposed that all phenomena in societies fit into either a
sacred or profane category.92 The formulation here differs from Durkheim’s technical
sociological use, with ‘profane’ following the more colloquial meaning of indecent,
polluting, and unhallowed, and ‘sacred’ meaning the opposite – that is: hallowed
and an object of devotion. Unlike Durkheim’s distinct categories, here the sacred
and profane exist on a continuum, so that something can be more or less sacred or
profane, and between them sits the mundane. The mundane is something ordinary,
commonplace, and something lacking the positive association of the sacred and the
negative connotation of the profane. In this position, the mundane has neutrality.93
This threefold schema not only breaks the unhelpful dichotomy of sacred and profane,
but envisages a sliding scale of sacral value on a continuum from sacred to profane.
Using this scale, we can then describe how it is one can move along it. To sacralize
(or deprofanize) means to move toward the sacred, while to profane (or desacralize)
means to move toward the profane. Sacralization means to make an object more
sacred, while desacralization, a topic covered extensively in Chapter 6, means to
remove sacral value from an object.
The following chapters will show that Milbank and Cavanaugh think that the state
is profane in opposition to those they think have given it sacred value. The position
upheld here sits between these and is that in the Christian political imagination the
state should be considered as neither sacred nor profane, but as mundane. The state,
as the work of human hands, is never inherently sacred, even if it can be thought to
be sacred by politicians or by citizens. Any sacral value of the state exists solely in the
political imagination of people. The state may wish to claim sacral value because it
91. See quotation on page 18.
92. See Émile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, trans. Joseph Ward Swain (London:
Allen & Unwin, 1915), 37–42.
93. This formulation is borrowed from W. E. H. Stanner, “Reflections on Durkheim and Aboriginal
Religion,” in Social Organization: Essays Presented to Raymond Firth, ed. Maurice Freedman (London: Frank
Cass, 1967), 217–240.
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wishes to gain adherents and claim legitimacy. The judgment of the state exists more
in the realm of the political imagination when the state is imagined to be bringing
a better future, solving problems, and punishing evil, in ways that displace God.
Likewise, the state is not profane in and of itself. It can, however, be thought of as
profane when it is seen as standing in the way of our preservation and redemption.
When the state uses violence, tortures, kills, and encroaches into people’s lives, we
may say the state is profane. If the state is considered profane, as Milbank and
Cavanaugh think it is, then it is something that Christians and churches should avoid,
ruling out their political engagement with the state.
God’s Work in Creation, Preservation, and Redemption
The following chapters will look more closely at how the state has been understood
theologically in various traditions, providing a framework for assessing the political
theologies of Milbank and Cavanaugh. This framework will be based on the doctrines
of creation, preservation, and redemption. Here the starting point is reflection on
the creative, preservative, and redemptive works of God, rather than on the human
condition. This latter view can be seen in the more common Reformed narrative of
‘creation, fall, and redemption’ that many believe ought to guide Christians’ ethical
and political thought.94 It should be observed that this narrative of ‘creation, fall,
redemption’ is human-centered, with the emphasis falling on humanity’s status as a
creature, fallen through sin, and in need of redemption.95 By contrast, the emphasis
here is on the work of God as Creator, Preserver, and Redeemer. The objects of
this work extend beyond individual human souls to creation as a whole, including
human society, its preservation, and ultimate redemption. This detaches the adopted
framework from a strict association with Reformed thought, which is alien to Milbank
and Cavanaugh.96
Across theological traditions, the divine acts of creation, preservation, and re-
demption describe the great works of God, and describe a large divine meta-narrative.
Human recognition of these works have inspired thanks and praise to God for His
94. See, for instance, Albert M. Wolters, Creation Regained: Biblical Basics for a Reformational Worldview,
2nd ed. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005); Richard J. Mouw, Politics and the Biblical Drama (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1976), 19; Charles W. Colson and Nancy Pearcey, How Now Shall We Live? (Wheaton: Tyndale
House Publishers, 1999), xiii, 14; David T. Koyzis, Political Visions & Illusions: A Survey and Christian
Critique of Contemporary Ideologies (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2003), 30, 31, 40, 41, 189.
95. Watson calls such a ’fall/redemption’ model ‘anthropomonistic’, since it relegates the created order
to be a mere backdrop for the all-consuming human drama of redemption. See Francis Watson, In
the Beginning: Irenaeus, Creation and the Environment, ed. David G. Horrell, Cherryl Hunt, Christopher
Southgate, and Francesca Stavrakopoulou (London: T&T Clark, 2010), 129.
96. Milbank, in particular, has been critical of Reformed forms of thought. See John Milbank, “Stale
Expressions: The Management-Shaped Church,” in The Future of Love: Essays in Political Theology (London:
SCM Press, 2009), 264–276; John Milbank, “Alternative Protestantism: Radical Orthodoxy and the
Reformed Tradition,” in Radical Orthodoxy and the Reformed Tradition: Creation, Covenant, and Participation,
ed. James K. A. Smith and James H. Olthuis (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2005), 25–41.
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works of creation, preservation, and redemption. For instance, Pseudo-Dionysius
identifies God as the ‘source’ of all things, their ‘preserver’ and ‘the One who brings
them to completion’.97 The seventeenth-century Anglo-Catholic Bishop William
Beveridge uses the formula several times in his Thesaurus Theologicus.98 Another
Anglican, Samuel Johnson, in his birthday prayer of 1738, blesses God for his
‘Creation, Preservation, and Redemption.’99 Austrian Jesuit Francis Xavier Weninger
also finds in ‘the wonders of creation, preservation and redemption’ reasons to praise
God.100 That several traditions affirm creation, preservation, and redemption as the
works of God, justifies Douglas John Hall’s assessment that this is the customary way
of classifying them.101 But how do these works relate to the work of governing human
societies? Can the institutions and practices of human government be described as
works of God located in creation, preservation, or redemption?
Many theologians have linked one or more of these doctrines to political authori-
ties. The formulation also has several adherents in relating this schema to the Christian
understanding of politics.102 The schema takes up the ‘chief problem’ Paul Ramsey
found in Christian ethical analysis: ‘This is the question how, in moral decision and
action, the Christian’s response to God the Creator, his response to God the Ruler
and Preserver of this fallen world, and his response to God the Redeemer stand
in indivisible relation to each other; and where the stress falls in cases of concrete
decision.’103 Similarly, Joan Lockwood O’Donovan notes that liberalism has derailed
Christian political thought and its biblical doctrines of ‘created moral structures’,
God’s providential establishment of political authority, and redemption through the
coming of the Kingdom of Christ.104
As will be seen in the following chapters, there are several reasons for adopting
this tripartite formulation as a tool to assess the political theologies of Milbank and
Cavanaugh. First, it takes account of the time between creation and redemption. As
97. Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, “The Divine Names,” in Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works,
trans. Colm Luibhéid, with an introduction by Jaroslav Pelikan, Jean Leclercq, and Karlfried Froehlich,
with a foreword by Paul Rorem (New York: Paulist Press, 1987), § 596C.
98. William Beveridge, The Theological Works of William Beveridge: Volume X, Thesaurus Theologicus
(Oxford: John Henry Parker, 1847), 57, 267, 291, 348.
99. Samuel Johnson, Doctor Johnson’s Prayers, ed. Elton Trueblood (London: SCM Press, 1947), 57.
100. Francis Xavier Weninger, A Manual of the Catholic Religion, for Catechists, Teachers and Self-Instruction,
6th ed. (Cincinnati: John P. Walsh, 1867), 184. Also see Elizabeth Singer Rowe, Devout Exercises of the Heart,
in Meditation, Soliloquy, Prayer, and Praise (Philadelphia: I. Watts, 1791), 88.
101. Douglas John Hall, Professing the Faith: Christian Theology in a North American Context (Minneapolis:
Fortress Press, 1996), 72–73.
102. See Rockne McCarthy, Donald Oppewal, Walfred Peterson, and Gordon Spykman, Society, State,
& Schools: A Case for Structural and Confessional Pluralism (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1981), 162–163; and
Nigel Wright, “Government as an ambiguous power,” in God and Government, ed. Nick Spencer and
Jonathan Chaplin (London: SPCK, 2009), 27–30.
103. Paul Ramsey, Christian Ethics and the Sit-In (New York: Association Press, 1961), 126–127.
104. Joan Lockwood O’Donovan made these observations in an interview by Rupert Shortt published
as Oliver O’Donovan, Joan Lockwood O’Donovan, and Rupert Shortt, “Political Theology,” in God’s
Advocates: Christian Thinkers in Conversation, by Rupert Shortt (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 2005),
252–253.
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discussed in Chapter 4, it is in this time we need to be preserved for redemption.
This is important to exclude realized eschatologies creeping too far forward into the
present. While both Milbank and Cavanaugh write about creation and redemption,
this schema highlights their omission of any consideration of preservation, which, as
Chapter 4 shows, has been a traditional way of understanding the state in Christian
theology. The secondary justification for this outline is that a theological reading of
the traditions of both secular and Christian political thought shows that it is over
these doctrines that traditions compete. Sometimes the state has been understood,
idolatrously, to displace God as the creator, preserver, or redeemer of human society.
At other times, God is sometimes believed to be altogether removed from using the
state in his creative, preservative, and redemptive work in human society. Statists
and anti-statists (or anarchists) differ on many questions, including those relating to
the origins of modern society, how society is preserved, and how human and societal
problems are solved. By applying these theological categories to political thought,
we can see where they differ on how they understand the doctrines of creation,
preservation, and redemption as relating to the political sphere.
This schema has been used by others in attempting to classify other views of
the state. As discussed in later chapters, it fits the three main doctrinal ways of
understanding the state in German theology: as an order of creation (Schöpfungs-
ordnung), an order of preservation (Erhaltungsordnung), or as an order of redemption
(Erlösungsordnung). Picking any one of these orders as the proper locale of the state
is problematic. In his book on Martin Luther King, Jr.’s view of the state, Michael
Long points out that King thought it futile to attempt to locate the state in the order
of creation, the order of preservation, or the order of redemption, since, as he saw
it, there is ‘a role for the state in the whole work of God—in creation, preservation,
and reconciliation.’105 This perspective is at odds with the desire to attempt to locate
the state in one of these three positions. As shown in the following chapters, the
reaction against placing the state in the order of creation (as it was in Nazi theology)
encouraged others, such as Bonhoeffer and Barth, to relocate the state in the orders of
preservation and redemption. Arguably, the perceived need to connect the state to the
immediate works of God is a false consciousness too. With this schema, theologians
are often tempted to place the state in one of these three categories. But, as will be
shown in the following chapters, to select one category risks giving an unnecessarily
positive evaluation of the state. For anti-statist theologians, the state can be seen as
bringing destruction to society (as an anti-preserver), or as something standing in the
way of the redemption of society (as an anti-redeemer). Milbank and Cavanaugh share
a negative evaluation of the state, and do not see the state in any of the three classic
105. Michael G. Long, Against Us, But For Us: Martin Luther King, Jr. and the State (Macon: Mercer
University Press, 2002), xiv–xv.
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orders, but in their opposites. So the schema is not just useful for classifying those for
whom the state is a sacred order of God, but also those who think it is profane.
God’s Work and Idolization of the State
The leverage of the doctrines of creation, preservation, and redemption in political
theology can be further illuminated by the notion of idolatry. In its broadest and
most useful definition, ‘idolatry’ means putting something in the place of God.106
This includes, but cannot be reduced to, the worship of things other than God.
Worshipping idols is certainly condemned in Scripture and the Christian tradition,
but the definition used here also includes the substituting of things for God in other
ways. These distinctions are illuminated by the landmark study of idolatry by Jewish
scholars Moshe Halbertal and Avishai Margalit.107 They write that the ‘ban on idolatry
is the attempt to dictate exclusivity, to map the unique territory of the one God.’108
This exclusivity has two features. The first is worship: we may only worship and
make sacrifices to the true God. The second, which is more relevant to the present
discussion, is the ‘attribution of forces and adjectives that are supposed to be exclusive
to a single force.’109
Following this definition of idolatry, idols are not only those things worshipped
instead of God, but also those things we attribute with the powers of God. Idols are
those things we put our trust in, and this can include the state. Luther made the point
this way:
For not only the adoration of images is idolatry but also trust in one’s own
righteousness, works, and merits, and putting confidence in riches and
human power. As the latter is the commonest, so it also is the most noxious
idolatry . . . How godless do you think it is to rely on these things and to
reject confidence in the eternal and omnipotent God?110
Why would people put their trust in things other than God, including the state?
For the reason that these idols are imagined to have the powers that have traditionally
been attributed to God. The authors of the First Helvetic Confession (1536), were clear
to delimit the attribution of power to ministers of the Church when they wrote: ‘that
in all things we ascribe all efficacy and power to God the Lord alone, and only the
imparting to the minister. For it is certain that this power and efficacy never should
106. This definition is also used by Paul Marshall, Thine Is The Kingdom: A Biblical Perspective on the Nature
of Government and Politics Today (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1984), 78.




110. Martin Luther, What Luther Says: An Anthology, Volume II: Glory — Prayer, comp. Ewald M. Plass
(Saint Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1959), § 2110.
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or can be attributed to a creature, but God dispenses it to those He chooses according
to His free will.’111 Likewise, we need to attribute divine attributes solely to God and
not to the state.
This is the central point: the state becomes sacralized and an idol when it is
attributed with autonomous powers to create, preserve, and redeem separate from
the action of God. Christian theology teaches, as the following chapters will show,
that God and only God, can properly be described as our creator, preserver, and
redeemer. Such attributes may only be applied to God; applying these identifiers
to a state, or any other work of human hands, makes these creations into imposters
of God.112 Attuned to this temptation, the authors of Scripture emphasized that God
alone should be ascribed certain powers (1 Chronicles 16:25–29). Similarly, in two
Psalms laden with political imagery (Psalm 29:1–2; Psalm 96:7–8), creatures, whether
heavenly or formed into peoples, are to attribute power to God, with the implication
that they are to turn from idolatry.113 Condemned here, then, is the ascription of the
powers of creation, preservation, and redemption to the state instead of God. These
condemnations are also found in Scripture.
Scripture not only affirms God as the sole Creator, but also condemns idolatry
which ascribes the power of creation to creatures and idols. In Jeremiah 2:27–28 we
find Israel condemned for ascribing their origins to trees or stones, which are also
upheld as saviours. Calvin comments on this passage: ‘the Prophet points out here
what is especially to be detested in idolatry, and that is, the transferring of the honor,
due to God, to statues, not only as to the external act by bending the knee before them,
but by seeking salvation from them.’114 In Acts 14:15 worthless, powerless idols are
compared to the God ‘who made the heaven and the earth and the sea and all that is
in them.’ By contrast to the works of the true God, the works of the gods and idols are
worthless (Isaiah 41:29).
Idols are sometimes ascribed with preservative powers by idolaters seeking in the
lifeless idol the providence that the biblical tradition says can be found in God alone.
This form of idolatry is condemned in Wisdom of Solomon where safe passage at sea is
sought through a lifeless wooden idol, rather than through trust in God’s providence.
In this passage (Wisdom of Solomon 14:5–7) the false faith of the idolater is contrasted
with the faith of Noah, who allowed himself to be guided safely over the waters by
God’s hand (Genesis 8).
With respect to redemption, Scripture rejects the notion that salvation can come
from idols, such as that mocked in Isaiah 44:17. Under the new covenant, according
111. Arthur C. Cochrane, ed., “The First Helvetic Confession, 1536,” in Reformed Confessions of the 16th
Century (London: SCM Press, 1966), § 15.
112. See William Stringfellow, Imposters of God: Inquiries into Favorite Idols (Eugene: Wipf & Stock, 2006),
6.
113. See James Luther Mays, Psalms, Interpretation (Louisville: John Knox Press, 1994), 308.
114. John Calvin, Commentaries on the Book of the Prophet Jeremiah and the Lamentations: Volume 1, trans.
John Owen (Edinburgh: Calvin Translation Society, 1850), 127.
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to the author of 1 Peter, true redemption comes through Jesus, not from mere metals,
even precious ones: ‘You know that you were ransomed from the futile ways inherited
from your ancestors, not with perishable things like silver or gold, but with the
precious blood of Christ, like that of a lamb without defect or blemish.’ (1 Peter 1:18–
19). While affirming the priceless value of Jesus’s blood, as it is commonly read, this
passage also tells what cannot redeem us: idols – even those of silver or gold (cf. Isaiah
30:22; Isaiah 31:7; Acts 17:29; Revelation 9:20).
The proper ascription of the powers of creation, preservation, and redemption to
God alone is developed in later chapters. Here we note that putting things in the place
of God in these ways is one way we can understand idolatry. The concern expressed
here is that the state not be made into a political idol by being put in the place of
God. But this is not the only danger. The state should not be wholly condemned and
seen as completely removed from the works of God. To suggest this would imply
that God plays no rôle in creating the state, preserving it, or redeeming it. Moreover,
this position would suggest that God does not use the state as a tool in preserving
or redeeming human society. Against such a position, the freedom of God can be
affirmed so that God is free to relate to the state in these ways.
When does the state become sacred or profane? The state becomes profane when
it is perceived to stand in the way of our preservation or redemption, or when it
comes from profane origins. Given the sliding scale between sacred and profane
outlined above, it will never be easy to say when this line has been crossed. But one
approach to this question comes from Barth and the Confessing Church when they
were confronted with the political question of National Socialism. For some time,
the National Socialists confronted the church with only a political problem (‘Whether
German National Socialism . . . will become to-morrow or the day after, first, the form
of our Society in Europe, and thus the form of our social structure as well, and so the
form of society which surrounds and conditions the Church in this area, and what
attitude we propose to adopt to this possibility.’115), but once they confronted the
church with a religious problem, the time had come for the church to reject a neutral
stance toward the party.116 This line was crossed, as Barth observed, when the Party
presented itself as ‘a religious institution of salvation.’117 Barth refers to the Party as a
religious institution because in National Socialism he finds the self-belief that ‘it itself
is able to be and to give to man and to all men everything for body and soul, for life
and death, for time and eternity.’118 This is an example of statism, because the state
alone is claimed to be sufficient. We may also call it idolization of the state, where the
state becomes a false god in which one is asked to place all one’s faith and trust.
115. Karl Barth, The Church and the Political Problem of Our Day (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1939),
22–23.
116. Ibid., 36–39.
117. Ibid., 41. Barth’s italics.
118. Ibid., 41.
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This section has concentrated on rejecting an idolization, or false sacralization, of
the state whereby it is attributed with the powers of God. When we make the state
our creator, preserver, or redeemer apart from God, we make it into an idol. The key
phrase here is ‘apart from God’, for there seems no reason why the state cannot be a
vehicle for the works of God. If idolatrous sacralization is the elevation of the state
into the place of God, then the opposite is the profanation of the state, so that the
state becomes completely separated from God or even viewed as demonic. Related to
the three-fold framework used here, if one implies that the state is profane, then they
also mean by that, that God has no use for the state in the creation, preservation,
or redemption of humans or their societies. Within such a perspective, the state
becomes autonomous, and not an agent in God’s work. In its idolatrous sacralization,
the state becomes autonomous in creating, preserving, and redeeming society; in its
profanation, the state becomes autonomous in its separation from and opposition to
God.
In contemporary political theology is it likely that more attention has been given
to the notion of the idolatrous sacralization of the state in politics than has been given
to the idea that the state is outside the utilization of God. There are several reasons
why this might be so. First, there are well-known extreme examples of states that have
claimed near divine status for themselves in ordering the lives of their people. Nazi
Germany and the Soviet Union serve as good examples of this; this more easily seen
with the benefit of hindsight. It is relatively more difficult to show how a country has
profanized its state and has attempted to show how the state is completely separate
from God’s work. Second, the profanation of the state is associated with anarchism,
which has been a minority tradition in Christianity and remains largely incongruous
to the political imagination of the majority of people. Anarchists, in avoiding the
idolatry of the state have been accused of making an idol out of freedom.119 Third,
dismissing the state as a work and tool of God requires relocating the political function
to somewhere else. This problem has plagued anti-statism: What do you put in the
state’s place? For the secular anarchist, it is the self-governing sovereign individual
or community. For Milbank and Cavanaugh, as seen in the following chapters, this
is the church. Both the autonomous individual or the political church can become
idols. Bernd Wannenwetsch illustrates how, by avoiding the idolization of the state,
theologians can be led to idolize the church:
At the same time, however, if out of fear that civil religion can become
idolatry, the Church thinks that it must refrain from a public engagement
of faith, it incurs the danger of making an idol of itself. It is this
which pins down the difficulty of seeing the Church as a counter-society
at its theologically most tricky point. The Church would acquire the
119. Ernst Victor Zenker, Anarchism: A Criticism and History of the Anarchist Theory (London: Methuen,
1898), 4.
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characteristics of an idol itself if it tried to preserve its purity by refusing
to enter into the ambivalence of civil religion which an involvement in the
civil and public sphere brings with it.120
While the anti-statists are right to reject the idolatry of the state, the main line of
criticism here takes a different theological angle. This is that the anti-statists, including
Milbank and Cavanaugh, have down-played the notion that a free God can and may
use the state, as the work of human hands, for God’s purposes in relation to human
society.
A central problem thrown up by this consideration of idolatry is this: if our loyalty
to God is absolute and includes political loyalty, then what loyalty do Christians have
to the civil powers?121 Both the Torah and Jesus were clear that we cannot serve
two masters (Deuteronomy 6:13; Matthew 6:24), but the Christian tradition has often
affirmed obedience to civic authorities as forming part of our loyalty to God. This
may lead some to believe that if we worship God then it is self-evident that we are
free from idolatry – especially if they consider the definition of idolatry to be limited
to the worship of things in the place of God. But Scripture also warns of a syncretism
where those who worship God also worship other gods and swear oaths by them
(see 1 Kings 18:21; 2 Kings 17:41; Zephaniah 1:5). This tendency reached right into
the temple, as seen in the purge of idols by King Josiah (2 Kings 23:1–15). Luther’s
interpretation of Zephaniah 1:5 illustrates what is at stake in political theology at this
juncture. He says that Christians must swear by God alone and worship only him.
Part of what serving God means is that we must also obey our rulers. But we must
never mix the two; while we obey our rulers we must never place our trust in them, as
trust is reserved for God alone.122 Pressing this point further, we sacralize the state
when we go beyond obedience to the state, and place our trust in the state for those
things that only God can provide.
The state as a possible agent of God is not ruled out by Scripture, but has support
in so far as rulers and nation can be vehicles of God’s working and self-revelation.
The major prophets bring the judgment of God to Israel, who uses rulers and whole
nations and empires as agents of his action.123 An example is Assyria, the tool of
God’s judgment against Jerusalem (see Isaiah 10:5–10). Another from Jeremiah is
where King Nebuchadnezzar of Babylon is raised up by God to bring punishment on
120. Bernd Wannenwetsch, Political Worship: Ethics for Christian Citizens, trans. Margaret Kohl (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2004), 266.
121. Richard Liong-Seng Phua, Idolatry and Authority: A Study of 1 Corinthians 8.1–11.1 in the Light of the
Jewish Diaspora, Library of New Testament Studies (London: T&T Clark, 2005), 33.
122. Martin Luther, “Lectures on Zephaniah,” in Luther’s Works, Volume 18: Lectures on the Lectures on
Minor Prophets I: Hosea, Joel, Amos, Obadiah, Jonah, Micah, Nahum, Zephaniah, Haggai, Malachi, ed. Hilton C.
Oswald, trans. Richard J. Dinda (Saint Louis: Concordia, 1975), 323–325.
123. See Michael Walzer, In God’s Shadow: Politics in the Hebrew Bible (New Haven: Yale University Press,
2012), 93.
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Israel (Jeremiah 25:1–11).124 But God not only uses rulers as agents of judgment and
correction; God raises and anoints rulers for positions of liberation and the enactment
of justice. God used the prophet Samuel to anoint King Saul to bring God’s deliverance
of his people from the Philistines (1 Samuel 9:15–17).
Scripture and the Political Imagination
Method
Scripture has already been used above, and it is cited throughout the following
chapters. One reason for the use of Scripture here is that, by contrast, Milbank
and Cavanaugh do not use it very often in their political theology (the reasons for
this are discussed below on page 175). This contrast will illuminate the question of
how Milbank and Cavanaugh can be doing political theology, when one of the key
sources for theology is largely absent. While it is widely acknowledged that the bible
does not prescribe a political system, it has played an influential rôle in the church’s
traditions of reflection on political matters, and in pre-modern times it was a, if not
the, primary source in forming the Christian political imagination. That the Bible has
been a constant source of inspiration to theologians and ethicists on political matters
means that they have, in every generation, found ways to relate Scripture to their own
situation. This tradition of biblical political theology remains an important but, in
contemporary times, underrated source for political theology.
While it has always been an important source in Christian political thought, the
application of Scripture to modern politics raises many problems. To Christian ethicist
Allen Verhey, these problems include the silence of Scripture on modern questions,
the strangeness of Scripture, its diversity, its being difficult to understand, and the
abuse of Scripture in politics.125 These problems are real, but they need not be fatal
to the use of Scripture in political theology. The approach taken here is alert to these
difficulties, believing that they can be overcome by adopting a method influenced by
‘biblical realism’ and which follows the plain sense of Scripture.
According to John Howard Yoder, it was the Dutch Reformed missionary Hendrik
Kraemer who invented the term biblical realism. For Yoder this method says: ‘ “To the
extent we can, we seek to understand the Bible in its own terms, to think the way
the Bible thinks, to use its thought patterns rather than our modern thought patterns,
to ask what questions the Bible is asking, so that we will hear the Bible’s answers as
answers to the right questions, rather than taking our modern questions straight to
124. Brueggemann, in commentating on this passage in Jeremiah makes the point that this illustrates the
claim that ‘God governs gentile history as well as Israelite history (cf. Amos 9:7).’ Walter Brueggemann,
To Pluck Up, To Tear Down: A Commentary on the Book of Jeremiah 1–25, International Theological
Commentary (Grand Rapids; Edinburgh: Eerdmans; Handsel Press, 1988), 213.
125. Allen Verhey, Remembering Jesus: Christian Community, Scripture, and the Moral Life (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 2002), 334–336.
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the Bible.” ’126 Some of the advantages of biblical realism were stated by John Howard
Yoder in this fashion:
One of the strengths of this position is that it opens one’s mind to take
seriously the elements that have been forgotten over the centuries, such as
the place of the demonic in the biblical view of society. It enables people to
be open to the possibility that the Bible might think with a different logic
than we think with and not necessarily be usable for the kinds of proof our
apologetics, for instance, use. This school of thought arose by refusing to
take sides between modern fundamentalism and liberalism.127
Yoder was likely to have been influenced into adopting this approach by Karl
Barth, his teacher at Basel, and Barth’s other followers. For Yoder, biblical realism
provides a middle way between ‘fundamentalism and liberalism’, both of which
Yoder rejects. These polarized positions may also be described as the ‘Literalism
and Expressivism’ which Barth’s ‘hermeneutical realism’ finds a way between.128 For
Barth, historical criticism was mere prolegomenon for real biblical interpretation. In
the preface to his Römerbrief, Barth complained that commentators only established
and reiterated the text. For Barth, an example of someone following a better approach
is Calvin, who wrestled with texts,
till the walls which separate the sixteenth century from the first become
transparent! Paul speaks, and the man of the sixteenth century hears. The
conversation between the original record and the reader moves round the
subject-matter, until a distinction between yesterday and to-day becomes
impossible.’129
In Barth’s view, the Bible is as real today as ever and speaks directly to our times,
whenever we live. The main advantages of biblical realism is that it adopts the
position that the truth of the Bible does not rest on external validation, and also that
we inhabit a world which is made understandable by use of the Bible.
This biblical realism is supplemented by use of the plain sense of Scripture, or
what Yoder would call the ‘straightforwardness’ of the text, a position he recognizes
in George Lindbeck.130 The plain sense, or literal sense (sensus literalis) of Scripture
126. John Howard Yoder, Christian Attitudes to War, Peace, and Revolution, ed. Theodore J. Koontz and
Andy Alexis-Baker (Grand Rapids: Brazos Press, 2009), 311.
127. John Howard Yoder, Preface to Theology: Christology and Theological Method (Grand Rapids: Brazos
Press, 2007), 390.
128. George Hunsinger, “Beyond Literalism and Expressivism: Karl Barth’s Hermeneutical Realism,”
Modern Theology 3, no. 3 (1987): 209.
129. Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, 6th ed., trans. Edwyn C. Hoskyns (London: Oxford University
Press, 1968), 7. Ellul, another follower of biblical realism, made similar remarks about commentators in
Reason for Being: A Meditation on Ecclesiastes (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990), 12. Also see Ronald R. Ray,
“Jacques Ellul’s Innocent Notes on Hermeneutics,” Interpretation 33, no. 3 (1979): 268–282.
130. John Howard Yoder, “Validation by Induction,” in To Hear the Word, 2nd ed., with a foreword by
Michael J. Gorman (Eugene: Cascade Books, 2010), 146–147.
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follows the meaning normally accepted by the community of faith. One benefit of the
plain sense is that the text remains accessible to all. This is critical for it to be able to
form a people’s political imagination, through the established channels of Christian
formation, initiation, confirmation, proclamation, and education.
The Yale theologian Hans Frei, an advocate of the plain sense, saw in traditionally
realistic readings three modes of unity. First, that the biblical story was to be read
literally as it referred to real historical circumstances. Second, there is a unity of
narrative across both Old and New Testaments. Third, this narrative encompasses all
times and places, embracing ‘the experience of any present age and reader.’131 With
regards to Frei’s first point, this perspective does not limit the meaning of bible stories
and events just to history, but instead acknowledges that there is a meaning in these
events which can reveal something about God’s relationship to humanity. In valuing
the narrative unity of the Biblical story of creation, preservation, and redemption,
the following chapters draw almost evenly from both the Old and New Testaments.
This is for the reason that both Testaments are part of a grand biblical narrative story
that begins in Genesis and concludes in Revelation and in the process demonstrates
the movement from creation to preservation for redemption. Throughout this story,
there is no simple political message. It cannot, at the risk of sacralizing the state,
be reduced to simple obedience to the state based on Romans 13. Nor can Scripture
simply be deployed for an anarchist ethic of resistance to the state (based on verses
like Acts 5:29). Scripture is diverse, and this diversity bears on the importance given
to all texts typically used in political theology. Also to be noted are references to the
Apocryphal books, which played an important rôle in the formation of the Christian
political tradition before the Reformation. On Frei’s third point, Lindbeck writes in a
similar fashion that ‘A scriptural world is thus able to absorb the universe.’132 This
universality of the biblical story makes the biblical revelation pertain to all aspects of
politics including contemporary reflections on the state.
The value of narrative to Christian theology is an emphasis of the Yale School, in
particular the work of Lindbeck. He writes: ‘To become a Christian involves learning
the story of Israel and of Jesus well enough to interpret and experience oneself and
one’s world in its terms.’133 The important corollary of this view is that learning to
be a Christian helps one to see other stories as non-Christian, especially those offering
idols in the place of God.
131. Hans W. Frei, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative: A Study in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century
Hermeneutics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), 2–3.
132. George A. Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age, 25th
Anniversary edition (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2009), 103.
133. Ibid., 20.
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The Use of Scripture in the Formation of the Political Imagination
The purpose of using Scripture here is to nourish a Christian political imagination,
which sees the political teachings of Scripture as relevant for contemporary political
theology. This relevance derives from the notion of continuity between the biblical
world and ours. Using Scripture as a resource for reimagining our political options
draws heavily on Walter Brueggemann’s corpus.134 Brueggemann defines the imagi-
nation as ‘the capacity to entertain images of meaning and reality that are out beyond
the evident givens of the observable experience.’135 One’s political imagination can
also be described using Brueggemann’s notion of a ‘script’, something which everyone
adopts in their own way or understanding reality and their place within it. This script
is analogous to the imagination of Cavanaugh and the mythos of Milbank (discussed
in more detail in Chapter 3). All three notions are similar in that they describe ways
in which we form commitments and allegiances, and think about the rôle of the state
in society. While the dominant script in modernity has had the state and the global
market in increasingly dominant rôles, Brueggemann believes that Scripture offers an
alternative script to that of modern secular society.136 Following Brueggemann’s lead,
Scriptures have been selected and used here at points where they pose questions about
the modern state.
The similarities between Milbank and Cavanaugh and Brueggemann can only be
taken so far. Lisa P. Stephenson has written on the similarities between the work of
Brueggemann and Cavanaugh, but the following draws on the differences between
them.137 The main similarity is in their use of the term ‘imagination’. In Brueggemann
this is his notion of the ‘prophetic imagination’, in Cavanaugh it is his notion of the
‘theopolitical imagination’. While both wish to counterpoise the political imagination
of the state with a Christian political imagination, there is only a superficial similarity
between them. Brueggemann’s political imagination is not simply political, but
scriptural, even ‘evangelical’.138 Conversely, Cavanaugh’s theopolitical imagination
is liturgical or, more specifically, Eucharistical. While Cavanaugh opposes the politics
of the state with the politics of the church, Brueggemann opposes the totalizing claims
of the state, leaving room for a state which knows its place under God, and leaves the
church free to imagine a better state.
134. Brueggemann’s main writings on the imagination are The Prophetic Imagination (Philadelphia:
Fortress Press, 1978), and Texts Under Negotiation: The Bible and Postmodern Imagination (Minneapolis:
Fortress Press, 1993). Others can be found in the bibliography.
135. Walter Brueggemann, “Biblical Authority: A Personal Reflection,” in The Book That Breathes New Life:
Scriptural Authority and Biblical Theology, ed. Patrick D. Miller (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2005), 28.
136. Walter Brueggemann, “Counterscript: Living with the Elusive God,” Christian Century 122, no. 24
(2005): 22–28.
137. See Lisa P. Stephenson, “Prophetically Political, Politically Prophetic: William Cavanaugh’s
“Theopolitical Imagination” as an Example of Walter Brueggemann’s “Prophetic Imagination”,” Journal
of Church and State 53, no. 4 (July 2011): 567–586.
138. Brueggemann, Texts Under Negotiation, 26–56.
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How have these perspectives on Scripture informed and shaped the use of the
Bible in the following argument? In pursuing a political imagination that judges
the state to be neither sacred nor profane, the emphasis has been put on the actual
use made of the Bible by theologians reflecting on Scriptures in developing political
theologies. This is partly to show that a traditional return to patristic and confessional
sources, as they are envisioned within Radical Orthodoxy, can challenge existing
political philosophies and theologies. For this reason, much use is made of other
theologians’ use of Scripture and the debates between them, as these show what is
at stake in political readings of Scripture.
Scripture here is used in two main ways: to illustrate doctrines and theological
points made, and to offer texts that can build a renewed political imagination. The
illustrative approach is used when outlining the doctrines that frame the thesis’s
central three chapters.139 This method largely follows the use of texts in systematic
presentations of doctrines as found in the work of theologians and confessional
summaries of the theological positions of Christian communities. Second, and more
importantly, the application of Scripture to contemporary politics depends on an
analogical use of texts. Since, as the above section on the concept of the state shows,
there is no modern ‘state’ in the Bible, the use of Scripture in contemporary political
theology faces the problem of relating Scripture to our contemporary situation.140 One
solution to this problem is to adopt an analogical approach of applying these texts
to our modern situation.141 The history of the interpretation of ‘political’ Scriptures
shows that this method has always informed Christian political theology. A classic
case would be commentary on Matthew 22:21 (‘Render therefore unto Caesar the
things which are Caesar’s; and unto God the things that are God’s.’ KJV), which has
spoken to Christian communities long after the demise of Caesars. The traditional
use of analogical application have permitted texts which speak of ‘Caesar’, ‘ruler’ and
the ‘city’ to be taken as speaking to forms of political rule, up to and including the
modern state. In using the Bible to make sense of our political reality, Hauerwas’s
suggestion is instructive: ‘The Bible does not so much provide a morality as it is the
source of images and analogies that help us understand and interpret the nature of our
existence.’142 In offering such analogical biblical reflections, the argument that follows
promotes the notion of a biblically-informed political imagination over sacralized
139. This method is common in systematic theology and among Christian ethics, as, for example in
Reinhold Niebuhr. See Jeffrey S. Siker, Scripture and Ethics: Twentieth-Century Portraits (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1997), 15–16.
140. I. Howard Marshall, “Using the Bible in Ethics,” in Essays in Evangelical Social Ethics, ed. David F.
Wright (Wilton: Morehouse-Barlow, 1981), 40–41; Richard Bauckham, The Bible in Politics: How to Read the
Bible Politically, 2nd ed. (London: SPCK, 2010), 3–19.
141. A defence of this method can be found in Charles H. Cosgrove, Appealing to Scripture in Moral Debate:
Five Hermeneutical Rules (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), 51–89.
142. Stanley Hauerwas, “The Moral Authority of Scripture: The Politics and Ethics of Remembering,” in
A Community of Character: Toward a Constructive Christian Social Ethic (Notre Dame: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1981), 59.
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politics or the politics of profanity. The notion of political imagination is one that
Milbank and, especially, Cavanaugh would recognize. But here the emphasis lies with
Scripture providing nourishment for the political imagination, instead of the political
imagination Milbank and Cavanaugh find in sacraments and liturgy.
However much the appeal to analogy solves the problem of application, it is useful
to think through how analogy works. Analogies have to be imagined; they are not
givens. Brueggemann, showing how the application of texts to our contemporary
situation have to be imagined, writes, ‘Interpretation is not the reiteration of the
text’, but rather, texts become ‘materials for imagination that pushed well beyond
what is given or intended even in the text.’143 As Brueggemann points out, this is
a traditional practice of the church, given the widespread recognition that ‘a cold
reiterative objectivity has no missional energy or moral force’.144 One example offered
by Brueggemann is Barth’s imagining that Romans 13 pertains to the obedience of
Christians in Communist Hungary.145
Throughout this work, there is no attempt to be original in the use of Scripture,
despite using it imaginatively. It is criticism of the use of Scripture that follows the
imagination that it may become gallus in campanili.146 Brueggemann is alert to the
dangers of individualist subjective interpretation, which, if not governed by authority,
can become ‘subjective, partisan, and ideological.’147 So, to get around this problem,
texts cited in the following pages usually follow broadly traditional uses, often from
sources within various traditions in a confessional sense. Other texts that have been
overlooked by traditional political theologians are used to broaden out the traditional
political theology ‘canon’, but typically follow the interpretations of theologians and
biblical scholars in order to illustrate the point that the state is to be considered as
neither sacred nor profane. Too often political theologians find a unity in Scripture
to support one view or the other. Embracing both views, we can see Scripture’s
ambivalence toward political authority, which denies any easy evaluation of the state
as sacred or profane.
143. Brueggemann, “Biblical Authority: A Personal Reflection,” 28.
144. Ibid., 28.
145. Ibid., 29. Brueggemann is probably referring here to Barth’s writings on Hungary in Against the
Stream: Shorter Post-War Writings, 1946–52, ed. Ronald Gregor Smith, trans. E. M. Delacour and Stanley
Godman (London: SCM Press, 1954).
146. Literally, ‘the weathercock in the churchtower’ which follows the theologian’s direction of mind.
See David H. Kelsey, The Uses of Scripture in Recent Theology (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975), 170.
147. Walter Brueggemann, Redescribing Reality: What We do when We Read the Bible (London: SCM Press,
2009), 25. While applauding the results of Ellul’s imaginative work on 2 Kings in Politics of God,
Brueggemann has concerns about the subjective methodology followed. See, Walter Brueggemann,
“Book Review: The Politics of God and the Politics of Man by Jacques Ellul,” Journal of Biblical Literature
92, no. 3 (1973): 470–471.
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The Use of Scripture in this Work
The individual texts used in the following chapters come from a broader range
than is usually found in political theology. While modern political theology may
claim that there is a political canon within Holy Scripture, this has not always
served the Christian political imagination well. If such a canon were limited to loci
classici of political theology (Romans 13; Matthew 22:21), one might limit Christian
political witness to a slavish ethic of obedience to the state, and constrain the political
imagination by a statist mythos. These texts have provided a guide to obedience, but
rarely to action. Taken alone, they limit the imagination and lack what Lindbeck
requires of a text to live by: ‘it must in some fashion be construable as a guide to
thought and action in the encounter with changing circumstances.’148 Furthermore,
by opening up a wider view on the potential political importance of Scripture, we
can rediscover marginal texts that may speak very effectively to our current politics
and provide fresh ways of imagining politics and the state. It may be that the dearth
of biblically-informed political theology is a product of the focus on the small canon
typically used in such work.
In the attempt to enlarge the theopolitical imagination, some Biblical citations are
used to illuminate certain points. These have been selected in line with traditional
uses of the texts, either from theologians or from confessional standards of the
churches. This approach demonstrates that the re-imagining of the theopolitical
vision of Christianity does not depend on rethinking, so much as rediscovery, of
texts and traditions that have already spoken to the church when considering the
civil authorities and its relationship to them. This approach could be criticized on
the basis of the hermeneutical principle that some texts carry more doctrinal weight
than others, with the implication that in the discussion of political matters there is
already a canon within the canon to guide these deliberations. In riposte, it may
be ventured that the discovery of this guiding canon would always be guided by
theological presuppositions which do not come from Scripture. But it must also be said
that there are many political traditions that draw on Scripture and use a range of texts.
The rediscovery of such texts and traditions remains a valid theological enterprise.
Chapter Outlines
The next chapter places Milbank and Cavanaugh in the historical and intellectual
context of the theological response to the rise of the state and its increasing intrusion
into family and other institutions of community life. It focuses on how the responses
to the rise of the state took two directions in the church; statist politicization, in which
churches sought to influence the state to solve social and moral problems, and, in
148. George A. Lindbeck, “Scripture, Consensus and Community,” in The Church in a Postliberal Age, ed.
James J. Buckley, Radical Traditions (London: SCM Press, 2002), 219.
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reaction against this statist politicization, a non-statist politicization in which many
theologians, including Milbank and Cavanaugh, politicized Christian thought and
practice so that the politics of the church was emphasized.
The subsequent three chapters use the doctrinal framework provided by the
doctrines of creation, preservation, and redemption to critically assess the political
theologies of Milbank and Cavanaugh. Each doctrine is examined through its biblical
and theological background for its political purchase. Then, using these biblical and
doctrinal resources as critical tools, the chapters examine how the concept relates to
Christian political thought. In the assessment of political programmes of states, use
of the doctrines of creation, preservation, and redemption help to reveal the actual
content of political idolatry, moving deeper than analysis of the formal elements of
religion into how political idolatry conflicts with faithful Christianity on a doctrinal
level.
Chapter 6, the final substantial chapter, advocates a positive theology of theolog-
ical engagement with the state. The freedom and sovereignty of God over the state
is foremost here, and it follows from this that both the church and the Christian are
free to relate to the state. Utilizing the thought of Jacques Ellul, this chapter will argue
that engagement with the state does not defile the Christian, and the state is not the
profane object some theologians make it out to be.
Chapter 7 offers conclusions to the whole work.
Chapter 2
The Sanctified State and the
Politicized Church
This chapter places John Milbank and William Cavanaugh within the context of twen-
tieth and twenty-first century political theology, providing contextual background for
the rest of the thesis in two ways. First, it will examine the rise and expansion of the
modern state since the late nineteenth century. In doing so, the chapter shows how
the rise of the state not only changed the political landscape, but became a matter for
theological debate, with some theologians and church bodies wishing that the state
would increase its powers to address serious social problems, while others reacted
against the increased scope of state activity. Second, it places Milbank and Cavanaugh
into the stream of politicized theology, which was a product of the reaction to this rise
of the state. The chapter shows how theology has been politicized in both statist and
anti-statist forms, with Milbank and Cavanaugh belonging to this latter category.
The chapter highlights that Milbank and Cavanaugh react against the statist
politicization of theology by politicizing theology in an anti-statist key, especially in
their politicized ecclesiology. While arguing against a profane state and its effects
on the church, they argue for a political church. This chapter proposes that with the
rise of the state in the twentieth century, society became more politicized in a statist
fashion, with the result that forms of thought, including theology, also became more
politicized. While some theology became more statist, there was also a reaction against
the state in non-statist political theology, including that of Milbank and Cavanaugh,
as well as others within Radical Orthodoxy.
The accounts Milbank and Cavanaugh give to the origins and rise of the modern
state are saved for the next chapter, so here the purpose is to locate their concerns in
theological debates over the rise of the state, and place them in various traditions
of thought which shared this concern, such as political pluralism. This chapter
has three main sections. The first considers how the rise of the state contributed
to the politicization of society. The second section considers the politicization of
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theology, especially in a statist direction. The third and final section considers how the
theological movement of Radical Orthodoxy reacted against this statist politicization,
and developed a non-statist political theology.
The Rise of Politicization
What is meant by ‘politicization’, and how does it come about? This section
introduces this concept and its statist and non-statist forms. ‘Politicization’ simply
means ‘becoming more political’ or ‘having become more political’.1 This is a
suitable definition of the noun, since it only means an increase in politics. Up to
a certain point, politicization of a society can be useful in raising people’s political
consciousness, but beyond a certain point politicization crosses a line and creates
a politicized phenomenon (it should be noted that when the term ‘politicization’ is
used below it will usually mean making something more political to the point where
something is politicized). ‘Politicized’, the concept’s adjectival form, means having
made something political to the point where politics becomes the predominant frame
of reference to the exclusion of other ways of regarding something.2 The main concern
of this chapter is with the politicization of theology until theology is politicized along
either statist or non-statist lines.
Before dealing with the politicization of theology, this statist/non-statist di-
chotomy needs to be examined. The above definition shifts the work of defining the
terms ‘politicization’ and ‘politicized’ back onto the definition of ‘politics’. As seen in
the previous chapter there are statist and non-statist definitions of politics. For R. M.
Hartwell politicization ‘takes the manifest form of increasing power of the state’.3 To
link politicization with increased state powers in this way demands a definition of
‘politics’ as having to do with the state.4 But, since the definition of ‘politics’ differs
from the definition of ‘state’, as discussed in Chapter 1, politicization here need not
mean the same as intensified ‘statism’. By adopting a definition of the ‘political’ which
the state and non-state actors, politicization can take statist and non-statist forms.
Politicization does not simply take these two forms independently. Creeping statist
politicization has engendered non-statist politicization as a reaction among those who
believe that the state that has extended its scope too far. This is because those who
resist statist politicization have wanted to find a way in which one can be political but
remain non-statist. If they cannot, ‘politics’ can have no place in their thought. This is
1. Thomas Halper and Richard Hartwig, “Politics and Politicization: An Exercise in Definitional Bridge-
Building,” Political Studies 23, no. 1 (1975): 77.
2. This definition owes much to the discussion of politicization in James Davison Hunter, To Change
the World: The Irony, Tragedy, and Possibility of Christianity in the Late Modern World (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2010).
3. R. M. Hartwell, “Introduction,” in The Politicization of Society, ed. Kenneth S. Templeton Jr.
(Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1979), 15.
4. For Ellul, who sees politics as being to do with the state, ‘politicization’ is also to do with the rise of
the state. Ellul, Political Illusion, 9.
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where the difference between ‘politics’ and the ‘state’ makes the largest difference:
in being able to argue that one can be political outside of the state. Non-statist
politicization, therefore, will refer to making something more political in the terms
of non-state human societies (including the church), recognizing the importance of
these non-state actors in how society is governed alongside, or in opposition to, the
state. Whether politicization is seen in a positive or negative light, will then depend
on what one’s definition of ‘politics’ is, and how one views politics. Those who define
politics as something to do with the state, and also hold a negative view of the state,
will view politicization in a negative light.
‘Politicization’ can be defined with reference to individuals or to societies.5 It can
also be applied to the church and its theology, resulting in ‘politicized theology’, which
can take both statist and non-statist forms. But where in theology does the line get
crossed between a proper interest in politics and politicized theology? A criterion for
this was given by Cardinal Ratzinger in his criticism of liberation theology. In this
theological movement he found, ‘A radical politicization of faith’s affirmations and
of theological judgments’, which he thought followed from its conception of ‘class
struggle as the fundamental law of history’. For Ratzinger, this had the following
effects:
The question no longer has to do with simply drawing attention to the
consequences and political implications of the truths of faith, which are
respected beforehand for their transcendent value. In this new system,
every affirmation of faith or of theology is subordinated to a political
criterion, which in turn depends on the class struggle, the driving force
of history.6
While Ratzinger was writing here about the importance of the ‘class struggle’ to
Marxist-influenced liberation theology, it would be possible to place other political
philosophies, such as democracy or pluralism, at the core of the politicization of
theology. But for purposes of clarifying the meaning of ‘politicization’, Ratzinger
usefully points to where the line is crossed between the proper recognition of the
political implications of faith and where theology is subordinated to political concerns.
This would take the form of making politics the start and end point of theological
reflection and to elevate the ‘political’ meaning of Christian doctrines and practices
over other theological values.
Having now defined ‘politicization’ and how the politicization of theology occurs,
the main concern of the remainder of this section is with the notion that the rise of
5. Halper and Hartwig, “Politics and Politicization.”
6. Joseph Ratzinger, “Instruction on Certain Aspects of the “Theology of Liberation”,” Sacred
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Vatican, August 6, 1984, <http://www.vatican.va/roman_
curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19840806_theology-liberation_en.
html> (accessed April 21, 2013), IX.6.
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the modern state encouraged the development of a statist form of politicization in
the churches, and, in reaction to that, indirectly to non-statist forms of politicization.
This latter form has taken a forthright form in the writings of Radical Orthodox
theologians, including Milbank and Cavanaugh.
The theological understanding of the modern state is a key topic in Christian
political thought and one that was never far from the minds of theologians in the
twentieth century. Theologians gave special attention to the state in the period from
the late 1800s to early 1900s because of its expansion into realms which it had never
touched before (with this tendency later reaching extreme proportions in Fascism and
Soviet Communism). The many accounts that have been given for this rise need not
be examined in detail here, as they are secondary to the primary interest in the effects
this rise has had on the political imagination of churches and theologians.
The following section prepares the way for the opposition of Radical Orthodoxy’s
rejection of politics as statecraft. From the widespread acceptance of laissez-faire to the
acceptance of increased state intervention into all aspects of life, this section covers
how these material changes also affected the churches’ theopolitical imaginary to
accept and, indeed, demand greater state involvement in society.
The Rise of the State and the End of Laissez-Faire
The nineteenth century has been described as the ‘Age of Individualism’ or an era
of laissez-faire.7 During this period, the state’s rôle was considered to be limited
to defending individual property rights and the nation. State intervention into the
economy and matters of social policy were ruled out by the doctrines of the classical
economists (Smith, Ricardo, and Malthus) and John Stuart Mill’s maxim that ‘Laisser-
faire, in short, should be the general practice: every departure from it, unless required
by some great good, is a certain evil.’8 The conventional historiography of the period
suggests that there was a reaction against this position from about 1870 onward.9
A. V. Dicey offered a now famous account of the changes in the nineteenth century
that paved the way for greater state intervention:
Somewhere between 1868 and 1900 three changes took place which brought
into prominence the authoritative side of Benthamite liberalism. Faith
in laissez faire suffered an eclipse; hence the principle of utility became
an argument in favour, not of individual freedom, but of the absolutism
7. See Edward Shillito, Christian Citizenship: The Story and Meaning of C.O.P.E.C. (London: Longmans,
Green and Co. 1925), 2–3; John Maynard Keynes, The End of Laissez-Faire (London: Hogarth Press, 1926),
5.
8. John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy, with Some of Their Applications to Social Philosophy, ed.
J. M. Robson, with an introduction by V. W. Bladen, vol. III, Collected Works of John Stuart Mill (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1965), 945.
9. See Arthur J. Taylor, Laissez-faire and State Intervention in Nineteenth-century Britain (London:
Macmillan, 1972), 50–52.
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of the State. Parliament under the progress of democracy became the
representative, not of the middle classes, but of the whole body of house-
holders; parliamentary sovereignty, therefore, came to mean, in the last
resort, the unrestricted power of the wage-earners. English administrative
mechanism was reformed and strengthened. The machinery was thus
provided for the practical extension of the activity of the State; but, in
accordance with the profound Spanish proverb, “the more there is of
the more the less there is of the less,” the greater the intervention of the
Government the less becomes the freedom of each individual citizen.10
While there is a debate among historians about the conventional account, the
history of these changes is not as important to this argument as the generally held
view that by the beginning of the twentieth century the age of laissez-faire was drawing
to a close.11 John Maynard Keynes, in commenting on the demise of laissez-faire,
observed: ‘We do not dance even yet to a new tune. But a change is in the air.’12 This
sentiment was also felt within the churches. In 1909, the American Baptist minister
and social reformer Samuel Zane Batten noted, ‘That great changes are imminent in
our modern world, that a new age is struggling to the birth, that a new order of society
is impending, that political institutions are still evolving, and that the State must
assume some new functions, the signs of the times indicate and the most discerning
men believe.’13 In Scotland, the United Free Church’s Committee on Social Problems
(1917) more soberly stated: ‘In the immediate future there will be, in connection with
many of the social problems which are before the Church and the nation, a great
increase of state and municipal action . . . The war has revealed not only our want
of organisation as a nation, but has shown the possibility as well as the effectiveness
of government action in many directions.’14 By the early twentieth century, laissez-faire
was finished and a new era was winning acceptance. One feature of this new era was
growing acceptance of a new rôle for the state.
The Statist Politicization of the Churches
Churches were not slow to take advantage of these changing conditions in their
activism on social issues, which took an increasingly statist turn. An indicator of this
is how moral issues became not just political issues, but issues involving the state and
its legislative powers.
10. A. V. Dicey, Lectures on the Relation Between Law & Public Opinion in England During the Nineteenth
Century, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1914), 301.
11. See Taylor, Laissez-faire and State Intervention, 13–14.
12. Keynes, The End of Laissez-Faire, 5.
13. Samuel Zane Batten, The Christian State: The State, Democracy and Christianity (The Griffith &
Rowland Press, 1909), 14.
14. United Free Church of Scotland, “Report of Committee on Social Problems,” in Reports to the General
Assembly of the United Free Church of Scotland (Edinburgh: United Free Church of Scotland, 1917), 2.
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On both sides of the Atlantic, the problem of alcohol and drunkenness showed
how times were changing. The Church of Scotland Commission on the [Great] War
urged greater moral education through the parish system, but increasingly recognised
that more than this was required. On the alcohol question, the church wrote: ‘The
Church of Scotland set itself a valuable precedent in its handling of the question
of Intemperance, in connection with which it has not only promoted an energetic
campaign in our own congregations, but has elaborated a policy for dealing with the
traffic, known as the Threefold Option’.15 In promoting the Threefold Option, the
Church recognised that moral education amongst its own flock would not be enough
to curtail the perceived and real evils of alcohol. The Church ‘has to remember that the
work it has taken in hand will only be exhaustively dealt with when it persuades the
State to co-operate by means of its special resources and machinery.’16 The Church’s
success with proposing a policy on alcohol led them to ponder ‘if there are not equally
strong reasons why the Church should give its mind in the same way to many kindred
questions.’17 In the United States, Amendment XVIII of the United States Constitution
introduced prohibition. The churches played an important rôle in this development,
initially by preaching and making pronouncements in favour of prohibition, with
Lyman Beecher’s sermons credited with playing a decisive rôle in awakening the
American churches to the need for prohibition.18 Eventually, however, the church
shifted toward playing a lobbying rôle, with the first major religious lobby being
established in Washington D.C. by Methodists lobbying for prohibition.19
These instances of alcohol regulation provide examples where moral problems (in
this case, drunkenness) were considered by the church to require legislative attention.
Not content to maintain moral standards of whatever position within their own ranks,
many churches saw the law as their ally in ensuring that the moral standards of society
cohere with their beliefs.20 When the church held a more dominant position in society
and in the lives of their parishioners, their own moral teachings could be more easily
upheld through church teaching and discipline, but with increasing secularization
and pluralism this approach broke down. Coming to reflect the culture around them,
Christians began to share a range of moral positions with others in society, and often
looked to the state to enforce what they thought was right. Such growing religious
and moral pluralism encourages the statist politicization of morality when the state,
15. W. P. Paterson, “Introduction: The Ethical Mission of the Church,” The Church of Scotland
Commission on the War, in Social Evils and Problems, ed. W. P. Paterson and David Watson (Edinburgh
and London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1918), 29.
16. Ibid., 29.
17. Ibid., 29. These questions included impurity, gambling, and crime.
18. Ernest H. Cherrington, The Evolution of Prohibition in the United States of America (Westerville:
American Issue Press, 1920), 73–74.
19. Allen D. Hertzke, Representing God in Washington: The Role of Religious Lobbies in the American Polity
(Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1988), 28.
20. See, for example, John Lee Eighmy, Churches in Cultural Captivity: A History of the Social Attitudes of
Southern Baptists (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1987), 48.
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rather than a shared moral consensus, is seen as the arbiter of public morals and solver
of moral questions.21 Here, the statist political imaginary holds the position that the
problems posed by moral pluralism can be finally settled in state law because the state
has the power of both legislating and enforcing law in a wide scope of areas.
Further evidence for statist politicization in the church is seen in the growth of the
number of agencies that are devoted to this work of state-directed social change.22 In
Washington D.C., the first major religious lobbyists were by Methodists, but the first
registered lobby there were the Quakers in 1943.23 From these humble beginnings,
the number of faith-based lobbies now stands at over 200, with combined annual
expenditures estimated at more than $350 million.24 While these figures show rapid
growth, the more dramatic changes occurred within forms of Christianity where
political action was traditionally shunned, before being adopted and promoted. Jerry
Falwell provides a paradigmatic case of this. Originally opposing the mixing of faith
and political action (as he saw happening in civil rights activism), he become a leading
political figure through his Moral Majority, arguably transforming the relationship
between American Christianity and politics in the latter half of the twentieth century.25
Another manifestation of statist politicization in the church is seen in how social
change is imagined to occur, with states increasingly seen as the movers of history
and the agents of change. This social imaginary infiltrated the church with few being
able to do public theology about society without using statist terms.26 One way this
is seen is in the development and ongoing practice of ‘politics as statecraft,’ which is
the understanding of politics dominated by the state. To this way of thinking, because
it is the state that designs and implements change, and gets things done, it is justified
and even prudent to focus on the state as the agent of political change, and make
it the target of political action.27 Throughout the twentieth century, this manifested
21. Peter L. Berger, “From the Crisis of Religion to the Crisis of Secularity,” in Religion and America:
Spiritual Life in a Secular Age, ed. Mary Douglas and Steven M. Tipton (Boston: Beacon Press, 1983), 18.
22. In the USA lobby groups in Washington D.C. have grown in number enormously, see Allen D.
Hertzke, “Lobbying for the Faithful: Religious Advocacy Groups in Washington, D.C.” Pew Forum on
Religion & Public Life, 2011, <http://www.pewforum.org/uploadedFiles/Topics/Issues/Government/
ReligiousAdvocacy_web.pdf> (accessed April 23, 2013). The United Kingdom also saw great growth in
the number of Christian groups involved in politics in the twentieth century, see Francis P. McHugh,
British Churches and Public Policy: Directory of Christian Social Study/Action Groups (Runcorn: C.I.P.A.S.
1982), viii–xi. Church lobbies, such as the World Council of Churches and the Conference of European
Churches are also active in the United Nations and European Union. But it should also be mentioned
that in addition to group involvement, individual Christians may also be motivated by their faith to be
involved in secular political groups, see Kenneth Medhurst and George Moyser, Church and Politics in a
Secular Age (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 363.
23. Hertzke, Representing God in Washington, 28–29.
24. Hertzke, “Lobbying for the Faithful.”
25. Susan Friend Harding, The Book of Jerry Falwell: Fundamentalist Language and Politics (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2000), 20–23.
26. This feature of academic public theology is observed in Willem Fourie, “Can Public Theology Be
Practised beyond the State?” International Journal of Public Theology 6, no. 3 (2012): 296–298.
27. Yoder thinks the church must move beyond this state-centered understanding of political change
in John Howard Yoder, “Christ, the Hope of the World,” in The Original Revolution: Essays on Christian
Pacifism (Scottdale: Herald Press, 2003), 162–163, 171.
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itself in the church trying to direct or influence the state, as seen in the growth of
church lobbies. We can categorize this mode of relation to the state into two categories:
the defensive mode and the assertive mode. In the defensive mode, individuals and
groups seek to defend their interests against the intrusion of the state. This has been
a factor in the growth of state-directed pressure groups in Great Britain.28 In the
USA, Allen D. Hertzke also notes that during the draft mobilization in World War
II, the peace churches created a presence in Washington D.C. in order to defend their
members’ conscientious objector status.29 In the assertive mode, on the other hand,
individuals and groups in society demand services and laws from the state to further
their interests.
The state’s growth was partly in response to such demands of voters and lobbyists
for new laws and rights. When combined with the means of the enforcing these laws,
the state justified the attention of those who sought to change society through the state.
It is no surprise, therefore, that political contention has increasingly concentrated on
the state, as it has the power to legislate and enforce laws on an entire people. The
changing nature of contention has driven many people to seek solutions to problems
in the courts and in legislation, rather than through other means.30 An example of this
comes from the USA. Harold E. Quinley writes that during the 1960s church activists
in struggles for civil rights commonly used tactics of direct action against private
and public authorities. He notes that by the mid-1970s such tactics had given way
to ‘renewed emphasis on the use of the electoral process as a means to bring about
political change.’31 These examples demonstrate that, with the rise of the state, the
western political imagination became increasingly statist.
Concern with the Increasing Reach of the State
With widespread acceptance of more state involvement in society, and with encour-
agement from churches and other agencies, the state expanded in size, strength and
scope. With its ever-expanding bureaucratic reach, the state has become involved in
every part of life. This was a complaint of French socialist Pierre-Joseph Proudhon in
his well-known jeremiad about the intrusion and brutality of the state: ‘To be GOV-
ERNED is to be at every operation, at every transaction, noted, registered, enrolled,
taxed, stamped, measured, numbered, assessed, licensed, authorized, admonished,
forbidden, reformed, corrected, punished.’32 But even Proudhon, as cynical about
28. David Marsh, “Introduction: Interest Groups in Britain – Their Access and Power,” in Pressure
Politics: Interest Groups in Britain (London: Junction Books, 1983), 7.
29. Hertzke, Representing God in Washington, 29.
30. Lawrence M. Friedman, American Law in the 20th Century (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002),
568–569.
31. Harold E. Quinley, The Prophetic Clergy: Social Activism Among Protestant Ministers (New York: Wiley-
Interscience, 1974), 7.
32. Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, General Idea of the Revolution in the Nineteenth Century, trans. John Beverley
Robinson (London: Freedom Press, 1923), 294.
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the state as he was, would be dumbfounded by the massive expansion of the state
since he penned these words in 1851. A century later, Cyril Garbett, Archbishop
of York, expressed similar sentiments about ‘The Great Leviathan’: ‘Year by year it
increases its power and enters into fields until recently occupied by private enterprise
and individual effort.’33 He noted that the state expanded greatly during World War
Two, and laments that the state’s bureaucracy, ‘through a vast army of civil servants
and by a never ending spate of orders and regulations, now casts like a gigantic
octopus its acquisitive tentacles into every nook and cranny of industrial, agricultural,
educational, and even domestic life.’34 Clearly things had changed since the laissez-
faire of the nineteenth century.
The increase in the scope of the state can be seen in studies of specific phenomena
under the control of the state. The state now takes a greater proportion of GDP than in
the nineteenth century, making it much more important in terms of taxation, and even
as a large employer.35 The legislative and regulative output of legislators has risen,
with many fields of law proliferating in the twentieth-century.36
While politicians argue over public policies that will change the scope of the state,
there is no real attempt to dramatically reduce its size.37 But the statist nature of our
political imaginary runs much deeper than this. The state has for a long time been
thought of as the root of all our solutions and problems.38 In other words, the rise of
the state has had the effect of colonizing our lives and political imaginations to such a
degree that politics is typically cast in statist terms.
Yet, while the state is undoubtedly important to modern life, some might object
that it has been replaced by the market as the primary organiser of society. Susan
Strange writes that, while the state still intrudes into daily life, raising scepticism
about its declining power, it is the quality and not the quantity of that authority that
has declined in recent years; but it is declining nonetheless.39 In their book, Empire,
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri argue that the sovereignty of nation-states has been
undermined by capital, and that transnational corporations have not so much replaced
the sovereignty of states, as incorporated them into their economic systems.40 But
33. Cyril Garbett, Church and State in England (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1950), 100.
34. Ibid., 101.
35. Vito Tanzi and Ludger Schuknecht, Public Spending in the 20th Century: A Global Perspective
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 3–22.
36. For commentary on the American situation see Friedman, American Law in the 20th Century, 568–591.
37. Even an enemy of ‘big government’ like Margaret Thatcher oversaw a growth in the state and its
power. See Phillip Blond, Red Tory: How the Left and Right Have Broken Britain and How We Can Fix It
(London: Faber and Faber, 2010), 122, 125. Cavanaugh notes the same trend under Reagan in “Killing
for the Telephone Company: Why the Nation-State is Not the Keeper of the Common Good,” Modern
Theology 20, no. 2 (2004): 257. Also see Tanzi and Schuknecht, Public Spending in the 20th Century, 18–20.
38. See Ruth Kenyon, “The Scope and Limits of State Initiative,” in Prospect for Christendom: Essays in
Catholic Social Reconstruction, ed. Maurice B. Reckitt (London: Faber and Faber, 1945), 189.
39. Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996), xii.
40. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), 306–309,
325–328.
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to those with opposing views, things are not so simple. Linda Weiss, for example,
believes that the state is more resilient than the globalists do, finding many of their
arguments weak.41
The Growth of the State and the Decline of the Church and Civil Society
The concern about the growth of state power and its reach, not only into our lives,
but also our hearts and minds, is one that Milbank and Cavanaugh share with many
of their predecessors in theology. From Pope Leo XIII onward, a large part of this
concern has been how the growth of the modern state affects the rôle of other bodies
that occupy the civil and social space.
Milbank and Cavanaugh agree that the rise of the state saw other social bodies
decline. For Milbank, intermediate bodies (those sitting between the individual and
the state) suffered ‘reduced autonomy, or else total expiration.’42 Cavanaugh offers the
opinion that, as the state rose in importance, it harmed civil society and undermined
the basis of any associations other than the state.43 Milbank and Cavanaugh share
the view that the social conflict which the rise of the state created was not a conflict
between the individual and the state, but between the association and the state.44
This is because the modern state, bound together in a social contract, is created from
individuals, and must draw out individuals from the associations of civil society so
that they depend on the state alone. By increasing its scope and penetrating into the
spheres of associations, the state does harm in two ways. First, it takes over their
functions, absorbing them into the state. Second, it makes the associations dependent
on the state, removing their independence. By flattening society in this way, the state
makes all individuals and associations directly dependent on the state.
But Milbank and Cavanaugh also believe that the rise of state sovereignty has had
a negative effect on the church. Whereas the church was previously understood to
be a political body in its own right, the growth of state sovereignty left this notion in
tatters. As the state pursued absolute political sovereignty, there was little political
space left for an independent church. The church has too often accepted this position
in society, preaching an ethic of obedience to the state alongside the notion that it is
no longer a political body, but something like the soul in the body of the nation-state.
Against this view, Milbank and Cavanaugh share a concern about finding a place for
41. Linda Weiss, The Myth of the Powerless State: Governing the Economy in a Global Era (Oxford: Polity,
1998). Ellul also criticizes those who see the economic system as the fundamental structure in society. See
“Needed: A New Karl Marx! (Problems of Civilization II),” in Sources and Trajectories: Eight Early Articles
by Jacques Ellul That Set the Stage, ed. and trans. Marva J. Dawn (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997), 42–43.
42. John Milbank, “On Complex Space,” in The Word Made Strange: Theology, Language, Culture (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1997), 275.
43. Cavanaugh, Torture and Eucharist, 3.
44. On this view see Robert A. Nisbet, The Quest for Community: A Study in the Ethics of Order and
Freedom, New critical ed (Wilmington: ISI Books, 2010), 100; Harold J. Laski, “The Pluralistic State,” The
Philosophical Review 28, no. 6 (November 1919): 564.
Chapter 2. The Sanctified State and the Politicized Church 46
the church to be a political body outside the sovereignty of the state. Milbank, who
draws heavily on the English pluralist tradition, wishes to reinvigorate a tradition of
legal personality for all sorts of organizations, which would enable a complex space to
re-emerge outside of the state. Cavanaugh’s vision is more limited, wishing merely to
make the church a political body, being less concerned about the rest of civil society.
At this point it is useful to clarify what is meant by the concept of ‘civil society’. It
is very difficult to define; its meaning has changed several times and it maintains
a plurality of meaning. A contemporary and relatively neutral definition is that
of Michael Banner: ‘the totality of structured associations, relationships, and forms
of cooperation between persons that exist in the realm between the family and the
state’.45
In the face of growing state power in the late nineteenth century, the concept
of civil society came back into fashion. In his seminal encyclical Rerum Novarum,
Leo XIII, who based the formation of the associations of civil society in a natural
human impulse, maintained that the individual’s right to form associations is gen-
erally inviolable by the state and condemned the trespasses of the state into these
associations.46 Accepting the reality of these intrusions of the state, Richard Mouw
writes that people have come to appreciate that, ‘Only a rich associational diversity
can provide a proper antidote to statism.’47 Ernest Gellner’s definition echoes this
view: ‘Civil Society is that set of diverse non-governmental institutions which is
strong enough to counterbalance the state and, while not preventing the state from
fulfilling its role of keeper of the peace and arbitrator between major interests, can
nevertheless prevent it from dominating and atomizing the rest of society.’48 In his
essay, “Reasons for a Civil Society”, Russell Hittinger traces the view that civil society
has an instrumental value in checking the powers of the state.49
In the early twentieth century, the value of intermediate associations was defended
by the English pluralists G. D. H. Cole, John Neville Figgis, and H. J. Laski. Pluralism,
which arose in response to the rise of the state, gave associations a central rôle in
its political vision. While pluralism declined quickly into obscurity, according to the
political theorist Paul Hirst, it found new relevance with the election of Margaret
Thatcher and her use of a parliamentary majority to attack various organs of civil
45. Michael Banner, “Christianity and Civil Society,” in Christian Political Ethics, ed. John A. Coleman
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 3.
46. Pope Leo XIII, “Rerum Novarum,” Vatican, May 15, 1891, <http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/
leo_xiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_l- xiii_enc_15051891_rerum- novarum_en.html> (accessed
April 23, 2013), § 50–53.
47. Richard J. Mouw and Sander Griffioen, Pluralisms and Horizons: An Essay in Christian Public
Philosophy (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1993), 43.
48. Ernest Gellner, Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1994), 5.
49. Russell Hittinger, “Reasons for a Civil Society,” in Reassessing the Liberal State: Reading Maritain’s
Man and the State, ed. Timothy Fuller and John P. Hittinger (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of
America Press, 2001), 13.
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society, such as unions.50 One aspect of this attack on unions was the legal interference
in their governance after 1979, with legislation imposing new democratic and funding
regulations on unions.51 This is a further example of the state’s intrusion into
independent associations.
Another sphere into which the state intruded was the family. The fear that the
state would do so originated with the rise of the state in the late nineteenth century.
In Rerum Novarum, Leo XIII wrote, ‘The contention, then, that the civil government
should at its option intrude into and exercise intimate control over the family and
the household is a great and pernicious error.’52 Throughout the twentieth century,
the family has been at the centre of debates over the rôle and scope of the state.
Over time, the state has assumed several rôles which were traditionally the domain
of the family. These include compulsory education (which may include, sometimes
against the wishes of parents, sex education) and regulated parental discipline of
children, in some places by banning “smacking”.53 These apparent intrusions have
placed the relationship of the state to the family at the centre of the ‘culture wars’ in
contemporary America.54
Other observers of a growing state were the Distributists (or anti-collectivists,
as they were also known), who tried to reform society based on early Catholic
Social Teaching, beginning with the seminal Encyclicals of Pope Leo XIII. The
Distributists took a more economic angle than the Pluralists, but they shared a belief
in decentralization, whether economic or political. The leading Distributists were the
Catholic laymen, G. K. Chesterton and Hilaire Belloc. They believed that society was
facing a concentration of economic-political power, and that dispossession of people’s
capital would lead to a state of servility, whereby people would become wage-slaves
or slaves of the state. Against these trends, they advocated political and economic
localism which would protect people from the ravages of both market and state.55
Both men are favourites of Milbank, who also cites the works of other Distributists,
such as Harold J. Massingham, Vincent McNabb, and Eric Gill.56 The Distributist
50. Paul Q. Hirst, ed., The Pluralist Theory of the State: Selected Writings of G. D. H. Cole, J. N. Figgis and H.
J. Laski (London: Routledge, 1989), 5–7.
51. Chris Howell, Trade Unions and the State: The Construction of Industrial Relations Institutions in Britain,
1890–2000 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 150–151.
52. Leo XIII, “Rerum Novarum,” § 14.
53. For examples of these concerns in Britain see Peter W. Coman, Catholics and the Welfare State
(London: Longman, 1977), 40, 93, 97.
54. See discussion in Don S. Browning et al., From Culture Wars to Common Ground: Religion and the
American Family Debate (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1997), 234–237.
55. Chesterton’s main distributist works are: What’s Wrong with the World, 5th ed. (London: Cassell,
1910); Utopia of Usurers, and Other Essays (New York: Boni and Liveright, 1917); The Outline of Sanity
(London: Methuen, 1926); Do We Agree?: A Debate between G. K. Chesterton and Bernard Shaw, with Hilaire
Belloc in the Chair (Folcroft Library Editions, 1928). Belloc’s main distributist works are: The Servile State,
2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1977); An Essay on the Restoration of Property (Norfolk: IHS Press,
2002); Economics for Helen: A Brief Outline of Real Economy (Norfolk: IHS Press, 2004).
56. H. J. Massingham, The Tree of Life, New (Charlbury: Jon Carpenter, 2003); Vincent McNabb, The
Church and the Land (Norfolk: IHS Press, 2003); Eric Gill, Art-Nonsense and Other Essays (London: Cassell
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doctrine also comes through in the work of ResPublica, with its talk of ‘ownership’
and ‘stakeholding’.57
Following these pluralist and distributist traditions, Milbank endorses a similar
instrumentalist view of civil society with the aim of reducing the power of the state.
Wishing to reverse the trend of state growth, Milbank advocates the reanimation of
the complex space that used to exist between the state and the citizen. By contrast,
Cavanaugh remains pessimistic about the possibilities of civil society being able to
free itself from the grip of the state. His reasons for thinking this are discussed
further in Chapter 5. One question that confronts both Milbank and Cavanaugh
then is whether their political theology is Niebuhrian, in the sense that they seek a
balancing of powers as the best form of society we can expect.58 Niebuhr thought
that a balance of powers within and between societies approximated justice in the
domestic and international arenas.59 Likewise, Milbank, and other fans of pouvoirs
intermédiaires, favour increasing the power of civil society to counter the power of
the state, providing a social balance of power where the state cannot dominate the
rest of society.60 Strictly speaking, however, Milbank does not give associations an
intermediate rôle between the individual and the state, but a place existing alongside
the state, counterbalancing it and competing with it.
The Rise of Political Theology
Theological reflection on politics and the state has often been inspired by moments
of political crisis or tension, where the available theological categories and doctrines
provided no clear guidance in current conditions. In twentieth century political
theology, a primary concern was the rise of the state and the correlative decline of
civil society and the church as political associations. These concerns are the topic of
this section, which starts by describing the growing interest in the theological study
of the state, and ends with the politicization of theology, including the theologies of
Milbank and Cavanaugh.
57. ResPublica, “ResPublica A-Z: Celebrating two years of ResPublica,” ResPublica, November 30,
2011, <http://www.respublica.org.uk/documents/iio_ResPublica_AtoZ_final.pdf> (accessed
April 23, 2013). Despite their best efforts at promoting Distributism, it has been observed that this feature
of Catholic social teaching is ill-suited to British socio-economic conditions. See Coman, Catholics and the
Welfare State, 86–92.
58. Milbank’s possible Niebuhrianism has also been questioned in Gerald W. Schlabach, “Is Milbank
Niebuhrian Despite Himself?” The Conrad Grebel Review 23, no. 2 (2005): 33–40.
59. Reinhold Niebuhr, Reflections on the End of an Era (New York: C. Scribner’s Sons, 1934), 243–248; The
Nature and Destiny of Man: A Christian Interpretation, Volume II: Human Destiny (London: Nisbet, 1943),
267–279; Christianity and Power Politics (Hamden: Archon Books, 1969), 26–27.
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The Theological Reaction to the State
The rise of the modern state in the twentieth century seemingly caught the church
without the doctrinal resources to understand this phenomenon. Writing for the
Church of Scotland inquiry into the Christian response to war and peace, Edward T.
Vernon attributed the churches’ silence on the rise of the state to its lack of a doctrine
of the state.61 His comment is intriguing because it incorrectly implies that the church
had no resources at that time to confront these transgressions of the civil authorities.
The theological resources that clearly existed were brought to bear on this issue
in the inter-war period, which saw an outpouring of critical reflection on the state.
Ellul, for instance, dates the beginnings of his critique of the state, which he sustained
throughout his career, from the crisis of the 1930s.62 Barth, Bonhoeffer, and Brunner
were also writing on the state during that time. The seminal ecumenical conferences
of the early- to mid-twentieth century were landmark occasions for considering
the church’s relationship to the state in times of crisis. The 1930s saw a range of
ecumenical conferences leading to the most important: the Oxford Conference of
the Universal Christian Council for Life and Work (Oxford, 1937).63 The totalitarian
direction of the state was central to its deliberations.64 In a volume related to
the conference, ecumenist Samuel McCrea Cavert wrote that the rise of the state
corresponded with an ‘epoch-making expansion of religion’s sense of responsibility
for the whole social and economic and political order.’65 This is no coincidence
or contradiction, since the rise of the state was condemned at the same time as it
influenced the churches’ changing perceptions of its rôle in society.
The ecumenical World Conference of Christian Youth (Amsterdam, 1939) also had
a theme on the nation and state, noting that ‘the democratic states are increasingly
tending towards a far-reaching control of all the main aspects of human life.’66 The
Conference’s preparatory volumes and reports also examined the rôle of the state
in family life, education, and racial issues. Following World War II, the inaugural
61. Edward T. Vernon, “Some Notes Towards a Christian Philosophy of the State,” in The Church’s
Attitude to Peace and War: The Question of Peace and War in the Light of Christ’s Teaching and the Practical
Means Whereby the Church May Lead the Nation in the Way of Peace (London: SCM Press, 1937), 74.
62. Jacques Ellul and Patrick Troude-Chastenet, Jacques Ellul on Religion, Technology, and Politics, trans.
Joan Mendès France (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1998), 87–88.
63. ‘The Conception and Preparation of the Conference’ in J. H. Oldham, ed., The Churches Survey Their
Task: The Report of the Conference at Oxford, July 1937, on Church, Community, and State (London: George
Allen & Unwin, 1937), 14–18.
64. Rejecting any simple ‘politicized’ interpretation of this conference, Graeme Smith argues that
Oxford 1937 can also be considered a missionary conference, and not simply a ‘political’ one. Oxford
1937: The Universal Christian Council for Life and Work Conference (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2004),
25–46.
65. Samuel McCrea Cavert, “Points of Tension between Church and State in America Today,” in Church
and State in the Modern World, by Henry Pitney Van Dusen et al. (New York and London: Harper &
Brothers, 1937), 163.
66. World Conference of Christian Youth, Further Studies on the Christian Community in the Modern World:
Second Preparatory Study Outline for the World Conference of Christian Youth, Amsterdam, Holland, July 24–
August 2, 1939 (Geneva: Conference Headquarters, 1939), 14.
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Assembly of the World Council of Churches (Amsterdam, 1948) had the theme, ‘Man’s
Disorder and God’s Design’, with a strong political focus, including reflections on the
rise of the state. The participants, who included Reinhold Niebuhr, Emil Brunner, and
John C. Bennett, concluded that two main tendencies contributed to the current world
situation (although reports only covered Asia, the USA, and Europe). These were, ‘the
vast concentrations of power’ in both economic and political forms, and the influence
of ‘technics’.67 A special concern at the Assembly was totalitarian states. Brunner
provided this statement of how the adjective ‘totalitarian’ was being used at that time:
The danger of totalitarianism would not be so overwhelming, if it were
merely a matter of political dictatorship as opposed to democratic forms
of government. Totalitarianism is something more pernicious than dic-
tatorship. It is the attempt to direct and mould the entire life of the
community and of its individual members in accordance with the dictates
of an omnicompetent state machine, using for this purpose all the powerful
methods of mass-suggestion and police control provided by modern
technics. The disquieting feature of our situation is that totalitarianism—
in the sense indicated—is in the ascendency everywhere, even in those
countries which are regarded as traditionally democratic.68
By the mid-twentieth century, many church leaders and theologians agreed that
the state had grown in scope to dangerous levels, and had concentrated power into
its own hands at the expense of individuals and intermediary organisations. As
Maurice Reckitt noted, the totalitarian state ‘regards its authority as the sole source of
all others.’69 But it was not always clear why the churches were so concerned with the
rise of the state.70 Some have argued that Christianity is also totalitarian and merely
objects to the totalitarianism of the state because of its pagan ideology.71
The World Conference on Church and Society (Geneva, 1966) was another land-
mark ecumenical forum. But while the state was once again a major topic of
discussion, its large size was no longer at issue. To the contrary, the report reads:
‘The nation-state is too small for a technological age, unless it enters into international
economic and political cooperation.’72 Some delegates wanted to permit their states
67. World Council of Churches, “Report of Section III: The Church and the Disorder of Society,” in The
Church and the Disorder of Society (London: SCM Press, 1948), 198.
68. Emil Brunner, “And Now?” in The Church and the Disorder of Society, by World Council of Churches
(London: SCM Press, 1948), 176–177.
69. Maurice B. Reckitt, “Religion and Politics,” in Faith that Illuminates, ed. V. A. Demant (London:
Centenary Press, 1935), 134.
70. As Paul Tillich wrote, ‘The Christian churches have no inherent reason for resisting national
concentration in itself.’ Paul Tillich, “The Totalitarian State and the Claims of Church,” Social Research 1,
no. 4 (1934): 435. Milbank and Cavanaugh would answer Tillich, as will seen, on the basis of ecclesiology
and what this state does to associations.
71. See Smith, Oxford 1937, 130–133.
72. M. M. Thomas and Paul Albrecht, Christians in the Technical and Social Revolutions of Our Time:
World Conference on Church and Society, Geneva, July 12–26, 1966: The Official Report with a Description of
the Conference (Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1967), 99.
Chapter 2. The Sanctified State and the Politicized Church 51
a ‘more encompassing role’ in countering individualism and building nationhood for
social justice.73 But the need to control the power of the state was also keenly felt. For
some, this could be done from above, through international law, some form of world
government, or a strengthened United Nations. For others, it was best controlled
from below through civil society. Control of recalcitrant states could also be exerted
horizontally by other states.
These theologians, churches, and conferences, in reflecting on the state, not only
identified the dangers of the state’s increased power, but also the opportunities to
remedy great social evils using this power. The church, perhaps without realizing
what it was doing (and continues to do), justified further increasing state power
through arguments for state amelioration of social ills. But the church was slow to
recognize the dangerous dilemma in advocating greater state powers, which political
philosopher Crispin Sartwell expresses in this fashion:
State power is the necessary condition of social justice, but it is also the
greatest single threat to social justice . . . When you constitute a state with
sufficient power to achieve a just distribution of goods, you constitute a
power with the ability and, admit it, the tendency to commit countless
unjust acts, or for that matter with the power and the tendency to impose
radically unjust distribution of goods.74
The church’s social witness continues to play out this dilemma, with some
branches of the church decrying the state intrusion into family life and the lives of
individuals, while others in the church simultaneously endorse welfare programmes
that, in order to be affordable, have to be targeted at those with needs that must
be assessed and monitored. In these and other ways, the church (along with other
agencies in civil society) indirectly encourages state growth, and supports the means
of state enforcement of laws. Over the decades, these piecemeal policy actions, often
lobbied for with the best of intentions, have led to an enlarged state. According to
Sartwell, we should not be surprised when the state uses its power for social justice for
social injustice, because this characterizes the state.75 Naively, the church often thinks
that the state’s increased power will be used primarily for good; rarely acknowledged
is that the state is beholden to sin, and that increased power can, and probably will be,
used to advance other interests.76
Milbank and Cavanaugh would not only sympathize with Sartwell’s view and
reject the intrusion of the state, but would also reject the state on the basis of its violent
means. Other theologians, on the other hand, would accept these means as enacting
73. Thomas and Albrecht, Christians in the Technical and Social Revolutions of Our Time, 98, 106–107.
74. Sartwell, Against the State, 82. Also see Nicholas Wolterstorff, “Contemporary Christian Views of
the State: Some Major Issues,” Christian Scholar’s Review 3, no. 4 (1974): 322.
75. Sartwell, Against the State, 76.
76. See Jeong Kii Min, Sin and Politics: Issues in Reformed Theology (New York: Peter Lang, 2009), 69–97.
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justifiable force. Hannah Arendt is a useful guide here in differentiating the two. In
Macht und Gewalt (revealingly translated as On Violence), she writes: ‘It is, I think, a
rather sad reflection on the present state of political science that our terminology does
not distinguish among such key words as “power,” “strength,” “force,” “authority,”
and, finally “violence”—all of which refer to distinct, different phenomena and would
hardly exist unless they did.’77 The fortunes of these terms and their use in political
theology reveals much about who uses them. Joseph Ratzinger observed that among
liberation theologians, force on behalf of the state in the service of law and order
was described as oppressive, while force directed toward freedom was described
positively.78 Taking a very different position, Yoder noted that to use the word ‘force’
for the legitimate violence of the state was ‘obfuscation’, with honesty requiring it be
called violence, with violence only being legitimized by it being less objectionable than
the alternative injustice.79 If one follows the path taken by Yoder, it becomes much
easier to portray the state as profane, as both Milbank and Cavanaugh do in calling the
force the state uses to maintain order and peace ‘violence’. Arendt comments on such
logic, saying that, ‘to equate political power with the “organization of violence” makes
sense only if one follows Marx’s estimate of the state as an instrument of oppression
in the hands of the ruling class.’80
Despite these conflicts over the means of the state, the mid-twentieth century
saw the emergence of a broad consensus on the rôle of the state within church and
society. Between the 1960s and 1980s, both theology and political science neglected
the concept of the state, with studies of the state dropping out of favour.81 So while
people debated the rôle of the state, public policy, and what the state should be doing,
little was being done on thinking about state qua state. Eventually, however, this
consensus fractured. In 1974, Nicholas Wolterstorff observed that, while previously
one could predict what each mainline Christian tradition would say about the state,
this ‘familiar stalemate’ or ‘comfortable equilibrium’ between the competing views
of Catholics, reformed Lutheran and others was now upset. He claimed two reasons
for this disturbance. First, the trust the church had in the state to work for the good
and punish the evil doer was shaken by the events of the twentieth century from the
First World War to the Vietnam War. Second, this historical experience was combined
with emerging theological and exegetical work into the principalities and powers
in Scripture (examples include Ephesians 3:10 and Colossians 1:16). Consequently
77. Hannah Arendt, On Violence (London: A Harvest/HBJ book, 1970), 43.
78. Joseph Ratzinger, “Freedom and Liberation: The Anthropological Vision of the Instruction Libertatis
conscientia,” in Church, Ecumenism, and Politics: New Endeavors in Ecclesiology, trans. Michael J. Miller et al.
(San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2008), 242–243.
79. John Howard Yoder, “A Theological Critique of Violence,” in The War of the Lamb: The Ethics of
Nonviolence and Peacemaking, ed. Glen Harold Stassen, Mark Nation, and Matt Hamsher (Grand Rapids:
Brazos Press, 2009), 36.
80. Arendt, On Violence, 36.
81. See William E. Connolly, Appearance and Reality in Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1981), 120–121.
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powers theology seemed central to a biblical understanding of our reality, meaning
texts like Romans 13 could no longer be read as a straightforward justification of
the civil authorities.82 Another factor which may have been influential in renewing
interest in state studies was the shattering of the mid-twentieth century political
consensus around 1980, with the election of Thatcher and Reagan, and the global rise
of the New Right.83
The Radical Orthodox theologian, Daniel Bell, has more recently noted the
development of a tradition of political theology moving away from the ‘dominant
tradition’, characterized by being captured by the mythos of the state. In this
mainstream consensus, the state and civil society are heralded as agents of freedom,
while the church is shorn of a concrete political presence in favour of an apolitical – or,
at most, only abstractly and generally political – presence as a custodian of values.84
Against this, Bell describes and endorses what he calls the ‘emergent tradition’ of
contemporary political theology. He identifies this with postliberal theologians such
as Stanley Hauerwas, John Milbank, and Oliver O’Donovan; and one could add
himself and Cavanaugh. To Bell, this ‘emergent tradition rejects politics as statecraft
and envisions the church as a concrete public, political space in its own right.’85 Bell
provides a good example of the dualistic nature of these opposing of traditions. He
concludes with the question, ‘Leviathan or the Body of Christ?’86 Despite attempting
to overcome dualisms, Cavanaugh also suggests that it is either the church, or the
state. We either endorse statecraft, or we do not.
To summarize this section, we might pose the following question: What explains
this breakdown in the theological consensus and the rise of this alternative anti-statist
tradition? The rejection of the church’s mainstream statist politics appears to witness
to dissatisfaction with how Christian politics has developed in response to the political
and economic developments of the last thirty years. As discussed throughout this
thesis, the church’s response in the United Kingdom and the USA to the rise of the
New Right agenda of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan was weak, and the
church’s political thinking failed to keep pace with these political developments. The
following section examines in more detail the politicization of Christian theology and
practice in the church, and the reactions against this.
The Politicization of Christian Praxis and Theology
With the churches and their theologians studying the rise of the state, and warning
against its deeper and broader intrusion into human lives, one may have expected
82. Wolterstorff, “Contemporary Christian Views of the State,” 311–312.
83. Dennis Kavanagh, Thatcherism and British Politics: The End of Consensus? (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1987).
84. Bell, “State and Civil Society,” 428–429.
85. Ibid., 433.
86. Ibid., 437.
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that they would have heeded these warnings, and tried to insulate themselves against
such tendencies. But instead, as this section will show, the churches became more
politicized in line with this broad cultural trend. Even those theologians, such as
Milbank and Cavanaugh, who most decry the rise and persistence of the modern,
totalitarian state, have not escaped its politicizing influence. In making their theology
– and, particularly in their case, their ecclesiology and sacramental theology – political,
their theology remains beholden to this modern tendency.
The tension between the church and the rise of the modern state has resulted
in two primary forms of politicized theology. The first, and statist form, exists within
mainstream theology (Bell’s ‘dominant tradition’), which is happy to engage in politics
as statecraft.87 This tradition recognises the legitimacy of statist politics and the state
itself, provided the state seeks legitimacy through the provision of justice and peace,
seeking these things largely through the state alone. Where this position falls short,
however, is in not truly appreciating the dominance of the state. It accepts things the
way they are, and is willing to work within the given structures of society. For holders
of this position, Marx’s analysis rings wholly true:
The more powerful the state, and therefore the more political a country
is, the less inclined it is to seek the basis of social ills and to grasp their
general principle in the principle of the state, and thus in the present structure
of society, the active, self-conscious and official expression of which is the
state.88
As Marx points out, when the state grows in power, and society becomes
increasingly politicized, the state fades into the background and becomes more or less
invisible. This explains how, in a politicized society, the church and the theologian
came to render social criticism political within the imagination of the state, while
hardly criticizing the state itself. But, notwithstanding their criticisms of this first form
of politicized theology, Milbank and Cavanaugh are captives of the second, which we
turn to now.
This second form of politicized theology is the opposite of the first. It recognizes
the theological compromises of statist politicization and finds, to the contrary, the
true politics within the church. Preferring to politicize doctrines and Christian
practice than admit to legitimate politics outside the church, it remains, nevertheless,
a theological accommodation to the politicization of society. This form of politicized
theology goes beyond merely accepting the political implications of faith, it elevates
politics into the position of being the standard by which faith is understood, trans-
forming, in this process Christianity into a political movement that opposes the state.
87. Bell, “State and Civil Society,” 428–433.
88. Karl Marx, “Critical Marginal Notes on the Article “The King of Prussia and Social Reform. By
a Prussian”,” in Marx: Early Political Writings, ed. Joseph O’Malley and Richard A. Davis (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1994), 107. Marx’s italics.
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Politicization of the church has often been associated with liberation theology and
is often cast in a negative light, but it is more widespread than that, appearing in most
Western nations and confessions, and paying little heed to one’s political orientation.89
There is plenty of evidence for these varieties of contemporary politicization given in
the pages that follow. Evidence for the statist politicization of Christianity also exists
in how those who retreat from political involvement are viewed. They are sometimes
called reactionaries or pietists, and thought of as sectarian, heretical, irresponsible,
deviant, irrelevant, and lacking a modern missiology. In the mind of their critics, they
fail to understand that Christianity is political and must engage with the state.90
Politicized Christianity has attracted several critics.91 One of the most prominent
was Edward Norman, who famously criticized the politically active church in his
1978 Reith Lectures.92 To Norman, the ‘politicization of religion’ is ‘the internal
transformation of the faith itself, so that it comes to be defined in terms of political
values.’93 His critique was that the church had got involved in political action in an
uncritical way.94 In making these charges against the church, he provoked a vigorous
reaction, both in its opposition to him, and in favour of a political church.95
John Howard Yoder also criticized the politicization of the church in its ‘Con-
stantinianism’, in which the church alters its theology to accommodate the ruler and
their realist ethics of government within its midst.96 Yoder argued that since the
conversion of Constantine, most churches have been unable to resist the temptation
of Constantinianism, falling into an inauthentic Christianity. His main project was
to reveal this as a heresy, and create an ecclesiologically sound basis for Christians
witnessing to the state while maintaining the purity of the church. Yoder, in writing
of the ‘fall of the church’ in its marriage with Roman and other powers, noted several
objections to this accommodation.97 This fall meant that Christians tried to control and
direct the state, and they succeeded to a large degree, making the ‘Christianization
of politics’ the flip side of the ‘politicization of Christianity’. Successive waves of
Constantinianism have plagued the church, making its relationship with the state
89. A strident criticism of politicization in liberation theology is found in Ratzinger, “Instruction on
Certain Aspects of the “Theology of Liberation”.”
90. For a discussion of these points, see Philip D. Kenneson, Beyond Sectarianism: Re-Imagining Church
and World, Christian Mission and Modern Culture (Harrisburg: Trinity Press International, 1999), 48–53.
91. For one survey see Duncan B. Forrester, Theology and Politics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988), 43–56.
92. Published as E. R. Norman, Christianity and the World Order (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979).
93. Ibid., 2.
94. This view was also expressed in Rachel Tingle, Another Gospel?: An account of the growing involvement
of the Anglican Church in secular politics, with a foreword by Tony Higton (London: Christian Studies
Centre, 1988).
95. See, for instance, Charles Elliott et al., Christian Faith and Political Hopes: A Reply to E. R. Norman
(London: Epworth Press, 1979); Dorothee Sölle, Peter L. Berger, and Roger L. Shinn, “Continuing the
Discussion: ‘A Politicized Christ’,” Christianity and Crisis 39, no. 4 (March 19 1979): 50–57.
96. John Howard Yoder, “The Constantinian Sources of Western Social Ethics,” in The Priestly Kingdom:
Social Ethics as Gospel (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), 135–147.
97. John Howard Yoder, “The Racial Revolution in Theological Perspective,” in For the Nations: Essays
Evangelical and Public (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997), 103.
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problematic. But, again, in rejecting one form of politicization, Yoder adopted it in
a different guise, politicizing the ministry of Jesus and the practices of the church.98
The criticisms by Norman and others of the politicization of Christian faith
remain relevant as a guide to the temptations faced by churches in the first form of
politicization. But more recent critics of the first form of politicization have become
susceptible to fall into the second form of politicization. This form of politicization
of Christianity finds a critic in James Davison Hunter, who identifies a tendency in
Yoder, Hauerwas, and Cavanaugh to politicize their theology so that the ‘dominant
language and thus the primary frame of reference’ is politics.99 Beyond these ‘neo-
Anabaptists’, as Hunter calls them, there are plentiful examples of the politicization
of Christianity in almost all areas of Christian theology and praxis: in doctrine, the
practices of the church, and the interpretation and application of Scripture.
Many Christian doctrines have been politicized. Chapters 3 to 5 that follow are
devoted to the political understanding of the doctrines of creation, preservation, and
redemption. Other writers have looked at providence in a more general sense.100 The
doctrine of the Trinity has been a popular locus for political reflection, such as found
in social trinitarianism.101 Furthermore, political theories have been developed from
focussing on each individual person of the trinity (Father, Son, and Spirit). Patriarchal
politics has not fared well in the wake of feminism, now existing as a fringe movement
among Christian Reconstructionists, Theonomists, and Complementarians.102 More
popular is the quest for the political Jesus, which comes with the risk that Jesus is
reduced to a political figure. Many authors have tackled this topic, but from reading
them, it appears that each author finds the Jesus they are looking for.103 The Holy
Spirit is another popular source of political inspiration.104 A further doctrine held
98. John Howard Yoder, The Politics of Jesus: Vicit Agnus Noster, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
1994); John Howard Yoder, Body Politics: Five Practices of the Christian Community Before the Watching
World (Nashville: Discipleship Resources, 1992).
99. Hunter, To Change the World, 162.
100. For examples, see Scott Bader-Saye, “Figuring Time: Providence and Politics,” in Liturgy, Time, and
the Politics of Redemption, ed. Randi Rashkover and C. C. Pecknold (Grand Rapids: SCM Press, 2006),
91–111; and various essays in Francesca Aran Murphy and Philip G. Ziegler, eds., The Providence of God
(London: T&T Clark, 2009).
101. For criticisms of social trinitarianism see Paul Fletcher, Disciplining the Divine: Toward an (Im)political
Theology (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009).
102. Patriarchy’s high point was in Robert Filmer, but his influence suffered greatly following John
Locke’s devastating criticisms. See Sir Robert Filmer, “Patriarcha,” in Patriarcha and Other Writings,
ed. Johann P. Sommerville (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 1–68; and John Locke, Two
Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
103. See Yoder, The Politics of Jesus; John Howard Yoder, “Jesus: A Model of Radical Political Action,” in
The War of the Lamb: The Ethics of Nonviolence and Peacemaking, ed. Glen Harold Stassen, Mark Nation, and
Matt Hamsher (Grand Rapids: Brazos Press, 2009), 77–82; Alan Storkey, Jesus and Politics: Confronting the
Powers (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2005).
104. See D. Robert Kennedy, The Politics of the Spirit: Understanding the Holy Spirit in the Community Called
Church (Lanham: University Press of America, 1996); Reinhard Hütter, “The Church as Public: Dogma,
Practice, and the Holy Spirit,” Pro Ecclesia 3, no. 3 (Summer 1994): 334–361; Amos Yong, In the Days of
Caesar: Pentecostalism and Political Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010).
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to have political implications is the atonement.105 Despite being largely sidelined in
modern theology, the doctrine of ascension has been called a ‘public truth’.106 The
creeds and confessions of the Christian church have often contained overt political
statements, making political theology intrinsic to how numerous denominations
understand their particular identity.107
Political interpretations are now also commonly given to many Christian practices.
Liturgy and worship have become central to Christian politics, with each component
of liturgy bearing its own political load.108 Both Barth and Bonhoeffer, for instance,
wrote on the political dimension of preaching.109 Praying has been described as ‘the
most political act any Christian can engage in.’110 Church music, whether traditional
hymns or Negro spirituals, is claimed to have a political element.111 There is also
a politics of forgiveness and absolution.112 The sacraments remain a particularly
fruitful area of ecclesial politics. Baptism, widely seen as initiation into a new
community, has, for many, political importance.113 The politics of the Eucharist have
been a special focus of Cavanaugh.114 Christian virtues have also been marshalled
into Christian politics, with Milbank believing that ‘political hope can only now be
sustained through a practice of the theological virtues.’115 Others have made political
105. Theodore W. Jennings, Transforming Atonement: A Political Theology of the Cross (Minneapolis:
Fortress Press, 2009).
106. Gerrit Scott Dawson, Jesus Ascended: The Meaning of Christ’s Continuing Incarnation (London: T&T
Clark, 2004).
107. On the politics of the creeds see Jaroslav Pelikan, Credo: Historical and Theological Guide to Creeds and
Confessions of Faith in the Christian Tradition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 216–244.
108. For a broad overview of this see Peter Scott and William T. Cavanaugh, eds., The Blackwell
Companion to Political Theology (Malden: Blackwell, 2003). For worship see Wannenwetsch, Political
Worship; Cavanaugh, Theopolitical Imagination.
109. Karl Barth, “The Christian Community and the Civil Community,” in Community, State, and Church:
Three Essays, ed. Will Herberg (Eugene: Wipf & Stock, 2004), 185; Dietrich Bonhoeffer, “What Is Church?”
in Berlin, 1932–1933, ed. Larry L. Rasmussen, trans. Isabel Best and David Higgens (Minneapolis: Fortress
Press, 2009), 265. Also see Stanley Hauerwas, Disrupting Time: Sermons, Prayers, and Sundries (Eugene:
Cascade Books, 2004), 9.
110. Graham Ward, The Politics of Discipleship: Becoming Postmaterial Citizens (London: SCM Press, 2009),
281. Also see Johannes Baptist Metz and Karl Rahner, The Courage to Pray, trans. Sarah O’Brien Twohig
(London: Burns & Oates, 1980).
111. Rochelle A. Stackhouse, “Hymnody and Politics: Isaac Watts’s “Our God, Our Help in Ages Past”
and Timothy Dwight’s “I Love Thy Kingdom, Lord”,” in Wonderful Words of Life: Hymns in American
Protestant History and Theology, ed. Richard J. Mouw and Mark A. Noll (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004),
42–66.
112. See John Milbank, “Forgiveness: The double waters,” in Being Reconciled: Ontology and Pardon
(Oxford: Routledge, 2003), 44–60; L. Gregory Jones, Embodying Forgiveness: A Theological Analysis (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995); Nigel Biggar, “Reinhold Niebuhr and the Political Possibility of Forgiveness,”
in Reinhold Niebuhr and Contemporary Politics: God and Power, ed. Richard Harries and Stephen Platten
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 141–153.
113. See Gerhard Van den Heever, “Making body politic: the rhetoric of early Christian baptismal
discourse,” Scriptura, no. 90 (2005): 709–721; Yoder, Body Politics; Debra Dean Murphy, “Identity Politics:
Christian Baptism and the Pledge of Allegiance,” Liturgy 20, no. 1 (2005): 5–10.
114. Cavanaugh’s primary work on this is Torture and Eucharist: Theology, Politics, and the Body of Christ
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capital out of hospitality.116 Christian witnessing, which can result in martyrdom, is,
Tripp York informs us, a political act.117
In relation to the Bible, Brueggemann warned of its politicization, whereby
‘everything is read as a mandate to social action and social transformation with
reference to urgent contemporary issues.’118 Contemporary biblical scholarship and
political philosophy have also generated an abundance of books on the politics of
scripture.119 This focus is not restricted to Christian theologians; philosophers have
also been drawn to St Paul for his political importance.120 But while Paul has become
for many the focal point for a Christian politics of anti-imperialism, there are several
sceptics about these political readings of Paul.121
A materialist explanation for this politicization of Christianity was given above
(in relating the rise of the state to the culture of politicization). Ellul gives further
theological reasons for Christianity’s politicization in his study of the ‘Causes of the
Political Transformation’ of the church.122 Ellul does not think these are all bad; to a
degree they are welcome in order to bring Christians up to a more appropriate level
of political awareness and action. For instance, he values the growing recognition
that Christians are to be loyal to God’s will and acknowledge the Lordship of God
over all things. Another is that Christianity cannot be confined to Sunday alone, but
must infiltrate all of life. Ellul also observes a growing sense of responsibility toward
the world. This implies that we must meet people where they are, and be present
on behalf of others, including in the political realm. Ellul also mentions the ‘Barmen
Complex’, whereby statements are made in the style of the Barmen Declaration on all
issues, with profound theology and great urgency. Further, there is the belief that all is
settled on the level of politics. Finally, from his French context, he mentions ‘Sartrian
existentialism’, with its ethos of involvement and criticism. Elsewhere Ellul addresses
the more sociological side of the politicization of the church as an accommodation to
116. See Hans Boersma, Violence, Hospitality, and the Cross: Reappropriating the Atonement Tradition (Grand
Rapids: Baker Academic, 2004); Daniel M. Bell Jr., Liberation Theology After the End of History: The Refusal
to Cease Suffering (London: Routledge, 2001), 72; Luke Bretherton, Hospitality as Holiness: Christian Witness
Amid Moral Diversity (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006).
117. Tripp York, The Purple Crown: The Politics of Martyrdom (Scottdale: Herald Press, 2007).
118. Brueggemann, Redescribing Reality, 19.
119. The general trend is observed in Adam Kotsko, The Politics of Redemption: The Social Logic
of Salvation (London: T&T Clark, 2010), 62. Recent examples include Bauckham, Bible in Politics;
J. Gordon McConville, God and Earthly Power: An Old Testament Political Theology, Genesis–Kings (London:
T&T Clark, 2006); Walzer, In God’s Shadow.
120. See John D. Caputo and Linda Martín Alcoff, St. Paul among the Philosophers (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 2009); Alain Badiou, Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism, trans. Ray Brassier
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003).
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13:1–7 in Recent Discussion,” Expository Times 121, no. 8 (May 2010): 383–389; and, Seyoon Kim, Christ
and Caesar: The Gospel and the Roman Empire in the Writings of Paul and Luke (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
2008).
122. Jacques Ellul, False Presence of the Kingdom, trans. C. Edward Hopkin (New York: Seabury Press,
1972), 100–109.
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the prevailing intellectual culture. Ellul sums up the political spirit of the times in this
fashion:
Everything is political. Politics is the only serious activity. The fate of
humanity depends on politics, and classic philosophical or religious truth
takes on meaning only as it is incarnated in political action. Christians
are typical in this connection. They rush to the defense of political
religion, and assert that Christianity is meaningful only in terms of political
commitment. In truth, it is their religious mentality which plays this trick
on them. As Christianity collapses as a religion, they look about them
in bewilderment, unconsciously of course, hoping to discover where the
religious is to be incarnated in their time. Since they are religious, they
are drawn automatically into the political sphere like iron filings to a
magnet.123
Here Ellul describes how Christians are attracted to the political spirit of the times,
supporting Bonhoeffer’s contention that Christians have sacralized politics, finding in
the political order a ‘religious significance’.124 It should be noted, however, that Ellul’s
exaggerated claim – that ‘politics is the only serious activity’ – is contradicted by the
other activities that Christians reverentially undertake (such as worship). Neverthe-
less, Ellul rightly points to the great importance of politics to many contemporary
Christians, as witnessed in the state-directed politics of their church agencies, and
also in their adoption of a non-statist theopolitical imagination. As will become
apparent throughout this study, it is clear that while some theologians shun statist
politics, they remain at pains to show that their ecclesiology, worship, or liturgy, are
nevertheless ‘political’ in order to demonstrate how the church is relevant to society.
Strong cultural and intellectual forces make this a great theological temptation. In the
words of Theodor Adorno, ‘Nothing of theological content will persist without being
transformed; every content will have to put itself to the test of migrating into the realm
of the secular, the profane.’125
Milbank and Cavanaugh, along with Bell, Hauerwas, and Yoder, wish the church
to be the site of politics. Why is the allure of politics so powerful? Are they
catering to a need for the church to be seen to be relevant in not giving up on
politics? While it is difficult to deny that Christianity is political (two central claims
of Christianity have been claimed as political: the confession that ‘Jesus is Lord’126,
and the affirmation that ‘Jesus has been raised from the dead’127), modern theology
123. Jacques Ellul, The New Demons, trans. C. Edward Hopkin (London & Oxford: Mowbrays, 1975), 199.
124. See Bonhoeffer quote on page 18.
125. Theodor W. Adorno, “Reason and Revelation,” in Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords, trans.
Henry W. Pickford (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 136.
126. J. G. Davies, Christians, Politics and Violent Revolution (London: SCM Press, 1976), 48; David
Lochhead, The Liberation of the Bible, Revised, ed. Norman K. Gottwald and Richard A. Horsley
(Maryknoll / London: Orbis Books / SPCK, 1993), 139.
127. N. T. Wright, The Resurrection of the Son of God (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2003), 730.
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sometimes goes beyond this justified interest in the political implications of faith to
politicize Christian doctrines and practices. Milbank has stated his disavowal of such
a ‘political theology’: ‘only a thoroughly craven theology would imagine that its task is
therefore to translate the Gospel message into “political” terms.’128 The key word here
is ‘translate’, with Milbank rejecting attempts to translate the message of Christianity
into terms secular politics can readily understand. But this does not mean that he
thinks the church and its teaching are non-political.
Suggesting that twentieth-century theology became politicized implies that there
is a non-politicized form of theology. It is important, therefore, to distinguish between
‘faithful political Christianity’ and a ‘politicized Christianity’. In explaining the
difference between them, it is useful to consider the difference between orthodoxy
and heresy. If heresy results from overemphasising a good in theological thought
(too much emphasis on either the divinity or humanity of Christ, for instance), then
it is difficult to say where this line is crossed in strictly definitional terms.129 So,
while faithful Christianity can be described as inherently political, it does not begin
or end with the political relevance of the gospel, or become reduced to its political
importance. As described above, to cross over into politicized Christianity is to elevate
the political importance of faith over and above other theological meanings of the
Christian faith.
How theology can be political without being politicized can be illustrated by an
example from Barth. In writing to American Christians in 1943 on the topic of the
proclamation of the Word of God, he urged that preachers should not preach on the
topic of the war, for this merely duplicates the rôle of newspapers and the propaganda
organs of the state. Instead he suggests that preachers preach, ‘The Word of the
reconciliation of the world with God through Jesus Christ (2 Corinthians 5:17–21) and
nothing else.’130 Preaching this in all its fullness, according to Barth, means preaching
about ‘the sole sovereignty of Jesus Christ, His human origin among the people of
Israel, His triumph over powers and dominations, about God’s mercy and patience
revealed in Him, the dual benefaction of Church and State realized in Him; about the
impossibility of serving two masters, about freedom, and the service of the children
of God conceived in the Holy Spirit’. By preaching this message, Barth believes that
they are
inevitably preaching . . . against Hitler, Mussolini and Japan; against anti-
Semitism, idolization of the State, oppressive and intimidating methods,
militarism, against all the lies and the injustice of National Socialism and
128. John Milbank, “The Thomistic Telescope: Truth and Identity,” American Catholic Philosophical
Quarterly 80, no. 2 (2006): 246–247.
129. This aspect of heresy is taken from David Christie-Murray, A History of Heresy (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1989), 11.
130. Karl Barth, The Church and the War, trans. Antonia H. Froendt, with an introduction by Samuel
McCrea Cavert (Eugene: Wipf & Stock, 2008), 30.
Chapter 2. The Sanctified State and the Politicized Church 61
Fascism in its European and its Asiatic forms, and thus they will naturally
(and without “dragging politics into the pulpit”) speak on behalf of the
righteous state and also for an honestly determined conduct of the war.131
The lesson to be learned from Barth here is this: theology can be political without
being politicized. If we take the criterion for politicized theology seriously, we should
not start with politics and shape Christian proclamation to the realities of the world.
Instead, as Barth suggests, the Word will speak directly to these realities when we
preach the Gospel.
To be clear: the argument here does not advocate apoliticism or suggest that
Christianity has no relationship to politics. The final chapter will be partially a defence
of a political Christianity through the advocacy of a desacralized view of the state
that does not profane Christians who engage with it. The focus throughout is on
the modern theological temptation of the politicization of faith as a critical tool to
understand the theologies of Radical Orthodoxy and their appeal in the contemporary
world.
Beyond Politics as Statecraft to Radical Orthodoxy
The rise of the modern state did not convert everyone to statist political theology.
Among those reacting strongly to this common view is the theological movement
known as Radical Orthodoxy, founded by John Milbank and others. In the seminal
essay on Radical Orthodoxy, co-authors Milbank, Catherine Pickstock, and Graham
Ward outline the core of their thinking. Radical Orthodoxy is ‘radical’ in that it is
a ‘return to patristic and medieval roots’, using this tradition to critique modernity
with ‘an unprecedented boldness’. In doing so, Radical Orthodoxy rethinks the
traditions of thought of secular modernity which seeks explanation in immanence
alone, and advocates instead transcendence as the only ground of truth.132 ‘The
central theological framework of radical orthodoxy is “participation”, as developed
by Plato and reworked by Christianity, because any alternative configuration perforce
reserves a territory independent of God.’133 All disciplines, including politics, must
be ‘framed’ theologically, ‘otherwise these disciplines will define a zone apart from
God, grounded literally in nothing.’134 Cavanaugh contributed an essay to this same
moment-making volume135, but would be less inclined than Milbank to see himself as
part of a theological movement.
131. Barth, Church and the War, 31.
132. John Milbank, Graham Ward, and Catherine Pickstock, “Introduction: Suspending the material: the
turn of radical orthodoxy,” in Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology, ed. John Milbank, Graham Ward, and
Catherine Pickstock (London: Blackwell, 1999), 2–3.
133. Ibid., 3.
134. Ibid., 3.
135. Cavanaugh, “The City.”
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Within Radical Orthodoxy, there are several writers with an identifiable political
focus. They include Daniel M. Bell, Jr., William Cavanaugh, D. Stephen Long, John
Milbank, Catherine Pickstock, and Graham Ward. While there are differences between
their views, together they form a cluster of theologians who have countered many
traditional understandings of the state and politics. These theologians speak into the
present political chaos with confidence and plausibility rarely seen from theologians
in this generation. Part of their project is contesting the concept of the state. They
go further than this in also contesting the meaning of ‘politics’ itself. This becomes
another way in which the movement is itself political – contesting a political concept
is not merely a scholarly practice, it is an inherently political act.136 At stake is the
true locus of politics, which to them is much more than statecraft. The state is not
the true locale of politics; true politics is found in the church. But not any church; the
true politics must be found, by definition, in the true church. There are churches that
have fallen from the true church through compromises with Constantinianism and
other accommodations to culture. More discussion on how Milbank and Cavanaugh
perceive the church will follow in later chapters. Another prominent ethicist related
to this movement is Stanley Hauerwas, who taught Bell, Long, and Cavanaugh, and
through his own writings has questioned the way the modern liberal nation-state has
influenced the church and its mission.137
Milbank and Cavanaugh do not reject politics but translocate it into the church,
although they differ as to the extent to which they do this. It could be asked whether
we are any better off bringing the political into the church, rather than taking the
church into the political. This is because the church is political in a different way to
the so-called politics of the state. To Milbank and Cavanaugh, the state is created
in, sustained through, and redeemed by violence. Relocating politics to the church
allows one to be political without being violent or supporting violence. But some
might be dissatisfied with this. Is politics in the church really a true politics? Of course,
having redefined the meaning of ‘politics’ means that anyone who does not adopt
one’s new definition becomes beholden not only to the false politics of statecraft, but
false theology as well. Both Milbank and Cavanaugh emphasize that it is the church
as the body of Christ which offers a true politics. The formation and sustenance of
this body politic is the political problem that they both address through seeing the
church as the body of Christ, formed in the Eucharist, as the body politic. Milbank
writes, ‘Political theory and ecclesiology must finally then be of one piece.’138 As the
following chapters show, Milbank and Cavanaugh are right to question how the state
136. See discussion in Clyde Barrow, Critical Theories of the State: Marxist, Neo-Marxist, Post-Marxist
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993), 10–11.
137. Hauerwas’s influence on Radical Orthodoxy is acknowledged in John Milbank, Simon Oliver,
and Rupert Shortt, “Radical Orthodoxy,” in God’s Advocates: Christian Thinkers in Conversation, by
Rupert Shortt (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 2005), 112.
138. Milbank, “Preface,” xv.
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has been sanctified. But the following discussion also shows that the state can be
desacralized and is not as profane as Milbank and Cavanaugh would have us believe.
In many ways, Milbank and Cavanaugh are not simply political theologians, but
theologians of political economy. This is witnessed to by the scope of their work,
which stretches well beyond the state or justice, but covers the secular underpinnings
of modern political economy and the state. This thesis cannot do justice to all this
work, but is primarily concerned with the appropriate theological standpoint on the
state. Milbank’s project is an attempt to go beyond the nihilism of capitalism and
political liberalism, and promote a form of Christian socialism. Cavanaugh, on the
other hand, is at pains to make the church a political society in its own right, and one
that will have the effect of undermining statist capitalism.
Some differences between Milbank and Cavanaugh will be apparent throughout
this work. One difference is how directly the church is an agent of social change in
society. For Milbank, the church maintains a rôle as an agent of social change in a
more direct rôle than for Cavanaugh. Cavanaugh’s church, as the locale for politics
in his theology, indirectly influences society and the secular, while for Milbank the
church tries directly to influence things. Milbank wishes to return to a time when the
church and Christianity still shapes society.
Conclusions
From the late nineteenth to early twentieth century, the rise of the state in both the
USA and UK led to increased politicization. Initially, this politicization took primarily
a statist form, as witnessed in state-centered political action by church and civil society,
as they defended themselves against enlarged state intrusion, and took to advancing
moral, political, and economic agendas through the state. The churches and their
theologians followed this general cultural trend by becoming politicized in statist
forms, as seen in their adoption of statist methods of social change. Curiously, at
the same time, the intrusion of the state into family life and independent associations
was condemned by theologians. This scepticism about the state, however, led some
theologians to reject the politics of statecraft, and sought the true Christian politics in
the church and its practices. This has led to the politicization of Christianity, but in an
anti-statist mode.
In this way, the political theologies of both Milbank and Cavanaugh constitute
reactions against the statist politicization of theology. Since they believe the state
to be profane, and something that Christians should shun, they prefer that politics
be located in the church. Yet, in wanting the church to remain political, their
ecclesiologies become politicized. Keeping the perspective of Bonhoeffer in mind, they
reject the sacral nature of the state, and have rebelled against the existing order. The
Chapter 2. The Sanctified State and the Politicized Church 64
following chapters provide more detail on why Milbank and Cavanaugh believe the
state to be profane and why they think the political church makes sense.
Chapter 3
Creation and the Origin of the State
Once, there was no ‘state’. While for some this may seem an obvious statement, there
are many scholars who disagree, using the word ‘state’ to describe any system of
political organisation.1 However, those who believe that the state has a beginning
often disagree over what the state is, and when, and how, the state came into existence.
This chapter discusses several answers to the question of the origins of the state, in
particular those of John Milbank and William Cavanaugh.
This chapter is the first of three that will place a doctrine – here, creation – in
relation to the political theologies of Milbank and Cavanaugh. The purpose of these
chapters will be to examine the work of God in the world of politics through the
theological themes of creation, preservation, and redemption. While these works
of God are not entirely distinct, by necessity they will be covered in three separate
chapters. God’s relationship to the state can be viewed through these doctrinal lenses.
‘Creation’ is not being used here in a technical sense alone, but also in the sense of the
origins.
Where God is seen to be directly ordering the state through creation, preservation,
or redemption, the state can become considered sacred. Where God is seen as
separated from the state altogether it can become viewed as profane. Outside of
theology, sacred/profane judgments of the state can also be made. The autonomous
secular state can be claimed to be God-like as a creator, preserver or redeemer of
society. Of these three chapters, this is the odd one out because, as will become
apparent, there is a sense in which the autonomous state can more easily claim to
be a preserver or redeemer of human society than it can to be a creator of humans or
of society. If so, making the case that the state is a creator in the place of God is more
difficult than in the other two instances. Yet, in the relationship between the state,
1. This was the view of the German Catholic priest and cultural anthropologist Wilhelm Koppers, see
Lawerence Krader, “The Origin of the State Among the Nomads of Asia,” in The Early State, ed. Henri
J. M. Claessen and Peter Skalník, vol. 32 (The Hague: Mouton, 1978), 95. Emil Brunner writes that ‘there
has never been, and never could be, a State-less condition of human society’ in Justice and the Social Order,
trans. Mary Hottinger (London: Lutterworth Press, 1945), 174.
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society, and the individual, elements of this can be found, especially where it is the
state which forms society from atomized, isolated individuals.
The doctrine of creation covers the divine origins of things, not merely in a
historical sense, but also in the ontological sense of the divine dependence of all
creatures on God. Therefore, a strong connection exists between the quest for origins
of things, and how these descriptions relate to God. John Polkinghorne, writing of
debates over the origins of the universe, says, ‘Theology is concerned with ontological
origins and not with temporal beginning.’2 This is also an important statement to
proclaim in political theology, for as this chapter will highlight, the act of describing
the temporal, historical origin of the state is something different from describing its
ontological origins.
The value we give to things, such as the state, is often influenced by our
understanding of their ontological and historical origins. For example, if something
originates apart from God that means it has its origins in sinful separation from God.
This is the traditional understanding of sin and violence.3 For this reason, locating the
origins of the secular state apart from God is of critical importance to both Milbank
and Cavanaugh in making the state appear profane. Milbank and Cavanaugh, in
making connections between the origins of the state and how we are to judge it, are
acting in line with the universal obsession with the origins of things.4 This is witnessed
in the strong impulse to explain things largely through where they came from. This is
the basis of the widely held genetic theory of the state: the view that the true essence
of the state can be found in its historical origins alone. This view extends back to
Aristotle: ‘He who thus considers things in their first growth and origin, whether a
state or anything else, will obtain the clearest view of them.’5 This genetic impulse is
commonly found in modern quests for the historical origins of the state.
The first section of the chapter will show how Milbank and Cavanaugh argue that
the state is profane because of its historical origins in heretical theology and violence.
Milbank’s vision is wider and deeper, locating the state in the overall rise of the
secular. Cavanaugh’s is a slightly narrower vision, attributing the origins of the state
to war. Both their accounts of the origins of the modern state strike a very modern
note of criticism in seeing the politics of modernity in stark contrast to the politics that
preceded it.
2. John Polkinghorne, Science and Christian Belief: Theological Reflections of a Bottom-Up Thinker (London:
SPCK, 1994), 73.
3. Augustine’s view of evil was that it is the corruption of the good. See Augustine, Concerning the
City of God against the Pagans, trans. Henry Bettenson (London: Penguin Books, 2003), XI.9, 22.
4. See Marc Bloch, The Historian’s Craft (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1954), 29; Joanne H.
Wright, Origin Stories in Political Thought: Discourses on Gender, Power, and Citizenship (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 2004), 3.
5. Aristotle, “The Politics,” in The Politics and The Constitution of Athens, ed. Stephen Everson
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 1252a24–25. A more modern statement of this view
is found in Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, “The State: A Lecture Delivered at the Sverdlov University, July 11,
1919,” in Collected Works, Volume 29: March – August 1919, ed. George Hanna (London: Lawrence and
Wishart, 1965), 473.
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The central part of the chapter examines the the origins of the state according to
biblical and theological traditions. Because Milbank and Cavanaugh are primarily
concerned with the historical evidence for the state’s origins, seeing its origins apart
from God’s work, they do not have to address the theological case that God is involved
in the making and use of the political systems and rulers, including the modern state.
In this they are out of step with the rich theological traditions that described the state’s
ontological origins in God.
Finally, the chapter will seek to reconcile historical and theological perspectives on
the origins of the state.
The Politics of Creation in Milbank and Cavanaugh
In the following treatment of Milbank and Cavanaugh, we start to see the origins of
the profane state and the concomitant decline of the political church. While Milbank
and Cavanaugh have different emphases and place the origins of the state at different
points, their positions are mutually reinforcing.
Milbank and the Secular Origins of the State
Milbank claims that the modern state is dangerously totalitarian, which, in domi-
nating society, has taken over powers from other associations, has monopolized and
increased violence, and has grown inhumanly bureaucratic. How did this political
form come about? Milbank shares with Cavanaugh an understanding of the modern
state as theologically constructed out of heretical Christian theological ideas and
practices, leading to a separation of politics from theology. This section examines how
Milbank locates the source of the profane modern state in the rise of the secular age,
which originated in the High Middle Ages. Determining these origins is a task that
Milbank places at the heart of his project of describing the history and genealogy of the
theologies and anti-theologies of the modern world.6 Less interested in the question of
ultimate origins of politics, Milbank locates the origins of the state in the new secular
political science of modernity.7 The main concerns here are with Milbank’s account of
the rise of absolute state sovereignty, based in origins of the secular, and the ontology
of violence, which both contribute to the modern state’s mythos. One purpose here
is to describe the ‘secular’ that Milbank thinks we need to be redeemed from, which
will be referred back to in the discussion of his redemptive proposals discussed in
Chapter 5.
6. John Milbank, “The Body by Love Possessed: Christianity and Late Capitalism in Britain,” in The
Future of Love: Essays in Political Theology (London: SCM Press, 2009), 82.
7. Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 10.
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‘Once, there was no “secular”.’8 This famous opening line to Milbank’s Theology
and Social Theory sets the agenda for what follows in this work. By placing ‘secular’
in quote marks, Milbank draws attention to the disputed and various ways in which
this concept is understood. Traditionally, the secular (saeculum) was understood in
Christianity as ‘the interval between fall and eschaton.’9 Nowadays, it represents more
of a ‘domain’, as Milbank calls it, or that sphere which is not religious. This is seen in
the constitutions of officially secular states, being those that have no favoured religion
and do not make religious tests for political office.10 Such a secularity attempts to
make a secular domain, as seen, for example, in secular schools where no religion
lies at the heart of them. By ridding this domain of religion, it operates ‘etsi Deus non
daretur’ (as if there were no God).11 The carving out of a secular domain, Milbank
argues, had to be instituted or imagined, both in theory and in practice.’12
According to Milbank, the origins of this imaginative shift to the secular were
laid in mediaeval thought, mainly in the false ontology of Scotus, who ‘set us on the
intellectual course to modernity.’13 Within Radical Orthodoxy, Scotus is blamed for
initiating the secular in two ways: through the ‘univocity’ of being, and ‘knowledge
by representation’.14 The univocity of being describes an ontology whereby ‘being’ is
something that God and creatures share in, meaning that creatures relate to being
independently of God. This simply means that things can exist apart from God,
with this in turn creating a realm of the secular that has complete independence
from God. This is opposed to ontologies that see all creatures participating in God,
which preserves the connection of everything to God. Knowledge as representation
altered the focus of knowledge from the objects to the subject, and, in turn, the focus of
modern epistemology changed from what we know to how we know something. This
assisted the birth of the secular by removing the illumination of the knower by God,
as described in patristic thought. Through these moves, a space autonomous from
the transcendent began and, along with it, disciplines such as epistemology, which
had no regard for God.15 In this way the secular was born, and human sciences –
including political science – were able to gain footholds as areas of life independent of
the increasingly side-lined theology.
A result of the rise of the secular was the secularization of politics, as just one
discipline eventually prized away from participation in God. This secularization has
two effects. Politics becomes removed from God, and it also becomes limited in its
8. Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 9.
9. Ibid., 9.
10. The Constitution of the United States of America, for example, outlaws religious tests for public
office (Article Six), and disallows any established church (First Amendment).
11. Ibid., 13.
12. Ibid., 9.
13. Milbank, “On Theological Transgression,” 159.
14. Milbank, “Alternative Protestantism,” 26–27.
15. Which is why Radical Orthodoxy wishes to ground all disciplines in theology. See Milbank, Ward,
and Pickstock, “Suspending the material,” 3.
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ends: ‘Once the political is seen as a permanent natural sphere, pursuing positive
finite ends, then, inevitably, firm lines of division arise between what is “secular” and
what is “spiritual”.’16 As will be shown in Chapter 5, Milbank’s redemptive proposals
for complex space and hazy boundaries between church and state seek to overcome
such a reduction to these secular categories.
A problem Milbank faces in his narration of the origins of the secular is how it
comes from a thoroughly Christian society. Like his assertion of the master discourse
of theology, it can seem that Milbank asserts, rather than argues for, the position that
the modern state emerges from the corruption of mediaeval theology. Nevertheless,
Milbank suggests that the church failed to retain its integrity, and thus had its own
fall:
That it was first of all the Church, the sacerdotium, rather than the regnum,
which assumed traits of modern secularity – legal formalization, rational
instrumentalization, sovereign rule, economic contractualism – ought to
give us pause for thought.17
No longer grounded in participation in God, politics becomes nihilistic and
‘grounded literally in nothing’.18 Yet it began to win adherents as an alternative
mythos to that of Christianity, and also within theology. These competing mythoi define
Milbank’s grand narrative of human history and thought. First was an ancient mythos,
then a Christian one, initiated by Christ, then, finally, in modernity there is a secular
mythos, which is partially a recapitulation of pagan mythos. The history of political
thought relates to these mythoi, and no political age or philosophy is without one.
Milbank aims to expose the state for what it is through narrating the content of its
secular mythos. It comprises an ontology of violence and absolute state sovereignty, as
described below.
Milbank’s main work, Theology and Social Theory, has as its major theme the
ontology of violence that lies at the heart of secular thought. With ontology being
separate from the peaceable God, the secular ontology is an ontology of violence. To
counter this nihilistic mythos, Milbank believes one must assert an ontology of peace:
‘one can try to put forward an alternative mythos, equally unfounded, but nonetheless
embodying an “ontology of peace”.’19 His critics sometimes say he asserts this
violently, undercutting his supposed peaceful alternative.20 Significant here, given the
structure of the present thesis, is that Milbank’s narration of the Christian mythos leaps
from creation to redemption, with no time for preservation between the two. Yet, as
16. Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 412.
17. Ibid., 18.
18. Milbank, Ward, and Pickstock, “Suspending the material,” 3.
19. Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 279.
20. Gavin Hyman, The Predicament of Postmodern Theology: Radical Orthodoxy or Nihilist Textualism?
(Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001), 73–77; Christopher J. Insole, The Politics of Human Frailty:
A Theological Defence of Political Liberalism, Faith in Reason (London: SCM Press, 2004), 133.
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the next chapter will show, the doctrine of preservation, as it relates to the preservation
of human society against the forces of sin and chaos, provides a justification for the
state .
It is this agnostic mythos that allows for the state to be profane in Milbank, since the
state is based in violence and deviant philosophy: ‘Here I show that from the outset
the secular is complicit with an “ontology of violence”, a reading of the world which
assumes the priority of force and tells how this force is best managed and confined
by counter-force.’21 For Milbank, it is this ontology of violence that under-girds
the secular state.22 It is easy to see how this operates in Hobbes, whose primordial
anthropology describes individuals at war with one another, and resolved by the
latent and real violence of the Leviathan. This mythology becomes another religious
mythos, and being violent implicates the state as profane. Hobbes’s state of nature is
just one foundational myth, but it shares characteristics with many others. In Greek
mythology, as Milbank describes it, the gods formed the world by taming a primordial
chaos and violence.23 By contrast, Creatio ex nihilo, as affirmed by Christianity, affirms
creation as the gift and act of God in love, which makes violence and evil privative of
this good. Peace and harmony are for the Christians the way things are, contrary to
secular and pagan thought.
For Milbank, it is not simply that the state is violent; violence can sometimes be
justified as the force necessary for policing.24 Rather, it is the acceptance of such
‘violence’ as the way things are, and have to be. It is easier to understand Milbank’s
point here if we understand it in reverse, examining the ontology inherent in social
theory, rather than the social theory which comes from an ontology of violence. Social
theory tries to explain ‘the way things really are’.25 To make such an explanation
is to make an ontological statement about fundamental realities. Milbank finds that
sociology and political philosophy explain social reality as being essentially violent.
For instance, Milbank cites Georg Simmel as posing ‘“an ontology of conflict” in
radical antithesis to Christianity’.26
Just as Milbank asserts a peaceable ontology over secularism’s ontology of vio-
lence, in place of the univocal ontology of Duns Scotus and Gilles Deleuze (see page 68
above), Milbank asserts a Platonic ontology of participation, in which everything
participates in God.27 Milbank’s position has the result that, since nothing is separate
21. Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 4.
22. Ibid., 279.
23. Ibid., 262.
24. Milbank believes that World War II was a just war, see “Christian Peace: A Conversation between
Stanley Hauerwas and John Milbank,” in Must Christianity be Violent?: Reflections on History, Practice, and
Theology, ed. Kenneth R. Chase and Alan Jacobs (Grand Rapids: Brazos Press, 2003), 209.
25. Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 220.
26. Ibid., 82.
27. Milbank calls this a ‘Platonic, neo-Platonic and Catholic “analogical ontology”’ in ibid., xxi. For
Deleuze’s treatment of the univocity of being see Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul
Patton (London: Continuum, 2004), 44–51, 79, 377–378.
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from God, there is no realm of evil or secular, since everything is created and
sustained by God, and is in immediate relation to God. Platonic ontology is based
on Plato’s notion of the forms in which the particular instances of things participate
in the pure form of that thing in a supernatural realm. The result of Christianising
this ontological framework is that all things participate in God for their being.
Endorsement of this ontology has profound implications for Milbank: ‘the Catholic
vision of ontological peace now provides the only alternative to a nihilistic outlook.’28
Milbank’s approach makes questions of ontology fundamental to the task of theology,
including its political and moral theology. This view suggests that philosophy is
primarily concerned with being, and then only secondarily with phenomenology,
logic, grammar, or ethics. For Milbank then, it is important to get the ontology right,
with everything else following from that.29 In all these assessments Milbank suggests,
we cannot simply ignore ontological questions to focus on practice. This is because
every political system ‘requires an account of human nature and of the role of human
beings within the cosmos; otherwise it is not clear why there is something now lacking
that needs to be emancipated, nor why one should suppose that we live in a reality
within which such emancipation is possible.’30
Milbank’s concern with the ontology of secular sphere lies at the heart of his
political theology and his criticism of the rise of state sovereignty. He identifies the
origins of the modern state with the modern suggestion that it is over the secular
political sphere which it can claim absolute sovereignty. This deep concern with the
concept of sovereignty in Milbank’s political theology provides a useful focal point
for his explanation of how modernity went wrong and where society might find
its political redemption. The concept of sovereignty provides a useful connection
between Milbank’s less accessible philosophical writings and his practical political
suggestions as the cure for the ills of modern society. There are strong parallels here
with the English tradition of political pluralism. This tradition denies the absolute
sovereignty of states, claiming that social groupings maintain sovereignty over their
own affairs. This was the case in the complex space of mediaeval times to which
Milbank hearkens back.
The mediaeval period is also the time in which Milbank locates the origins of state
sovereignty. Milbank links the sovereignty of the modern state with Scotus’s theology
insofar as it provided a ‘new conception of earthly authority as legitimate according
28. Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 442. The first edition reads ‘the absolute Christian vision . . .’
Perhaps in this emendation Milbank is making an identification between Catholic and Christianity and
rendering non-Catholic forms of Christianity nihilistic. Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason,
1st ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), 434. A similar update (to ‘Catholic ontology’) appears at Theology and
Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 362, with ‘Christian ontology’
found at Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason, 1st ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), 359.
29. John Milbank, “Faith, Reason, and Imagination: The Study of Theology and Philosophy in the
Twenty-First Century,” in The Future of Love: Essays in Political Theology (London: SCM Press, 2009), 321.
30. John Milbank, “Materialism and Transcendence,” in Theology and the Political: The New Debate, ed.
Creston Davis, John Milbank, and Slavoj Žižek (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2005), 393.
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to the exercise of power by a single sovereign center if constituted by, and exercised
in, the right formal terms, quite apart from the question of the inherent justice of its
acts.’31 No longer did acts of the state refer to ‘divine order or cosmic hierarchy’.32
Not surprisingly, given his appreciation for analogical reasoning, Milbank agrees with
Schmitt that state sovereignty is analogous to the sovereignty of God.33 Milbank
bases this on the parallel between the modern notions of absolute sovereignty and
the medieval notion of the absolute sovereignty of God. But he considers as ‘facile’
any direct transfer of voluntarist sovereignty ‘from God and the sacred to the human
and secular.’34
An absolute notion of sovereignty residing in the state renders the sovereignty
of other associations dependent on the state, for otherwise there would be a source of
sovereignty outside the state. State absolutism renders the church, then, in the position
of being a mere voluntary association, but one dependent on the state. Milbank and
Cavanaugh cannot accept that the church could ever be in this position under the state.
The development of a secular space involved the alteration of the church from being a
political body, to having merely suasive influence within society.35 For these reasons,
Milbank, like Cavanaugh, laments the de-politicization of the church, and wishes to
re-politicize the church in the form of a politicized ecclesiology.
Central to Milbank’s understanding of the modern state is his account of the
growth of state sovereignty, which has simplified social space. His political theology
is largely dominated by this motif, explaining the genesis of the modern state through
how this sovereignty came about and finding the redemption of human society in
the dissolution of state sovereignty into a more complex society. In narrating the
growth and acceptance of the concept of state sovereignty, Milbank blames several
early-modern political philosophers for these ideas, namely Hugo Grotius, Hobbes,
Jean Bodin, and Baruch Spinoza. To Milbank, it is Bodin who is primarily (but not
solely) responsible for the development of the modern view of absolute sovereignty
that resides in the modern state. This finds a theological root in the notion of an
‘infinite God, defined mainly by an unlimited will.’36
For Milbank, the new theory of sovereignty is profoundly theological, in that
the divine sanction exists initially but is pushed into the background and eventually
disappears, replacing it with its own mythos or theology.37 In such a way, the state is
31. John Milbank, “The Conflict of the Faculties: Theology and the Economy of the Sciences,” in The
Future of Love: Essays in Political Theology (London: SCM Press, 2009), 310.
32. Ibid., 310.
33. John Milbank, “Paul against Biopolitics,” Theory Culture Society 25, no. 7–8 (December 2008): 130. See
Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, trans. George Schwab (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2005), 36. Cavanaugh, as seen below shares with Milbank his enthusiasm
for Schmitt’s insight.
34. Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 27.
35. Ibid., 19.
36. John Milbank, “Atonement: Christ the exception,” in Being Reconciled: Ontology and Pardon (Oxford:
Routledge, 2003), 98.
37. Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 27.
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then created and justified through a false theology. And in endorsing this new state,
theology indirectly affirms a false and deviant theology which has replaced God with
this mythos. For Milbank, then, state sovereignty rests on a false god.
In Milbank’s criticisms of state sovereignty, he echoes many of the complaints of
the English traditions of Anglo-Catholicism and political pluralism. Ernest Barker,
an English pluralist, argues that it was the Nonconformists who were the original
discreditors of the state within England, but that since 1833 this title shifted to the
‘high Anglican’.38 Milbank shares their concerns, which, according to Barker, are that
the ‘Church is a substantive body independent of the State, with its own origin in
divine foundation, its own continuity in virtue of apostolical descent, its own rights
in virtue of its origin and continuity.’39 Barker named John Neville Figgis as carrying
this tradition of Anglican discrediting forward.
The modern state comes late in the story Milbank narrates. By the time we get
to someone like Hobbes, the outcome is almost inevitable – a nominalist, voluntarist
state based in nihilism. Such a state commands absolute sovereignty over atomized
individuals, and is based on violence in order to overcome the chaos which lies at
the heart of its ontological commitments. With the state’s origins found in heretical
theology, it becomes profane. But for Milbank, this is not inevitable, for what
holds the modern state together is not the force of the ideas that underpin it, but
its mythos. At ground, Milbank agrees with the thesis that every society has some
mythos or metaphysical grounding, even if, as in the case of secular modernity, it is
explicitly denied. In Milbank’s account of the various mythoi, we do not find a simple
progression over time. Modern figures can ground their thought in an ancient mythos,
for instance, as he finds in Girard.40 To out-narrate this mythos requires an alternative
mythos:
Yet Christianity implicitly (if not in practice) puts an end to this division,
because in the life of Christ a new mythos is established which replaced
and resituated the mythos of antiquity. Christianity is now the lien logique
du mythe et de l’histoire in the following way: Christ is the founder of a new
city, which, uniquely, does not refer to a story of primal murder, primal
sacrifice and expulsion (like the story of Romulus and Remus) but traces
its descent from a sacrificial victim who had no material issue.41
Milbank’s account of the origins of the state is largely an idealist one – the ideas
of Scotus, Bodin, Hobbes, Spinoza, and Grotius made the state what it is now. Their
mythos of state sovereignty, which displaced the medieval Christian mythos, makes
38. Ernest Barker, “The Discredited State,” in Church, State and Study: Essays (London: Methuen, 1930),
154-155.
39. Ibid., 156.
40. Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 397–398.
41. Ibid., 72.
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the state discontinuous with the political structures that preceded it. The modern
developments of sovereignty, rights, and so on, mean that the state as we now have it
is grounded in false theology and in an ontology of violence. Theologies of the modern
state are basically heretical, with the state therefore being profane.
As seen below, there are historians who find such structural factors important
in the formation of the state. But they would not necessarily serve as a support to
Milbank, but may in fact offer an alternative, more materialist, account of the state. Of
course, Milbank rejects this voluntarist and nominalist notion of the state. But to reject
the modern state on this basis requires that this account is true, or at least plausible.
Milbank clearly thinks it is. But is there anything more that can be said about this
idealist notion than that the figures he identifies – Hobbes, Spinoza, and Grotius–
created the modern state out of the false theology and praxis of the medieval church?
What is missing in Milbank is the connection of these ideas to the concrete realities of
the rise of the state.
To get to the base of this, Milbank examines the basis of voluntarism: the idea of
the priority of the will which developed in medieval theology. This was a contingent
deviation from a theology which favoured the rational ordering of the universe
based in the reason of God, and not, as in voluntarism, God’s arbirtary will. To
Milbank, voluntarism become part of the ‘liberal-Protestant metanarrative’ grounded
in Troeltsch and Weber.42
Milbank’s criticism of voluntarism is largely targetted at Hobbes. This is partly for
what voluntarism does to the church: makes it a creation of the will of sovereign
Leviathan. The voluntarism of the state renders the church a mere voluntary
association. In order to make the church a political body, as both Milbank and
Cavanaugh wish to, they must overcome this voluntarist position, which they see as
false.43 Their argument here is as much legal as theological. Originating with Pope
Innocent IV, the doctrine of persona ficta renders such associations fictitious.44
That the will came to be preferred over intellect led to an individualizing move,
which led to nominalism. How did this shift take place? Milbank blames bad theology
which preferred monotheistic unity of will to orthodox Trinitarianism, which saw in
unity a unity of mind and action.45 A link was therefore forged between ‘monotheism
and monarchic unity’.46 He further writes: ‘A bureaucratic regime of a socialist,
42. Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 95.
43. Cavanaugh, “The City,” 192, 199n39.
44. See F. W. Maitland, “Translator’s Introduction,” in Political Theories of the Middle Age, by Otto Gierke,
trans. Frederic William Maitland (Boston: Beacon Press, 1958), xix. Further work could be done here on
the influence of this tradition in the work of Milbank and Cavanaugh. The origins of this tradition lie
in the work of Otto Gierke, and his introduction to the English reader by Frederic William Maitland.
Maitland in turn influenced one of Cavanaugh’s main sources, Ernst Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies:
A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997). Dealing fully with all
this voluminous material in English Pluralism is beyond the scope here, which is merely to show how
Milbank and Cavanaugh use it uncritically to affirm the church as a social body in its own right.
45. Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 15.
46. Ibid., 15.
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or other kind, will suppress polytheistic variety, and with this the impulse of the
liberative will which is the legacy of Western monotheism.’47
In discussing Hobbes, Milbank finds that he reduces the state to nominalist as-
sumptions; the state is the invention of individuals and has no essence.48 ToMilbank,
Hobbes’s state is both voluntarist and nominalist, being a mere voluntary association
with no essence apart from the individual elements. This is the only sense in which the
state can be a creator, albeit a creator of a special sort. Being the creature of contracting
individuals, the state makes society between these same individuals. The implications
of this view are followed through more fully in Cavanaugh, when discussing the unity
offered by the state.
It is outside the scope of the present work to provide a full appraisal of all
Milbank’s philosophical moves and positions. Others, as surveyed in Chapter 1, have
tried this. Another approach is to show that Milbank is wrong about the origins of the
secular, as Jeffrey Stout has claimed to do in his alternative account of the secular.49
Stout argues that the public space became increasingly secularized as the Bible lost
its authority in public debate. While many traditions, Stout notes, have authoritative
interpreters of scripture, the early modern post-Reformation period was characterized
by many political groupings claiming authoritative readings of scripture. Yet their
profound and insurmountable differences in interpretation meant that appeals to the
Bible soon lost their purchase in public discourse. It was apparent that in public
debate, differences had to be resolved by means other than the Bible. This brought
about the secularization of public life and politics.50 He concludes that in no way does
secularization of this kind necessitate a commitment to secularism, secular liberalism,
any other ideology or the secular state.51 The subtext of Stout’s conclusions is that
Radical Orthodoxy flattens the secular into a stereotype, without acknowledging the
differences between ‘secularism’ and ‘secularisation’ and the multifarious forms these
take. He also believes that confessional heterogeneity is a fact of life, and one that can
be neither wished away, nor transformed coercively into a homogeneous society.52 Of
course, the narration of the secular which Stout has starts in the early-modern period.
Milbank goes back much further than that to Scotus in the High Middle Ages, some
three hundred years before Stout’s beginning point. One would hesitate to say that
such selections of the beginning of the secular are arbitrary, but it does highlight the
differences on the authority of history and the lack of a point outside history to judge
between various options here.
An overall appraisal of Milbank’s narration of the origins of the state will come
later in the chapter, following a discussion of Cavanaugh. Milbank remains critical of
47. Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 99.
48. Ibid., 14.
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theologians who adopt the knowledge and methods of the secular disciplines (such
as sociology) in an uncritical fashion, since they are grounded in bad parodies of true
theology, and grounded in violent pagan ontologies.
Cavanaugh and the State’s Violent Origins
Like Milbank, Cavanaugh also writes of the competing mythoi of state and church,
which for him oppose each other in offering competing solutions for the fundamental
political problem of bringing about and sustaining the unity of human societies. This,
as he sees it, is the problem which exercised the minds of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau,
and other political theorists. While accepting the problem, Cavanaugh’s solution is
theological, and not secular.
In the way Cavanaugh frames their conflicting solutions, both state and church
address the same problem of disunity, and both attempt, in their different ways, to
bring about the unity of humanity into a social body. For Cavanaugh, then, there are
not ‘two essentially different spheres of discourse’, with one ‘political’ and the other
‘religious’. Rather, there is one story about ‘conflict and reconciliation’ with two very
different tellings.53 This antagonism between the narratives of church and state lies at
the heart of Cavanaugh’s political theology.
While both church and state try to solve the problem of disunity, they differ in
where the origins of the problem lie. In describing ‘the Christian story’, Cavanaugh
goes to Genesis 1 to locate the ‘natural unity of the human race.’54 Fall from this
primordial harmony comes through the disobedience of Adam, Cain’s fratricide, and
the scattering at Babel, all of which created individuals with a need for redemption
from this disunity.55 Redemption, for Cavanaugh, is found in reunifying humanity
through the practice of the Eucharist. Contrasted with the Christian story, Cavanaugh
describes ‘the state story’.56 This is modernity’s political history, beginning not with
unity but ‘from an assumption of the essential individuality of the human race’ in the
state of nature.57 Political salvation comes through the social contract. Yet, despite
their differing starting points, ‘both accounts agree that salvation is essentially a
matter of making peace among competing individuals. It is in soteriology, in other
words, that the ends of the Christian mythos and the state mythos seem to coincide.’58
Politics originates for Cavanaugh in the human will to unity. The origins of the politics
53. See Cavanaugh, “Discerning,” 196.
54. Cavanaugh, “The City,” 183.
55. Another perspective is that the spreading out of humanity is a fulfilment of the divine mandate to
multiply and fill the Earth, against the tendencies of humanity to want to stay put and centralize in Babel.
See Martin Sicker, Reading Genesis Politically: An Introduction to Mosaic Political Philosophy (Westport:
Praeger, 2002), 128.
56. Cavanaugh, “The City,” 186–190.
57. Ibid., 186.
58. Ibid., 187.
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of both church and state are soteriological, originating in saviour figures, either the
politics of the body of Christ, or in the profane political body of the state.
Cavanaugh’s framing of the problem of disunity is central to his political theology,
but he does not establish his case for this being the political problem. He accepts
the problem of disunity and the primordial natural unity of humanity as given, even
though they also form the ontological foundations of competing theories of the state
to his. The idea of unity as the political problem does not come from nowhere;
it springs from the medieval principle of principium unitatis.59 That unity between
people is thought possible implies the inherent sociability of humans, a position that
is the basis of the naturalistic foundation of the state.60 This theory of sociability,
or, in other words, the idea that humans are inherently political creatures, is usually
attributed to Aristotle.61 As a theory of the state, that the state is the highest form of
human association derives from this view of the unity possible in human life. Yet, this
theory runs counter to Cavanaugh’s view that the unity offered by the state depends
on the natural disunity of individuals in the state of nature. This exposes another
difference in the unity wanted by Cavanaugh. In the mediaeval period, unity was
also considered an ideal, but the sort of unity wanted by someone like Dante was
the unity of church and state.62 In narrating the modern quest for unity, Cavanaugh
presents the options as either through the church or through the state, with the state
excluded from being a part of the unity that God brings.
When he turns to the specific origins of the modern state, Cavanaugh finds another
expression of the attempt to solve the problem of disunity, this time expressed in how
the so-called ‘wars of religion’ between Catholics and Protestants are narrated. To
Cavanaugh, the state claims it emerged to bring unity and peace to the warring parties
by providing a neutral space (politics) in which their differences could be set aside. Of
how the story is told, he writes:
It has a foundational importance for the secular West, because it explains
the origin of its way of life and its system of governance. It is a creation
myth for modernity. Like the ancient Hebrew Genesis or the Babylonian
Enuma Elish, it tells a story of the overcoming of primordial chaos by the
59. Otto Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age, trans., with an introduction by Frederic William
Maitland (Boston: Beacon Press, 1958), 9; Marsilius of Padua, The Defender of the Peace, ed. and trans.
Annabel Brett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 114n1. Unity was also a special focus
of Aquinas in “De regimine principum,” in Aquinas: Political Writings, ed. and trans. R. W. Dyson
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 5–52.
60. John Neville Figgis, The Political Aspects of S. Augustine’s ‘City of God’ (London: Longmans, Green,
and Co. 1921), 38.
61. Aristotle, “The Politics,” 1253a2.
62. Dante, Monarchy, ed. and trans. Pru Shaw (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), I.viii,
xv. Also see Figgis, Political Aspects, 100.
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forces of order. The myth of the wars of religion is also a soteriology, a
story of our salvation from mortal peril.63
For Cavanaugh, this is a myth because the ‘centralized bureaucratic state preceded
these wars’.64 The wars of religion did not make the modern state, but this is narrated
in such a way as to be a believable mythos for modern people.
It may not have been the ‘wars of religion’ that made the state, but, for Cavanaugh,
it was war nonetheless: the wars of the state against internal powers and in defining
territorial boundaries.65 Cavanaugh’s account of the rise of the state depends heavily
on a strand of historical sociology that makes a strong link between war-making and
the formation of the state. He cites Otto Hintze, Perry Anderson, Hendrik Spruyt,
Anthony Giddens, Victor Burke, and others, in claiming a ‘wide acceptance’, or even
‘consensus’, on the link between war-making and state-building.66 But bellicism is not
the only explanation of state formation.
Against this bellicist ‘consensus’, one does not need to go far to find other
models of state formation. In his essay ‘Theories of State Formation’ in The Blackwell
Companion to Political Sociology, Gianfranco Poggi describes three summary views in
contemporary scholarship on state formation; ‘The Managerial Perspective’ (based on
the work of Joseph Strayer and Harold Bermans), ‘The Military Perspective’ (based
on the work of Otto Hintze and Charles Tilly), and ‘The Economic Perspective’ (as
witnessed in Karl Marx, Perry Anderson and Barrington Moore, Jr.).67 In a similar
essay, Thomas Ertman breaks down recent research on European state building into
three streams being warfare, rational choice theory, and the ‘cultural turn’ associated
with the work of Julia Adams and Philip Gorski.68
To fully examine all these theories is beyond the task here, which is merely to
raise doubts about Cavanaugh’s claimed ‘consensus’ for the view that the origins and
development of the modern state lie solely in war-making. Where Cavanaugh errs
is in making war and violence the sole root of the modern state. But we should be
wary about single-variable explanations. Things are usually much more complex than
having a single cause. Cavanaugh falls for this simplistic account of origins of the state
because he needs it to cast the state as profane and good for nothing. Born in bellicism,
the state can only be profane.
Cavanaugh’s historical account of the state relies on the work of respectable
sources in historical scholarship and sociology. But what is notable about his account
63. William T. Cavanaugh, The Myth of Religious Violence: Secular Ideology and the Roots of Modern Conflict
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 123.
64. Cavanaugh, Theopolitical Imagination, 29.
65. Cavanaugh, Myth of Religious Violence, 162–163.
66. Ibid., 163, 262n232.
67. Gianfranco Poggi, “Theories of State Formation,” in The Blackwell Companion to Political Sociology,
ed. Kate Nash and Alan Scott (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 95–106.
68. Thomas Ertman, “State Formation and State Building in Europe,” in The Handbook of Political
Sociology: States, Civil Societies and Globalization, ed. Thomas Janoski, Robert R. Alford, Alexander M.
Hicks, and Mildred A. Schwartz (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 378.
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of the rise of the state is its limited scope. The question of the origins of the modern
state remains one of the most debated topics in modern historical scholarship, with no
clear consensus on what the state is, or when it came to be. Scholars place the origins of
the modern state at any time from the middle ages onwards, with the modern welfare
state not emerging until after the Second World War. This is not a debate that can be
resolved here, but if pieces of his argument are doubtful it will challenge Cavanaugh’s
conclusions. One possible criticism is to show that the church contributed to the rise of
the state in non-violent ways. The church was, at times, heavily involved in the state,
providing it with services and personnel.69 Another source of this view is Joseph
R. Strayer, who believes that the church played a rôle in the formation of the modern
state by having some of the attributes needed for state development: ‘for example,
enduring institutions—and was developing others—for example, a theory of papal
sovereignty.’70 These practices and theories were in constant contact with politics
since government could not take place without ongoing interaction with the church.
Church teaching also had an impact: ‘The Church was also teaching that secular rulers
were bound to give peace and justice to their subjects—a doctrine which logically
demanded the creation of new judicial and administrative institutions.’71 But for
Strayer, the church was only one influence among many, and was not a sufficient cause
of the modern state. Strayer also addresses an issue that preoccupies Cavanaugh: the
relationship between war and the rise of the state. According to Strayer, while war had
a rôle in the development of the state, it also stunted the growth of the state.72 Again,
there is no space here for a full examination of the historical material marshalled in
support of Cavanaugh’s thesis, or that which might challenge it. More important here
is his construal of history and what Cavanaugh is doing in relating this history. Suffice
it to say that this history is more highly contentious than Cavanaugh admits.
In his endeavour, Cavanaugh confirms the thesis discussed below (on page 98):
that one selects a starting point in the narration of origins where one finds the most
interesting change. In this task, Cavanaugh tries to make the state discontinuous with
what went before it. In doing this, ‘Cavanaugh downplays what the modern state has
in common with earlier forms of political community, namely the purpose of creating
the physical conditions for human flourishing.’73 Cavanaugh’s history of the state
downplays any mention of its providing any temporal goods. Part of the problem here
is that Cavanaugh lacks an adequate theory of the purpose of human government. In
his analysis of the origins of government, he finds only a false soteriology; he does
69. See Hélène Millet and Peter Moraw, “Clerics in the State,” in Power Elites and State Building, ed.
Wolfgang Reinhard (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 173–188.
70. Joseph R. Strayer, On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1970), 15–16. Also see Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), 113–115.
71. Strayer, Medieval Origins, 16.
72. Ibid., 58–60.
73. Shadle, “Cavanaugh on the Church,” 269.
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not find, as others in the tradition have, any social or communal goods that help to
explain the formation of human government or the state. Where others find in the
state a promoter of the common good and social order, Cavanaugh only finds mere
parodies of these goods.
Part of the reason for this is Cavanaugh’s enthusiasm for the analysis of Carl
Schmitt who famously wrote that, ‘All significant concepts of the modern theory of
the state are secularized theological concepts’.74 Cavanaugh depends on this passage
in several places, but it largely underscores his view of the origins of politics and
the state.75 Cavanaugh wants to believe this because it makes the state profane. He
therefore sees the rôle of the state as being to do what the church should do, since
the state is merely a parasite on theology and has no independence from being a
corruption of theological concepts. The origins of the state become the mirror image of
the origins of Christ. Because Christ came to save, the state comes to save. And since
Cavanaugh believes he has found in history a place – in the wars of religion – in which
the state ‘saves’, he has proved this point. This short-circuits any genuinely theological
basis for anything other than a profane state because it is defined as parasitic on
the church, the way evil is parasitic on the good. This christological analysis can be
extended into the profane origins of the state, by comparing, analogously, the sacred
origins of Christ with the violent origins of the Antichrist.
While Cavanaugh never directly calls the state the Antichrist, there are two ways
in which the state can be described as fulfilling the rôle of the Antichrist in his
theology. First, as shown above, Cavanaugh shows how Church and state have
the competing doctrine of salvation. While Christ offers true salvation through His
church, the state as Antichrist offers a false parody of this salvation. The second way
in which the state is the Antichrist is seen in the parallels between the violent origins of
Cavanaugh’s state and the violent origins of the Antichrist, as understood by Christian
traditions. Through this interpretation of Cavanaugh, it will bring to light his method
of describing the history of the state and how this is set up in opposition to the church.
Furthermore, since Christ and the Antichrist are opposites, it is possible to learn about
Cavanaugh’s Christ from a consideration of his implied Antichrist.
The Antichrist has sometimes been identified with political figures.76 Some
anarchists have seen the state as the devil, as C. J. Friedrich observed in early twentieth
century: ‘The only radical opposition has, in recent times, come from anarchists who,
denying the ethical value of the political community, have insisted that it is the devil
74. Schmitt, Political Theology, 36.
75. Cavanaugh discusses this quote in “Messianic Nation: A Christian Theological Critique of
American Exceptionalism,” University of St. Thomas Law Journal 3, no. 2 (2005): 267–268; “If You Render
Unto God What Is God’s, What Is Left for Caesar?” The Review of Politics 71, no. 4 (2009): 607–619;
“Separation and Wholeness: Notes on the Unsettling Political Presence of the Body of Christ,” in For the
Sake of the World: Swedish Ecclesiology in Dialogue with William T. Cavanaugh, ed. Jonas Ideström, Church
of Sweden Research Series (Eugene: Pickwick Publications, 2010), 23.
76. See Bernard McGinn, Antichrist: Two Thousand Years of the Human Fascination with Evil (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2000), 45–50, 260.
Chapter 3. Creation and the Origin of the State 81
incarnate which stands in the way of all that is desirable.’77 Here, however, the
emphasis is on the parallel between the violent origins of Cavanaugh’s state and the
violent origins of the Antichrist. This is apparent in the traditional contrast between
the pure birth of Christ and the profane origins of the Antichrist. Adso of Montier-en-
Der, in the mediaeval text Libellus de ortu et tempore Antichristi, says that, unlike Christ,
the Antichrist was ‘born as the result of sexual intercourse of his mother and father,
like other men.’ In this account, the Antichrist will be ‘conceived entirely in sin, he will
be engendered in sin, and he will be born in sin.’ In contrast to Christ, the devil, rather
than the Holy Spirit, will enter the womb of the Antichrist’s mother.78 Hildegard of
Bingen gave a later account of the origins of the Antichrist in Scivias. The Antichrist’s
mother was full of vice and a fornicator, not knowing which man inseminated her.
Once born the ‘son of perdition will be nurtured by the Devil’s arts until he comes
to full adulthood.’79 Hildegard also writes of the lies and deception of the Antichrist
in claiming to be a false saviour with political ambitions: ‘he will join with kings,
dukes, princes and the rich, crushing humility and exalting pride, and by the Devil’s
arts subjecting the whole world to himself.’80 Other traditions variously show that the
Antichrist was conceived in incest, and born by Caesarean section, and so not only
not born of a woman as Jesus was, but also killing his mother in being born.81 Born of
human lust and incest, the Antichrist is profane, coming from depravity and violence,
and for this reason is not worthy of human devotion or praise.
An analogy can be drawn between these traditional accounts of the origins of the
Antichrist and how the origins of the state are described by Cavanaugh, with both
being judged to be profane due to their origins. Not only, according to Cavanaugh, is
the modern state born in violence, but it also, like the Antichrist, offers a false salvation
for humanity – away from one’s primary allegiance to a church and to allegiance to
the “peace-making” state. Statist political theory misleads people about the true state
of humanity in order to deceive people to give allegiance to the state and not Christ
and His church. Following Hildegard, we might also construe that Satan, being the
father of lies (John 8:44), tries to deceive us about the origins of the state, which does
not bring peace or salvation, but only more of the warring from which the Antichrist
comes. As shown above, Cavanaugh sees the true origins of the state in war and
violence.
It is intriguing here that Cavanaugh rarely resorts to scripture to support his
political commitments. One might have thought that in the demonization of the
state, Revelation 13 would prove useful to him. Heinrich Schlier, commenting on
77. C. J. Friedrich, “The Deification of The State,” The Review of Politics 1, no. 1 (January 1939): 29.
78. Cited in Renate Blumenfeld-Kosinski, Not of Woman Born: Representations of Caesarean Birth in
Medieval and Renaissance Culture (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 132–133.
79. Hildegard of Bingen, Scivias, trans. Mother Columba Hart and Jane Bishop (New York: Paulist Press,
1990), 502.
80. Ibid., 502.
81. Blumenfeld-Kosinski, Not of Woman Born, 125–142.
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Revelation 13, calls ‘this world state’ an instrument of Satan, which ‘Instead of serving
God, this political power works to serve God’s enemy.’82 Yet, while there are parallels
here between this interpretation of Revelation 13 and an Antichrist state, as found in
Cavanaugh, to go to Revelation 13 traditionally entails considering its opposite image
in Romans 13.83 According to some traditions of political theology, this text is a more
positive image of the ‘state’, with these two views showing the best and worst of
the state. Cavanaugh short circuits this tension by making the state an Antichrist,
which never works for the good. Whereas some would see here a state which can
be sometimes good and sometimes bad, Cavanaugh sees pure rivalry that cannot be
resolved or mediated. Yet this move can never fully succeed, since the Antichrist
does not have its own ontological existence that can be denied or avoided. Rather,
the Antichrist and the evil it promotes, is derivative from Christ and parasitic on the
good.84
For Cavanaugh, the modern state is not only created through profane violence, but
also becomes a creator of civil society. He reasons that the state creates civil society,
since ‘there were no such thing as societies, in the sense of clearly bounded and unitary
systems of interaction, until the birth of the modern state.’85 Cavanaugh agrees with
Milbank, that the state simplifies space, with the modern state replacing the complex
space of guilds, families, clans, and other overlapping groupings with a levelled space
with one ultimate allegiance owed to the sovereign.86 For Cavanaugh, this rules out
the notion that the state comes from the evolution of civil society, with the implication
that civil society cannot be a non-statist space within society.
Cavanaugh’s critique of the modern state’s absorption of civil society applies also
to Hobbes and Locke. In Hobbes, society is formed through the creation of the
state which brings everyone and everything together into equal relations under the
sovereign: ‘This creation of a unitary space requires the absorption into the sovereign
of the church and any other bodies that would threaten the unity of Leviathan.’87
Cavanaugh finds the same tendency in Locke:
The “society” that Locke’s state enacts is coterminous with the market,
to which individuals come to contract for certain goods, both material
and political. Locke’s simplification of political space into the oscillation
between individual rights and state sovereignty . . . relegates all other
forms of common life—those based on biology, locality, common blood,
82. Heinrich Schlier, Principalities and Powers in the New Testament (Freiburg: Herder, 1961), 77–78.
83. See, for example, William Stringfellow, Conscience & Obedience: The Politics of Romans 13 and
Revelation 13 in Light of the Second Coming (Eugene: Wipf & Stock, 2004).
84. See Niebuhr, Nature and Destiny of Man, Vol. II, 330.
85. Cavanaugh, “Killing for the Telephone Company,” 246.
86. See ibid., 251.
87. See ibid., 252.
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common tasks, or common calling—to the status of the essentially private
“voluntary society”.88
In making this point, Cavanaugh targets the Catholic public theologian John
Courtney Murray, who placed a strong emphasis on the distinction between state and
civil society, with the state playing a rôle within society to provide certain goods, such
as law and administration. This creates, or leaves open, public space in which civil
society and the church can act to influence the state. Murray writes:
In general, ‘society’ signifies an area of freedom, personal and corporate,
whereas ‘state’ signifies the area in which public powers may legitimately
apply their coercive powers. To deny the distinction is to espouse the
notion of government as totalitarian.89
In demonizing the state, Cavanaugh denies this distinction, because liberal secular
theory makes the society dependent on the state. This has huge implications for
alternatives to the state’s politics and political redemption, which is discussed in
Chapter 5. In Cavanaugh’s account, this creation of the state has two important effects
for the church. First, it makes the church dependent on the state. Second, it makes
the state the primary and sole political body, denying that the church is also a political
body in its own right. But by affirming that the church can escape the grip of the state
and be a political body causes the following problem for Cavanaugh: if the church can
escape the state, why cannot other associations in civil society also be political bodies
in their own right? What is so special about the church?
conc
In conclusion, Milbank and Cavanaugh stress the profane origins of the state to be
found in selective historical narratives of its development. In their relating the origins
of the state and violence, both Milbank and Cavanaugh echo Friedrich Nietzsche:
‘One would think that whoever took a glimpse into the origin of the state would
henceforth seek his salvation only at a fearful distance from it: and where does one
not see the monuments of that origin, ravaged countries, destroyed cities, brutalised
people, consuming hatred of nations!’90 A final assessment of their account of origins
will be made in concluding this chapter. The remainder of this chapter will consider
other theological and secular accounts of the origins of politics and the state, some
describing the state as sacred, some profane.
88. See Cavanaugh, “Killing for the Telephone Company,” 254.
89. John Courtney Murray cited in William T. Cavanaugh, “Is Public Theology Really Public?: Some
Problems with Civil Society,” Annual of the Society of Christian Ethics 21 (2001): 106.
90. Friedrich Nietzsche, Writings from the Early Notebooks, ed. Raymond Geuss and Alexander Nehamas,
trans. Ladislaus Löb (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 72.
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The Politics of Creation in Christian Tradition
This section will look into the relationship of the origins of politics as found in
Scripture and theological traditions. This will be important in how theology relates
to the tension between the historical and ontological origins of the state.
The Politics of the Bible
Scripture contains no explicit mention of the creation of the state, but this has not
prevented people looking there for the sacred or profane origins of the state. Searching
here, instead of in secular thought, finds support in Robert Filmer, who writes of
the ‘scandal’ that Christians ‘seek the original of government from the inventions
or fictions of poets, orators, philosophers and heathen historians’ neglecting the
Scriptures, ‘which have with more authority most particularly given us the true
grounds and principles of government.’91 Despite Filmer’s encouragement, it has
been more common for the political theologian to seek the legitimacy or illegitimacy
of the civil powers in Scripture than to look there for their origin. But, as the following
sections show, Scripture has much to say about the origins of government. Genesis is
the main popular source here, with other texts from both testaments supplementing
this to show how Scripture contains evidence for both sacred or profane views of the
state.
The Genesis of the State according to the Bible
In the pursuit of origins, the book of Genesis has proved to have perennial promi-
nence. Western culture still measures its alternative genealogies of many phenomena
against Genesis, with the paradigmatic case being the apparent conflict between
Genesis and Charles Darwin’s Origins of the Species on the origins of life.92 In the
history of political thought, we also find that Genesis has played an important rôle in
the political imagination, both in the legitimizing efforts of some and the overturning
stories of others.
This fascination with Genesis is partly explained by the positive connection
commonly held between antiquity and legitimacy. For this reason, a politics grounded
in Genesis, which, because it describes the first events of human life, even if it is not
the oldest book of the Bible, will have the greatest legitimacy of all. In explicating
politics from Genesis, there are attempts to go back further in time than competing
theories. So while some find the origins of the state in sin (Genesis 3), others see it in
the dominion given to Adam (Genesis 1:28), still others find it in the creation of the
91. Sir Robert Filmer, “The Anarchy of a Limited or Mixed Monarchy,” in Patriarcha and Other Writings,
ed. Johann P. Sommerville (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 133.
92. For Genesis as a yard-stick in Western culture see Ana M. Acosta, Reading Genesis in the Long
Eighteenth Century: From Milton to Mary Shelley (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006).
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two lights (Genesis 1:16).93 One can construct a doctrine of the sovereignty of God
over all creation based in Genesis 1:1; this linking God’s right to govern creation with
God’s creative acts (cf. Psalm 24:1–2). Exploring all these proposals is not possible
here. The following paragraphs will explore a few that display, in turn, the sacred and
profane origins of the state in Genesis.
In Reformed thought, the ‘cultural mandate’ of Genesis 1:28 is central to its under-
standing of the divine origins of politics. Min does not exaggerate when he writes:
‘For the Reformational thinkers, the cultural mandate of Genesis 1:28 is the placenta
of politics destined to reach other spheres of life.’94 But the political importance of this
text to the Reformed churches should not overshadow its importance in Catholicism.
Leo XIII’s Rerum Novarum, for instance, sees in this verse the basis of the family as the
‘true society’ providing for a social space anterior to, and outside, the sovereignty of
the state.95
The search for origins in Genesis need not be positive; one can just as easily find
profane politics in it. For many theologians, the notion of the Fall in Genesis has been
the basis for the foundations of political problems as well as for political order. Martin
Luther, as will be discussed below, grounded his theory of the state in the Fall, with
the primary rôle of government being to ‘hold sin in check.’96
André Dumas also has a negative account of the origins of politics. Based on
his reading of the Old Testament, Dumas finds the ‘great political drama of the Old
Testament,’ as the ‘continual conflicts between brothers.’97 He writes, ‘Human politics
consists first in coming to terms with the fact that the brotherhood itself nourishes
war.’98 While, in support of his thesis, Dumas ranges over the entire biblical canon,
others, including Milbank and Cavanaugh, find direct support for their negativity
toward the state in the story of Cain and Abel in Genesis 4.99 Cavanaugh’s main
use of Cain’s fratricide is that he sees it as part of the primordial splintering of
humanity, out of which we require redemption.100 He also links the murder of Abel
by Cain with Cain’s being the first city builder (Genesis 4:17), and the originator of
political society.101 Milbank does this too, using the story of Cain and Abel (following
93. See Samuel Ajzenstat, “Liberal Democracy and the Biblical Account of Creation: Some Structural
Analogies,” in Liberal Democracy and the Bible, ed. Kim Ian Parker (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1992),
19–37.
94. Min, Sin and Politics, 34.
95. Leo XIII, “Rerum Novarum,” § 12.
96. Martin Luther, Luther’s Works, Volume 1: Lectures on Genesis, Chapters 1–5, ed. Jaroslav Pelikan, trans.
George V. Schick (Saint Louis: Concordia, 1958), 104.
97. André Dumas, Political Theology and the Life of the Church, trans. John Bowden (London: SCM Press,
1978), 32.
98. Ibid., 35.
99. Figgis argues that Augustine traces the earthly city back to Cain. See Figgis, Political Aspects, 41.
100. Cavanaugh, “The City,” 183, 184; “The Body of Christ: The Eucharist and Politics,” Word and World
22, no. 2 (2002): 176.
101. William T. Cavanaugh, “A World without Enemies: The Eucharist and the Work of Peace,” ABC
Religion & Ethics, September 18, 2012, <http://www.abc.net.au/religion/articles/2012/09/18/
3592178.htm> (accessed April 23, 2013).
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Augustine) to show that the Earthly City is of profane origin.102
Can political theology move from the ancient city to the modern state so easily?
When talking about ancient political structures, it is customary to use the term ‘city’.
That Milbank and Cavanaugh both do so provides support for the idea that they
acknowledge continuity between theological reflection on the city and theological
reflection on the state, despite affirming discontinuity between the ancient city and
the modern state.103 Milbank, in particular, speaks of the polis (Greek for ‘city’) when
speaking of politics. The linkage between the city and other political structures
(whether states or empires) is provided by Augustine in De civitate Dei, which has
influenced theological reflection on politics ever since. His multivalence is considered
fortunate by Augustine scholar Eugene TeSelle, who writes that civitas could mean
people in general, a built city, the state or polity, or citizenship.104 This multivalence
is one reason why the ‘city’ has become an enduring symbol of human politics. Part
of the problem with relating the city with the language of the ‘state’ is that there is no
ancient word for the modern state, as Oliver O’Donovan notes.105
Returning to the first biblical city, deriving the profanity of the state from Cain and
Abel, as Milbank and Cavanaugh do, is questionable for several reasons. First, this
perspective makes a firm link between Cain’s fratricide and the founding of politics.
But instead of fratricide being the origins of the politics, it could be read that God’s
preserving work in allowing Cain to procreate, and founding of the city of Enoch for
his protection, was God’s providing for Cain’s survival.106 Of the few church Fathers
who commented on this passage, Nemesius of Emesa finds the city providing a means
for expressing human sociability.107 Given the range of interpretations of Cain’s city,
urban theologian John Rogerson writes of the city that, ‘It exists by divine permission,
permission granted to a person who had betrayed his brother and thus humanity.
This is an ambiguity that runs like a constant thread through the biblical narratives
that deal with cities.’108 Second, Milbank and Cavanaugh, in linking Cain’s city with
our states, would have us believe that there is continuity between the city of Cain and
102. Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 394. Here the correct reference to Augustine’s discussion of
Cain and Abel is Augustine, City of God, XV.1.
103. For examples of their uses of the ‘city’ trope see: Cavanaugh, “The City.”; Milbank, Theology and
Social Theory, 382ff.
104. Eugene TeSelle, Living in Two Cities: Augustinian Trajectories in Political Thought (Scranton: University
of Scranton Press, 1998), 24–25.
105. The closest we can get is Greek’s politeia and Latin’s civitas and respublica. See Oliver O’Donovan,
The Desire of the Nations: Rediscovering the Roots of Political Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1996), 231.
106. This is how the story was read by Ambrose, “Cain and Abel,” in Hexameron, Paradise, and Cain and
Abel, vol. 42, Fathers of the Church (New York: Catholic University of America Press, 1961), 435.
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ed. William Telfer, The Library of Christian Classics (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2006), 243.
Also see Ptolemy of Lucca, On the Government of Rulers: De Regimine Principum, trans. James M. Blythe
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997), 4.2.5, 4.3.12.
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the profane modern state, with the violence of Cain being somehow transmitted to
the state. But, in general, Milbank and Cavanaugh tend toward seeing discontinuity
between the ancient and modern forms of polity. Furthermore, a political imagination
formed by Scripture would recognize that the biblical city was founded and protected
by God (Psalm 48:8; Psalm 127:1), and those whom God is with, such as David (2
Samuel 5:9–10). The city is not only founded by God, but is also regularly faithful
(Zechariah 8:3; Isaiah 1:21,26), holy (Isaiah 52:1), and the dwelling place of God (Psalm
46:4–5; Ezekiel 48:35). Third, it sets aside the meaning of the city in the redemption of
humanity and the end of history. At the end of time, the New Jerusalem is promised
to us, with redemption coming through the city of God.109 For these three reasons,
a clear link between fratricide and the profanity of the city and modern state is not
therefore as clear cut as Milbank and Cavanaugh would make it appear.
In this brief survey of several political interpretations of Genesis, there are two
main competing interpretations of where politics and the state come from. Some argue
from Genesis that they are of divine origin, while others, using the same evidence, see
them resulting from the murder and sin of humanity. Given these divergent opinions,
Genesis provides no easy answers, therefore, in deciding whether the state is sacred
or profane.
Prophecy and the Origins of Politics
Prophetic biblical literature also speaks to the divine ordering of politics. Especially
challenging to contemporary secular justifications of the autonomous state are the
‘Judgment-speeches to foreign nations’.110 That these ancient kings considered their
own actions and political and military victories to be the sole source of their rule,
places them as harbingers of modern rulers, as neither the Pharaohs nor our Prime
Ministers consider themselves to be ruling under God. Walter Brueggemann is a rare
guide to this prophetic literature, and considers the nations (Egypt, Assyria, Babylon,
and Persia) as partners to Yahweh.111 Claims for independence are found within
all these empires. In Isaiah, for instance, God punishes the arrogant boasting of the
Assyrians whose King is full of pride in his autonomy:
For he says: “By the strength of my hand I have done it, and by my
wisdom, for I have understanding; I have removed the boundaries of
peoples, and have plundered their treasures; like a bull I have brought
down those who sat on thrones. My hand has found, like a nest, the wealth
of the peoples; and as one gathers eggs that have been forsaken, so I have
109. See Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics, ed. Clifford J. Green, trans. Reinhard Krauss, Charles C. West, and
Douglas W. Stott (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2009), 71.
110. Claus Westermann, Basic Forms of Prophetic Speech, trans. Hugh Clayton White (London:
Lutterworth Press, 1967), 95.
111. Walter Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament: Testimony, Dispute, Advocacy, New ed
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1997), 492–527.
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gathered all the earth; and there was none that moved a wing, or opened
its mouth, or chirped.” (Isaiah 10:13–14)
Commenting on this passage, Ellul asks, ‘Were these words really written in the
seventh century B.C.? Do they not sum up the whole thinking of modern man?’112
Ellul’s suggestion that the Bible speaks directly to today’s autonomous politics is
reinforced by the book of Daniel.
Daniel 4 contains perhaps the most unambiguous account of the political sover-
eignty of God in scripture, with the statement that God is the source of political power
repeated no fewer than four times. The ‘holy watcher’ in King Nebuchadnezzar’s
dream affirms that ‘the Most High is sovereign over the kingdom of mortals’ (4:17).
This is reaffirmed when Daniel interprets the dream (4:25). All this comes to pass
as Nebuchadnezzar was driven into the wilderness (4:29–33). Finally, however,
Nebuchadnezzar came to his senses and finally affirms the sovereignty of God (4:34–
37).
The biblical account of God’s sovereignty over political power clashes with mod-
ern politics based on secular rationalistic justifications that ignore any transcendent
grounding. Brueggemann points out, in opposition to autonomous politics, that all
nations sit under the Noachic covenant, since God makes a covenant with all the
nations of the earth (Genesis 9:8–17).113 Some theologians, however, might argue
that the modern state is something new and a definitive break with the past. Others,
such as Brueggemann, make a firm link here between the witness of Israel and liberal
politics:
Have we arrived at last at a nation-state that is finally immune to this
witness of metapolitics, so that we came to a point in which Israel’s
witness is seen to be outmoded or self-deceived rhetoric? . . . I imagine
that this ancient witness would judge liberal autonomy to be nothing new,
but one often and anciently utilized in the service of self-deceiving self-
sufficiency.114
Prophetic literature contributes to the theological teaching that all political power
comes from God, challenging any self-sufficient political system that has forgotten
its relative position to the sovereignty of God. Prophecy speaks of the rule of God,
reminding rulers of their dependence on God, even if they do not recognize Him. As
Barth wrote, God ‘rules not only over the Church, but also over all creation, even if
creation ignores it . . . Every man is under the dominion of Christ, whether he knows
it or does not know it.’115 In light of this, the prophet not only proclaims justice and
112. Jacques Ellul, The Politics of God and the Politics of Man, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1972), 159–160.
113. Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 494.
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righteousness, but is also to ‘Say among the nations, “The LORD is king!”’ (Psalm
96:10). In the political imagination of Israel, this rule deabsolutizes or delegitimates
‘all other governances that imagine that are unfettered and absolute.’116
Further Scriptures on Government
Most of the Scriptures discussed above allow the state positive biblical grounding.
From a different standpoint, Christian anarchists also base their position in Scripture,
which is predominantly the incompatibility of the state’s means with the positive
teachings of Jesus’s Sermon on the Mount.117 But there are two places where
anarchists specifically locate the perverse origins of the state in Scripture: 1 Samuel
8 and in the temptations of Jesus.118
In 1 Samuel 8, the elders of Israel petition Samuel for a king to govern them so
they can be ‘like other nations’ (8:4–5). Despite Samuel’s warning about the evils that
a king would bring, the people insisted on having a king. This could be considered
an example of libido regnandi instead of the libido dominandi that Augustine saw as the
foundation of the state.119 God finally relents, giving them their king. Anarchists
see two evils here: the list of crimes of the state that Samuel lists (8:11–18), and the
rejection of the rule of God (8:7). This verse would then seem to justify judging the
state as profane. But even someone as sympathetic to anarchism as Ellul cautions
against this conclusion. As he observes, by demanding a monarch the Israelites made
a ‘human error’, but one God allows his people to make. Eventually, after the failure
of Saul, God ‘uses the error and disobedience of his people, and integrates it into his
plan, so that David is not just the ancestor of Jesus Christ, but also the one who imitates
his kingship.’120 By endorsing the freedom of God to use human mistakes for good,
Ellul undercuts those, including Milbank and Cavanaugh, who stop with the profane
origins of the state without investigating God’s further purposes for it.
While not a direct statement on the createdness of rule, the temptation of Christ in
the wilderness (Matthew 4:8–10; Luke 4:5–8) has been used to show both the profanity
of rule, and its sacred origin. Matthew 4:8–10 reads: ‘Again, the devil took him
to a very high mountain and showed him all the kingdoms of the world and their
splendor; and he said to him, “All these I will give you, if you will fall down and
worship me.”’ Important in interpreting this text is one’s opinion of Satan’s reliability
in claiming that he can grant political power to whomsoever he pleases. Ellul believes
116. Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 239, 492–493.
117. Alexandre J. M. E. Christoyannopoulos, Christian Anarchism: A Political Commentary on the Gospel
(Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2010), 43–82.
118. Ibid., 84–88, 92–95.
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that the devil tells the truth, partly because his word is not challenged by Jesus.121 As
a result, Ellul’s conclusion is that worldly power is demonic.122 Another view is that,
since the Devil is a liar, power is not his to distribute at all.123
The texts discussed above show that Scripture speaks to the origins of political
power, but not in a univocal way. On the basis of Genesis, the origins of politics and
the state can be either grounded positively, in God’s creation of a social humanity, or
negatively, in humanity’s fallenness and desire to be ruled. But whichever view is
favoured, there remains common agreement that, and as the biblical account shows,
political sovereignty is God’s to dispense. This is further confirmed within Christian
theological traditions’ reflections on the origins of politics and the state, which is the
subject of the next section. It should be noted here that Scripture does not describe the
historical origins of particular states or systems of political organization, but merely
provides a perspective on the ultimate grounding of political power.
The State’s Origins According to Christian Doctrine
The foregoing biblical material feeds directly into traditional theologies of the state.
This section offers a brief account of how the state’s origins have been considered by
some major theological traditions in the restraint of sin and the promotion of the good.
The Restraint of Sin
The predominant theological position on the ontological origin of the state is to
identify it as God’s ordinance for the restraint of sin following humanity’s fall (Romans
13:1 in the KJV reads in part ‘For there is no power but of God: the powers that be
are ordained of God.’). Because the provision of the state by God for this purpose
is usually viewed as a providential act of God, this restraining function of the state
will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter; here the focus is on its origins.
Does describing the state as God’s ordinance to restrain sin mean that God created the
state? The answer here will depends on one’s definition of the verb ‘to ordain’, which
can mean both ‘to cause to be made’ and ‘to arrange’. In the former, God would be
creating the state, albeit through human actions. In the latter, God would be arranging
and using the politics of humans for divine purposes. The difference between the two
lies in whether God has an immediate relationship with the state, or a mediated one,
a distinction that will be discussed further below. This section will show how some
121. Jacques Ellul, Anarchy and Christianity, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991),
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theologians, from the Fathers onward, link the origins of the state in God’s ordaining
it to restrain sin.
While Augustine does not go into detail about the origins of the state, he does find
the origins of politics related to the notion of the Fall.124 Consistent with this view,
he sees that, ‘Without the slightest doubt, the kingdoms of men are established by
divine providence.’125 For this reason, Augustine’s politics will be considered in more
detail in the next chapter on preservation. Here we observe that Augustine famously
speaks of two cities being created by two loves: one by the love of God, and the other
by humanity’s self-love.126 The earthly city is founded in the domination in the heart
of people to dominate others. As already seen, this analysis has been adopted by
Milbank and Cavanaugh as providing a foundation for the separation of the political
church (civitas Dei) and the profane state (civitas terrena or civitas diaboli). The further
discussion on Augustine below will show that, while it is sin that is the origin of the
earthly city, the civil authorities are used providentially for the good of the restraint of
sin.
Luther also grounds government in sin and fallen humanity, arguing that before
the Fall no state was needed. In his commentary on Genesis 2:16,17, he remarks that:
Civil government is a remedy required by our corrupted nature . . .
Therefore if men had not become evil through sin, there would have been
no need of civil government; but Adam, together with his descendants,
would have lived in utmost serenity and would have achieved more by
moving one finger than all the swords, instruments of torture, and axes
can achieve now. At that time there would have been no robber, murderer,
thief, envier, and liar. What need, therefore, would there have been of
laws and of civil government, which is like a cauterizing iron and an
awful remedy by which harmful limbs are cut off that the rest may be
preserved?127
So, even though Luther finds biblical justification for government in Genesis, he
does not place it in the realm of creation, but as a remedy for sin, with the aim of
preserving society. Note that this remedy is not redemptive, but merely a remedy
which enables human beings to live together without the full effects of sin being
unleashed upon one another. Luther’s locating of the state in God’s interim remedy for
human sinfulness makes the state a provision of God necessary for the preservation of
people. In this task, it must maintain a level of force and use it against the wrongdoer
124. See discussion at Robert A. Markus, Saeculum: History and Society in the Theology of St Augustine,
2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 197–198.
125. Augustine, City of God, V.1.
126. Ibid., XIV.28.
127. Luther, Lectures on Genesis, 1–5, 104.
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in order to preserve the community as a whole. This is so essential to Luther that
humans must obey the state as if they were obeying God.128
Anabaptists agree with Luther that the state, even with its origins in the restraint
of sin, can be used for good, but they are more interested in the state as an agent
of God’s providence than having its origins associated with God, for this helps to
ameliorate the problem of the violent means the state uses, but also the violence of
its origins. Yoder writes: ‘God does not say, “I want the sword and the state, so I
hereby decree that there shall be a state.” There is no divine act of instituting . . .
God does not create the sword. God does not make oppression, but somehow God
uses it and disposes it.’129 Nevertheless, Yoder, like Cavanaugh, holds a bellicist
position, locating the origins of the state in violence: ‘for there is no regime whose
beginnings was not either revolution or conquest.’130 Yet there is this mystery, which
this perspectives generates: ‘How God can use that which is pagan, indeed that which
is demonic, without affirming it, is something that human understanding cannot
completely grasp.’131
Together with an anthropology of human depravity, holding the state to be God’s
ordinance for the restraint of sin risks sanctifying the state. This is because our
gratitude for the restraint of sin that the state provides will be directly proportional
to our understanding of the depth of human sinfulness. In other words, the more
depraved and sinful humans are assumed to be, the more the state is upheld as a
necessity for the preservation of society. The risk here is that this necessity becomes
divorced from its theological anthropology and becomes a self-justifying presumption
of the state.
Government for the Good
Some theologians think that understanding the state as something which finds its
warrant in sin is too negative and emphasizes the coercive nature of the state.
According to Michael Long, this view was held by Martin Luther King, Jr., who,
in wanting to emphasize more than the coercive nature of government, split with
Luther’s basis for the state in human sinfulness.132 King understood that to call on the
government to concern itself with positive functions, such as the provision of social
welfare, ‘called for an ontological grounding of the state in human sociality, in the
relatedness between human persons, or in something similarly positive.’133 Such an
ontological grounding can be found in the medieval position that one could locate
128. See among many sources, Luther’s commentary on Ecclesiastes 8:2 in Luther’s Works, Volume 15:
Notes on Ecclesiastes; Lectures on the Song of Songs; Treatise on the Last Words of David, ed. Jaroslav Pelikan,
trans. Jaroslav Pelikan, Ian Siggins, and Martin H. Bertram (Saint Louis: Concordia, 1972), 135.
129. Yoder, Christian Attitudes, 177.
130. John Howard Yoder, The Christian Witness to the State (Newton: Faith and Life Press, 1964), 43.
131. John Howard Yoder, Discipleship as Political Responsibility (Scottdale: Herald Press, 2003), 20.
132. See Long, Against Us, But For Us, 120–122.
133. See Ibid., 122.
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the origins of human politics and the state in the created social nature of humans.134
Aquinas developed this position in his theological appropriation of Aristotle.
In De regimine principum, Aquinas outlines ‘both the origin of a kingdom and what
pertains to the king’s office.’135 In doing so, Aquinas relies on Aristotle’s Politics, and
especially the basing of the state in humanity’s social nature.136 Aquinas supports
this perspective with Ecclesiastes 4:9: ‘Two are better than one, because they have the
reward of mutual companionship.’137 He also cites Proverbs 11:14 for the purpose
of showing how political rule is the means to make community life possible. So,
for Aquinas, the ruler is tasked with promoting the common life and therefore the
common good of society, and should not allow society to dissolve by permitting
everyone to follow their own goods.138 Because the priestly office has the knowledge
of the end of the community, it has a duty to guide and steer the kingly office toward its
true end. This notion opens up the way for statecraft, or the church trying to influence
the state, for as Aquinas says: ‘If, therefore, as we have said, he who is responsible for
a final end must govern those who are responsible for the things directed towards that
end and must direct them by his command, it is clear that the king, just as he must be
subject to the lordship and governance administered by the priestly office, must rule
over all human occupations and direct them by his own command and rule.’139
Calvin’s position was that God ordained the magistracy. His evidence for this is
the high names given to rulers in Scripture (Exodus 22:8; Psalm 82:1,6 as interpreted
through John 10:35).140 His position is that ‘it has not come about by human perversity
that the authority over all things on earth is in the hands of kings and other rulers, but
by divine providence and holy ordinance.’141 Calvin also finds rulership a gift of God
(based on Romans 12:8), and finds in Romans 13 a summary statement of civil power
as an ‘ordinance of God.’142 Why, according to Calvin, did God ordain rulership?
His answer is consistent with the end of humanity: in order to worship God.143 He
also writes that Christian kings should see themselves as ministers of God, and in this
office placed under his overall rule, and owing due reverence to God (here Calvin cites
Psalm 2:10–12).144
134. See Ewart Lewis, Medieval Political Ideas, vol. 1 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1954), 146.
135. Aquinas, “De regimine principum,” 5.
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This view, that God ordains rule and even rulers, has sometimes led to the belief
that systems of government, or even individual rulers or particular governments, have
been raised up by God. This found its most pointed expression, and was most abused,
by those who viewed the state as an order of creation.
The State as an Order of Creation
Locating the state in the order of creation (Schöpfungsordnung) is the view the
God’s creative act instituted human politics and the state. Because this gives an
ontological warrant for the political powers that exist, locating the state in the order
of creation remains controversial because of the link that has sometimes been made
between God’s creative act and particular governments, as if God has placed certain
people in power. Such a view is treated as a conservative theological position that
provides legitimacy to the present rulers, and sacralizes the present order. Some
German theologians who took this position in the early twentieth century were
heavily criticized by Barth145 and Bonhoeffer.146 Barth and Bonhoeffer offered a
partial corrective to such a theology of culture in the direction of preservation and
redemption, topics to be covered in the following chapters. Nevertheless, defining the
state as an order of creation has had prominent adherents and is still making converts.
This section discusses the abuses of this view, and how viewing the state as an order
of creation can make the state profane.
A representative of this view was Emil Brunner. Brunner places the state in the
order of creation because humans are created as political beings. Here he follows
Aristotle and Althusius.147 The social nature of men and women finds fulfilment
firstly in the family and then in larger associations, culminating in the state, which
is ‘only the last link in the chain of these associations.’148 A similar anthropology
is implicit in underpinning political pluralism.149 The order is important, as the
family and other associations are served by the state and they exist in a near zero-
sum relationship when it comes to the rôle and foundations of the different orders
of creation. So, ‘The more families and communities fail to do, the more the State
must do’, and a centralized state becomes a ‘substitute for the lost community of the
people.’150 Writing in 1945, Brunner was particularly concerned with the totalitarian
145. See Karl Barth, Ethics, ed. Dietrich Braun, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1981),
243–244, 518; Karl Barth, The Word of God and the Word of Man, trans. Douglas Horton (New York: Harper,
1957), 171. Also see page 160 below.
146. See Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall: A Theological Exposition of Genesis 1–3, ed. Martin Ruter,
Ilse Todt, and John W. de Gruchy, trans. Douglas Stephen Bax (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2004), 139–
140. Also see page 120 below.
147. Brunner, Justice and the Social Order, 122, 244n48. See Aristotle, “The Eudemian Ethics,” in The
Athenian Constitution; The Eudemian Ethics; On Virtues and Vices, 3rd ed., trans. H. Rackham, Loeb Classical
Library (London: William Heinemann, 1952), 1242a5–10; Johannes Althusius, Politica, ed. and trans.
Frederick S. Carney (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1995), 17–18, 24–25.
148. Brunner, Justice and the Social Order, 123.
149. See John Neville Figgis, Churches in the Modern State (London: Longmans, Green, and Co. 1913), 92.
150. Brunner, Justice and the Social Order, 124.
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state, which, in a statement that anticipates Milbank’s analysis, ‘grew gradually
out of the modern conception of the sovereignty of the State and the breakdown
of individuals and communities’, he finds the ‘deepest cause of that failure’ in the
‘atrophy of the Christian substance.’151 Brunner’s state is therefore in the order
of creation in so far as it coheres with his anthropology and the will of God for
human unity in associations.152 But he does not baptise the origins of actual states,
recognizing that states come about through compulsion and violence, and that this is
not willed by God.153 To Brunner, the Christian should accept the existence of the state
in gratitude for the peace and order it provides, while also recognising that, ‘Over
every State there broods something of the light of the divine creation and a heavy
cloud of anti-divine forces.’154
More recently, there has been a resurgence of interest in creation theology. Gordon
McConville has recently suggested that the recovery of creation theology offers fresh
possibilities for an Old Testament political theology. He notes that the loss of creation
theology, ‘had entailed a disjunction between the faith of the Old Testament and
ordinary processes of life.’155 If the state as an order of creation is making a come-
back, it has also brought the well-known dangers of creation theology with it. The
context of the German church struggle, of which Barth and Bonhoeffer were part,
has shaped the reception of creation theology ever since.156 Since the time of Barth’s
rejection of natural theology, Brueggemann has been a leading critic of its adoption in
political theology. While he has reservedly welcomed the return of creation theology,
and has usefully catalogued the main instigators of its recovery, he remains wary of
its ideological misuse.157 In Brueggemann’s opinion, accounts of origins and creation
serve to establish and legitimate order. He writes:
The social function of creation theology . . . is characteristically to establish,
legitimate, and advocate order at the cost of transformation. It is of course
reassuring to claim that God’s good order of creation is a sure decree
against chaos. The problem is that regularly (I believe inevitably), creation
theology is allied with the king, with the royal liturgy, and therefore with
reasons of state.158
151. Brunner, Justice and the Social Order, 124.
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Brueggemann’s concern is not only supported by twentieth century abuses. The
ideological use of political origins stories was a feature of Plato’s ‘myth of the metals’
and Timaeus.159
That there is potential for abuse of natural theology is acknowledged by its
advocates. Brunner, for instance, partially accepts Barth’s criticism, but argues
that there are two possible ways of using natural theology: one being conservative
and authoritarian, and the other – which he favours – as a ‘refracted’ concept of
order.160 Brunner’s defence is simply that our ethos determines the outcome of our
natural theology, not the other way around, thus denying the inevitability of natural
theology being conservative. Whereas for Barth natural theology was a denominator,
determining all else, for Brunner it is a numerator, which takes on the character of the
underlying theology. In either mode there is a risk that the state, by being described as
an order of creation, is valued as the immediate creation of God as it currently exists.
If such a view is adopted by the church, then it can only accept the state passively, and
perhaps attempt to make it work for the good.
More generally, and from a creational perspective, having God as the creator of
a ‘very good’ Creation (Genesis 1:31), denies the positive ontology of evil, seeing it
instead as a privation of this good creation. This in turn calls into question social and
political thinking that grounds politics in a basic foundation conflict between good
and evil as primeval realities. This point is proclaimed by liberation theologian Pedro
Trigo: ‘To profess that our God is the creator of heaven and earth, then, means denying
a sacred foundation to that which enslaves and subjects the world today.’161 At this
general level there can be found implicit social ethics in Genesis.
This doctrinal survey emphasizes the connection between theological anthropol-
ogy (a social, but fallen humanity) and the perceived need for politics and the state to
provide for organized sociality and the restraint of sin. Such a focus is largely absent
from Milbank and Cavanaugh. They have emphasized the sins of the state, but not of
humans. This deficiency – surprising in theological politics – may result from their lack
of engagement with the traditional Scriptures and confessions dealing with the state.
On the one hand, Scripture and doctrine can be used to support the conclusion that
the state is profane. On the other hand, the state, understood as existing as an order of
creation and an immediate work of God, can become sacred. But whatever the state’s
origins, even profane ones, the tradition affirms the freedom of God to allow the state
159. The myth of the metals is in Plato, The Republic, ed. G. R. F. Ferrari, trans. Tom Griffith (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 414e–417b; Plato, Timaeus, trans. Donald J. Zeyl (Indianapolis:
Hackett, 2000), xiv–xv.
160. Emil Brunner, “Nature and Grace,” in Natural Theology, by Emil Brunner and Karl Barth, trans.
Peter Fraenkel (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1946), 51. Brunner also defends himself against Reinhold Niebuhr
in “Reply to Interpretation and Criticism,” in The Theology of Emil Brunner, ed. Charles W. Kegley (New
York: Macmillan, 1962), 350.
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to work for the benefit of humankind. In this more nuanced way, the state can be
understood as mundane.
conc
On Types of Origins and the Politics of Creation
So far, this chapter has looked into how Milbank and Cavanaugh perceive the origins
of the secular state and how the origin of the state is accounted for in theological
traditions. In the case of Milbank, the state’s absolute sovereignty comes from the rise
of the secular as a realm separated from God. For Cavanaugh, the state is effectively
the Antichrist, born in violence and working in opposition to Christ in offering a
competing soteriology. For them, modern secular political life is based in violence
and therefore cannot be a creation of God, but merely the product of sinful human
will. This makes their political theology appear incommensurable with biblical and
theological accounts of the rise of the state that sees God at work in and with political
power.
In assessing their position, it is important to observe that Milbank and Cavanaugh
rely almost exclusively on historical accounts of the rise of the state. In this way, their
approach fits within modern historical consciousness by locating the (il)legitimacy of
the state in its historical origins. But even here, they stick more to accounts of conflict
and war at the origins of the state and ignore other accounts. Other sociological,
anthropological, and historical accounts of the rise of the modern state give more
credence to factors where the state developed as a force for meeting the changing and
growing needs of the citizens. Recognising, or even emphasizing, these other factors
does not make the state into an idol.
Another reason for the popularity of historical accounts of the rise of the state is the
decline of the Biblical narrative in Western society. Theological accounts of the origins
of political power and the state have been set aside in favour of secular accounts,
where we typically find either social-scientific or philosophical accounts of the origins
of the state. This risks making the state sacred by being a self-generating object,
without any relationship to God. As Karl Marx wrote: ‘A being only considers himself
independent when he stands on his own feet; and he only stands on his own feet
when he owes his existence to himself.’162 So, to be free, as in modernity, requires that
human institutions are understood as being humanly created, made by human hands
and will. This notion, that the state comes from human freedom and can be freely
shaped for human ends, is at the root of the political philosophies of Hobbes, Locke,
162. Karl Marx, “Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844,” in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels,
Collected Works Volume 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–44, by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, ed. Maria
Shcheglova et al., trans. Martin Milligan and Dirk J. Struik, vol. 3 (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1975),
304. Marx’s italics.
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and Rousseau. In secular thought, government and politics are human inventions and
have nothing to do with God’s creation.
Despite their differences, secular and Christian theories of origins of the state
fulfil a similar human need. Origin stories, of whatever kind, help us make sense
of, and locate us within, the world. Without a Christian story of origins, the church
will be tempted to baptize a secular story of political origins, even if only implicitly.
Such a secular politics recognizes no transcendent basis for founding, evaluating, or
guiding political institutions. At this point, having surrendered a story of political
origins, the church finds it increasingly difficult to have a way of speaking into politics,
having been sidelined from the outset. Another way to put this is that the church,
in conceding the story of the origins of politics and the state to secular thought, has
also conceded to secularism the right to write the rules of engagement in the political
sphere.
Stories of origins are not only categorized by religious or secular categories, they
can also reveal deep ideological commitments. Lest one think that the quest for
origins is a dispassionate task guided by objective values for the truth, Karen L. King
suggests that talk about beginnings is never neutral, but reveals ideological positions:
‘Historically, to talk about beginnings is rather a way to talk about change; since
historical beginnings are always in media res, they are always instances of change, not
absolute, pure, or essential origins.’163 For this reason, those who talk about the state’s
origins, or those who emphasize its discontinuity with what has gone before, may
be aiming to posit a new beginning to support their argument, either in favour of
the secular state, which is discontinuous with the medieval system of government, or
to say that this new form of government rests solely upon the errors of modernity.
Applying King’s point to Milbank and Cavanaugh, we find that they chose their
particular points of origins of the state where they see the most important change.
In the case of Milbank, the origins of the state are narrated through a deviant form of
ontology. He is primarily concerned with the modern state as a material expression of
deficient philosophy. His idealism sees the changes that brought about the state in the
realm of ideas and the manifestation of the modern state and market as reflecting this
reality. Cavanaugh, on the other hand, narrates the important changes in the material
consideration of the wars of religion, where dramatic social change saw the emergence
of the modern state. But what purposes do these narratives serve? King suggests that
we approach historical narratives with a hermeneutics of suspicion:
Historical narrative . . . authorizes particular constructions of power and
reality (the nature of humanity and the world), places the reader at a
163. Karen L. King, “Mackinations on Myth and Origins,” in Reimagining Christian Origins: A Colloquium
Honoring Burton L. Mack, ed. Elizabeth A. Castelli and Hal Taussig (Valley Forge: Trinity Press
International, 1996), 163.
Chapter 3. Creation and the Origin of the State 99
particular place in the story, and distinguishes truth from falsehood by
telling things the way they really were — and thus really are.164
Extending King’s point to the history of the origins of the state, we can say that an
author’s starting point in such an account designates that point from which they can
write history as if intervening history has not really changed things. Another way of
putting this is that one’s departure point becomes historically flattening by asserting
continuity between the present and one’s chosen historical starting point. In their
narrations of the origins of the state, we see how for Cavanaugh little has changed
since the wars of religion, and with Milbank we still live in the direct political legacy
of Scotus’s philosophy and Hobbes’s voluntarism and nominalism.
Origins not only highlight change, for Ana Acosta they also provide an insight
into the agenda of those posing them. In discussing Rousseau, she suggests that
the ‘Origin Is the Goal’.165 What she means by this offers a further methodological
clue to origins writings, including those of Milbank and Cavanaugh. Her position is
that, generally speaking, in writings of origins, we enter into a dialectic of origin and
goal: ‘the desired future can be attained only by returning to, and hence redefining,
the beginning.’166 And for Rousseau specifically, Acosta writes: ‘Creating an origin
enables Rousseau to create a fiction that allows him to reach the one he is really after:
the utopian goal.’167 We have already seen how Milbank and Cavanaugh locate the
origins of the state where they see that things went awry. By telling their stories of
origins of the state they are able to pose a view of the future that looks like a better
past. Therefore their histories are as much about how we recover a more satisfactory
future, as much as they are about describing what went wrong.
The insights of King and Acosta combine to highlight how, in a teleological fashion,
Milbank and Cavanaugh start with the secularism and nihilism of the profane state,
and then write their narrations of the state to this position from their chosen starting
points. They do not start where the origin is, but where they find a congenial
change point in history from which they can launch their critique of the state. It is
hardly surprising, then, that they offer a selective history of the rise of the state with
little theological engagement. While this prevents their falling prey to the error of
sanctifying the state in its origins and making it sacred, they err at the other extreme:
writing a narrative of the descent of politics into the profanity of the modern state,
completely separated from the creative force of God or his power to mitigate the worst
of humanity’s profane politics and bring good out of it.
By contrast to this historical approach to origins, patristic and medieval thought
often sought the legitimacy of the state outside of history in doctrine and scripture. For
164. King, “Reimagining Christian Origins,” 158–159.
165. See Chapter 1 of Acosta, Reading Genesis. See p. 96 for how her analysis applies to Rousseau.
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this reason, scripture and tradition, while of continued interest in framing questions
of legitimacy and obedience, do not trouble the historian of the state.168 The apparent
conflict between these two perspectives echoes a famous medieval dispute. Pope
Gregory VII asks: ‘Who may not know that kings and dukes have had their origin
from those who, being ignorant of God, by pride, rapines, treachery, murders—
at length by practically all crimes whatsoever, with the devil, the prince of the
world, indeed urging them on, have presumed by blind greed and insupportable
presumption to lord it over their equals, namely men?’169 Gregory was answered
directly by the Benedictine monk Hugh of Fleury: ‘How foolish this opinion is is
evident by the teaching of the Apostle, who says, “There is no power but of God. For
the powers that be are ordained of God” [Romans 13:4]. Therefore by this statement it
is certain that the royal authority on earth was ordained or disposed on earth not
by men, but by God.’170 While it may appear that this discussion is one where
the participants are talking at cross purposes, at dispute is the difference between
the historical and the ontological origins of the state. In emphasizing the historical
origins, Milbank and Cavanaugh downplay the possibility that God may be involved
in originating the political authorities we have. One result of doing is that it allows
the state to be more easily portrayed as profane.
In the medieval period, the final divine origin of authority was taken for granted.
A more important dispute was whether rule came from God in an immediate or a
mediate fashion. Adopting a mediated view, that God works through the structures
established by sinful humans, we might conclude that the historical origins of the state
are not very interesting, because whatever these origins, God can use the state for his
purposes.171 The modern state may not have been directly created by God, but the
absence of any appreciation of the createdness of human government in Milbank and
Cavanaugh, rules out for them even a mediated interest of God in the state. So the
rise of the modern state exists for them completely separate from God’s work and in
discontinuity with other political systems which preceded it.
With a mediated view of the state, the historical and biblical-theological views
on the origins of power are not incompatible. Joseph de Maistre, in his study of
sovereignty, offers a way of reconciling the rôle of humanity and the rôle of God in
making the state. The place of humans in making the state through their own will and
actions is undeniable. But theology cannot allow this fact of human action to disallow
the view that God is involved in the creation of politics and direction of the state. As
de Maistre writes:
168. Lewis, Medieval Political Ideas, vol. 1, 140.
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Since God has not thought it appropriate to use super-natural agents in the
establishment of states, it is certain that all developments have come about
through human agencies. But saying that sovereignty does not derive from
God because he has made use of men to establish it is like saying that he is
not the creator of man because we all have a father and mother.172
De Maistre was right to see how some, in accounting for the origins of the state,
focus on profane human means and actions, without seeing the divine permission
for what is made by human hands. This coheres well with the view that, while the
state is not a direct creation of God, it is something that God uses for his purposes
in governing the world. This view will be further developed in the next chapter on
God’s preservation of human society.
This chapter has also demonstrated that Milbank and Cavanaugh lack serious
engagement with scripture and tradition with respect to the state’s origins. Scripture
and tradition teach that all political power comes from God, even if the state is
not one of His creatures. Milbank and Cavanaugh maintain a distance from these
theological accounts, symptomatic of their lack of serious engagement with scripture
(the reasons for this are discussed further on page 175). One reason scripture is
unimportant for Milbank and Cavanaugh may be the apparently ahistorical nature of
biblical reflections on the state. An illustration of this sort of complaint can be found
in Arne Rasmusson’s criticisms of Barth’s unmediated biblical view of the state.173
Rasmusson is critical of Barth for lacking a thick description of historically contingent
realities and allowing his times to influence his apparently neutral exegesis. In the
same way, Milbank and Cavanaugh would likely argue that modern theologians can
hardly address scripture without their resultant interpretations being influenced by
the state’s modern mythos. But this criticism of biblical interpretation merely shifts the
locus of authority from the Bible to history, thereby valuing historical method over
the use of Scripture. But, as seen above, Scripture and history ask different questions
about the state. Traditionally, Scripture was used to question the legitimacy of states,
not their historical origins. This priority should make the political theologian seeking
origins question the demand for thick historical description.
Rasmusson’s criticism is evasive, and does not fully recognize the political
theologian’s task of grappling with both history and theology in understanding the
state. Instead of trying to relate scripture and doctrine to the state, together with
its specific history, it is easier to adopt the approach of Milbank and Cavanaugh in
seeing to the origins of the state in profane human history, which is directed by the
172. Joseph de Maistre, The Works of Joseph de Maistre, ed. and trans. Jack Lively (London: George Allen
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sinful human will. But, as we have seen, this historical or genealogical methodology
is plagued with difficulties.
Conclusions
This chapter began a three-fold investigation into how the state may be considered
profane according to Milbank and Cavanaugh. Here, through considering the doctrine
of creation and the origins of the state, we find one way in which they consider the
state to be profane.
In conclusion, we find a difference between historical and ontological accounts
of the state. Milbank and Cavanaugh have selective accounts of the descent of the
state from the rise of the secular and from the wars of religion. While both these
sources have their place in Christian reflections on the origins of the state, theology is
more concerned with the ontological origins of human politics and the state in God.
By focussing on the state’s history, which has many dark moments, this theological
point may be missed, and the state may be too easily described as profane. On
the other hand, we must temper the possible harm that could be caused by treating
uncritically the notion that God ordains not the state, but each and every government.
The balanced view is that the state is mundane, without great importance placed on
where it came from, and more attention paid to reflecting on how God may ordain
and use the political creations of humans in his work. To maintain the position that
the state is merely mundane, it need not have profane or sacred origins. But placing
the state in the order of creation will not do. This, as history has shown, has been a
dangerous move to make, with inherent risks that the state and present government
can be sacralized as the immediate creation of God. But in rejecting this position, care
must be taken not to suggest that God is divorced from working through the state in
ordering human life.
In considering God’s work in relation to politics, we cannot rest content with
creation and origins. What is created must be preserved. And so the next chapter will
move beyond origins into a discussion of the relationship of God’s work of preserving
creation and the relationship of this work to politics.
Chapter 4
Preservation and the Order of the
State
Origins alone can never fully explain the state, since explanations of origins do not
exhaust its meaning, function, or direction. Aristotle, for instance, writes that the polis
comes into existence to meet our bare necessities, but remains in existence for the sake
of living well.1 For some Christians, the state exists in the order of preservation, acting
as a means of God’s providence in sustaining human society. This chapter outlines
the origins of the doctrine of preservation as found in scripture and the early church’s
recognition of the need for this doctrine, given what it experienced as the delay of the
parousia. While theology affirms the preservation of the whole of creation, the focus
here will be on God’s sustenance of humanity as individuals, and, more importantly
here, on the preservation of human societies by political means, including the state.
As shown below, the doctrine of preservation is largely absent from the political
theologies of Milbank and Cavanaugh. This is a weakness, partially explained
through the inherent tension between the theological doctrines of preservation and
eschatology. Furthermore, because Milbank and Cavanaugh treat the state as profane,
they fail to see the preserving rôle of the state in providing temporal goods for the
sustaining of human community.
Superficially, it is perhaps more difficult to make a case that the sustaining function
of the modern state is idolatrous, especially since the state is often held to derive its
legitimacy from its origins or its redemptive work. But, insofar as the state exists
merely to preserve and protect in secular liberal politics, without it preserving society
for anything other than its self-perpetuation, then this preservative function risks
being absolutized as the sole purpose of the state. This focus on the preserving rôle of
the state in secular political theory, which knows no end beyond the self-generating
egoist end of the individual, risks making an idol of the goal of preserving society and
the state as a preserving agent. Such a move is in direct conflict with Christianity’s
1. Aristotle, “The Politics,” 1252b29.
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teleology that teaches the movement of all things toward God. But even within
the discipline of theology, preservation is often overlooked as a serious theological
doctrine, both by those who believe that redemption is imminent, and by those who
hold to a realized eschatology that compresses ordinary time between the fall and
redemption.2
A link could be made here between human society and the scientific understand-
ing of the upholding of the universe, which does not collapse in on itself. Christian
theology affirms that God both created and sustains Creation, and that without
God’s preserving work, the universe would cease to be. Others believe that the
universe (however it came into being) is simply upheld by natural life-sustaining
forces autonomous from God. An analogy can be made here with the modern
understanding of society and the state. Statist thought affirms the notion that if society
is not preserved by the autonomous state then we shall return to the chaos of the
Hobbes’s state of nature, where life is nasty, brutish, and short. What do Christians
believe here? Does theology teach a form of political Deism whereby God is equally
removed from the ongoing governance of the human society, while also affirming his
active work in sustaining Creation in general? Or, do Christians believe that just as
with Creation in general, God plays a part in sustaining society either immediately
or mediately through the state? It has become tempting for Christianity to believe
that we can hold to both the ongoing direct preservation of Creation by God, and the
sustaining of society by an autonomous secular state without any need to explain why
God is actively involved in one but not the other. In other words, theology appears
to affirm that God looks after Creation in general, while human agency makes and
preserves our political instruments, without concurrence between the two wills. If
this assessment is correct, then theology indirectly allows the preserving autonomous
state to be made into an idol with the powers of preservation. On the other hand,
Christian theology may teach that God may use the state to preserve society in a more
direct way. Still others see the state as a barrier to preservation, affirming that God
preserves society without reference to the state at all, perhaps through the church.
Christian accounts of preservation differ from secular ones, in the means used in
preserving society, what society is preserved against, and what it is preserved for. This
final point is critical, since in secular thought the means of preservation risk becoming,
without a telos, an end in themselves. Theology rejects this view in affirming that
creation is preserved for redemption, the subject of Chapter 5.
2. Irenaeus has been accused of making this mistake by Oscar Cullmann, Christ and Time: The Primitive
Christian Conception of Time and History, Revised, trans. Floyd V. Filson (London: SCM Press, 1962), 57,
196–197.
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The Politics of Preservation in Milbank and Cavanaugh
This chapter will follow the format of the previous one, in considering the thoughts of
Milbank and Cavanaugh and their views of the doctrine of preservation before consid-
ering the biblical and doctrinal background to the Christian doctrine of preservation.
Milbank and Political Providence
Some critics think Milbank has no political doctrine of providence. In this vein,
consider Stephen Webb’s judgment of Milbank:
Milbank . . . has no providential interpretation of how democratic nation-
states have preserved the common goods of sinful humanity by providing
political order and stability. Like radical Protestants who think the Holy
Spirit left the church after the triumph of Constantine, only to return with
the Anabaptists, Milbank thinks God withdrew his hand from political
affairs with the rise of modern nation-states and will return to history
only when they are replaced by some form of global Christian socialism.
Democracy is a blank on Milbank’s providential slate.3
This section assesses whether it is a just assessment of Milbank by outlining and
examining his doctrine of preservation.
In the first chapter of Theology and Social Theory, Milbank discusses the ‘New
Science of Politics’, which he says was ‘concerned with creation, or the institution
of a new, secular space’ from absolute beginnings, as, for instance, found in Hobbes.4
Then, in chapter two, Milbank moves on to consider political economy, which was
concerned with ‘providence or a process of prudent conservation’.5 Does this mean
that Milbank believes that the new politics does not have a means of preserving
what was created, instead delegating this function to economics? In his discussion,
Milbank finds the political economists, such as Adam Smith, seeking to find a guiding
hand in the selfish workings of individual economic subjects: ‘God, or “providence”
or “nature”, is the Machiavellian sovereign who weaves long-term benefits out of
short-term interests and individual discomfitures.’6 Milbank’s consideration of the
secular forms of providence are contrasted, but only in passing, with ‘the traditional
providence of Catholic orthodoxy’.7 He writes that, ‘Physical sciences have their
rationale in the conservation of the physical body, human sciences in the conservation
3. Stephen H. Webb, American Providence: A Nation with a Mission (New York: Continuum, 2006), 78.
Also see Stephen H. Webb, “From Prudentius to President Bush: Providence, Empire and Paranoia,”
in The Providence of God, ed. Francesca Aran Murphy and Philip G. Ziegler (London: T&T Clark, 2009),
231–254.
4. Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 27.
5. Ibid., 26. Milbank’s italics.
6. Milbank, “Thomistic Telescope,” 38.
7. Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 28.
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of the social body.’8 Milbank complains that, in political economy, providence has
become an amoral force for the preservation of the secular: ‘it imagined and helped
to construct an amoral formal mechanism which allows not merely the institution but
also the preservation and the regulation of the secular.’9
Preservation, then, seems to be a problematic part of modern secular thought. This
is borne out in Milbank’s analysis of our modern political life. His view is that in
modernity, the secular dictates to the church and its disciplines of theology a limited
rôle in society. It follows from this that the Christian doctrine of providence, formerly
linked to history, is excluded:
Within the bounds laid down by the state, theology is instead confined
to upholding a supposedly universal morality and to better scholarly
establishment of the facts which are taken to ground belief. Thus theology
in the course of the nineteenth century acquired wholly questionable sub-
disciplines which were no longer expected to participate in God’s self-
knowledge, but were instead expected simply to establish the foundational
facts and with pure historical neutrality (on which the Church as depart-
ment of state depends): biblical criticism, Church history (as no longer a
reflection on divine providence), historical theology, and so forth.10
So it happens that, according to Milbank, theology in modernity became part of
the state’s own self-survival. Theology, in any capitulation to modern secular reason,
becomes manipulable as a tool to uphold the morality needed for social cohesion. In
this way, the state is parasitic on trust, and other desirable attributes of individuals
that religion maintains. But, ultimately, the parasite risks killing the source of such
nourishment. As Milbank points out, society ‘looks to the “social” to preserve the
essence of human life’, at which point ‘theology should be alarmed, to note that often
the sociologists themselves here discover a “role” for religion’.11
In the following quote, he describes how some church fathers were willing to
accept a notion of political providence, albeit reluctantly:
If submission to pagan political authority was, nonetheless, earnestly
advocated, then this was because a coercive order ensuring a certain rough
justice (but no longer defence of race or territory) was seen as God’s will for
the limitation and discipline of sin in the interval before the final eschaton.
However, it is abundantly clear from the writings of Ambrose, Augustine
and others, that the gradual conversion of Roman citizens and of Roman
rulers was expected to have implications for the character of political
8. Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 59.
9. Milbank, “Thomistic Telescope,” 47.
10. Milbank, “Conflict of the Faculties,” 312.
11. Milbank, “Body by Love Possessed,” 88.
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governance, and indeed (in a manner they found inherently problematic
to define) to bring this rule also within the scope of the ecclesial rule.
At the same time, the gradual confusion of boundaries between imperium
and ecclesia led to fears that the distinctive character of the ecclesial rule
was being lost, and so encouraged the monastic movement: precisely the
setting up of relatively self-sufficient Christian societies.12
This notion of the limitation of sin is reminiscent of the interpretation of 2
Thessalonians 2:7, a text Milbank addresses in this discussion:
St Paul did not propose to abolish the biopolitical order of the Roman
Empire – indeed, as Blumenfeld waspishly says, his proto-Constantinian
programme rather ensured that the Roman Empire is in reality still with
us. So he did not deny that the second-best – the exercise of imperative
nomos in the face of scarcity, sin and death – would remain necessary
(Romans 13; 2 Thessalonians 2:7). The latter passage suggests that all nomos
is a temporary katechon restraining evil until the eschaton – this power to
[restrain] remains, though, for Paul thoroughly ambiguous and literally
daemonic, as Carl Schmitt’s reading of this passage fails to recognize.13
Milbank’s comment raises the question that even if the restrainer is ‘daemonic’, as
he suggests, it is still ultimately under the control of God. Nor does Milbank conclude
from this passage that the nomos preserves society against evil, and that this might
involve the exercise of force. Milbank, known for his criticism of violence, is critical
of any doctrines and theologians that require or justify violence. For example, he has
little time for Reinhold Niebuhr’s making a tension between the personal and political:
Christianity is seen to have tended to set impossible personal perfectionism
over against a dangerously exaggerated political pessimism. Occasionally,
as in Luther’s exhortation to the peasants, the perfectionism is hypocrit-
ically intruded into the political sphere. The essence of the latter is seen
to consist in a necessity for violent coercion that results from the fall; yet
often this imperfect power has been wrongly treated as sacred, as the direct
presence of a divine created order.14
Given Milbank’s distaste for violence, it is no wonder that he is disparaging of
Luther and Niebuhr. What makes belief in the necessity of violence feasible is an
account of the way things are. For Milbank, an account of reality that makes violence
necessary is based on an ‘ontology of violence’, which he calls a ‘malign mythology’.15
12. Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 403.
13. Milbank, “Paul against Biopolitics,” 159.
14. John Milbank, “The Poverty of Niebuhrianism,” in The Word Made Strange: Theology, Language,
Culture (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), 235.
15. Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 279.
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Such an ‘ontology of violence’ is, according to Milbank, ‘a reading of the world
which assumes the priority of force and tells how this force is best managed and
confined by counter-force.’16 Milbank does not accept the necessity of violence, yet
does not directly address others’ arguments for why they see violence or legitimate
counter-force (as they might see it) as necessary. Milbank does, at times, allow for the
possibility of the justification of violence: ‘even justified violence is the justification of
a lesser evil.’17 But he would not allow this justification to be based in an ontology
which demands violence.
Milbank not only argues against the necessity of violence, he is also critical of any
doctrine of providence that creates passive acceptance of the way things are. In a
criticism of Gregory Baum he writes:
Like all political economists, political and liberation theologians shift politics
and economics from the site of ethics to the site of a theology of providence.
For, in making the merely algebraic equation, liberation = salvation, they
still celebrate a hidden working of divine design through purely immanent
processes. What they really say is what they claim not to say: namely that
Christians should say their prayers, be decent citizens, and otherwise just
accept society as it is.18
Milbank, in other words, tells us what providence should not be: a secular doctrine
of the social science that operates to support capitalism and the profane state. He does
not suggest that this is a secularized Christian doctrine, since it appears as having an
important place in the rise of modern capitalist society. As evidence for this we find
Milbank writing: ‘divine agency is invoked much more directly as an explanatory
cause in the eighteenth century (both in natural and social science) than in the Middle
Ages.’19 From this, one gets the impression from Milbank that a doctrine of providence
is a modern notion with a special place in modern reason.
In one of his rare passages on providence, Milbank discusses the Thomistic roots of
Henri de Lubac’s Surnatural thesis.20 Milbank writes that for Aquinas, as for de Lubac,
‘the providential mode of dealing with spiritual creatures ultimately includes grace,
since such creatures attain the “ultimate end” of knowing and loving God.’21 While
Milbank does not draw out any political implications about grace here, the notion of
grace was linked positively to the politics of the state in the lifetime of de Lubac, in the
Barmen Declaration Article VI. In other Reformed sources, much has been made of
16. Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 4.
17. John Milbank, “Violence: Double passivity,” in Being Reconciled: Ontology and Pardon (Oxford:
Routledge, 2003), 26.
18. Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 249. Nicholas Lash considers this passage ‘tasteless’ in “Not
Exactly Politics of Power?” Modern Theology 8, no. 4 (1992): 357.
19. Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 38–39.
20. John Milbank, The Suspended Middle: Henri de Lubac and the Debate concerning the Supernatural (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005), 98.
21. Ibid., 99.
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“common grace” having providential importance.22 Barth also placed the state within
the realm of Grace.23
Joan Lockwood O’Donovan, in an essay that discusses Erasmus to illuminate
Milbank, suggests that in the sphere of social and political ethics ‘Milbank’s con-
structive thought has only made sketchy forays beyond the foundational stage’.24
She draws on two of Erasmus’s texts but finds in them weaknesses that are implied
criticisms of Milbank too. The texts fail, she writes, to clearly discriminate, ‘firstly, the
goods of created human community from their disordered condition, and secondly,
God’s providential work of preserving the common goods of sinful humanity through
structures of political authority and human law.’25 A shade more explicit as a criticism
of Milbank is O’Donovan’s judgment of Erasmus’s political theology: ‘His rhetoric of
civil government particularly suffers from theological incompleteness in its failure to
recognize as a distinct Trinitarian work ad extra the Father’s preservation of the sinful
human community by the lawful use of coercive power and to relate this work to the
universal rule of the risen Christ through the Holy Spirit.’26
This is a fair assessment of Milbank’s position on the politics of providence.
While Milbank speaks of the suppression of theological reflection on providence in
modernity, he does little to reintroduce an explicit doctrine of providence into his
own theology. His political theology lacks a theological doctrine of providence or
preservation which has a rôle for the God in relation to the state. Instead he finds a
secular form of providence at the heart of secular political economy. The latter part of
this chapter will consider why this is the case.
Cavanaugh and the Non-Necessity of Preservation
Like Milbank, William Cavanaugh is not known for his writings on providence or
preservation. Cavanaugh’s placing of the state in competition with the church means
that Cavanaugh is likely to be more interested in the preservation of the church and the
individual Christian life, than the preservation of the state. In fact, the preservation
and expansion of the one leads in such an agonistic theology to the demise of the
other. At the individual level, we can see how this might work. In discussing torture,
Cavanaugh writes how the secular liturgy of torture is one way in which Pinochet’s
state in Chile was able to preserve itself, often at the expense of the will to self-
preservation of the individuals the practice of torture created.27 The state’s liturgy
22. Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology (Edinburgh: Banner of Truth Trust, 1958), 441.
23. Karl Barth, Community, State, and Church: Three Essays, ed. Will Herberg (Eugene: Wipf & Stock,
2004), 156; Min, Sin and Politics, 104-105.
24. Joan Lockwood O’Donovan, “The Christian Pedagogy and Ethics of Erasmus,” in Bonds of
Imperfection: Christian Politics, Past and Present, by Oliver O’Donovan and Joan Lockwood O’Donovan
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004), 122.
25. Ibid., 122.
26. Ibid., 136.
27. Cavanaugh, Torture and Eucharist, 40.
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of torture works against the individual preserving the integrity of their union of body
and soul, with the victim often surrendering one to save the other.28 The liturgical
element is that the state makes citizens by breaking down other allegiances, such as
resistance movements and especially, for Cavanaugh, the church. For Cavanaugh,
this runs counter to how the Eucharist makes the individual a political actor through
grafting them into the true politics of the body of Christ.
If the state is a torturer, as Cavanaugh claims it is, this throws up the problem of
how such a state can be seen at the same time as a means of God’s preservation. Surely
God would not sanction torture as legitimate in the preservation of the social order?
If this is permitted, then such a doctrine becomes a serious problem for Christian
political theology; for not only is such a doctrine of the state a conservative one,
that is offensive to the victims of torture, but it raises the problem of theodicy. An
ongoing concern with the doctrine of providence has been its ostensibly conservative
nature, as Charles Cashdollar notes in his survey of the nineteenth-century debates on
providence in America. He comments that conservatives used providential theory as
a sort of practical theodicy. ‘Essentially, they saw the socio-economic order as God-
ordained, a perfectly composed “preceptive” moral order operating to the benefit of
man.’29 Social injustice and poverty were acceptable because they served the common
good by having disciplinary or punitive actions. This theory encouraged the view that
if one was poor or sick or otherwise harmed, God was responsible.30
This view did not last, which allowed the rise of the view that if evil did happen
then we can blame Satan or an enemy, or a secular state. Cashdollar further observes
that the ‘demise of the orthodox theory [of providence] was, as its critics knew, a
prerequisite for the Social Gospel.’31 With the demise of providence, Cashdollar writes
that other doctrines, such as Christology, stepped in to fill the doctrinal vacuum.
This might help explain why Cavanaugh has a high Christology and no discernible
doctrine of providence. Cashdollar also notes that the decline of providence correlated
with the rise of social sciences to explain social evils.32 Cavanaugh’s own decoupling
of divine providence from the state has more than a hint of theodicy about it. The
state’s evil, such as torture, provides an example of the classic conflict between evil
and God’s providence. God is innocent, as far as torture is concerned, if the Antichrist
is the torturer and not the state that God has providentially raised up. Death squads
become the full responsibility of Satan, and bear no relationship to God’s works.
In the tensions between doctrines, Cavanaugh’s political theology also fits into
the conflict already mentioned between eschatology and preservation. As he writes,
28. Cavanaugh, Torture and Eucharist, 40.
29. Charles D. Cashdollar, “The Social Implications of the Doctrine of Divine Providence: A Nineteenth-
Century Debate in American Theology,” The Harvard Theological Review 71, no. 3/4 (1978): 274.
30. See the quote from William Plumer in ibid., 278.
31. Ibid., 282.
32. Ibid., 283–284.
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‘Eschatology is always in tension with history.’33 For Cavanaugh, this can be clearly
seen in how the church has come to understand the Eucharist: ‘The Eucharist has
lost much of its eschatological import precisely where the church has come to feel
at home in the world, forfeiting its sense of the transitory nature of the Christian
sojourn among the earthly kingdoms.’34 So rather than the church being sustained
by the Eucharist in its worldly sojourn (like the Israelites were sustained by manna
in their Exodus), the church has been an agent sustaining the state, making its home
among the kingdoms of this world, and in the process suppressing true eschatology.
Cavanaugh, in response, makes the Eucharist representative of the eschatology that
was suppressed by the church:
It has been all too easy to regard the Eucharist as a mere representation of
a past historical event in order to secure the graces won in that past event.
Secular history – the uniform, and literally end-less, progress of time which
makes the events of the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ ever
more remote from us – has come to predominate over eschatology, with
grave consequences for the church. As the church made itself at home
in the world’s time, the urgent sense of pilgrimage through a temporary
world toward an eternal end was muted. The Eucharist became a sacrifice
performed for the benefit of the church which re-presented before God the
historical process of redemption which had already been achieved in the
past. The Eucharist as the inbreaking of the future Kingdom of God into
time was suppressed.35
For Cavanaugh and Gregory Dix (whom Cavanaugh draws on here), the Eucharist
risks becoming a mere memorial of something in the past and, at most, something that
sustains the church, rather than an eschatological reality.36 But what is at stake here is
bringing eschatological reality so far forward into the present that one risks creating a
realized eschatology, with a folding of time back on itself so that the future becomes
the present in which the church becomes the realization of the Kingdom of God. We
are not, therefore, sustained for anything, but have amongst us the realization of God’s
plan for creation. As Cavanaugh writes: ‘But Christ’s resurrection also marks his
decisive triumph over sin, and thus the beginning of the new age in which we already
are living.’37 In this short quote, we see the removal of the need for the suppression
of sin (since it has been defeated) and the elimination of preservation for redemption
(since we are already in the kingdom). This is at the root of Cavanaugh’s criticism of
the notion of the mystical body of Christ:
33. Cavanaugh, Torture and Eucharist, 273. Also see 79, 179, 184.
34. Ibid., 225.
35. Ibid., 222.
36. Gregory Dix, The Shape of the Liturgy (Westminster: Dacre Press, 1945), 305–306.
37. Cavanaugh, Torture and Eucharist, 227.
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The adjective “mystical,” when applied to the church, in the cases we
have studied, signals a retreat in varying degrees from any interruption of
historical time by the Kingdom of God. We look for the Kingdom outside
of time. The eschatological significance of the body of Christ, and the
sacramental action which produces it, is effectively denied. Christ comes to
the individual upon her death, but the parousia as the end of history and
its anticipation within history are rendered incomprehensible by a state
and an earthly patria which declare their own indispensability and insist
on their own perpetuity.38
Here, we may note that Cavanaugh not only rejects the state’s false claim to
permanent necessity, but is sceptical about its necessity at all. Not only is the state,
for Cavanaugh, unrelated to our redemption, but by denying it any penultimate
significance, he renders it irrelevant to our preservation. Here Cavanaugh brings a
Hauerwasian/Yoderian critique to the doctrine of preservation in arguing against the
notion that it is the churches’ task to ‘manage history by bringing some order to a more
basic chaos.’39 To think this, Cavanaugh argues, relies on a distortion of Christian
ethics that treats the sin-filled not yet as a ‘constant feature of life on earth.’40 Such
a description of ‘reality’, Cavanaugh argues, sees only the one city ‘protected from
dissolution by the state, a natural institution meant to safeguard those penultimate
political goods that require protection by coercion.’41 This runs counter to a tradition
in the church that understands, better than the state itself does, that the rôle of the
state is as a means of preservation for future redemption.
Cavanaugh’s theology emphasizes the eschatological nature of Christianity. Rep-
resentative of his general approach is his criticism that, in Luther, the eschaton is
‘indefinitely deferred’, making the temporal authorities a permanent necessity.42 In
support of this view, Cavanaugh cites the following passage from Luther, where the
reformer writes of the two governments: ‘Both must be permitted to remain; the one
to produce righteousness, the other to bring about external peace and prevent evil
deeds. Neither one is sufficient in the world without the other.’43 For Luther, the
temporal authority must be allowed ‘to remain’, which Cavanaugh reads as Luther’s
total removal of the eschatological. But in another translation of the same passage,
the verbal phrase bleiben lassen is rendered ‘continue’, which means something closer
38. Cavanaugh, Torture and Eucharist, 220.
39. William T. Cavanaugh, “From One City to Two: Christian Reimagining of Political Space,” Political
Theology 7, no. 3 (2006): 318.
40. Ibid., 317.
41. Ibid., 317–318.
42. Cavanaugh, “Separation and Wholeness,” 20.
43. Martin Luther, “Temporal Authority: To What Extent it Should be Obeyed, 1523,” in Luther’s Works,
Volume 45: The Christian in Society II, ed. Walther I. Brandt, trans. J. J. Schindel and Walther I. Brandt
(Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1971), 92.
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to the interim rôle of the secular government.44 It could also mean ‘to be left to do
its own work’, since this is what Luther thinks is important: that both governments,
temporal and spiritual, be allowed, without interference from the other, to perform
their functions. For Luther, and as Cavanaugh observes above, the state must be
as permanent as the sinfulness of humanity: ‘for the world and the masses are and
always will be un-Christian, even if they are baptized and Christian in name.’45
But does Cavanaugh get Luther right? The interpretation of Luther depends,
as shown above, on how Luther is translated, but does Cavanaugh make Luther
into a straw man who does not believe in the return of Christ and therefore the
final eradication of sin in Christ’s Kingdom?46 But despite this potential bias is
Cavanaugh’s reading of Luther, he is not the only one who has observed Luther’s
‘de-eschatologizing’.47
Cavanaugh’s emphasis on the eschatological nature of Christianity is at the
expense of any positive appraisal of a doctrine of preservation. Traditionally, such
a doctrine has been linked to preservation against the effects of sin. Cavanaugh seems
to have no need for the state to act as a restrainer of sin in the public realm. Is this
because Cavanaugh’s anthropology lacks a strong notion of personal sin? A common
complaint against anarchists is that they are too idealistic about human nature and do
not have an adequate concept of sin.48 It is unclear why Cavanaugh sees no need for
the state to perform this rôle, and makes no case for the state on this basis. Perhaps
this is because of his anti-violence, and his lack of an anthropology which adequately
deals with sin. Rather, Cavanaugh wishes to cast off the state altogether. In this way
he is in the tradition of Hananiah (Jeremiah 28) who wanted to throw off the yoke of
the Babylonian Empire. But, as a false prophet, Hananiah does not recognize that the
Empire was part of God’s design for the long term survival of Israel.
Another way Cavanaugh critiques the state is on the basis of the means by which
it sustains itself. Cavanaugh’s position, that the state is founded and sustained in
violence, means that, for him, the preservation of the social order by the state will
involve violence.49 From a similar position, Ellul finds violence in the establishment
of states, but goes on to ask, ‘Now how does a government stay in power?’ His answer
44. Martin Luther, “On Secular Authority: how far does the Obedience owed to it extend?” in Luther
and Calvin on Secular Authority, ed. and trans. Harro Höpfl (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1991), 11. Luther uses similar language elsewhere, see Cavanaugh, Theopolitical Imagination, 24.
45. Luther, “Temporal Authority,” 91.
46. See Theodore G. Tappert, ed. and trans., “The Augsburg Confession (1530),” in The Book of Concord:
The Confessions of the Evangelical Lutheran Church (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1959), § XVII.
47. Helmut Thielicke, Theological Ethics: Volume 1: Foundations, ed. William H. Lazareth, trans. John W.
Doberstein (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1979), 380.
48. See Dave Morland, “Anarchism, Human Nature and History: Lessons for the Future,” in Twenty-
First Century Anarchism: Unorthodox Ideas for the New Millennium, ed. Jon Purkis and James Bowen
(London: Cassell, 1997), 8–23; and also Reinhold Niebuhr, “Catholicism and Anarchism in Spain,” Radical
Religion 2, no. 2 (Spring 1937): 25.
49. Cavanaugh, Myth of Religious Violence, 41.
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is simple: ‘By violence, simply by violence.’50 This is a fact that has been observed by
many theologians, but with different outcomes. Some, by rejecting violence, reject the
state; others, in accepting the state, accept its force as a necessary evil. Consider this
passage from Barth:
I quote T. Haering (Das Christliche Leben, 1907, p. 427): “If the Christian
deliberately wants the state for the sake of the kingdom of God, then with
this means to advance the kingdom of God he must also want the means by
which the state is supported. But there is no penal law above the various
nations; its ultimate means to maintain its rights is war, the self-defence of
nations.”51
This quotation is used by Barth to illustrate the point that many theologians falsely,
and too easily, accept the necessity of war as the means essential to the state. But for
theologians with more anarchist leanings, Haering’s point is honest, but clearly not
normative for the Christian theologian. If we want to have a state, we cannot refuse the
means of the state, these being violence and war. If these means are rejected, it follows
that we reject the state. This is the argument of pacifist-anarchist Christians, such
as Leo Tolstoy, who claimed that the non-resistance taught by Christ in the Sermon
on the Mount (especially Matthew 5:39) applies equally to individuals and states.52
Cavanaugh clearly has much sympathy with such a view, as witnessed throughout
his corpus.
Finally, we may add that, for Cavanaugh, based on his view of the alternative
soteriology of the state, the notion that the state separated from its redemptive
function makes no sense. With his focus on the conflict between the state’s and
the church’s salvation, Cavanaugh may have missed seeing that in order to reach
salvation point we first need to be preserved. Although, in one of his more recent
pieces, Cavanaugh does appear to allow some room for the Holy Spirit in the time
of penultimate to move politically in rejecting as simplistic the outright and full
condemnation of ‘Constantinianism’, agreeing that ‘God will write straight with
crooked lines.’53
It is a weakness of the political theologies of Milbank and Cavanaugh that the
doctrines of providence and preservation do not feature strongly in their work.
50. Jacques Ellul, Violence: Reflections from a Christian Perspective, trans. C. Edward Hopkin (London:
SCM Press, 1970), 85.
51. Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics: Volume III, The Doctrine of Creation, Part 4, ed. G. W. Bromiley and
T. F. Torrance, trans. A. T. Mackay et al. (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1961), § 55.2, p. 457. An English rendition
of Theodor von Haering’s text is The Ethics of the Christian Life, trans. James S. Hill (London / New York:
Williams and Norgate / G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1909), 431-432.
52. Leo Tolstoy, “The Kingdom of God is Within You,” in The Kingdom of God and Peace Essays, Tolstóy
centenary ed, vol. 20, trans. Aylmer Maude, The Works of Leo Tolstoy (London: Oxford University Press,
H. Milford, for the Tolstóy Society, 1935), 1–460. Also see Christoyannopoulos, Christian Anarchism, 50-61.
53. Cavanaugh, “Separation and Wholeness,” 17.
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The following discussion of the biblical foundations and theological traditions on
providence will suggest why this might be so.
The Politics of Preservation in Christian Tradition
The theological doctrine of preservation, which is a part of the broader doctrine of
providence, presumes a creation to be preserved, and therefore typically follows the
doctrine of creation in theology. As Benjamin Farley observes, the ‘great confessional
documents of the Reformed tradition follow this order.’54 Similarly, John Calvin, in an
anti-deist passage, wrote that:
Moreover, to make God a momentary Creator, who once for all finished
his work, would be cold and barren, and we must differ from profane men
especially in that we see the presence of divine power shining as much in
the continuing state of the universe as in its inception.55
This section discusses the theological doctrine of preservation and its relationship
to politics and the state. This will enable an assessment of where Milbank and
Cavanaugh are situated in relation to this doctrine.
Preservation in the Bible
As this section will show, the doctrine of preservation is a biblical doctrine. Ben-
jamin Farley, in describing the doctrine of preservation, breaks it down into three
components: the ‘preservation of the physical universe, the earth and its species,’ the
‘preservation of humankind,’ and the ‘preservation of the people of God.’56 It is worth
considering these in turn.
Of creation in general, it is to God that creation and its ongoing life is attributed, as
in the words of Ezra in Nehemiah 9:6: ‘To all of them you give life’. In Hebrews 1:3 we
read that God, through Christ, ‘sustains all things by his powerful word.’ And from
Colossians 1:17: ‘He himself is before all things, and in him all things hold together.’
Louis Berkhof cites all these verses (and many others) as the scriptural basis for the
doctrine of preservation, which he defines as ‘that continuous work of God by which
He maintains the things which He created, together with the properties and powers
which He endowed them.’57
The preservation of humankind is a more specific form of preservation. This
occurs in each individual life, and also for whole peoples. Humans are commanded to
procreate and increase the size of the human family (Genesis 1:28). But God preserves
54. Benjamin Wirt Farley, The Providence of God (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1988), 27.
55. Calvin, Institutes, 1.16.1.
56. Farley, Providence of God, 32–37.
57. Berkhof, Systematic Theology, 170.
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not only the human species, but also each individual life. God is the ‘keeper’ (Psalm
121:5) and ‘upholder’ (Psalm 54:4) of each individual. God is also our guardian,
preserving us from enemies and threats (Psalm 64:1; 143:11).
Farley affirms that the creation does not, in a theological understanding, exist for
itself – it exists for the glory of God. The preserving activity of God preserves a
people who acknowledge God as their Creator, Sustainer, and Redeemer. There is
a convenantal aspect to this form of preservation. With obedience to God, his people
can endure. This link between obedience and preservation is also found in Exodus
20:12: ‘Honor your father and your mother, so that your days may be long in the land
that the LORD your God is giving you.’ Also 1 Kings 11:38: ‘If you will listen to all
that I command you, walk in my ways, and do what is right in my sight by keeping
my statutes and my commandments, as David my servant did, I will be with you, and
will build you an enduring house, as I built for David, and I will give Israel to you.’
Further to Farley’s exposition of the biblical basis of preservation, Christian
theology has typically instructed that preservation of the social order is not where
history ends. Consider Hebrews 13:14: ‘For here we have no lasting city, but we
are looking for the city that is to come.’ For Bonhoeffer here is an eschatological
expectation of divine rule that transcends the temporal earthly city that cannot last
forever, when compared with the hope Christians have for the everlasting glorification
of the heavenly city and God’s eternal rule in Heaven.58
Having dealt with the generalities of preservation in scripture, the next section will
turn to another aspect of providence, or the flip-side of preservation, that of perishing.
Preservation versus Perishing
Divine providence not only preserves, but also allows its opposite: the judgment and
laying waste of those who do not serve God. Both these aspects of providence must
be taken together. The Old Testament, in particular, makes it clear that, along with the
power to create, the power to destroy also lies in God’s hands, and that those who do
not obey God will ultimately perish. Consider Isaiah 60:12, with its explicit political
overtones:
For the nation and kingdom
that will not serve you shall perish;
those nations shall be utterly laid waste.
So while God lays some cities, or even entire nations to waste (Amos 3:6), God
also raises up some nations in order to subdue others (1 Chronicles 5:26; Isaiah 45:1).
58. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, “A Theological Position Paper on State and Church,” in Conspiracy and
Imprisonment, 1940–1945, ed. Mark S. Brocker, trans. Lisa E. Dahill and Douglas W. Stott (Minneapolis:
Fortress Press, 2006), 504.
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Furthermore, in the New Testament, Jesus links the avoidance of perishing with
repentance (Luke 13:1–5).59
There is a covenantal sense in the above scriptures that the wicked perish under
the judgment of God (Deuteronomy 8:19; Psalm 37:20; Proverbs 11:10; 19:9), and that
the good and faithful will not perish (John 3:16). Yet there is also a sense in which
all people are preserved by God’s action. First of all, the Noahic Covenant assures
humanity that never again will God destroy the Earth (Genesis 9:11). And later,
the city of Sodom could have been saved if only a few righteous people could be
found within its walls (Genesis 18:20–32). Yet both these examples are negative acts of
omission; more positively, God ‘makes his sun rise on the evil and on the good, and
sends rain on the righteous and on the unrighteous’ (Matthew 5:45), and upholds all
his creatures (Matthew 6:26–30).60
What could this teaching – that God causes some to perish, while preserving
others – mean politically? One possible answer is that it is God who decides who
is raised up and who is laid to waste, with regard to both nations and individuals
(see Psalm 7361). This dual nature of providence and perishing is sometimes
obscured by recent interpreters of divine providence in contemporary political life.
In American Providence, Webb argues that some contemporary theologians, such
as Stanley Hauerwas, readily accept the judgment side of providence, without
appreciating the other side. According to Webb, Hauerwas readily acknowledges
God’s judgment in an event such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the USA, while
not appreciating the ways in which God has lifted up the USA to be a chosen
nation.62 Whether or not Webb is being fair to Hauerwas on whether he ignores the
twofold nature of providence, Webb highlights the valid point that these two sides
(preservation and perishing) must be held together in a sound doctrine of providence.
Webb’s analysis of Hauerwas, as will be seen below, can also be applied to Milbank
and Cavanaugh.
The State as an Order of Preservation
Having dealt with the doctrine of providence in general terms, this section will discuss
the problem of the means of God’s preservation of human society, and the theological
question on whether the state can be an order of preservation.
The central question here is to what extent, if at all, the state can be viewed as a
means of God’s preservation of individuals and human society. That God provides for
59. For commentary on this point, see Guy D. Nave Jr., The Role and Function of Repentance in Luke-Acts,
Academia Biblica 4 (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2002), 149n19, 174–179.
60. This perspective on God’s providence can be found in Daniel L. Migliore, Faith Seeking
Understanding: An Introduction to Christian Theology, 2nd ed (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004), 118–119.
61. For one interpretation of this Psalm and its relationship to God’s providence see John Calvin, A
Commentary on the Psalms of David, trans. Arthur Golding, vol. 2 (London: Thomas Tegg, 1840), 267–288.
62. See Webb, American Providence, 69–88.
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his creatures is a given here, for, as Augustine wrote, ‘Can’t the one who gives you life
give you the means of passing your life?’63 Following this general providential line,
the Second Helvetic Confession of Faith (1566) affirms: ‘We believe that all things
in heaven and on earth, and in all creatures, are preserved and governed by the
providence of this wise, eternal and almighty God.’ It goes on to speak of the subject
of this section, the means of preservation: ‘we do not spurn as useless the means by
which divine providence works, but we teach that we are to adapt ourselves to them
in so far as they are recommended to us in the Word of God.’64
If taken seriously, this teaching on the means of preservation becomes important,
since it raises the problem of political evil and the state’s use of force. If the divine
means for human preservation includes the state, then this raises a question about
whether the state’s evil can be reconciled with the work of a loving God. It is for this
reason that some theologians, who perceive the state to be involved in profoundly evil
acts (such as torture), reject it as profane, and wish to sever the link between God’s
work and the state. Such questions have been at the forefront of the discussion of the
political providence from the Church Fathers to the present day.
Church Fathers on Preservation
In the tradition of theological reflection on scripture and politics, it is a common view
that God has provided rulers for society. In an exegesis of Romans 13:1, Theodoret
of Cyrus finds rulers are provided as a gift from God, since: ‘These depend on God’s
providence: he it is who in his care for the general order has arranged for some to
rule and be ruled, bringing upon wrongdoers fear of rulers like a kind of bridle.’65
Theodoret also writes that the inequality in human community was provided by God
so that fear of rulers could provide order and peace.66
Augustine is one of the foremost Western theologians of providence. Against the
positions of non-believers, Augustine affirms that God is interested in earthly affairs:
‘But other fools are not lacking who have said: “The Lord shall not see,” that is, He
does not extend his providence to these earthly affairs.’67 Against others, Augustine
begins with a clear statement of the duplicitous nature of the notion of providence. Of
those who complained about the Christian era, but survived the collapse of Rome, he
63. Augustine, “Sermon 177: On the Words of the Apostle, 1 Timothy 6:7–19: We Brought Nothing into
this World, and What is More We Cannot Take Anything Out of It, etc.; A Discourse on Avarice,” in
Sermons, (148–183) on the New Testament. Volume III/5, ed. John E. Rotelle, trans. Edmund Hill, The Works
of Saint Augustine (New York: New City Press, 1992), ¶5.
64. See Arthur C. Cochrane, ed., “The Second Helvetic Confession, 1566,” in Reformed Confessions of the
16th Century (London: SCM Press, 1966), § 6.
65. Theodoret of Cyrus, Commentary on the Letters of St. Paul, Volume One, trans., with an introduction
by Robert Charles Hill (Brookline: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 2001), 122.
66. Theodoret of Cyrus, On Divine Providence, ed. Thomas Halton, Ancient Christian Writers 49 (New
York / Mahwah: Newman Press, 1988).
67. Augustine, “Letter 184A: Augustine to Peter and Abraham,” in Letters: Volume IV (165–203), trans.
Wilfrid Parsons, vol. 30, Fathers of the Church (New York: Fathers of the Church, 1955), § 6.
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writes, ‘They attribute their deliverance to their own destiny; whereas if they had any
right judgement they ought rather to attribute the harsh cruelty they suffered at the
hands of their enemies to the providence of God.’68 More positively Augustine states:
the providence of God rules and administers the whole creation, both
natures and wills: natures in order to give them existence, wills so that
those that are good may not be without merit, and those that are evil may
not go unpunished.69
Augustine is clear that the ‘increase and preservation of the Roman Empire’ could
not have been due to the actions of Roman gods, but can only be attributed to God.70
By sustaining the empire, God provided for the sphere in which Christ was born,
killed, and through which his message spread to the ends of the Earth.71
Toward the end of De civitate Dei, Augustine relates the story of the dilemma faced
by the Saguntines, through which he contrasts the city of man and the city of God.72
In this example, the pagan Saguntines had to decide between their faith, which bound
them to Rome, and their safety. By choosing to follow their faith, they perished,
earning the praise of all ‘citizens of the earthly commonwealth’. In the City of God,
however, this dilemma vanishes because safety is acquired through faith alone, and
therefore they cannot come into conflict because they are one and the same. Something
similar is claimed by those Christians who understand that to seek the safety of the
Empire or state is not merely to compromise faith, but to place one’s faith in where
one’s safety lies. This problem is also seen in Scripture in the case of the murmuring
Israelites in Sinai, who were prepared to return to the security of Egypt, were willing
to place their faith in the provision of Pharaoh, while rejecting the providence of God
to guide them to the promised land (Exodus 16). Another example is provided by the
people of Israel returning to Jerusalem, and rejecting the protection offered by King
Artaxerxes against ambush, because they had already witnessed God’s protection and
grace (see Ezra 8:21–23). As one commentator wrote of Ezra’s decision: ‘To ask for
an accompanying band of soldiers would appear to be a denial of his confidence in
God.’73 For Christians throughout the ages, this has seemed the perennial choice: to
keep the faith at the risk of death, or choose secular self-preservation over true faith in
the providence of God.
68. Augustine, City of God, I.1. This is reverse way of stating Webb’s criticism of Hauerwas above.
69. Augustine, The Literal Meaning of Genesis, Volume II, Books 7–12, trans. and annot. John Hammond
Taylor, Ancient Christian Writers 42 (New York: Newman Press, 1982), 8.23; p.64.
70. Augustine, City of God, IV.28.
71. Ibid., XVIII.46. According to the discussion in Karl Löwith, Meaning in History: The Theological
Implications of the Philosophy of History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), 177–178, this notion
takes even a stronger form in the work of Orosius.
72. See Augustine, City of God, XXII.6.
73. Fredrick Carlson Holmgren, Israel Alive Again: A Commentary on the Books of Ezra and Nehemiah,
International Theological Commentary (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1987), 68.
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The Reformers on Preservation
In the Reformation, Luther proposed a political doctrine based on the providence of
God linked to the civil authorities. In the Augsburg Confession (1530), a paragraph
condemning the Anabaptists reads: ‘The Gospel teaches an eternal righteousness of
the heart, but it does not destroy the state or the family. On the contrary, it especially
requires their preservation as ordinances of God and the exercise of love in these
ordinances.’74 On the matter of love in politics, Luther grounds obedience to the
state in the fourth commandment, based on the love of the father, which includes
the ‘father of the nation.’75 Luther further held that rulers and princes are preserved
through the obedience of those ruled, and also through holding the gospel in honour.76
Furthermore, ‘Temporal government is preserved not only by laws and rights, but by
divine authority; ’tis God maintains governments, otherwise the greatest sins in the
world would remain unpunished.’77
In the Lausanne Articles (1536), the Swiss Reformers directly linked the purpose
of the state with preservation. They wrote that the church ‘acknowledges the civil
magistrate ordained by God only as necessary to preserve the peace and tranquillity of
the state. To which end, it desires and ordains that all be obedient in so far as nothing
contrary to God is commanded.’78 For Calvin, an innate desire for self-preservation
lent natural adherence to the second half of the Decalogue: ‘Men have somewhat more
understanding of the precepts of the Second Table [Exodus 20:12ff.] because these are
more closely concerned with the preservation of civil society among them.’79 Within
Reformed theology, it is commonly accepted that the state has an important rôle in the
preservation of social peace and civil society.
Bonhoeffer and the Order of Preservation
More than any other twentieth century theologian, it was the German Dietrich
Bonhoeffer who wrote positively about the order of preservation in relation to political
life. As explored in the previous chapter, both Barth and Bonhoeffer reacted against a
theological turn in Germany that placed the state in the order of creation. Instead,
Bonhoeffer places the state firmly in the order of preservation. Bonhoeffer rejects
orders of creation because: ‘That the world has fallen and that sin now rules and that
the creation and sin are so intertwined that no human eye can see them as separate,
that every human order is the order of the fallen world and not of creation, all that is
74. Tappert, “Augsburg Confession,” § XVI.
75. Martin Luther, “The Large Catechism,” in The Book of Concord: The Confessions of the Evangelical
Lutheran Church, ed. and trans. Theodore G. Tappert (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1959), 357–461.
76. Martin Luther, The Table Talk of Martin Luther, ed. and trans. William Hazlitt (London: George Bell,
1883), 308.
77. Ibid., 309. Luther also observed that some of the largest sins are committed by rulers.
78. Arthur C. Cochrane, ed., “The Lausanne Articles of 1536,” in Reformed Confessions of the 16th Century
(London: SCM Press, 1966), § VIII.
79. Calvin, Institutes, 2.2.24.
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not seen in its seriousness.’80 The state, then, becomes what preserves human society
in a fallen world. Such orders of preservation, to Bonhoeffer, ‘are forms of purposeful
formation against sin in the direction of the gospel.’81 Bonhoeffer clearly expresses
this notion in Creation and Fall:
All orders of our fallen world are God’s orders of preservation that uphold
and preserve us for Christ. They are not orders of creation but orders of
preservation. They have no value in themselves; instead they find their
end and meaning only through Christ. God’s new action with humankind
is to uphold and preserve humankind in its fallen world, in its fallen
orders, for death – for the resurrection, for the new creation, for Christ.82
This theme – that the orders of preservation do not find an end in themselves, but
preserve us for Christ – is central to the assessment of the secular means of creation
and society. Bonhoeffer places the state in the order of preservation:
The kingdom of God takes form in the state insofar as the state recognizes
and maintains the order of preservation of life and insofar as it accepts
responsibility for preserving this world from collapse and for exercising
its authority here against the destruction of life.83
For Bonhoeffer, the value of the order of preservation does not lie within itself, as
an order of creation might claim for itself, but has value only insofar as it is open to
Christ.84 He finds the orders of preservation more theologically congenial than orders
of creation, but he also finds support for the order of preservation in scripture:
Only two things can prevent the final fall into the abyss: the miracle of a
new awakening of faith; and the power that the Bible calls “the restrainer,”
κατεχων (2 Thessalonians 2:7), that is, the ordering power, equipped with
great physical strength, which successfully stands in the way of those
who would throw themselves into the abyss. The miracle is the rescuing
act of God that reaches in from above, beyond all historical calculations
and probabilities, and creates new life out of nothingness—that is, the
resurrection from the dead. The “restraining power” [das Aufhaltende] is
the force that is made effective within history by God’s rule of the world,
80. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, “Lecture in Ciernohorské Kúpele: On the Theological Foundation of the Work
of the World Alliance,” in Ecumenical, Academic, and Pastoral Work, 1931–1932, ed. Victoria Barnett, Mark S.
Brocker, and Michael B. Lukens, trans. Anne Schmidt-Lange et al. (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2012),
363.
81. Ibid., 364.
82. Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 140.
83. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, “Thy Kingdom Come! The Prayer of the Church-Community for God’s
Kingdom on Earth,” in Berlin, 1932–1933, ed. Larry L. Rasmussen, trans. Isabel Best and David Higgens
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2009), 293. Bonhoeffer’s italics.
84. Bonhoeffer, “Lecture in Ciernohorské Kúpele,” 364.
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which sets limits to evil. The “restrainer” [das Aufhaltende] itself is not
God and is not without guilt, but God uses it to protect the world from
disintegration. The place where God’s miracle is proclaimed is the church.
The “restraining power” is the ordering power of the state. As different as
they are in essence, they move close to each other in the face of threatening
chaos, and the hatred of the destructive powers directs itself to both of
them alike as deadly enemies.85
Bonhoeffer later turned from the language of ‘orders’ to that of ‘mandates’
(namely: marriage and family, work, government, church), developing this idea in
his uncompleted Ethics.86 Despite the linguistic change, the point remains that, in the
divine mandate of government, there is a preservative function. The difference lies
in the turn toward the divine initiative, rather than the institutions, or concrete social
realities, as the locus of divine action. But, in promoting the state (or government
mandate) as an order of preservation, and as the restrainer, Bonhoeffer takes his
readers into the quagmire of the interpretation of 2 Thessalonians 2. This passage all
but defies interpretation, with modern scholarship on this passage barely advancing
beyond Augustine’s assessment of it as being impenetrable.87
Yet, as Augustine pointed out, there have been many guesses and attempts
at interpretation, with influential interpretations helping to win the text a certain
importance. Bonhoeffer follows many of the Church Fathers in seeing the restrainer as
a political power. Tertullian, for instance, saw the Roman Empire as having a rôle in
arresting worldly afflictions.88 Adso of Montier-en-Der saw that the Antichrist could
not gain ground as long as the Roman Empire has all nations under its control.89 Based
on such ancient and medieval interpretations, Carl Schmitt claims that this text and the
notion of the restrainer was of capital importance in the Middle Ages.90 He writes that,
‘The empire of the Christian Middle Ages lasted only as long as the idea of the katechon
was alive.’91 As Giorgio Agamben remarks, the ancient traditions of interpretation
85. Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 131–132. Also see “Thy Kingdom Come! The Prayer of the Church-Community
for God’s Kingdom on Earth,” in Berlin, 1932–1933, ed. Larry L. Rasmussen, trans. Isabel Best and David
Higgens (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2009), 293, where Bonhoeffer writes: ‘the power of death . . . is
restrained in the state through the order of the preservation of life.’
86. See discussion in Clifford J. Green, “Editor’s Introduction to the English Edition,” in Ethics, by
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, ed. Clifford J. Green, trans. Reinhard Krauss, Charles C. West, and Douglas W. Stott
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2009), 17–22.
87. Augustine, City of God, XX.19.
88. Tertullian, “Apology,” in Tertullian: Apologetical Works and Minucius Felix: Octavius, by Tertullian and
Minucius Felix, trans. Rudolphus Arbesmann, Emily Joseph Daly, and Edwin A. Quain, vol. 10, Fathers
of the Church (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1950), § 32.
89. Adso of Montier-en-Der, “Letter on the Origin and Time of the Antichrist,” in Apocalyptic
Spirituality: Treatises and Letters of Lactantius, Adso of Montier-en-Der, Joachim of Fiore, the Franciscan
Spirituals, Savonarola, ed. and trans. Bernard McGinn (London: SPCK, 1979), 93. Schmitt offers a small
survey of similar interpretations in The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum
Europaeum, trans. and annot. G. L. Ulmen (New York: Telos Press, 2003), 60.
90. Ibid., 59–60, 87.
91. Ibid., 60.
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of this passage culminate ‘in the Schmittian theory that finds in 2 Thessalonians 2
the only possible foundation for a Christian doctrine of State power.’92 Bonhoeffer
is just one theologian who justified the state on the basis of this passage. But its
influence may extend into secular thought, as Agamben writes: ‘In a certain sense,
every theory of the State, including Hobbes’s—which thinks of it as a power destined
to block or delay catastrophe—can be taken as a secularization of this interpretation
of 2 Thessalonians 2.’93
For Bonhoeffer, orders of preservation negatively judge orders of creation and
anticipate orders of redemption, insofar as the preserved creatures are directed toward
redemption in Christ. This makes sense of the current state of the fallen world:
‘From a Christian perspective the fallen world becomes understandable as the world
preserved and maintained by God for the coming of Christ, a world in which we
as human beings can and should live a “good” life in given orders.’94 Christianity,
therefore, affirms the rôle of God as sustaining creation and directing it in line with
both the order of creation and redemption. Barth expressed this idea in these words:
‘In its politics it will always be urging the civil community to treat this fundamental
purpose of its existence with the utmost seriousness: the limiting and the preserving of
man by the quest for and the establishment of law.’95 To summarize, the state becomes,
in the Christian tradition, a means of preservation to ward off chaos and the collapse
of society. Although this cannot become a theodicy against state evil and violence, we
must not choose between faith and society, as the Saguntines had to.
Hendrik Berkhof finds, in the order of preservation, a neutralization of the
foundation of the state. Reducing the state to an instrumentalist concept of preserving
for peace:
For the state it means “de-ideologizing,” a reduction to its true dimensions.
The state no longer serves its own interest and no longer enslaves men
to the world view it propagates; it becomes simply a means of staving
off chaos and ordering human relations in such a way that we can all
lead a quiet and stable life and follow God’s call, unhampered by external
hindrances.96
This approach of ‘de-ideologizing’ is similar to the notion of desacralization
discussed in Chapter 6. But here it must be asked whether this preservationist
approach to the state cannot also risk becoming ideologized, idolized, or made into
more than a mere means. When we understand God as our preserver, we create the
92. Giorgio Agamben, The Time That Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans, trans. Patricia
Dailey (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 109.
93. Ibid., 110.
94. Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 165. Bonhoeffer’s italics.
95. Barth, “Christian Community,” 172. Also 174, 175.
96. Hendrik Berkhof, Christ and the Powers, 2nd ed., trans. John Howard Yoder (Scottdale: Herald Press,
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conditions in which a parody of this can come about, that is making our preserver,
the state in this case, into our god. This possibility is enhanced if the preservation
of society is given such a high value that it must be maintained at almost any cost.
This is a particular risk in modernity, with the decline of the doctrine of divine
providence and secularization of the doctrine of preservation in sociology. It also
implies justifying the means by which the state operates, which necessarily involves
force. For some, this force means the state is violent and profane. For others, the state
is God’s sacred katechon.
Contrasting with the view that the secular state is an idol with preservative
powers, is the view that the state is sacred because it is God’s tool for preservation.
But, viewing the state as an order of God’s preservation does not automatically
sacralize the state; it is not necessary to see a direct immediate link between God and
the state erected for this purpose. God can use the state which is created by people for
this purpose. And the state is never the sole means of preservation in society – to make
it so would be totalitarian and dismissive of the preserving power of the Church, the
family and other institutions which also check the power of socially destructive forces.
The state would be sacralized where it alone is given the power to preserve – either as
God’s sole instrument of societal preservation, or as an autonomous preserving agent
independent of God but with a sacral rôle to preserve society.
Ancient and Modern Challenges to Providence and Preservation
The doctrines of providence and preservation were not the first doctrines that
Christian theologians or the church adopted. They developed later, as the reality
of Christ’s non-return started to be taken seriously by a church that had to grapple
with mundane day-to-day issues while awaiting his return. Expecting Christ’s
imminent return, the earliest Christians had little need for a doctrine of providence,
and instead prepared themselves for this event. That the early Christians held
this position is supported by examining the earliest Christian writings in the New
Testament. In his study of the parousia and its scriptural basis, Osvaldo Vena finds
that eschatology is a major focus of the earliest writings, such as 1 Thessalonians,
whereas ecclesiological and missiological concerns developed only with the decline
of eschatological expectation, as he finds it in the later books of Mark and 2 Peter.97
Further evidence may be found in the practice of baptism. Whereas in the New
Testament baptism appears to be immediate (Acts 8:36–38; 16:33), as time passed the
catechumenate developed, with some people taking three years to prepare for the
sacrament. Such a change may have come about from an acceptance of the delay in
Christ’s return.
97. Osvaldo D. Vena, The Parousia and Its Rereadings: The Development of the Eschatological Consciousness
in the Writings of the New Testament (New York: Peter Lang, 2001), 262–263.
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This had important effects for politics throughout salvation history, with a tangible
tension between this early eschatological expectation, and a need to preserve the
church and human society against threats to its stability, and even survival. Com-
menting on such changes in theological focus, Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza writes:
This functional shift within early Christian apocalyptic literature indicates
a change in the socio-political situation of the Christian community. It
signals a shift from an alternative vision of the world and political
power to the rejection of the world for the sake of the afterlife, from a
counter-cultural Christian movement to a church adapted and integrated
into its culture and society, from a social-political, religious ethos to an
individualized and privatized ethics.98
It remains a challenge for the church to balance these perspectives, and much
contemporary theology can be seen as working through this tension. For example,
Yoder, in a passage from a similar perspective as that of Schüssler Fiorenza, writes that
this theological transformation was given impetus in the post-Constantinian period.
Prior to Constantine’s conversion, it was taken on faith alone that Christ was ruling
the world. Afterwards, one knew this as a matter of empirical experience, and the
notion of a ‘a believing church’ was thereafter an object of faith: ‘Thus the order of
redemption was subordinated to that of preservation, and the Christian hope turned
inside out.’99 The negative results of the conversion of Constantine meant, for Yoder,
that, ‘Providence no longer needed to be an object of faith, for God’s governance of
history had become empirically evident in the person of the Christian ruler of the
world.’100 Eschatologically, this meant that the future had arrived, because the rule
of Christ was manifest. If this is true, then ‘All that God can possibly have in store
for a future victory is more of what has already been won.’101 Yoder’s point raises
the issue that, with the decline of Christendom, and with increased secularization, the
doctrine of preservation might also be in decline for theological reasons, related to the
consummation of grace in the state. Yoder seems to believe that providence can more
easily be taken on faith when the church is suffering or in a small oppressed minority,
rather than when it is ruling society. But this is a temptation which takes us away from
the doctrine of providence, which teaches that God’s overall governance extends into
both moments, as Webb affirms above.
98. Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, “The Phenomenon of Early Christian Apocalyptic: Some Reflections
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These attempts to make the later church appear less eschatological than the early
church risk making this history one of a steady decline.102 To such moves, Brian Daley
has replied that doctrines develop in a more cyclical fashion:
Eschatological emphases in the early Church varied, apocalyptic hopes
died and were revived, and individual or cosmic or ecclesiological or
mystical perspectives succeeded one another, not so much in a direct line
of development as in response to the social and ecclesial challenges met
by Christian communities in each generation, and as an outgrowth of the
personal theological interests and allegiances of individual writers.103
The above motif of oppression can be read, therefore, as an example of the
way in which providence operates. This is the dialectic between apocalyptic and
preservation, which existed in the early church, and has resurfaced from time to time
throughout church history, especially at points where some Christians react against
the apparent compromises of the church with secular powers. Here two examples will
be considered, one from the medieval period, and one from the Radical Reformation,
with an assessment of whether we also live at such a time. This will be considered in
the current reaction against some forms of politicized theology.
The first example comes from the thirteenth century, where the Franciscan Spiri-
tuals revived, against the accommodations of the church to the world, a revitalized
eschatology.104 The Franciscan Spirituals expected that a final conflict would bring
about the end of the world. Their own hopes were dashed when Frederick II, who
was thought to be the Antichrist ushering in the final conflict, died in 1260. But, in the
assessment of Löwith, their influence has carried through until today. This legacy is
alive in those who expect the kingdom of God to be ushered in through a final battle
with secular evil. So, lest it is thought that eschatology is less harmful politically and
spiritually than a churchly compromise with the world, Löwith makes this historical
judgment, regarding historical realizations, such as the Third Reich: ‘The source of
all these formidable attempts to fulfil history by and within itself is the passionate,
but fearful and humble, expectation of the Franciscan Spirituals that a last conflict
will bring history to its climax and end.’105 When it is internalized by the state, this
perspective allows it to believe that it has an important spiritual rôle in realizing the
fulfilment of history. In this way, the state can be held to be sacralized as a redeemer
of society out of its current predicament.
102. Such a view is well represented in Martin Werner, The Formation of Christian Dogma: An Historical
Study of its Problem, trans., with an introduction by S. G. F. Brandon (London: Adam & Charles Black,
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This tension was also seen in the second example. Taken from the Reformation
period, this dispute was between the Magisterial Reformers’ promotion of order,
and the Anabaptist’s expectation of the impending eschaton. Within Anabaptism,
Balthasar Hubmaier gives an account of his dispute with Hans Hut. Hubmaier
charged Hut with the error of predicting an early return of Christ, which lured his
followers to sell their means of subsistence and forsake their families in order to follow
him.106 It is obvious now that Hubmaier was correct to admonish Hut on this occasion,
but the tendency within Anabaptism to concentrate more on the parousia than the
means of preservation was more widely held than this aberration. Part of the reason
for the Anabaptist apocalyptic fervour was the persecution they received at the hands
of other Reformers and the Catholic church. Their suffering was seen as a sign of the
approaching parousia.
These examples from church history highlight the point that, in political theology,
tensions prevail between the doctrines of preservation and eschatology. Where
preservation is dominant, we would expect a focus on the primacy of order over
justice and the suppression of revolution.107 Where eschatology is dominant, we
would expect to find conflict with the status quo, which is perceived to be holding
back the coming of the Kingdom or parousia. These impulses in theology may also be
expected to arise when the other is in ascendancy. And, as shown above, Vena finds in
the New Testament writings a tension between ecclesiology (which accepts a delayed
parousia) and eschatology (which eagerly anticipates an imminent parousia).
While one may observe a concurrent decline in the doctrine of preservation, it
would be more accurate to say that this doctrine has been secularized, bringing with it
a conflict between the preserving state and a church that may sometimes side with the
state, while at other times being more eschatological in outlook. With the politicization
of social life in the twentieth century, as reviewed in Chapter 2, it is not surprising
that as theology accommodated itself to the statism of the period, a reaction was
found in movements to re-eschatologize political theology independently of its statist
formulations.108 However, this turn has taken a decidedly political shape, in line with
the modern politicization of theology.
Despite the presence of the doctrines of providence and preservation in scripture
and tradition, they have not fared well in modern times. The decline of the doctrine
of providence in the West has not been at a steady rate that correlates directly with
increasing secularization. It has taken blows from both philosophers and theologians
over the last few centuries. The decline in the doctrine has been a result of the glacial
and seismic forces, quite literally. The 1755 Lisbon earthquake shattered complacency
106. Balthasar Hubmaier, Balthasar Hubmaier: Theologian of Anabaptism, ed. and trans. H. Wayne Pipkin
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108. See Fletcher, Disciplining the Divine, 145–178; Nathan R. Kerr, Christ, History and Apocalyptic: The
Politics of Christian Mission (London: SCM Press, 2008).
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about progress and the idea of a loving beneficent God.109 But in many cases, it was
only a facile optimism that was shaken and, as Rousseau observed, pious Christians
were able to reconcile God’s providence with such devastation, while the philosophes
thought that belief in God’s providence was misplaced.110
It was not only singular events which challenged the notion of God’s providence,
but also the theological accounts that went along with them. Theological explanations
of the Great Irish Famine (1845–1852) helped to bring the doctrine into disrepute.111
The twentieth century also saw a decline in the purchase of the doctrine of providence,
according to Grenz. Given two world wars, and the prospect of a nuclear and other
holocausts: ‘A doctrine of providence which claims that all of history is moving
towards a divine goal is difficult to maintain in the face of the reality of a world that
appears to have spun out of control.’112
Aside from natural catastrophes and wars, the fortunes of the doctrine of provi-
dence was also harmed by slower moving events, such as the reconfiguration of the
understanding of history and time that occurred over the modern period. This saw the
secularization of the understanding of time, so that preservation changed from being a
penultimate work of God in the pre-eschatological period (the saeculum) into a notion
of preservation for its own sake. Science has also been destructive to the notion of
preservation in general. Whereas much of the so-called conflict between science and
Christianity is focused on the differences between orthodox accounts of God’s creative
acts and the godless accounts of the origins of the universe, perhaps a more important
matter of disagreement is over the means by which the universe is preserved in being.
For while the originator of the world may also be upheld as its preserver (God, or,
conversely, a self-sustaining nature), a threat to theology is to risk accepting a deist
approach to creation, which could affirm creation by God, together with a belief in
the preservation of creation through natural laws (setting aside the premise of God
at this juncture). Such a deism is contrary to the detailed providence of God attested
to in scripture, where he gives the birds enough to eat and provides for humans too
(Matthew 6:25–26).113 This is not only a temptation in our abstract understanding of
the natural world, which can remain remote from our day-to-day affairs, but can also
affect our politics and our appreciation of God’s relationship to the ordering of society
and the state.
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The notion of political deism, a derivative from the same modernist impulse as
scientific deism that excludes the ongoing post-creation work of God, implies that
God is sidelined in human political life. This notion is expressed in the words of
Schmitt, ‘The machine now runs by itself.’114 Political deism specifically excludes
God’s ongoing revelation in the created order, limiting knowledge of God to the act
of creation and to the moral law planted within humanity by the Creator. It is no
surprise, then that in modernity – influenced as it is by Deism – there is little place for
miracles, or any other act of God in history. The political implications of this modern
deistic turn are profound, since politics is reduced to a human creation based in the
cutting with the grain of human nature. This is not necessarily a secular atheistic
movement, but can be a Christian heresy in which God is reduced solely to the rôle
of Creator, without any ongoing presence in human history. To be tempted to adopt
political deism results from evacuating theology from serious political theory. This
allows no room for the ongoing revelation of God in creation, and excluding God’s
action from the operation of human politics.
In considering the connection between political deism and the sacralization of the
state it is worth taking in Barth’s three arguments against Deism, which also have
application to political deism:
First, it overlooks the fact that a creature independent of the Creator and
maintaining itself in life and movement would no longer be His creature
but a second God. It thus ascribes to God the absurdity that He can and
must cease to be the one and only God. Second, it overlooks the fact
that it not only belongs to the nature of the creature, but constitutes its
true honour, not merely occasionally but continuously to need and receive
the assistance of God in its existence. Third, it overlooks the fact that
the existence of even the most perfect creature is not an end in itself, but
stands under a determination in relation to its Creator whose meaning is
established and conditioned by the further dealings of the Creator towards
and with it.115
In Barth’s first point we can find the self-sacralization of the state, which in its
godless preservation becomes a second god. This political deism reaches its logical
endpoint in the total independence of the human as a scientific and political animal,
whose social life is self-generated and is regenerated through human effort, without
reference to God. Such an approach results in the secularization of the doctrine of
preservation. This makes the state a preserver which parodies God’s rôle as sustainer
of all creation. For this reason, it is surprising that Milbank and Cavanaugh are so
114. Schmitt, Political Theology, 48.
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silent on this topic, since it is no less important a battleground between theologies and
anti-theologies than creation and redemption, to which they devote more attention.
conc
The Instrumentalist State
The modern state has many means of preservation at its disposal. But what is it
preserving society for? Does it merely provide the space in which individuals can
work out their own meaning and perhaps salvation, or does it have an aim toward
which it is heading? To follow Michael Oakeshott’s metaphor, the state merely keeps
society afloat:
In political activity, then, men sail a boundless and bottomless sea; there is
neither harbour for shelter nor floor for anchorage, neither starting-place
nor appointed destination. The enterprise is to keep afloat on an even keel;
the sea is both friend and enemy; and the seamanship consists in using the
resources of a traditional manner of behaviour in order to make a friend of
every hostile occasion.116
In this way, a legitimising function of the modern state has been to preserve the
basis of society from both internal and external threats. Such threats may come
from other states, internal enemies, and also from criminals, but not all threats take
personal form. Social unrest can come from economic inequality, epidemics, and
natural disasters. The state seeks to eliminate or mitigate such threats so that society
can operate and continue as before.
For such states, being those that merely have the means of preservation at their
disposal, and no end towards which they direct society, it is only preservation
that they can offer as salvation. By contrast, in Christianity we are preserved
for salvation with the difference here lying in eschatology. The modern state
provides preservation within a modern conception of time which has been de-
eschatologized.117 Without an eschatological horizon, the political and the theological
exists forever in the present. This secular de-eschatologized time-frame came from
Christian theology in response to the delayed parousia, as the discussion above shows.
In philosophical language, to move beyond present preservation requires a grand
‘narrative of emancipation’, which in the contemporary modern world does not have
validity to justify contemporary action other than that which preserves.118 Thus, the
modern state can aim at preserving society, but this will not satisfy everyone, some of
116. Michael Oakeshott, “Political Education,” in Rationalism in Politics: And Other Essays (London:
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whom wish to see the state serve society in a more proactive fashion, leading society
forward. But to serve society means to assist society to reach its own independent
aims, and such goals in a modern state are rarely coherently known.119
Aquinas would accept Oakeshott’s metaphor of the ship, but would complete it in
this fashion:
First of all, however, it must be noted that to govern is to guide what is
governed in a suitable fashion to its proper end. Thus a ship is said to be
governed when it is steered on its right course to port by the industry of
the sailors. If, therefore, something is directed towards an end external to
itself, as a ship is to harbour, the duty of its governor will be not only
to preserve the thing itself, but also to guide it towards its final end;
whereas if there were something with no end outside itself, then the sole
task belonging to the ruler would be the preservation of the thing itself in
perfect condition.120
The similarities between Aquinas and Oakeshott deserve as much attention as the
differences. In both examples, the temporal goods of preservation are shared between
the ship forever at sea and the ship with a clear destination. This similarity recalls
Augustine’s writings on the temporal goods (including government) shared by the
City of God and the City of Man.121 Cavanaugh has been criticized here for misreading
Augustine and not having a satisfactory appreciation of the temporal good provided
by the state for the preservation of society.122 The same might also be said of Milbank.
The Tension between Eschatology and Preservation
It remains to make a final assessment of the notion of the state in relation to the
doctrine of preservation and how this judgment can be used to gauge the political
theologies of both Milbank and Cavanaugh. As outlined above, a prima facie
tension exists between secular understandings of preservation in relation to political
organization, and also tensions within theology between doctrines of eschatology and
preservation. The modern church exists in a time of tension between the already
and the not yet. We live after the central event in history: the incarnation, life,
death, resurrection, and ascension of Jesus Christ. And in also living before Christ’s
return, we look both backwards to Christ, and forward to his return. The Christian’s
119. This is observed by Cavanaugh, Torture and Eucharist, 5.
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attitude toward the state exists within this tension, the ethical meaning of which
is a conundrum.123 Such a posture can have various modes, such as viewing the
state as that which preserves us in human society for the return of Christ. This has
been a predominant position in the tradition of Christian political thought. Another
perspective sees the state as beholden to demonic powers that Christ will finally defeat
upon his return. Still another view, which emphasizes a different eschatological vision,
wishes to see the state as helping to usher in God’s Kingdom.
Yet, both Milbank and Cavanaugh have a more or less realized eschatology within
the present. This is why the state can easily be dismissed as having no part in salvation
history, since it can play no determinative part in any future end point, since the end
is already present. This contrasts with an eschatology which places our redemption
in the future (whether near or far does not matter). There will be more on this in
discussing their doctrines of redemption in the next chapter. Milbank and Cavanaugh
narrate and give the facts of the development of the rise of the state, with a view to
showing that the present and future will be like the past. They are not future-focussed,
as traditionally Christian views typically are.
For someone like Jürgen Moltmann, the inherently conservative doctrine of
preservation could even be seen as a theologization of a conservative secular doctrine
of the preservation of the state, making Machiavelli the originator of the doctrine.
Such a point inverts that of Carl Schmitt, who saw that the secular doctrines of the
state derived from a secularization of the doctrine of preservation of society against
chaos. The purpose of this chapter is not to come to a decision on either side of this
debate, but merely to highlight what is at stake here. Yet, this raises, once again, the
extent to which Milbank and Cavanaugh are committed to the views of Schmitt and
Löwith that secular politics is nothing more than a secularized version of Christianity.
Alongside this emphasis on the preservation of the state lies the view that some
injustice and human suffering is tolerable in order to preserve the social order. If
the state is accepted as a means of preservation, then the means of the state must be
accepted as well, as was outlined by Barth. A version of this view was expressed by
Paul Ramsey:
We may not have taken seriously enough, in obedience to God’s gover-
nance and judgment of a sinful world, our Christian responsibility also
to articulate our thinking and discipline our action so as to preserve this
world and not some other, and to preserve an orderly, even if unjust, social
or legal system while we engage in the struggle for justice within it. This,
too, is needed to maintain the fabric of man’s life with fellow man, or a
garment for covenant.124
123. For an account of this see Thielicke, Theological Ethics: Vol. 1, 39–47.
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Chapter 4. Preservation and the Order of the State 133
Here Ramsey is willing to accept some injustice for the the sake of order. If the
necessity of preserving the existing social order is accepted, then, some would argue,
this entails the suspension of the proclamation of Jesus’s coming and a resignation
to the realm of necessity over that of freedom.125 Furthermore, at this point Milbank
and Cavanaugh believe that the violence needed to uphold the state renders the state
largely unacceptable from a Christian viewpoint.
Another position, which focusses on the initiative of God suggests that in God’s
preserving work God can use the state and rulers, even those like Nebuchadnezzar
of Babylon, for God’s purpose. Such a position would affirm that God is free to use
the powers of this world for his purposes, and while it is correct to judge violence
as against the will of God, God can use the sin of men for his ends, which is the
redemption of all of Creation for his glorification. Aligned with this, theology must
affirm the absolute prerogative of God in preserving Creation. As sovereign, God is
also free to use whatever means he chooses to effect this sustenance of creation and
his people. We must take care not to reject God’s means out of hand, lest we fall foul
of God’s judgment. Consider Jeremiah 2:13:
for my people have committed two evils:
they have forsaken me,
the fountain of living water,
and dug out cisterns for themselves,
cracked cisterns
that can hold no water.
Following this metaphor, the people of Israel have rejected God’s precious, life-
saving water supply and have dug out cisterns in order to provide for themselves.
Luther connects this passage with the works of human hands through which hu-
manity tries to justify itself.126 He identifies such works righteousness as idolatrous.
This idolatry extends to how the work of human hands can be seen as displacing
the true preservation that comes from God alone. This passage can be read as
condemning two errors. Because true preservation through living water remains the
prerogative of God, the first evil is to reject God’s preserving water. Rejection of God’s
means of preservation – water – leads directly to the second error. This is to rely –
having already rejected God’s preservation – on humanity’s own inadequate efforts
at self-preservation. These human means risk becoming a sacred idol when they are
attributed with the divine power to preserve society against the threat of chaos.127
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This sacralization of the state runs counter to the traditional Christian position that
our preservation depends on God alone, while allowing that the work of human hands
can become God’s means for the preservation of creation for divine ends.
That God’s ends remain central in considering the doctrine of preservation is
affirmed by Barth:
God has an aim for the creature when He preserves and accompanies it.
His preservation and accompanying are as such a guiding, a leading, a
ruling, an active determining of the being and activity of all the reality
which is distinct from Himself. He directs it to the thing which in
accordance with His good-pleasure and resolve, and on the basis of its
creation, it has to do and to be in the course of its history in time; to the
telos which has to be attained in this history. It is He Himself who has set
for it this telos, and it is He who as Ruler guides it towards this telos.128
Contrary to the rule of politicians, God’s rule is to the end of ends, the redemption
of all creation. Any other end must be either subservient to this end, as a penultimate
end, or be in direct conflict with it. Rulers who merely preserve without an end in view
may serve a useful interim purpose, but they ultimately achieve nothing. In contrast
to Christian politics, which is a politics of ends, secular politics is purely about means.
Yet, sometimes the means can create ends or become ends in themselves. Ellul states
the problem in these terms: ‘The means determine the ends, by assigning us ends that
can be attained and eliminating those considered unrealistic because our means do
not correspond to them.’129 The problem is that in not having ends, we are left only
with means which grow, unchecked by their utility for achieving an end. The means
grow in search of an end which it never finds. Here we find, perhaps, a reason for the
ever-expanding totalitarian state.130
The Christian understanding of preservation is that preservation is for a further
purpose, being future salvation by God and the renewal of all creation. As Helmut
Thielicke writes that ‘the physical safeguarding of existence is never an end in itself.
It is subject to a pneumatic goal which God will accomplish in his elect people.’131
Modern politics, with its disavowal of eschatology, therefore posits preservation as
salvation, while theology teaches preservation for salvation. Brunner puts it like this:
For one who lives in the knowledge and certainty of the Providence of
God, what we were obliged to deny as a general truth comes true in his
own life: for him the grace of preservation and the grace of redemption
are one. For him this temporal life is part of the way to the eternal goal,
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therefore the preservation of the temporal life is by permission of God who
arranges that he shall follow this path. He knows that he is preserved by
God for redemption; he knows no other meaning of his existence than this,
which is the whole meaning and the final meaning, the Telos, not a Telos.132
This passage, in short, describes the difference between the secular and Christian
view of political time. Some versions of the sacred state will stop here, being
an autonomous sustainer for eternity. Others will proceed further and claim to
bring redemption. This conclusion, that the state may remain forever in the task
of preservation, does not exhaust the state’s potential sacralization. It remains to
consider in the next chapter how redemption and salvation is understood in relation
to secular politics.
Conclusions
This chapter has considered the often neglected doctrine of preservation in relation to
politics. The doctrine of preservation has not fared well in this scientific age where the
world is often viewed as being sustained by forces that science aims at discovering. In
like fashion political and social laws are often deemed to be enough to sustain political
society. Contrary to these approaches, this chapter has taken preservation seriously as
a work of God, it has investigated how this work relates to creation in general and
the sustaining of human society in particular. Linking the doctrine of preservation to
God’s work has been a traditional Christian view, but one that, curiously, does not
feature strongly in the work of Milbank and Cavanaugh.
There are several reasons for this neglect. An important one when judging
the soundness of the theologies of Milbank and Cavanaugh is the ongoing tension
between the doctrines of preservation and eschatology. Milbank and Cavanaugh
wish to compress the time for preservation, bringing the redemption into the present
with a realized eschatology. This tension cannot be resolved by merely considering
preservation on its own terms. Traditionally the doctrine has emphasized our
preservation for redemption. For this reason, we cannot fully address one’s doctrine
of preservation unless one also considers one’s doctrine of redemption, the subject of
the next chapter.
132. Emil Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption: Dogmatics, Vol. II, trans. Olive Wyon
(London: Lutterworth Press, 1952), 159. Here Brunner draws on 1 Corinthians 1:18 and 2 Corinthians 4:3.
Chapter 5
Redemption and the End of the
State
This chapter completes the threefold treatment of creation, preservation, and redemp-
tion in their relation to the theological understanding of the modern state. Again,
the competitive nature of the interpretation of the state’s relationship to the present
doctrine, redemption, will be at stake. Will the state be redeemed and have its place
in the Kingdom of God? Does the state offer salvation to humanity, or does it stand
in the way of our redemption? The discussion of such questions guides this chapter
to the conclusion that the state is neither a redeemer nor an anti-redeemer (something
which stands in the way of our redemption), or, in other words, the state is neither
Christ nor the Antichrist.
Milbank and Cavanaugh are not the only theologians linking redemption and
politics. Others view the good works of the state redemptively. Barth, for one, placed
the state in the order of redemption. For Barth, salvation in Christ alone means
that Christ does not need any helpers.1 This may seem like an obvious truth, but
it is worth repeating often because the Christian, formed in a church which teaches
true redemption, can be seduced by non-Christian redemptive language. Christians,
possibly more than non-Christians, are liable to fall victim to the claims of political
redeemers, sometimes taking the form of a supplementary redemption to that of God.
That rulers are saviour figures is the true Christian approach, provided only that
our ruler and judge is our Lord. This is seen in Isaiah 33:22:
For the LORD is our judge, the LORD is our ruler,
the LORD is our king; he will save us.
In the book of Isaiah, this summary statement of God’s rule serves as the
conclusion to the issue of whether the Hebrew people will put their trust in God or
1. Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics: Volume IV, The Doctrine of Reconciliation, Part 1, ed. G. W. Bromiley and
T. F. Torrance, trans. G. W. Bromiley (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1961), 632.
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their neighbouring nations.2 In like fashion, this verse serves as a succinct summary of
this chapter, both in what it affirms (the sole sovereignty of God as judge, ruler, king,
and saviour) and in what it denies (that we have other rulers and saviours). When we
accept a ruler other than Christ, then it follows that we are tempted to see that ruler
as our saviour as well. Our ruler is our saviour and our saviour is our ruler. But this
conclusion – that we reject the state as a saviour – does not justify the state as profane.
The chapter begins with a brief overview of redemption, addressing the issue of
what it is we are saved from, and relating this to political redemption. A key point
in this discussion is that redemption relates strongly to the diagnosis of the human
condition. Having laid this basis for the discussion, the politics of redemption in
Milbank and Cavanaugh are then outlined and contrasted. The final main section
of the chapter looks into the politics of redemption in Christian tradition, in scripture
and in the theology, with specific attention given to Barth and his placing the state in
the order of redemption. Finally the relationship between notions of redemption and
the welfare state are investigated.
Redemption in Doctrine and Scripture
Any treatment of political redemption must first consider the notion of the human
need for redemption. All humans, at some time or other, feel unfulfilled and wish
that things would be better, both in their own lives and in the world as a whole. They
desire to be made whole, with all aspects of their life coming together in harmony.
People wish to be saved from the threats that challenge their preferred way of life and
favoured destiny. They also wish to be reconciled with others and live in harmony
and peace with all of humanity. This holistic need for redemption drives one to find
the most all-encompassing story of redemption, one that offers to transform all of life,
in all aspects, permanently.
It is, therefore, clear that redemption links to our diagnosis of the human condition,
with our chosen saviour being a good remedy for our perceived predicament. There
are many competing analyses of the human condition and many redeemers offering
to save us. These often take the shape of political ideologies which are comprehensive
in the diagnosis and prescription for the human condition. Against these and other
political saviours, the Christian analysis is unique: it does not rely on an intuitive sense
of our fallenness, or the material conditions of life. Christianity affirms that humanity
has sinned and faces the results of their sin in death, decay, and violence.3 Those who
reject such Christian accounts of sin will necessarily provide an alternative account
of the travail of human life. In secular politics the state is sometimes seen as the
2. See John N. Oswalt, The Book of Isaiah, Chapters 1–39, The New International Commentary on the
Old Testament (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1986), 604.
3. This is a common statement in many churches’ confessional statements, supported with reference
to Romans 6:23. See, for instance, The Bohemian Confession (1535), Article 4.
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problem that ails humanity, standing in the way of human liberation and redemption.
Then there are others who see politics and the state as offering redemption, a way of
overcoming the chaos created by unrestrained human nature and unregulated human
interaction. This is sometimes given a Christian colour, with the state as the redeemer,
whether wholly or as a supplementary redeemer, sitting alongside Christ and playing
an important rôle in bringing about the Kingdom of God.
The Language of Redemption
Given the importance of redemption and salvation in Christian theology, it is no
surprise that we have a confusing array of terms for it. So, in discussing redemption
we need to be aware of the parallels with other terms used both in theological
discourse and in political language which closely mirrors that of theology. The
words ‘redemption,’ ‘salvation,’ ‘atonement,’ ‘reconciliation,’ ‘expiration,’ ‘liberation,’
and ‘deliverance,’ are all used in scripture and are sometimes used as synonyms in
theological writing.4 They are also commonly found in political speech, which alerts
us to the theological flavour of much political thought.
Catholic theologian Gerald O’Collins focuses his attention on ‘salvation and
redemption’, but notes in passing that St Anselm of Canterbury used the nouns
redemptio and liberatio as synonyms, and the verbs redimere and liberare as equivalents.5
But, despite such similarities, care is required in the selection of terms to ensure that
the initiative for our salvation stays with God. O’Colllins, for example, warns of the
use of ‘reconciliation’, because we need to recognize that the Bible uses terms in ways
that do not always cohere with secular uses: ‘Any speech drawn from human states
of affairs does not simply apply to God’s redemptive work towards sinful men and
women.’6
‘Atonement’ is especially important here, for its root is the English ‘at-one-ment’,
which indicates unity through making something whole. This at-one-ment has a
parallel political meaning in Cavanaugh’s salvation of humanity as the reunification
that comes through the reconciliation of humanity and God in the Eucharist. Dis-
cussions of Christian salvation often focus on the means of redemption rather than
the ends. This can be seen readily in the history of the term ‘atonement’, which
has gone from being mainly to do with the unity (at-one-ment) we receive in Jesus
Christ, to the work of Jesus’s atoning sacrifice and how this functions to save us.7
This understanding of what redemption results in will be important for assessing
Milbank’s and Cavanaugh’s proposals.
4. See, for examples from scripture and tradition, Gerald O’Collins, Jesus Our Redeemer: A Christian
Approach to Salvation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 3–7.
5. Ibid., 6–7.
6. Ibid., 15.
7. On this background see Robert S. Paul, The Atonement and the Sacraments: The Relation of the
Atonement to the Sacraments of Baptism and the Lord’s Supper (Eugene: Wipf & Stock, 1960), 17–32.
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The Politics of Redemption in Milbank and Cavanaugh
Where do Milbank and Cavanaugh stand in relation to the state and redemption?
They reject the state as saviour, and seek salvation in the Body of Christ and out of the
clutches of the state. But there is a twist here: they both place salvation and politics
within the church, since for them soteriology and politics are both ecclesially-based.
While, in their opinion, the state is neither redeemed nor redeemer, this does not make
the state profane in itself. Rather, they hold that it is because it is profane that we need
to be saved from it.
Milbank’s Pluralist Salvation
Milbank has a very dim view of the current status of the modern world. As shown
in Chapter 3, Milbank locates the origins of the modern world’s sin and death in the
rise of the secular. It follows that for Milbank that, ‘Salvation from sin must mean
“liberation” from cosmic, political, economic and psychic dominium, and therefore
from all structures belonging to the saeculum, or temporal interval between the Fall
and the final return of Christ.’8 Elsewhere he writes: ‘it is quite precisely the political
order (the order of the polis) that we are to be saved from.’9 Milbank sees the state as an
anti-redeemer, but for him it’s more than an obstacle to redemption; it is the profane
thing we need saving from. In Milbank’s politicized theology, ‘the central aspect of
salvation is the creation of perfect community.’10 For Milbank, everything else related
to salvation follows from this, including the analysis of what we are redeemed from,
and how this is enacted. In his opinion, our political fall occurred in the rise of the
absolute sovereignty of the profane state and its maintenance of ‘simple space’ which
sits ‘suspended between the mass of atomic individuals on the one hand, and an
absolutely sovereign centre on the other.’11 Against this atomizing vision, Milbank
posits salvation coming through the dissolution of absolute state sovereignty and the
reintroduction of Gothic complex space and the recapture of the social rôle of the
church.12 Milbank’s political soteriology is, therefore, a mirror image of the rise of
the state described in Chapter 3.
To recapitulate, Milbank’s ‘desire is merely to undermine not only the sacral
aura, but also its long-extended shadow – the secular legitimacy – of coercive power.
And to insist that salvation is precisely, out of this political domain which constantly
reproduces “original” sin.’13 For Milbank, salvation is out of the state and to be found
in the societas perfecta of the church, but the church is understood in a broad sense of the
8. Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 394. Milbank’s italics.
9. Milbank, “Essay against Secular Order,” 209. Milbank’s italics.
10. John Milbank, “Postmodern Critical Augustinianism: A Short Summa in Forty-Two Responses to
Unasked Questions,” in The Future of Love: Essays in Political Theology (London: SCM Press, 2009), 345.
11. Milbank, “On Complex Space,” 275.
12. Ibid., 275–276.
13. Milbank, “Essay against Secular Order,” 220. Milbank’s italics.
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extended Body of Christ, and certainly not limited to mere church-going. Mirroring
his complex space, he describes the vehicles of salvation: ‘There has been, we must
believe, salvation in monasteries, in parishes, in families, in separatist communities,
in guilds, in trade unions.’14 Because such a salvation requires making and sustaining
the space in which this can happen, Milbank writes that, ‘The Church, in order to be
the Church, must seek to extend the sphere of socially aesthetic harmony – “within”
the State where this is possible’.15
In order to undermine the state’s claim to absolute sovereignty, Milbank advocates
both distributism and pluralism. To Milbank, unlike some pluralists, associations do
not mediate between the individual and the state, but exist alongside it and undermine
its claims to absolute sovereignty.16 To Milbank, associations which merely mediate
between the individual and the state remain under the state, to which Milbank
attributes a wish ‘to exterminate all “intermediate associations” between itself and the
individual’.17 Furthermore, Milbank understands the church to have an international
dimension that entails an independence from the claims of the state.18
Milbank’s notion of salvation for is that it society moves from state domination,
and transforms into what he calls Gothic complex space, characterized by a matrix
of overlapping associations. It is for this reason that Milbank, following the work of
the English pluralists and other Christian socialists, advocates the re-establishment
of guilds. To Maurice B. Reckitt and C. E. Bechhofer, ‘The establishment of National
Guilds involves the abolition of the wage-system, the attainment of self-government
in industry, and the modification of State sovereignty.’19 This aligns with Milbank’s
hopes for his advocacy of guilds, which is not simply the development of associations,
but aims at a political and economic revolution.
Having outlined Milbank’s position of the state from which we are redeemed, and
how we are redeemed out of it, we can now turn to some criticisms of his position.
Central to Milbank’s proposed expansion of civil society, is that it comes at the
expense of the sovereignty of the state. As the sphere of just exchange grows it must
necessarily take away from the sphere of the market/state and reclaim the ground lost
with the expansion of the state. This notion rests behind Milbank’s support for the Big
Society – a flagship programme of the Conservative Party under David Cameron’s
leadership. From the start of his premiership, Cameron’s concern was the ‘size, scope
14. Milbank, “Essay against Secular Order,” 221. Milbank’s italics.
15. Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 428.
16. On the undermining potential of pluralism see George Schwab, “Introduction,” in The Concept of the
Political, Expanded, by Carl Schmitt, trans., with an introduction by George Schwab, with a foreword by
Tracy B. Strong (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 12..
17. See Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 231, 410.
18. John Milbank, “The End of Dialogue,” in The Future of Love: Essays in Political Theology (London:
SCM Press, 2009), 286.
19. Maurice B. Reckitt and C. E. Bechhofer, The Meaning of National Guilds (London: C. Palmer &
Hayward, 1918), xii.
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and role of the state’.20 It was also clear that, from its adoption, the notion of the
Big Society was linked to cutting the deficit and about being able ‘to deliver more for
less’.21 This has led to scepticism about whether the programme is really about finding
ways to cut welfare state spending. This is just one problem for the Big Society agenda,
which has failed to capture the public imagination, partly because it is considered
vague. Economic issues aside, Cameron also sees the Big Society programme about
the ‘redistribution of power away from the central state to local communities’.22 This
is where the best connection between the Conservative programme and Milbank’s
pluralism exists: in the pluralist concern with limiting of the power of the state by
giving more power to other associations in society.23
In Milbank’s vision of a new society, he problematically combines political plu-
ralism with philosophical monism. He seeks in pluralism the complex space which
is denied by the state, which claims sovereignty over all of society. But this
cannot be a plurality of ends, for he wishes to see all things turned toward God.
Milbank advocates political pluralism, while disliking religious pluralism. Can this
be consistent? The problem is that if politics is essentially an expression of a mythos,
then political pluralism can exist only as a manifestation of a deeper ‘religious’
pluralism. This issue lies at the heart of the type of pluralism that Milbank thinks
society should reflect – this is the pluralism of means, not a pluralism of ends. But
is a viable position to hold? Reckitt commented that the synthetic matrix of groups
in Christendom ‘has been replaced by the kaleidoscope of the modern world, with its
maze of purely self-regarding associations’ in business, professional bodies, unions,
and universities.24 Groups in the modern world do not, according to Reckitt, operate
as they would in Christendom, since there is no ‘accepted end to which their interests
can be subordinated.’25 Groups, for Reckitt, are atomistic collections of individuals
with self-regarding ends.26 This remains a major problem for Milbank’s pluralism.
To what end are his proposed guilds and the voluntary societies of the Big Society
directed? Is this the creation of an anonymous Christendom, in which they are all
directed to God?
Milbank’s adoption of the philsophy of pluralism has unfortunate consequences
for his anti-individualist position. To Carl Schmitt, political pluralism is inherently
individualistic, in that it has no centre other than the individual. When faced with
20. David Cameron, “The Big Society,” Conservatives, November 10, 2009, <http : / / www .
conservatives.com/News/Speeches/2009/11/David_Cameron_The_Big_Society.aspx> (accessed
April 23, 2013).




23. On pluralism and the Big Society see Rodney Barker, “Big Societies, Little Platoons and the
Problems with Pluralism,” The Political Quarterly 82, no. 1 (January–March 2011): 50–55.
24. Reckitt, “Religion and Politics,” 137.
25. Ibid., 138.
26. Ibid., 138–139.
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competing claims, ‘One association is played off against another and all questions and
conflicts are decided by individuals.’27 For a theologian, this entity would have to
be the church, representing Christ, whose sovereign claims outweigh all others. So,
for instance, where a trade union suggests to its members that the church is part of
the capitalist superstructure and should not be attended, this conflicts with a church
which teaches that a union is part of secular humanist communism. The church might
further teach that it is not in the hands of the individual to negotiate the waters of these
competing claims, but in submission to church teaching, the worker should follow the
church’s advice.28 Pope Leo XIII addressed this very situation in Rerum Novarum:
‘Under these circumstances Christian working men must do one of two things: either
join associations in which their religion will be exposed to peril, or form associations
among themselves and unite their forces so as to shake off courageously the yoke of
so unrighteous and intolerable an oppression.’29 But even here, the task of judging
whether their religion is threatened seems to lie with the individual.
Schmitt’s objection, that pluralism is individualistic, can be applied to Milbank
because his associations are voluntary or free, with some notable exceptions. Milbank
points out that in antiquity, the three main associations were not voluntary: ‘the
familial, the tribal and the political communities’.30 Milbank claims that the church, by
being the first free association (one joined voluntarily), invented the ‘social world’.31
According to Milbank, Christianity’s social innovation was to develop the idea of
having a space of free association, with ‘people coming together for all kinds of
shared purposes of organisation and running their lives’.32 So whereas one did
not choose one’s initial nationality, citizenship, or family, one could choose to be a
member of a church. Yet, elsewhere, Milbank questions too much church freedom. He
simultaneously advocates for compulsory membership of parishes and membership
of free associations. In the past, compulsory associations included the parish structure
and compulsory guild membership and political affiliation, such as bondage to a Lord
or King.33 Against churches based on communities of special interests which overlap
parish boundaries, Milbank favours the inclusion of all people into parishes:
27. Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, Expanded, trans., with an introduction by George Schwab,
with a foreword by Tracy B. Strong (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 45. On the individualism
of pluralism also see Harold J. Laski, “The Sovereignty of the State,” in Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1917), 24.
28. This example is from Schmitt, Concept of the Political, 41.
29. Leo XIII, “Rerum Novarum,” ¶ 54.
30. John Milbank, “Christian Vision of Society Puts Economics and Politics in Their Place,” ABC
Religion & Ethics, December 8, 2011, <http://www.abc.net.au/religion/articles/2011/12/08/
3386474.htm> (accessed April 23, 2013).
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Harold J. Laski makes this point that until the Reformation the church was a compulsory form of
association in the West. See “The Pluralistic State,” The Philosophical Review 28, no. 6 (November 1919):
564.
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In this manner the logic of parish organization is simply the logic of
ecclesiology itself: the way for the Church to include all is to operate
the cure of souls in such and such a specific area. It is pure geography
encompasses all without exception.34
Arguably, Milbank’s concern is that the church should discipline itself by adopting
a strict parish structure and offer an alternative to the complex space of fragmented
ecclesiologies, where church-goers become consumers in the religious market-place.
But this must clash with his notion that the church is a free association.
Regarding guilds, which were also compulsory in medieval times, it is a criticism
of contemporary advocacy of guilds that they are monopolistic and restrict freedom.35
In reply to this problem, Milbank more latterly has advocated ‘free guilds’.36 Presum-
ably, individuals will decide to join them or not, in just the same way they are free to
join churches. Milbank says individuals are better off in groups, giving the example
of the benefits of wage negotiations through unions, rather than standing alone and
vulnerable before an employer. But ultimately here the sovereignty of the individual
reigns supreme, rather than the union.37
If Milbank’s proposals for the advancement of associations were successful and
the state was undermined, then the consequences may expose a sound reason why the
state arose in the first place. This is to arbitrate between groups in society. Christopher
Morris argues that in a stateless society we would not fear the state or other people, but
groups led by ambitious individuals seeking power.38 This is especially the case where
groups can claim absolute sovereignty over even a part of life. This threat from groups
provides one reason why a state can be justified: to arbitrate, not between sovereign
wills of individuals, but between groups. This is obscured in Milbank and Cavanaugh
by their adherence to Hobbessian contractarianism in describing the origins of the
modern state.
A further practical problem with pluralism is in explaining why the state would
voluntarily cede sovereignty back to the associations from whom it was taken in the
first place.39 Robert L. Carneiro writes that there must be some ‘external constraint’
for sovereignty to be given away.40 Milbank is aware of this dynamic in relation to
civil liberties: ‘the self-interest of power will be reluctant to concede once more an
advantage that it has already gained’.41 But he is blind to this problem in his major
34. Milbank, “Stale Expressions,” 273.
35. See Thomas E. Woods Jr., Beyond Distributism (Grand Rapids: Acton Institute, 2008), 51–61.
36. John Milbank, “The Real Third Way: For a New Metanarrative of Capital,” in Crunch Time: A Call to
Action, ed. Angus Ritchie (London: The Contextual Theology Centre, 2010), 82–83.
37. Milbank, “Christian Vision of Society.”
38. Morris, An Essay on the Modern State, 11–12.
39. Cavanaugh is critical of those who ask the state to ‘destatize’ in Cavanaugh, Torture and Eucharist,
194.
40. See Robert L. Carneiro, “A Theory of the Origin of the State,” in The Politicization of Society, ed.
Kenneth S. Templeton Jr. (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1979), 33.
41. Milbank, “Paul against Biopolitics,” 129.
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political proposal. Cynics about the Big Society, this being the closest tangible political
form Milbank’s ideas have taken, are apt to think that the ‘external constraint’ here in
the devolution of services to local communities is fiscal, with the government wishing
to make cuts in social spending.42
In understanding one way in which the state might give away its sovereignty, it
helps to make use of the distinction between the size and the scope of the state. Francis
Fukuyama writes that scope ‘refers to the different functions and goals taken on by
governments’, while strength (also called state or institutional capacity) is the ‘ability
of states to plan and execute policies and to enforce laws cleanly and transparently’.43
The sorts of functions which fall under scope include law and order, public health,
education, and wealth redistribution. It is more difficult to measure the strength
of states, which can vary across functions, but measures of corruption, and other
indicators, such as those that measure human rights and legal justice, go some way
to measure this.44 It is possible, as the example of New Zealand shows, for a state
to reduce its scope while becoming stronger.45 By applying this useful schema to
pluralist attempts of the moderation of state sovereignty, we can see that simply
involving community groups in the delivery of government functions may well limit
the scope of the state, but if these functions remain monitored and policed by the state,
the state’s strength and overall grip on society can be increased.
A final problem for Milbank’s proposals are the international dimension, which
he ignores. Rearranging sovereignty within societies cannot be separated from
international relations. Philip Watson observes that ‘internal and external affairs . . .
are not ultimately separable, and a loss of authority over the one inevitably means
some weakening in the other.’46 Adopting internal political pluralism may be the
equivalent of unilateral disarmament, if the state is weakened greatly. It would be
foolish to expect that any modern state would do this voluntarily. Bodin would agree,
suggesting that whatever sovereignty the prince gives away, he keeps much more to
himself and remains in control.47 The Big Society vision of Milbank falters at this point
of wishful thinking that the state will either cede its hard-won sovereignty, or let it be
spirited away by community groups.
Whereas Milbank primarily advocates salvation from the state through political
pluralism, in his more recent political activism and advocacy, the state becomes
instrumental for the rejuvenation of redemptive complex space. For Milbank, the
42. Ben Kisby, “The Big Society: Power to the People?” The Political Quarterly 81, no. 4 (October 2010):
485–487.
43. Francis Fukuyama, State Building: Governance and World Order in the Twenty-First Century (London:
Profile Books, 2004), 9.
44. On measuring scope and strength see ibid., 10–15.
45. Ibid., 18–19.
46. Philip S. Watson, The State as a Servant of God: A Study of its Nature and Tasks (London: SPCK, 1946),
5.
47. Jean Bodin, On Sovereignty: Four Chapters from The Six Books of the Commonwealth, ed. and trans.
Julian H. Franklin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 2.
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state is neither redeemer nor anti-redeemer, but a dialectical mixture of the two
which sometimes sits in between. Political salvation, on this account, comes neither
from state nor market, but through the complex space of intermediate institutions.48
Milbank is more politically statist than Cavanaugh here. While Cavanaugh is more of
an anarchist, Milbank is a polyarchist49, with a limited state alongside other sovereign
associations. For Milbank, the state can play a negative or positive rôle in permitting
the development of these other institutions to come about. But is Milbank too
optimistic about the state’s potential to bring about the end of its own tyranny through
facilitating its reduction in raw power by giving it away to the third sector?
Milbank’s politics of the Body of Christ extends beyond the church, with a focus
on civil society. It is worth considering whether Milbank will get to his social vision of
a more complexified space. Milbank, along with his disciple Red Tory Phillip Blond,
seems willing to adopt statecraft to realign society. Both the church and the family,
as two Christian societies, have a rôle to spread outwards into society at large as a
positive force for salvation:
And such extensions of family must invade also the entire realm of law and
punishment. The Church should promote the sense that such processes
must be processes of penance and reconciliation as well as of justice. It
must have done forever with Luther’s two kingdoms, and the notion that
a State that does not implicitly concern itself with the soul’s salvation can
be in any way legitimate.50
Milbank, then, thinks that a telos is necessary for the direction of society. It should
at least be concerned with the soul’s salvation. If so, then a question arises about
the relation of Milbank’s advocacy of ‘complex space’ to the unity of society. Does
this society have a unified direction? Or does a complex society merely offer here
the opportunity for people to determine their own direction? As Milbank describes
complex space, it is not a plurality of interests, but, rather, overlapping spheres of
authority, not with differing goals, but with different prerogatives. Milbank is critical
of associations that are merely interest groups, and do not offer true encounters with
those who are genuinely different, since this does not indicate a vibrant community,
but rather a breakdown in community, as people withdraw from each other into
interest groups, with little interaction with the stranger.51
In bringing about this non-statist community of associations, both Milbank and
Blond, as shown above, are willing to make use of the state. Using the state as a means
48. Milbank’s analysis is reminiscent of Kropotkin’s in Peter Kropotkin, The State: Its Historic Role, Rev.
ed. Trans. Vernon Richards and Freedom Press (London: Freedom, 1987).
49. This term is taken from Barker, “The Discredited State,” 169.
50. John Milbank, “Culture: The gospel of affinity,” in Being Reconciled: Ontology and Pardon (Oxford:
Routledge, 2003), 209.
51. This point is made as a criticism of interest-group churches in Milbank, “Stale Expressions,” 271.
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of social change is advocated by both the Red Tory and Blue Labour movements, of
which Milbank is a part.52 Both groups are willing to use the state as a temporary
means in order to divest the state of its power as part of bringing about a more
socialist society.53 The Manifesto of ResPublica decries the rise of the ‘centralised
authoritarian state’ and promises a renewal of society through the means of existing
social structures: ‘In order to reclaim a civilised society, market and state should not be
regarded as the ultimate goal or expression of humanity. They are the means by which
we achieve our end; they are not the end itself.’54 This fits with the politics of Milbank
– that the government can be used to divest social initiative from the state and relocate
it in guilds, unions and other associations. It must be stated clearly that this differs
from red socialism, which wants to absorb all things into the state.55 Whereas Milbank
remains more closely associated with Blue Labour, he is involved with both, and sees
them as belonging in the same broadly pluralist tradition.56 In an interview about
his politics, Milbank described what he sees as the common ground between the two
movements: ‘Red Tories and Blue Labourites reject both the deontology of the right
and the utilitarianism of the left in favor of the view that state, society, and economy
must all see their role as the building up of individual and relational flourishing—of
honor and virtue.’57
Cavanaugh and Eucharistic Salvation
More than any other contemporary political theologian, William Cavanaugh offers a
politicized account of salvation, with soteriology marking a clear distinction between
the church and state. In contrast to Barth, who places the state in the order of
redemption (see page 160 below), Cavanaugh sees the state as being a parody of
the true redeemer, which draws people away from our true redeemer. On this
52. Milbank is a trustee of the Red Tory think-tank ResPublica, see ResPublica, “Advisors and Trustees,”
ResPublica, January 1, 2012, <http://www.respublica.org.uk/authors/4> (accessed April 23, 2013).
He also contributes to discussions about the fortunes of Blue Labour, see Blue Labour, “Blue Labour
Midlands seminar,” Blue Labour, May 21, 2012, <http://www.bluelabour.org/2012/05/21/blue-
labour-midlands-seminar/> (accessed April 23, 2013).
53. On ‘Red Tory’ see the book by Milbank’s former student, Blond, Red Tory. Milbank, a Fellow
of Blond’s think-tank ResPublica, is acknowledged in this work for his ‘editorial enthusiasm’. A
sympathetic account of Blue Labour is given in Rowenna Davis, Tangled up in Blue: Blue Labour and the
Struggle for Labour’s Soul, with a foreword by Steve Richards (London: Ruskin Publishing, 2011).
54. ResPublica, “ResPublica Manifesto,” ResPublica, c. 2009, <https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/
u/15126312/ResPublica_Manifesto.pdf> (accessed April 23, 2013).
55. See Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, trans. Samuel Moore
(Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1953), 80–81.
56. For accounts of the similarities and differences between Red Tory and Blue Labour see Phillip Blond
and Maurice Glasman, “The Prospect Debate: Red Tory vs Blue Labour,” Prospect, April 30, 2010, <http:
//www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/2010/04/the- prospect- debate- red- tory- vs- blue- labour/>
(accessed April 23, 2013), and Malcolm Brown, “Red Tory and Blue Labour: More Theology Needed,”
Political Theology 13, no. 3 (2012).
57. Nathan Schneider and John Milbank, “Orthodox Paradox: An Interview with John Milbank,” The
Immanent Frame, March 17, 2010, <http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2010/03/17/orthodox-paradox-an-
interview-with-john-milbank/> (accessed April 23, 2013).
Chapter 5. Redemption and the End of the State 147
account, the state offers a false soteriology based in the social contract, whereby the
Leviathan saves individuals from the war of all against all. But since, according to
Cavanaugh, the state is formed and sustained in violence, it can only bring us more
of the same, and not the true redemption of the Body of Christ. This section outlines
the different soteriologies of church and state and also Cavanaugh’s account of the
political salvation found in the Eucharist.
Chapter 3 described how Cavanaugh contrasts the common origins of church
and state in offering different soteriologies. For Cavanaugh, both church and state
offer to save humans from their separation (whether found in sin or the original
individuality of the state of nature) and bring them together into a peaceful co-
existence.58 The modern state also seeks, in the view of Cavanaugh, to save humanity
from religious wars by making religion a purely private thing without any public
or political importance. Cavanaugh’s position is that the state, in offering a false
salvation, is a false redeemer.
The state, in being described as a false redeemer, provides another way to view it
as an antichrist in Cavanaugh’s theology.59 For Cavanaugh, the state fails to save us
from violence and separation, yet its true profanity is shielded from us by the political
imaginary of statism, which promotes the state as a form of political messiah.
Given the prominence of state violence in the world, it may be asked why this
fact is not more widely appreciated. This may have to do with the apparent failure
of Christ to bring salvation, creating a salvific vacuum which draws in alternative
saviours such as the Antichrist. In the words of René Girard, ‘The Antichrist boasts of
bringing to human beings the peace and tolerance that Christianity promised but has
apparently failed to deliver.’60 This is an eschatological critique of Christianity insofar
as Christ promises peace, but there remains war, hatred, and human division. So why
not look elsewhere for the salvation that is promised, but remains unrealized? This is
what the state offers, according to Cavanaugh: a false salvation, that not only Christ
has failed to bring, but religion in general has necessitated through its wars.
Cavanaugh’s emphasis on the irreconcilable competition between the salvation
of the state and the salvation of God is necessary for his theology because a
statistimagination may tempt us to believe that the former is merely the salvation
from political, social, economic, physical, and environmental threats in this life, while
God saves our soul in the next. This is clearly wrong for Cavanaugh, since the gospels
attest to a comprehensive salvation that challenges the truthfulness of others’ claims
to even physical salvation.
For Cavanaugh, our salvation is found in the forming of the social body of
the church through the Eucharist. In this way, political redemption is central to
58. See page 76ff. above.
59. A comparison between the violent origins of both the state and Antichrist was made in Chapter 3
at page 80 above.
60. René Girard, I See Satan Fall Like Lightning (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 2001), 181.
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Cavanaugh’s ecclesiology. The church saves by reversing the splintering of humanity
by binding humanity together into the Body of Christ. For Cavanaugh, humanity is
reconciled in the Eucharist, which links the reconciliation of humanity to itself and to
God. Cavanaugh quotes Matthew 26:27–28 to this effect: ‘Then he took a cup, and
after giving thanks he gave it to them, saying, “Drink from it, all of you; for this
is my blood of the covenant, which is poured out for many for the forgiveness of
sins.”’61 Cavanaugh supplements the simple gospel account with the instructions
from The Didache that instruct the congregation to be ‘reconciled’ to one another
before partaking of the Eucharist.62 The Eucharist produces reconciliation, but also
forgiveness, through demanding ‘a real unity among people now,’ since prior to
partaking of the Eucharist one must forgive and receive forgiveness.63
In describing the body that the Eucharist makes, Cavanaugh favours the ‘true’
body of Christ (corpus verum) rather than the mystical body of Christ (corpus mysticum):
‘The designation of the church as “mystical” rather than “true” body of Christ
has often served the imagination of a disincarnate church which hovers above the
temporal, uniting Christians in soul while the body does its dirty work.’64 Cavanaugh
wishes to assert the tangibility of the real physical body of the church, as an
incarnation of the Body of Christ. This physical presence would provide a counter
to the argument that the church is private, as evidenced by existing only in the souls
and minds of believers.
As the Body of Christ, the church, as Cavanaugh understands it, has its own
political existence independent of the state. It does not rely on the state for its
existence, but it is a body in its own right. Such an ontological statement is important
if one wishes to ground the church as its own political body. William Cunningham
makes a similar point in his study of Augustine:
But for S. Austin the kingdom of God was . . . an actual Polity, just as the
Roman Empire was a Polity too: it was “visible” in just the same way as the
earthly State, for it was a real institution with definite organisation, with a
recognised constitution, with a code of laws and means of enforcing them,
with property for its uses, and officers to direct it.65
This is at core what Cavanaugh’s sacramental ecclesiology aims at showing: that
the church is a political body in its own right. His criticism of statistpolitics is
not simply that the state has grown, but that the church no longer sees itself as an
independent political power in competition with the state.
61. Cavanaugh, Torture and Eucharist, 238.
62. Andrew Louth, ed., “The Didache,” in Early Christian Writings: The Apostolic Fathers, trans. Maxwell
Staniforth and Andrew Louth (London: Penguin Books, 1987), § 14.
63. Cavanaugh, Torture and Eucharist, 238.
64. Ibid., 207.
65. W. Cunningham, S. Austin and His Place in the History of Christian Thought, Hulsean Lectures 1885
(London: C. J. Clay & Sons, 1886), 116. ‘Austin’ is an archaic English contraction of Augustine, see Eugene
TeSelle, Augustine, Abingdon Pillars of Theology (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2006), 1.
Chapter 5. Redemption and the End of the State 149
The reasons for why Cavanaugh wishes to affirm the true, and not mystical, Body
of Christ should be apparent by now. The mystical body lacks the personality and
physical nature of a true political body. With only a mystical body, Cavanaugh claims
that, ‘The church does not have a political body but only a religious body, a mystical
body, which unites all Christians above the rough and tumble of the temporal.’66
Cavanaugh links the notion of corpus mysticum with persona ficta as both used by
Innocent IV, who, according to his sources, is the origin of the notion.67
The competition between church and state is around their unification of people.
This occurs, as Cavanaugh explains it through the respective liturgies of church and
state.68 In his use of the term ‘liturgy’, Cavanaugh wishes to reclaim the original
meaning of liturgy as leitourgia, citing Orthodox theologian Alexander Schmemann
to the effect that ‘an action by which a group of people become something corporately
which they had not been as a mere collection of individuals.’69 It is worth noting that
Cavanaugh acknowledges that his politics of the Eucharist will only have resonance
with Christian churches with strong liturgical traditions.70
The Eucharist is not the only thing that unifies. Reformed theology may also find
in baptism, the preaching of the word, the recital of the creed, and communal prayer
and confession liturgical elements that bring unity to the church. Cavanaugh seems
to limit liturgy to the Eucharist alone, as that which makes the unified Body of Christ.
Theologically speaking, the ‘body’ conjures up the image of the incarnation, the
embodiment of the Word in Jesus of Nazareth. But we must remember that the
church cannot be captured in only one metaphor, for why would Paul use several
of them if one would suffice? There remain several other metaphors of church that
can also carry political importance.71 Understanding the church as the Body of Christ
is not a universal practice. In fact, care needs to be taken with this (as with every
metaphor). The risks in this metaphor are that christology, being integral to the
metaphor itself, becomes distorted. While christology and ecclesiology are closely
linked in Cavanaugh, the linkage may be too close. The danger is that the Church
becomes Christ, risking the deification of the church. Joseph Ratzinger warned against
identifying the church with Christ:
The “Body of Christ” idea was developed in the Catholic Church in the
sense that some theologians liked to call the Church the “continuation
of Christ’s life on earth”, and the Church was described as the ongoing
incarnation of the Son until the end of time. This elicited opposition
66. Cavanaugh, Torture and Eucharist, 79.
67. Ibid., 218.
68. William T. Cavanaugh, “The Liturgies of Church and State,” Liturgy 20 (2005): 25–30.
69. Cited in Cavanaugh, Torture and Eucharist, 12.
70. Ibid., 15.
71. For examples see: Paul Sevier Minear, Images of the Church in the New Testament (London:
Lutterworth Press, 1960); Avery Robert Dulles, Models of the Church, Expanded ed. (Garden City: Image
Books, 1987, 2002).
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from Protestants, who saw in this an intolerable self-identification of
the Church with Christ, in which the Church, so to speak, worshipped
herself and claimed to be infallible. Gradually, however, Catholic thinkers
too, found—without going quite so far—that this formula ascribed to all
the official acts and utterances of the Church a definitive character that
made any criticism appear to be an attack on Christ himself and simply
overlooked what is human, all too human, in the Church.72
Avery Dulles has also expressed concerns about the divinization of the church,
but his main problem with the body of Christ metaphor is pneumatological. If the
Holy Spirit is taken as the ‘life principle’ of the church, any action the church takes
becomes the work of the Holy Spirit. ‘This would obscure the personal responsibility
and freedom of the members, and would make the presence of sin and error in the
Church—even on the corporate and official level—unintelligible.’73 With potentially
both Christ and the Holy Spirit running into trouble in the Body of Christ metaphor of
the church, what might be lacking is a sacramental understanding of the church that
points to the Trinitarian God of Father, Son, and Spirit. This is what other metaphors
of the church may function as: a balancing of the metaphor of the Body of Christ.
Calling the church the real body of Christ also runs into other doctrinal problems. The
doctrine of ascension affirms that Jesus’s body is in heaven. If this is not Christ’s body,
then does Cavanaugh demand a distinction between Jesus and Christ? Then there is
the Parousia – the return to Earth of Christ’s body. It cannot return if it never left or
exists among us already.74 These problems demand that we not take the church as the
Body of Christ literally.
Cavanaugh has a different position from Milbank. Whereas Milbank has high
praise for political pluralism, Cavanaugh only shares with this position a desire to
have a church with real personality. Cavanaugh’s criticisms of pluralism are revealed
in his long discussion of Jacques Maritain, an advocate of political pluralism in True
Humanism, a work which had great influence in Chile.75 Being more of an anarchist
than both Jacques Maritain and Milbank, it is not surprising that Cavanaugh’s main
objection to pluralism is the rôle that it retains for the state. Cavanaugh also thinks it
a fantasy that the state will divest itself of power.76
One reason he offers for this is the language the early church used to describe itself:
72. Joseph Ratzinger, “The Ecclesiology of the Second Vatican Council,” in Church, Ecumenism, and
Politics: New Endeavors in Ecclesiology, trans. Michael J. Miller et al. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2008),
24–25.
73. Dulles, Models of the Church, 47.
74. The identification of Christ and the church ran into this and other problems according to Dietrich
Bonhoeffer, Sanctorum Communio: A Theological Study of the Sociology of the Church, ed. Clifford J. Green,
trans. Reinhard Krauss and Nancy Lukens (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 2009), 140.
75. Jacques Maritain, True Humanism, trans. M. R. Adamson (London: Geoffrey Bles: The Centenary
Press, 1938), 156–158.
76. Cavanaugh, Torture and Eucharist, 194–195.
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The early Christians borrowed the term ekklesia or “assembly” from the
Greek city-state, where ekklesia meant the assembly of all those with citizen
rights in a given city. The early Christians thus refused the available
language of guild or association (such as koinon, collegium) and asserted
that the church was not gathered around particular interests, but was
interested in all things; it was an assembly of the whole.77
Adopting this approach, Cavanaugh rejects the notion that the church is either polis
or oikos, because in their original use these terms were considered mutually exclusive,
with an individual belonging to the former as a citizen, or, by being a women, child,
or slave, consigned to the latter.78 Cavanaugh distances himself from the politics of
civil society by using the word ekklesia for church, which, to him, is more universal.
But this usage, which is at the foundation of his notion of the political church,
holds a problem for Cavanaugh. This problem is whether the church can escape the
governmentality which pervades society. While Cavanaugh is firm that the church
cannot be merely part of the voluntary sector, it is unclear how the church escapes
being subject to the same statist mythos that troubles the associations in civil society.79
Cavanaugh’s treatment does not allow space for non-state-directed organisations
within civil society. Obvious examples of such organisations would be trade unions,
schools, the church and clubs, and, in former times, guilds and so on – the very things
that Milbank finds in complex space.80 But Cavanaugh treats all of these as orientated
toward the state. He marshals Michel de Certeau, Michel Foucault, Hardt, and Hegel
as witnesses to support the view that the state dominates all aspects of social life.81
While Cavanaugh acknowledges that, ‘Intermediate associations such as the church,
unions, and the family still exist,’ he notes that ‘they are expected to convey identities,
virtues, and common ends in a context in which their relationships to production,
mutual aid, education, and welfare have been absorbed into the state and market.’82 A
question here for Cavanaugh is whether the church’s absorption by the state/market
means that his solution for an ecclesiastically-based ‘true politics’ is meaningful. Is
there a contradiction in Cavanaugh in that there is no sphere of action outside the
discipline of the state? Has the church really escaped the statism that has plagued
civil society? And if it has, why have all other associations succumbed to the state?
In Cavanaugh’s final analysis, we are left with church and state, with everything that
is not church effectively being the state. There remains no sphere for civil society or a
place outside either of these in which to mediate between them. Such a view is deeply
77. Cavanaugh, “Is Public Theology Really Public?” 117. Cavanaugh’s italics.
78. Ibid., 117.
79. This point is from Peter Dula, “Fugitive Ecclesia,” in The Gift of Difference: Radical Orthodoxy, Radical
Reformation, ed. Chris K. Huebner and Tripp York, with a foreword by John Milbank (Winnipeg: CMU
Press, 2010), 117–118.
80. See Milbank, “On Complex Space.”
81. Cavanaugh, “Is Public Theology Really Public?” 113–114.
82. Cavanaugh, “Killing for the Telephone Company,” 258.
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problematic for those political and public theologians that wish to ground Christian
politics in civil society or attempt to be non-statist.
Cavanaugh has done a great service in reminding us that the church should not
be placed alongside other voluntary organisations in a flattened civil society. For
Joseph Ratzinger, what is important here is the church’s self-understanding in the
face of a pluralistic society. The church should resist being placed in the ‘Pantheon
of all possible value systems’ for this would be the church’s denial of the truth of
faith.83 But there are problems with Cavanaugh’s understanding of these issues.
Foremost is whether he can be consistent with his search for alternatives to the
market and state, given that there is no longer any space in which this can happen.
The re-complexification of space (as Milbank describes it) requires grounding this
somewhere. Without the destruction of the state, it is difficult to see where this
grounding can take place, apart from inside the church.
This reconciliation (Cavanaugh’s at-one-ment) is the only form redemption takes
in his thought. It is the re-membering of the Body of Christ, or the reunification
of splintered humanity. This emphasis on salvation as unity raises the question of
whether Cavanaugh merely poses redemption as the restoration of humanity’s unified
state in creation, as a restoration of paradise lost. Such a teaching ignores the destiny
of creation moving beyond its createdness. If so, then Cavanaugh rejects a future
eschatology in favour of a realized eschatology in which the church is a pathway to
the return to paradise. But is this all we need to be saved from: radical separation
from one another? What about sin? Cavanaugh does not write on sin apart from his
understanding of the unity of all humanity in both creation and redemption: ‘Not
individuals but the human race as a whole is created and redeemed.’84 The unity
represented by the first Adam enables him to say (using Romans 5:12) that ‘sin came
into the world through one man’. Adam represents humanity as a whole. Cavanaugh
draws on Henri de Lubac who writes ‘every breach with God, is at the same time a
disruption of human unity.’85 Henri de Lubac, emphasising the oneness, cites Irenaeus
in his emphasis of the oneness of faith: ‘there is but one God the Father, and one Logos
the son, and one Spirit, and one salvation only for all who believe in him.’86
Cavanaugh also enters into the debate as to whether sin is individual, social, or
both, since, for him, these ontological categories are the fruit of sin itself. The profane
state consists of individuals, while the political church must resist the idea it is simply
a collection of individuals: ‘At the heart of the modern reluctance to see the church as
itself a type of politics is the inability to see it as more than a gathering of individuals,
83. Joseph Ratzinger, “A Christian Orientation in a Pluralistic Democracy?: On the Indispensability
of Christianity in the Modern World,” in Church, Ecumenism, and Politics: New Endeavors in Ecclesiology,
trans. Michael J. Miller et al. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2008), 206.
84. Cavanaugh, Theopolitical Imagination, 11.
85. Henri de Lubac, Catholicism: Christ and the Common Destiny of Man (San Francisco: Ignatius Press,
1988), 33.
86. Ibid., 32.
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who are assumed to be the real subject of salvation.’87 For Cavanaugh, ‘the effect of
sin is the very creation of individuals as such, that is, the creation of an ontological
distinction between individual and group.’88 As evidence for this view, Cavanaugh
draws on Henri de Lubac’s interpretation of the Fathers:
Instead of trying, as we do almost entirely nowadays, to find within each
individual nature what is the hidden blemish and, so to speak, of looking
for the mechanical source of the trouble . . . these Fathers preferred to
envisage the very constitution of the individuals considered as so many
cores of natural opposition.89
While Cavanaugh then moves on to comment on this passage, it is notable that
in the very next (unquoted) sentence, Henri de Lubac wrote: ‘To be sure, these
two explanations are by no means contradictory, and may often in fact be found
together.’90 Henri de Lubac, therefore, reminds us that sin affects the unity of the
personal will with that of God, and the unity of humanity with each other in God.91
This alerts us to the fact that in Cavanaugh’s stress on redemption as reunification, he
is addressing the disunity caused by sin, not sin itself.
Despite his suspicion of the category of the individual, Cavanaugh cannot help
but use it in explaining how individuals are saved: ‘The salvation of individuals is
only through Christ’s salvation of the whole of humanity.’92 This can only mean that
individuals are outside the Body of Christ, and once incorporated into the Body of
Christ, they lose their individuality and become reunited with humanity. As he writes
of the Body of Christ, in which the many become one (1 Corinthians 12:4–31): ‘the
members of the Body are not simply members individually of Christ the Head, but
cohere to each other as in a natural body.’93 Is Cavanaugh here guilty of explaining
one metaphor through another one? Church members do not literally adhere to one
another as parts of a human body. Christians retain their own physicality and mind
and spirit, however much their actions, thoughts, and will conform to Christ.
Elsewhere, Cavanaugh writes that sin is the breaking of communion with the
church, which, in notorious cases, is recognized formally in the excommunication of
the sinner. In excommunication, official recognition is merely given to the breaking
of communion that the sinner has already effected.94 Cavanaugh cites 1 John 2:18–19,
87. William T. Cavanaugh, “Church,” in The Blackwell Companion to Political Theology (Malden:
Blackwell, 2007), 394.
88. Cavanaugh, Theopolitical Imagination, 13.
89. Cited in ibid., 12–13. The original passage appears in Lubac, Catholicism, 34–35.
90. Ibid., 35.
91. On this point Lubac reminds us of the ‘wonderful psychological analyses’ of Augustine’s
Confessions. Ibid., 35.
92. See Cavanaugh, Theopolitical Imagination, 13.
93. See ibid., 13.
94. Cavanaugh, Torture and Eucharist, 242–243.
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where the ‘many antichrists’ are those who ‘went out from us’ and in so doing ‘they
made it plain that none of them belongs to us.’95
Having outlined and criticized the political theologies of redemption of Milbank
and Cavanaugh above, this section will offer some observations of their similarities
and differences.
Milbank and Cavanaugh Compared
Both Milbank and Cavanaugh base their anti-statist political salvation on the demo-
nization of the state. The soteriologies of Milbank and Cavanaugh have in common a
strong emphasis on the real personality of associations and the church. This position
is problematic for the reasons set out below, which, in summary, are that it reinforces
the sovereignty of the state and cipherizes the individual.96
First, the state. In asserting the personality of associations, pluralists make an
argument that can also be used for asserting the personality of the state. The state,
as just another association, can be recognized as having legal personality. Mark
Neocleous points out that the pluralists sometimes accepted this implication of their
ideas themselves. For instance, the English jurist F. W. Maitland wrote that ‘an
uncomfortable suspicion that the State itself is but a questionably real person may
not be easily dispelled.’97 The recognition of the state’s real personality can have the
opposite effect to that desired by promoters of the pluralist doctrine. For instance, the
state’s personality was recognized by Italian tyrant Mussolini who put the doctrine
of communitas communitatum into practice to devastating effect.98 Others deny the
personality of groups altogether, with some nominalists claiming that theirs is the
right position based in medieval doctrine and tradition.99
Second, the notion of political redemption through associations leaves the indi-
vidual in an ambiguous position. On the one hand, they have to arbitrate between
competing associations; on the other hand, if this decision is out of their hands, their
autonomy is reduced. With respect to the individual, we also see how corporatism
diminishes individual responsibility. For Laski, the danger is that, in personifying
an association, ‘we obscure individual responsibility’, becoming loyal to a fictitious
95. Cavanaugh, Torture and Eucharist, 242.
96. This line of critique is owed to Mark Neocleous, Imagining the State (Maidenhead: Open University
Press, 2003), 92–97.
97. F. W. Maitland, “Moral Personality and Legal Personality,” in State, Trust and Corporation, ed. David
Runciman and Magnus Ryan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 67.
98. See Runciman, Pluralism and the Personality of the State, 217–218; Neocleous, Imagining the State, 96–
97.
99. Ewart Lewis, “Organic Tendencies in Medieval Political Thought,” The American Political Science
Review 32, no. 5 (October 1938): 849–876; Maurice de Wulf, Philosophy and Civilization in the Middle Ages,
Louis Clark Vanuxem Foundation Lectures 1920 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1922), 220–241.
For more recent works that question Otto Gierke see Stephen J. Grabill, Rediscovering the Natural Law in
Reformed Theological Ethics (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006), 59–61.
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creation which works to occlude the critical judgment needed to exercise ‘reasoned
judgment.’ Furthermore, he continues:
we give our consciences into the keeping of some national government,
some church, or some other association and that their operation is then
organized from without until we fail to realise that we have become
nothing more than an automatic instrument in the hands of men into the
validity of whose power it never occurs to us to enquire.100
This is also seen in the immunity from prosecution that legal corporations
provide to their employees in cases of negligence, even in cases that lead to mass
deaths.101 With the state too, which participates in this legal personality, individual
responsibility is often difficult to pinpoint.102 This disappearance of individual
responsibility in associations is analogous to the vanishing of the Christian doctrine
of sin, as we find here, for example, in Milbank and Cavanaugh. While they do
acknowledge evil acts, these are located in an abstract realist understanding of the
state, divorced from the sins of responsible individuals who make up the state. The
solution here is not to endorse a nominalist doctrine of the state, but merely to
recognize that giving the state a ‘personality’ and will does not remove the taint of
political sin from individuals in the state.
It is not surprising that the downplaying of individual sin from the theologies of
Milbank and Cavanaugh is reflected in their notions of salvation. As described above,
their doctrines of salvation emphasize the reconciliation of humanity to God, and to
each other in the politics of the church. A truth of this approach to understanding
salvation is that we are in fact redeemed by Christ out of false servantship to secular
or pagan powers. To serve God faithfully means to be released from bondage to a
foreign power, as witnessed in the drawn-out battle between Moses and Pharaoh,
whereby worship and service of God demanded the non-service of Egypt (Exodus
10:3). Other aspects of their notions of redemption are more questionable.
One issue is that in both Milbank and Cavanaugh the eschatological nature of
redemption is underplayed. What purpose does the parousia have in our redemption?
If Jesus is amongst us as the Body of Christ, then what happens to the expectation of
His return? Another aspect of God’s eschatological promise is the reconciliation of all
creatures to the Creator (Colossians 1:20). This cosmic redemption is missing in the
sacramentally-centred salvation of Milbank and Cavanaugh.
As similar as they are in many respects, John Milbank and William Cavanaugh
differ on redemption and the state: on the question of the means of political
redemption, Milbank is more willing to use the state to bring about a socialist society,
100. Harold J. Laski, “Morris Cohen’s Approach to Legal Philosophy,” The University of Chicago Law
Review 15, no. 3 (April 1948): 581–582.
101. For several examples see Neocleous, Imagining the State, 84–85.
102. Witness the trial of Adolf Eichmann recounted in Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report
on the Banality of Evil (London: Penguin, 2006).
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while Cavanaugh is more of an anarchist. Cavanaugh is more of an anarchist for his
proposals that the state is to be rejected altogether. Writing of the classical Russian
anarchist Bakunin, Engels writes the following passage which applies equally to the
anti-statist politics of Cavanaugh: ‘Now then, inasmuch as to Bakunin the state is the
main evil, nothing must be done which can keep the state—that is, any state, whether
it be a republic, a monarchy or anything else—alive. Hence complete abstention from
all politics. To commit a political act, especially to take part in an election, would be
a betrayal of principle.’103 Cavanaugh’s politics are anti-statist, but they do have a
positive aspect. This, as already shown, is the development of the alternative politics
of the church and its action in the development of community-based alternative
economies.
Cavanaugh also differs from Milbank on the question of the associations in civil
society. Being more of an anarchist than Milbank, it is not surprising that Cavanaugh’s
main objection to pluralism is the rôle that it retains for the state. Cavanaugh also
thinks it a fantasy that the state will divest itself of power.104 Here we can note some
differences between Milbank and Cavanaugh. Cavanaugh wishes to make the church
political, but in a different way from Milbank. While Cavanaugh shares with Milbank
a concern with the flattening and simplification of social space in modernity,105 a
difference between them is the rôle given to intermediate associations in saving people
from this. For Milbank, redemptive value is found in intermediate associations, while
Cavanaugh – in claiming that the state creates civil society – is sceptical that it can offer
an alternative to the state. Milbank is happy to have the church within the same social
space as guilds and associations, but Cavanaugh wishes to distinguish the church
from other non-state organisations.
Despite their differences, there are great similarities in Milbank and Cavanaugh
concerning the status of the individual in redemption. In both Milbank and Ca-
vanaugh the individual is saved from being an individual by being drawn out of the
profane state, and into the body of the church. This raises questions about the status
of the person in both of their theologies.
The Politics of Redemption in Christian Tradition
Milbank and Cavanaugh are not the only theologians who have soteriology closely
related to their assessment of the state. Some have a much more positive assessment
of the relationship between the state and redemption, including Barth. This section
103. Friedrich Engels, “Letter, Engels to T. Cuno, January 24, 1872,” in Selected Correspondence, by Karl
Marx and Friedrich Engels (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1955), 335. Engels’s italics.
104. Cavanaugh, Torture and Eucharist, 194–195.
105. William T. Cavanaugh, “The World in a Wafer: A Geography of the Eucharist as Resistance to
Globalization,” Modern Theology 15, no. 2 (1999): 182–183.
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judges whether these positions need to be rejected as positions that make the state
sacred by having a redemptive function.
The Nature of Redemption
Discussions of Christian salvation often focus on the means of redemption rather than
the ends, yet it is difficult to separate the two. While Jesus is typically affirmed in
theology as our only saviour, it is not always emphasized that he saves in many
different ways. In writing of Jesus in Acts 4:12, Luke states: ‘There is salvation in
no one else, for there is no other name under heaven given among mortals by which
we must be saved.’ In Matthew 24:23–28 we are warned of ‘false messiahs and false
prophets’. While affirming an exclusivity of salvific faculty in Jesus Christ, salvation
in Christian soteriology is multifaceted, being neither simply individual nor social.
Salvation takes place in many different contexts, as Gert J. Steyn shows: Economically:
Luke 1:52, 1:54, 1:68–75, 2:30–31, 2:38, 3:6, 9:54–56, Acts 1:6–8; Socially: Luke 19:9–10;
Physically: Luke 6:9, 8:48, 8:50, 17:19, 18:42; Psychologically: Luke 8:36, 4:18, Acts 10:38;
Religiously: Luke 1:77, 7:50. Steyn comments that, ‘It is a total restoration on all levels
of society. It is an holistic approach that provides an opportunity to enter into the
kingdom of God (Luke 13:28, 18:26).’106
To this catalogue, ‘politically’ can be added. Part of our salvation is political, with
God as our sole political redeemer. In Psalm 74:12 God’s Kingship is linked with his
salvation: ‘Yet God my King is from of old, working salvation in the earth.’ Elsewhere
in the Psalter we read:
The salvation of the righteous is from the LORD;
he is their refuge in the time of trouble.
The LORD helps them and rescues them;
he rescues them from the wicked, and saves them,
because they take refuge in him. (Psalm 37:39–40)
Despite this holistic vision, we should not expect everything in redemption, or
from redeemers. Bonhoeffer warns us that redemption is not the solving of human
problems:
Since Jesus brings the redemption of human beings, rather than the
solutions to problems, he indeed brings the solution to all human problems
—“all these things will be given”—though from a completely different
vantage point.107
Human problem-solving is the fruit of redemption, rather than its raison d’être. Our
political, social, and individual problems are not to be offered up to God for resolution
106. Gert J. Steyn, “Soteriological Perspectives in Luke’s Gospel,” in Salvation in the New Testament:
Perspectives on Soteriology, ed. Jan G. van der Watt (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 95.
107. Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 354. The scriptural reference is Matthew 6:33.
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without there being a recognition of what true redemption is, and that only Christ can
be the means by which we are redeemed.
Rather than solving human problems, redemption is more to do with the renewal
or rebirth of the human. Ephesians 4:22–24 teaches: ‘You were taught to put away
your former way of life, your old self, corrupt and deluded by its lusts, and to be
renewed in the spirit of your minds, and to clothe yourselves with the new self, created
according to the likeness of God in true righteousness and holiness.’ Here, the new
self is a return to the untarnished likeness of God that we see in Creation. Understood
in this way, redemption to one’s former state requires an appreciation of this former
state. In Christianity, this renewal transcends the individual/social divisions common
in redemptive language. We are made new through our baptism into Jesus Christ
(Romans 6:4), while a ‘new humanity’ is created out of internal, religious, and social
divisions (Ephesians 2:15).108
Christianity teaches both the cleansing of the individual through baptism and their
incorporation into the church. In this way, the sacraments affirm that both individual
and communal exist in Christian thought and practice. Over-emphasis of one or
the other leads to a disappearance of the individual altogether, or, alternatively, an
individualistic focus on one’s own piety and destination after death. The metaphors
used to describe redemption must take care not to obscure this, as the following
section discusses.
Political Redemption
Redemption is personal, but also social and political. As Paul put it, the whole
of creation calls for redemption (Romans 8:19–23). While this is a central motif
for eco-theology, it is equally important in political theology, being a link between
inter-personal relations and the relations between humanity and the remainder of
creation.109 We can better appreciate the political purchase of redemption through
some of the social metaphors used to describe the redeemed. These include the
‘Body of Christ’, the ‘People of God’, and the ‘Family of God’. These are not merely
ways of understanding the church per se; they are how we understand the results of
redemption. Milbank and Cavanaugh value the ‘Body of Christ’, because salvation
with this metaphor is the incorporation of individuals into the political body of the
church. But, as valuable as this metaphor is in ecclesiology, there are other ways of
thinking about the social understanding of the church.
There are many metaphors for the church.110 The familial metaphors ‘Family of
God’ or ‘children of God’ (see 1 John 3:1–2) are two ways the church is understood.
Since the primary community we are born into is the family, to be born again as a
108. See Bonhoeffer, Discipleship, 218–219.
109. A political and social reading of this passage is given by Brueggemann, Texts Under Negotiation,
44–45.
110. Surveys of these include Minear, Images of the Church and Dulles, Models of the Church.
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Christian is to be born into a new family. This being born again happens with our
baptism, where we die to the old self and become a new person with a new family:
the church. Much of the familial language of the New Testament attests to this, with
God as our new Father, and fellow Christians as our brothers and sisters (for example,
Mark 3:34–35). The Mennonite Confession of Faith (1963) affirms this move from the
individual becoming saved and incorporated into a society: ‘Those who repent and
believe in Christ as Saviour and Lord receive the gift of righteousness, are born again,
and are adopted into the family of God’ (Art. 6). This is supported scripturally. Pieter
G. R. de Villiers, in his study of the first epistle to the Thessalonians, describes new
believers as ‘having been saved into a new community similar to that of a family,’111
and the church as ‘the new family of God’.112 Later he writes, ‘To be established as a
new family, as brothers, is a direct consequence of salvation and is, at the same time,
an experience of salvation.’113 Not only are there familial terms of address used (1
Thessalonians 1:4), but this family supports each other in practice (1 Thessalonians
5:11).114 Milbank also recognizes the political implications of thinking about the
church as a family when writing that since the church forms with Israel a ‘spiritual
bloodgroup’, we must learn to ‘think of all of our human relations in terms of extended
family.’115 He writes this in explaining his notion of the ‘gospel of affinity’ in which
the culture of family relations infuse our society with love, penance, forgiveness, and
justice.116
While this familial language is not so obviously political to the modern mind as
‘the Body of Christ’, this is not an apolitical usage, since family relations have provided
political models in the history of philosophy. In Plato’s Republic, the family features
as a means to ensure peace and obedience in the polis, by using familial names for
addressing others. Plato hopes that in calling each other brothers, citizens will treat
each other like brothers.117 It is important to note that Plato does not abolish the
family, but uses the existing family as the basis for knowing how to act politically.
The same might be said of the church: when we refer to fellow Christians as ‘brothers
and sisters’, we depend on these relations within the organic family to know how to
treat one another socially and politically. When we call God ‘Father’ and Jesus ‘Son’,
we become siblings of the Son, which is a way of recognising Jesus’ shared humanity
with us, and our shared childship of the Father with the Son. Another way in which
this metaphor is political is in the prioritization of the new family over one’s original
111. Pieter G. R. de Villiers, “Safe in the Family of God: Soteriological Perspectives in 1 Thessalonians,”
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biological family (Luke 9:59–62).118 This is political in the way we belong, along with
an extended family, to a household. So the adoption of a new family is the adoption
of the new politics of a new household, in this case the household of God (Ephesians
2:19; 1 Timothy 3:15). As Bonhoeffer reminds us, this household extends beyond the
church for the good of all (Galatians 6:10), and in service of the victims of a “lawless
state”.119
It is not intended that this discussion result in displacing the ‘Body of Christ’ as
a metaphor for church or should be taken as a way of understanding the politics of
the church. It is drawn out here to show that there are other sound models of church,
some without offering obvious competitiveness to the state as the body politic. It may
be that Christians understand that Christian identity is not only in political opposition
to other political bodies. In other words, Christians are not to make the political
of great importance, either in what they affirm, or what they deny. That is to say,
how we understand the language and metaphors of redemption, and what we are
redeemed from and into, makes a huge political difference. As seen in the case of
Cavanaugh, his favouring the Body of Christ metaphor for the church allows him
to use the Augustinian conflict between the two cities as a parallel for the conflict
between the body politic (state) and the Body of Christ (church). Considering the
‘family of God’ image for the church here has shown that while other imagery for the
church is not apolitical, the selection of one metaphor over another may reveal – as it
does in the case of Cavanaugh – a particular politicizing tendency for finding inherent
antagonism between the church and state.
The notion of political redemption is one readily seen in Scripture. Following on
from considering the state as an order of creation and an order of preservation, the
state as an order of redemption or reconciliation will be considered. Here, this is
represented through the work of Karl Barth.
Barth and the Order of Redemption
While Barth’s earlier writings on politics had anarchist (or libertarian socialist)
tendencies toward the state,120 in his mature theology, Barth was a proponent of
the idea of the state as an order of redemption.121 As already seen, he rejected the
state as being part of the order of creation, as this risked getting too close to natural
118. See Robert H. Stein, Luke, vol. 24, The New American Commentary (Nashville: Broadman Press,
1992), 300–301. Also see Wannenwetsch, Political Worship, 133.
119. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, “The Church and the Jewish Question,” in Berlin, 1932–1933, ed. Larry L.
Rasmussen, trans. Isabel Best and David Higgens (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2009), 365.
120. See Friedrich-Wilhelm Marquardt, “Socialism in the Theology of Karl Barth,” in Karl Barth and
Radical Politics, ed. and trans. George Hunsinger (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1976), 55–56.
121. Karl Barth, “From the Discussion in Budapest on the Morning of April 1st 1948,” in Against the
Stream: Shorter Post-War Writings, 1946–52, ed. Ronald Gregor Smith, trans. Stanley Godman (London:
SCM Press, 1954), 94. Barth also calls it ‘the order of divine salvation and grace’ in Barth, “Christian
Community,” 170.
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theology. So, while he earlier saw a need to fight the state, in later writing he seems
to have moved to an acceptance of the state, but not its metaphysical justification. His
commentary on Romans 13 explicitly denies both ‘Revolution’ and ‘Legitimism’.122
He sees, for instance, how the state can work for the will of God as ‘an order of grace
relating to sin.’123 For Barth, the state is God’s instrument of grace in a sinful world,
not a mere human tool for a better world. In apparent indifference to human systems
of government, Barth denies all attempts to make the Kingdom of God through human
structures, including the church. This section shows that, even though Barth called the
state an order of redemption, he does not sacralize it.
Barth’s order of redemption comes close to being preservative. The civil commu-
nity, ‘is the sign that mankind . . . is yet not forsaken but preserved and sustained by
God. It serves to protect man from the invasion of chaos and therefore to give him
time: time for preaching of the gospel; time for repentance; time for faith.’124 This
sense of time is the time of waiting for Christ’s return. Naturally, it follows that if
the state is playing a part in redemption, it has to be preserved against threats to its
existence. This does not make the means of preservation redemptive, but these means
have to be accepted as part of God’s overall salvific programme. This causes a few
problems for Barth in his relationship to war, and the use of the state’s police function.
Barth is no pacifist; he considered pacifism an absolutism, arguing that Christians
ought to obey God and not some principle or idea.125 Rather, Barth accepts the
necessity of force, but would not grant that force and violence constitute the essence
of the state:
But it does this in any case, and it is no primary concern of Christian
ethics to say that it should do so, or to maintain that the exercise of power
constitutes the essence of the state, i.e., its opus proprium, or even a part of
it. What Christian ethics must insist is that it is an opus alienum for the state
to have to exercise power.126
It is interesting that there is a parallel passage to this in Weber, who wrote:
‘Violence is, of course, not the normal or the only means available to the state.’127
For this reason, it is astonishing that Cavanaugh agrees with Barth here,128 since, for
Cavanaugh, the state is born and sustained by violence, and therefore one would
expect him to offer the opposite view to Barth.129 According to O’Donovan, Paul
122. Barth, Epistle to the Romans, 477.
123. Barth, Ethics, 518.
124. Barth, “Christian Community,” 156.
125. Karl Barth, Karl Barth’s Table Talk, ed. John D. Godsey, Scottish Journal of Theology Occasional
Papers 10 (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1963), 81.
126. Barth, CD III/4, § 55, 456.
127. Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” 33.
128. Cavanaugh, “From One City to Two,” 315.
129. Cavanaugh affirmatively cites Randolph Bourne’s adage that, ‘War is the health of the State’ in
“From One City to Two: Christian Reimagining of Political Space,” Political Theology 7, no. 3 (2006): 307.
Chapter 5. Redemption and the End of the State 162
Ramsey also disagreed with Barth, believing that force is both always suspect and
always necessary.130
Barth had a christological understanding of the state, with church and state issues
meeting most clearly in the confrontation between Jesus and Pilate.131 Barth uses this
example to show that God’s will for the state is much greater than the will of rulers
can ever be. He affirms that ‘even an evil State cannot escape doing God’s will, that
is, something good,’ so that Pilate ‘cannot but serve the will of God.’132 This preserves
God’s absolute freedom in relation to human authorities, in ways that some judgments
about the state will not permit. Based on this, Barth does not seem to allow for the state
to have its own will, apart from that of individuals: ‘The State as such is neutral, but
the men who make up the State are not neutral.’133 This is also seen in the fall of
sinners, but the state – as an order of God – cannot fall.134 Given this distinction, Barth
allows for the removal of rulers, but not the overthrow of the system of government
itself.135 He comments that, ‘The State is always both good and evil—just like the
Church, for that matter.’136
But in response to a question about the Christian attitude to a godless state that
becomes an enemy of the church, Barth’s answer gives pause for thought: ‘I am
afraid that these questions betray the uneasiness of a mistrust that is not Christian.’137
Barth continues that, ‘There is not a trace in the New Testament of the Church being
afraid of the State.’138 Instead of fear of the state, Barth urges trust in the God who
has everything in his hands. This explains why, in his Ethics, Barth places his main
discussion of the state under the section titled ‘Humility’.139
Barth opposes an Augustinian understanding of the state as the city of devils.140
Nor is the state the Antichrist. Barth sees violence as a secondary purpose for the state,
because his primary rôles of the state include a broadly socialist agenda that includes
the defence of ‘equal rights’, the provision and protection of ‘national labor’, education
and culture, freedom of action and expression, and public support for the church.141
In short, Barth promotes the state as a means of service to one’s neighbour.142 Barth’s
130. Oliver O’Donovan, “Karl Barth and Paul Ramsey’s “Uses of Power”,” in Bonds of Imperfection:
Christian Politics, Past and Present, by Oliver O’Donovan and Joan Lockwood O’Donovan (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 2004), 270.
131. Barth, Table Talk, 71; Barth, Community, State, and Church: Three Essays, 108.
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justification of the state is partly based on the mutual service for one another that the
state enables.143 He wrote:
The church recognizes and helps the state inasmuch as service to the
neighbor, which is the purpose of the state, is necessarily included in its
own message of reconciliation and is thus its own concern. It will take up
a reserved attitude toward the state to the extent that this diverges from
its purpose, being unable as the church to accept co-responsibility in this
regard.144
This approach to the state is probably the most popular one in liberal societies,
where the church maintains a watching brief on the actions of the state and speaks
‘truth to power’, with the aim of keeping the state working on behalf of us for the care
of the neighbour. This favourable evaluation of the state does not see the state as part
of the Kingdom of God, of which it knows nothing.145
Good Works and the Welfare State
The argument that the state can be a redemptive power seldom takes such theolog-
ically rigorous forms as found in Barth. To some Christians, the state’s salvific rôle
in society is found in positive evaluations of its regulatory and distributive functions.
Such a state is not divorced from Christian concerns; in these ways the state becomes
the vehicle for the liberation of individuals and communities out of sin, poverty, or
illness. Such a view rejects a sole focus on the destiny of the person in the after-life
and endorses a view of salvation which includes this life as a foretaste of the next.
In its negative form, this view of the state takes shape in efforts to curtail sin,
often through the regulation of ‘sinful’ activity, such as trade in alcohol, weapons,
and pornography. A notorious example of such morals legislation was ‘The Noble
Experiment’ of alcohol prohibition in the USA from 1920 to 1933. In this way, the state,
according to some theological views, becomes part of the restraint of evil, making
sinning more difficult, and salvation more likely.
A more positive rôle for the state can be found in a theology of good works, which
may also support a theology of the state as redeemer. If good works are good, then the
more the better. And what better vehicle to leverage good intentions than the state,
which has considerable powers at its disposal? This finds expression in Christian
support for the welfare state.
The miserable social conditions of the late nineteenth century and the Great
Depression provided impetus for the current welfare state. In Rerum Novarum (§ 3),
Leo XIII wrote ‘some opportune remedy must be found quickly for the misery and
143. Barth, Ethics, 518.
144. Ibid., 450.
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wretchedness pressing so unjustly on the majority of the working class’. Leo XIII
lamented the loss of some possible remedies, such as guilds, because a living wage
was not being generated through the labour market. Remedies had to be sought
elsewhere, and were found in the welfare state. Other associations did not always
collapse or disappear; some were absorbed into the state, including many church
organisations. Sunday Schools led to state education, while state healthcare came
from Christian hospitals, and welfare and social provision from Christian charity. A
basic social safety net, education and health became the sine qua non of state functions,
providing the state with unprecedented legitimacy.146 In Britain in the mid-twentieth
century, Christian leaders championed the rise of welfarism, with Donald Soper,
President of the Methodist Church of Great Britain, declaring, ‘I thank God for the
welfare state.’147 Views in support of welfare were consolidated in the West so that
this opinion of Haddon Willmer became standard fare: ‘the state as systematic and
extended love of neighbours is a form of the Good Samaritan. In the state, the Good
Samaritan may be given a longer reach’.148 While the welfare state has resources
to address social ills well beyond that of the church, it remains a subject of debate
whether private charity in total could meet the needs of the poor.
The rise of the welfare state has been heavily criticized in church circles. One
criticism that Milbank and Cavanaugh would endorse is that the welfare state makes
relations between human beings abstract and bureaucratic.149 The massive scope of
modern states helps to explain the increasingly abstract and bureaucratic nature of
modern political life. Such concerns were held by British Catholics, who initially held
staunch opposition to the rise of the welfare state, but eventually this died away.150
Catholic opposition to the excesses of the welfare state was seen more recently in Pope
John Paul II’s Centesimus Annus:
In recent years the range of such intervention has vastly expanded, to the
point of creating a new type of State, the so-called “Welfare State”. This
has happened in some countries in order to respond better to many needs
and demands, by remedying forms of poverty and deprivation unworthy
of the human person. However, excesses and abuses, especially in recent
years, have provoked very harsh criticisms of the Welfare State, dubbed
the “Social Assistance State” . . . By intervening directly and depriving
society of its responsibility, the Social Assistance State leads to a loss of
human energies and an inordinate increase of public agencies, which are
dominated more by bureaucratic ways of thinking than by concern for
146. Michael Walzer, “Dissatisfaction in the Welfare State,” in Radical Principles: Reflections of an
Unreconstructed Democrat (New York: Basic Books, 1980), 27.
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serving their clients, and which are accompanied by an enormous increase
in spending.151
It is here we have a paradox for the church. The state’s increased intrusion into
the various institutions of social life, lamented in Christian social thought since the
late nineteenth century, found encouragement elsewhere in the church. The church
supported, and continues to support, state action on behalf of the vulnerable and the
state’s regulation of human life to endorse Christian morality, while at the same time
lamenting the growing scope of state action. Welcomed by some in the church as the
necessary work of the state, justified on the basis on extending God’s justice and peace,
others see this extension of state action as the risking the sacralization of the welfare
state. Norwegian bishop Eivind Berggrav, for example, gave the following warning
of the state’s idolatrous desire for growth and praise:
This state wishes to become, as we have seen, a kind of “All-Father,” it
wants to be omnipotent. There will be no actual demands to worship
the state, in the traditional sense; rather, it will be said that the state is
sufficient; that the state is all we need; that we need no Providence beyond
the STATE. The state which we see developing today, attempts to take the
place of God by substituting welfare for God and Faith.152
In summary, we can see that the church has supported the state in regulating
morality and providing welfare, often with the effect of displacing the redemptive
functions of the church in making Christians virtuous and willing helpers of the poor.
This is not to make works more important than faith, but in giving over to the state the
functions of works, our faith can be diminished. But only if it is not relocated to faith
in the state. The church’s politics must, therefore, be extremely wary of sacralizing the
state as an agent of welfare.
The Redeeming State?
This chapter has been focussed on redemption in church and state. It affirms that
we cannot work for our own redemption, even if human work is required in the
political sphere in enacting our love of our neighbour. Duane Friesen emphasizes
that redemption is a gift and does not come through human effort, and within this
grace political work is relativized:
151. Pope John Paul II, “Centesimus Annus,” Vatican, May 1, 1991, <http://www.vatican.va/holy_
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This redemption is celebrated as God’s gift. It does not come about
primarily by human effort, nor does it arise out of the inherent goodness
of humanity. This makes the biblical concept of the redemption of human
institutional life very different from various forms of secular humanism
which have neither a view of human sin nor consequently a concept of
grace. It is in the context of this gracious activity of God that human
ethical responsibility for human institutional transformation should be
understood.153
Yet, at times, the redemption offered by the state may seem more within human-
ity’s grasp than waiting for it as God’s gift. In this way, we relate to the situation of
the near-defeated Israelites in Isaiah 36 who are mockingly taunted by the Rabshakeh,
who say to them: ‘Do not let Hezekiah mislead you by saying, The LORD will save
us. Has any of the gods of the nations saved their land out of the hand of the king of
Assyria?’ (Isaiah 36:18). To the believer in political and military might, these means
of the state can appear irresistible and necessary. But it is a mistake, as the Assyrians
were to find out, that the God of Israel is like any god or idol. False gods may be
impotent in the wake of military might, but, ultimately, God delivers the Israelites
from the hands of the Assyrians. Faith demands no surrender to the state, nor seeking
of redemption other than in Christ.
This chapter has shown the ambiguous nature of considering the state as a
redeemer. Political redemption is obscure for several reasons. First, the nature of
the human condition, from which we need to be redeemed, remains indistinct until
we arrive in a new redeemed situation and can look back on where we once were.
Christianity teaches the sinfulness of the human being and how we are redeemed out
of sin and death by Jesus Christ. That much is agreed, yet theologians disagree over
the nature of sin and what redemption is and how it occurs.
Second, as this chapter has discussed, there is a conflict between those who see the
state as sacred (either as an autonomous redeemer, or by being God’s direct tool for our
redemption), and those who view the state as an profanely standing in the way of our
redemption. The first group includes secular people who wish to liberate humanity
through the state, or Christian people who wish to supplement God’s redemptive
work by baptising the state’s secular reforms. The second group believes that our
personal and corporate salvation requires eliminating or minimizing the profane state
by actively undermining it or working outside of it. Christians have been attracted to
this view too. At the same time, the church teaches that only God can save us. From
a Reformed perspective, sola fide teaches that only faith can save and perfect us. The
state is not our redeemer and can add nothing to the work of Christ. The position
153. Duane K. Friesen, Christian Peacemaking and International Conflict: A Realist Pacifist Perspective
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argued for here is that the state is neither a redeemer nor a barrier to the redemption
we have in Christ.
For Milbank and Cavanaugh, redemption is social and saves us from individuality
into the political body of the church and, in the case of Milbank, other social bodies.
Yet, there are shortcomings with this. This anthropology accepts our inherent social
nature and the desire for communion with others, which is the same nature lying at
the basis of natural law theories of the state. But Milbank’s and Cavanaugh’s crude
adoption of the notion of the personality of groups raises many questions. It is not
clear, for example, that the myriad groups that Milbank wishes to see occupying a
more complex space have their own internal absolute sovereignty. If they are not
absolute in their own space, then it might be asked who is sovereign over them; it
must either be the individual, the state or the church. If these groups have sovereignty
there is potential that they may in fact be more oppressive than the state154, replacing
one sovereign (the state) with several. As Morris Cohen writes: ‘The evils of an
absolute state are not cured by the multiplication of absolutes.’155 Since Milbank and
Cavanaugh link their ecclesiology to group personality, it may be asked whether a
political and legal doctrine can legitimately form the basis of the doctrine of the church
(the biblical notion of the Body of Christ seemed secondary to this).
Conclusions
In Milbank and Cavanaugh we have two different forms of political redemption. For
Milbank, redemption is out of the secular state and into a complex space made up
of numerous overlapping associations. For Cavanaugh, it is through the Eucharist
in the church that offers redemption by reunifying humanity as one. In their detail
these approaches reveal real differences between Milbank and Cavanaugh. Milbank
is willing to make use of the state in bringing about his desired form of society, while
for Cavanaugh, who is more of an anarchist, the state offers just a parody of the true
redemption.
The church, in engaging with the state, can easily be tempted to see the state
as sacred and as a redemptive force in society. Or it may see the state as profane
in standing in the way of our redemption. Milbank and Cavanaugh take this latter
approach; many other theologians take the former. To avoid either of these positions
requires putting the state in its place, being sceptical about the claims of politics, and
having a theologically-rich anthropology and sound doctrine of sin. These things will
help prevent the church seeing the state as a redeemer. As the next chapter argues, the
church may be involved in statecraft, but should not do so when it makes the state a
sacred redeemer.
154. Morris R. Cohen, “Communal Ghosts and Other Perils in Social Philosophy,” The Journal of
Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 16, no. 25 (December 1919): 687.
155. Ibid., 689.
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This chapter concludes the threefold treatment of looking at the state as a creator,
preserver, and redeemer, and the assessment of Milbank and Cavanaugh in light of
this framework. Each of the last three chapters took a similar approach in considering
how the great works of God in creation, preservation, and redemption relate to the
state. This framework was then used to assess the soundness of the contribution of
Milbank and Cavanaugh to understanding the state theologically. The next chapter
draws on the conclusion drawn so far, that the state is mundane, and proposes that
given this assessment of the state, occasional statecraft is permissible for the church.
Chapter 6
The Political Church and
Desacralized Statecraft
If the state is as profane as Milbank and Cavanaugh suggest, then surely it is some-
thing faithful Christians should avoid, limiting prospects for Christian engagement
with the state. The logic at work here is that there is a direct connection between
a correct theological understanding of the state and the possibility of Christian
engagement with it. Engaging with the profane state in the politics of statecraft would
be particularly ruled out, since this would be staining of the Christian, who should not
participate, even indirectly, in violence. If the state is properly sacred as a direct and
immediate creation and tool of God, then engagement is possible, even a duty in some
cases. If, however, the state is a mundane instrument, Christians have nothing to fear
in occasionally engaging with it.
The case for the profane state, as the previous three chapters show, rests on its
profane origins, how it is preserved by violence, and how it competes with the
church as our redeemer. For these reasons, both Milbank and Cavanaugh are negative
about the possibilities of positive Christian engagement with the state. The previous
chapters on creation, preservation, and redemption have examined their arguments
and have argued instead for the deprofanization of the state from these negative
assessments, and alongside a desacralization from positions that try to sacralize the
state. This task of deprofanizing and desacralizing theologies of the state continue
in this chapter in order to provide the basis for occasional Christian statecraft as a
tool of the public witness of the church, making it a mere tactic, but never a strategy
or goal. This chapter further argues that both God and Christians are free to act
politically. God’s freedom enables God to use political forces, including the state, for
God’s purposes. Individuals and churches are also free to be ‘political’ in a range of
ways, but it must always remain secondary to faithfulness to God, and the love of
one’s neighbour.
‘Statecraft’, the name given here for engagement with the state, is often used to
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describe what ‘statesmen’ do, particularly in international affairs.1 But there are other
definitions of the term, some with a strong historic link to Christian political thought,
including the genre of ‘mirrors for princes and political testaments’ which aimed
to guide and influence rulers.2 For John Tashjean, statecraft focuses on the ‘art of
leadership, on the key questions of public policy and on the problems of political and
military strategy.’3 Much Christian political thought fits within Tashjean’s category of
statecraft, including works of Aquinas, Giles of Rome, Erasmus, and many others.4
These examples show that statecraft used to describe the way in which rulers first
managed themselves and, from that, the affairs of state. Following the French
Revolution, increasing democratization diverted attention from the ruler to political
structures.5 But this was not a direct shift. The rise of the modern state meant that, as
more people come to be directly an object of the state’s concern, these people became
more interested in how the state could be used to solve social problems. Following this
logic, the rise of the state has inevitably meant that politics would come to be defined
as statecraft, with politics understood as the domain of the state, which has become
the primary force in changing history.
Consonant with more modern usage, the definition of ‘politics as statecraft’ in this
chapter follows that of Bell: ‘that social and political power rests in the state and
therefore the key to change is seizing the state and wielding it for revolutionary ends.’6
Here, Bell adapts Weber’s definition of ‘politics’ as being about ‘the leadership, or the
exercise of influence on the leadership, of a political organization, in other words a
state.’7 According to Bell, the church has been captivated by the mythos of politics as
statecraft, and can imagine no other way of being the church in relation to the state
than its conscience, offering pointers in the right direction for Christianization of the
social order. This is seen whenever Christians run for political office, or try to influence
those in power. Since both Milbank and Cavanaugh agree with Bell that the church is a
political body in its own right it is no surprise that that also reject politics as statecraft.
The approach this chapter takes is not to see the staining influence of the state
come from the state itself, but from the idolatry that elevates the state into the place
of God, and imagines that it can create, sustain, and redeem individuals and society.
On the other hand, it is a mistake to make the state wholly profane. To do this is to
1. Morton A. Kaplan, “An Introduction to the Strategy of Statecraft,” World Politics 4, no. 4 (July 1952):
548.
2. John E. Tashjean, “On Theory of Statecraft,” The Review of Politics 35, no. 3 (July 1973): 375.
3. Ibid., 382.
4. See for several examples ibid., 383–384; and, Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political
Thought: Volume One: The Renaissance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 213–215.
5. Tashjean, “On Theory of Statecraft,” 384.
6. Daniel M. Bell Jr., “Only Jesus Saves: Toward a Theopolitical Ontology of Judgment,” in Theology
and the Political: The New Debate, ed. Creston Davis, John Milbank, and Slavoj Žižek (Durham and London:
Duke University Press, 2005), 203.
7. Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” 32. Weber’s italics. Cited by Bell, “State and Civil Society,”
426. Although it should be noted here that Weber observes a much broader definition and limits the
discussion to the state in this instance for the purposes of his lecture.
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make the whole secular world profane, without allowing for the freedom of God to
use human institutions for his purposes. The error to avoid is to equate the world with
worldliness.
Drawing heavily on the thought of Jacques Ellul, this chapter begins with the
notion and practice of desacralization and how it puts the state in its place. This clears
the way for a closer consideration of statecraft in Milbank and Cavanaugh. Finally, a
Christian statecraft is defended as an appropriate and occasional tactic of the church’s
politics, which manages to avoid making the state profane or sacred, and is part of
putting the state in its proper mundane rôle.
A Desacralized State
This section will focus on the desacralization of the state in order to clear the way for
the church to engage with the state without fear of contamination. This is necessary
because Milbank and Cavanaugh link the profane state with the dangers of statecraft.
They believe that the state is tarnished by being based in, and sustained by, illegitimate
violence. Furthermore, in their Augustinianism, the state is an expression of the
undisciplined desire to dominate others. It has a will to power and has become, in its
modern form, beyond the control of citizens. The state, as the City of Man, is opposed
to the City of God, the former being profane, the latter being holy and sacred. On their
reading, there is no easy reconciliation of these; in fact they are diametrically opposed.
Statecraft, for them, is profane for shoring up the state and entrenching the statist
imagination. The argument here does not directly oppose Milbank and Cavanaugh
and suggest that the state is good and that statecraft is a worthy, noble practice of
the church. Rather, it values the contribution of Milbank and Cavanaugh in exposing
the idolatrous nature of statism. The argument here is that non-statist statecraft is as
ambiguous as the state itself. This means that statecraft will be found to be sometimes
valuable and sometimes less so. A theological appraisal of the state and statecraft
can parallel Milbank’s assessment of modernity: ‘Not outright refusal, nor outright
acceptance.’8
Nevertheless, the church’s political judgment requires its outright refusal of the
demonic, and the outright acceptance of the Divine. The argument here is that the state
is neither, but is merely mundane, a position maintained by continually desacralizing
and deprofanizing the state from the extremes of the sacred and profane. Previous
chapters attempted to desacralize the modern state from any positive religious
significance in being seen as creator, preserver, or redeemer. This task is nothing
less than the theological deconstruction of the Church’s statist political imagination.
This task involves the church in shaping its own theological reflection on the social
order so that the statist imaginary has a much reduced influence in its own life. In
8. Milbank, “Culture: The gospel of affinity,” 196.
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preaching and teaching about the true Creator, Preserver, and Redeemer, it can reduce
the idolatrous temptation to locate these apart from God, whether in the state or
elsewhere.
Such idolatry can take the form of misplaced trust or confidence in human rulers
that displace God’s true rule (Psalm 118:8–9; 146:3–4; Jeremiah 17:5–6). Yet care needs
to be taken not to give these verses a strong anarchist interpretation. In commenting
on this viewpoint in Psalm 146, James Luther Mays writes that the Psalm ‘does not
say that leaders are unnecessary or not useful. It does warn against trusting them for
salvation.’9 We see misplaced ultimate trust in human leaders (a perennial temptation,
according to Mays10) when the state is idolized by being ascribed with salvific powers
that properly belong to God. The potential of Christianity to put the state back in its
place through its desacralization (without making it profane) is the subject of the next
section.
The emphasis here is on desacralization not on deprofanization. Rather than
confront the profane state head on and resacralize it, as some would through a shallow
appeal to Romans 13 and parallel texts, the approach taken is to desacralize the state
by making it mundane, rather than profane.
Practical Desacralization
Jacques Ellul is a modern guide to how to desacralize of the state, which he identifies
as a religious idol of modernity. Ellul believes that desacralizing the state is a political
rôle of the church. Another is to form its members so that they can resist the ubiquitous
propaganda of the state that tries to shape the political imaginations of all its citizens
so that they begin to see it as their preserver and redeemer. Such desacralization, being
the removal of the mystique of the state, has real benefits for Ellul: ‘If we regard the
state as a set of offices, with a lot of papers, with typewriters — things — then we
are much less ready to sacrifice the lives of human beings to it. Other reasons will be
needed at that moment. The state is no longer the last reason.’11 It ought to be noted at
this point that Cavanaugh advocates something similar to Ellul here when he writes
that, ‘The urgent task of the Church, then, is to demystify the nation-state and to treat
it like the telephone company.’12 Cavanaugh’s focus here is to avoid the making state
the defender of the common good, and to make it become merely a provider of goods
and services (like mail delivery).
Cavanaugh does not offer any specifics on how to go about this task of demystifi-
cation. Ellul, on the other hand, suggests how we might proceed:
9. Mays, Psalms, 440.
10. Ibid., 441.
11. Jacques Ellul, “Christian Faith and Social Reality,” in Sources and Trajectories: Eight Early Articles by
Jacques Ellul That Set the Stage, ed. and trans. Marva J. Dawn (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997), 177.
12. Cavanaugh, “Killing for the Telephone Company,” 266.
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We must profane by our conduct, not by statements or theories, the sacred
of money, the sacred of the State (which means that the State and politics
are reduced to their function of managing the material interests of a
collectivity, an honorable function but not one involving any excessive
valuing or sacralizing, all this in accordance with the doctrine of the
secularity of the State).13
How Ellul suggests we desacralize money provides a model for how we can
desacralize the state. On profaning money he writes: ‘To profane money, like all other
powers, is to take away its sacred character.’14 ‘Profane’ is being used here in a slightly
different sense from its main usage in the present work. It is not Ellul’s intention to
make money polluted or dirty, but rather, following the sense of ‘mundane’ in this
work, ‘unhallowed’ and lacking in religious significance. Once removed of its sacred
character, money can become a mere instrument for exchange, and the grip that money
has on us is broken. As a result of this act we can once more become the masters of
money, and not its slaves, using it in a way that it does not conflict with our Christian
faith.
In a sermon on 1 Timothy 6:7–19, Augustine preached a similar ethics to Ellul,
suggesting that we can use money out of necessity, but should not love it. Money,
for Augustine, should have mere utility for the journey through this world, but not
displace the true object of our desire, which should be God alone.15 Rather than blame
what some might see as defective objects (gold, bodies, praise, power), Augustine
blames the defective will for seeking in things that which we should seek in God
alone. The classic discussion in Augustine here is the distinction between use (uti)
and enjoyment (frui).16 In general, Augustine writes that ‘the good make use of this
world in order to enjoy God.’17 This use of the world, already extended to money,
may also be extended to states; we should not seek from, nor give to states that which
God alone can provide, or is owed.18
Returning to Ellul, he specifically advocates giving money away as a key profaning
act, which takes its purest form in the gift.19 For Ellul, giving is profaning because
it directly challenges the ever present temptation to accumulate and hoard wealth,
as he finds criticized in scripture (Matthew 6:21; 1 Timothy 6:10).20 For Ellul, the
13. Ellul, False Presence, 203–204.
14. Jacques Ellul, Money and Power, trans. LaVonne Neff (Basingstoke: Marshall Pickering, 1986), 109.
15. Augustine, “Sermon 177: On the Words of the Apostle, 1 Timothy 6:7–19: We Brought Nothing into
this World, and What is More We Cannot Take Anything Out of It, etc.; A Discourse on Avarice.” Also see
Augustine, Eighty-Three Different Questions, trans. David L. Mosher, Fathers of the Church (Washington,
D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1982), Q. 30; Augustine, City of God, § XI.25.
16. A guide to this discussion can be found in Oliver O’Donovan, “Usus and Fruitio in Augustine,
‘De doctrina Christiana I’,” The Journal of Theological Studies 33, no. 2 (1982): 361–397. Also see Markus,
Saeculum, 67–68.
17. Augustine, City of God, § XV.7.
18. Ibid., § XII.8.
19. Ellul, Money and Power, 110.
20. Ibid., 83–84.
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most profaning act is giving to the church (‘Giving to God is the act of profanation
par excellence’), and then freely to the needy in acts of free charity, which ‘glorifies
God and proclaims grace to other men.’21 Charitable giving, and especially giving to
programmes of direct welfare to the poor, both desacralizes (profanizes) money and
undermines the pretensions of the state to be able to solve the questions of poverty and
deprivation. In giving directly to the poor, we say to the state that it has been unable
to fulfil its promises of poverty eradication, while at the same time enacting the true
religion of James 1:27 (‘Religion that is pure and undefiled before God, the Father, is
this: to care for orphans and widows in their distress, and to keep oneself unstained
by the world.’). To give freely requires the consecration of our money and ourselves
to God. Only in God can the pure gift exist; otherwise we give for our own glory, from
a sense of duty, or with a desire to receive something in return, which means the gift
is not pure, but remains sacralized by expecting something in return.22
Can the same be said of the state? Can we desacralize the state in the same way,
and in the process remove the grip its mythos has on us? Like money, the state cannot
be avoided in the modern world, but we can treat it in a desacralized fashion that
disarms its pretensions to absolute sovereignty over our lives. Ellul makes day-to-day
actions an opportunity for the desacralization of the state:
To profane the state, affirm the liberty of the person and your own liberty
in actions — actions in the face of the decisions that can make an idol
of the state. It might even mean, under certain conditions, refusing to
participate in political life. I do not say always, all the time, but under
certain conditions; sometimes to be a good, and true, and loyal citizen
might mean refusing to play the game that the state offers us.23
But there remains the danger that poverty or political non-participation become
sources of justification. Yet neither are a sign of the church, or necessary for salvation.
Ellul writes that ‘as soon as this poverty becomes a factor in human self-justification, it
loses all its value.’24 Likewise with political power and influence. The church should
exhibit its belief that politics is a matter of mere indifference to salvation. It should
not affect the church if God permits the dispossession of its political power. The
church could even show the world its indifference to power by dispossessing itself or
neglecting to use that which it has. Ellul provides an example of this ‘Non-Power’ (not
‘Powerlessness’) based on the arrest of Jesus (Matthew 26:47–55).25 The difference, as
he suggests, is that Non-Power is voluntarily declining to do something one has the
21. Ellul, Money and Power, 111–113.
22. See Stringfellow, Imposters of God, 32–33.
23. Ellul, “Christian Faith and Social Reality,” 178.
24. Ellul, Money and Power, 149.
25. Jacques Ellul, ““I Believe In”: Theological Brief,” in Christian Theology: A Case Method Approach, ed.
Robert A. Evans and Thomas D. Parker (London: SPCK, 1977), 38; and also “Lust for Power,” trans.
The Monks of New Skete, Katallagete: Be Reconciled 7, no. 2 (Fall 1979): 30–33.
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power to do. As such, Jesus did not call angels to his rescue in Gethsemane in order
to demonstrate his power (Matthew 26:53).26
Here, both Ellul and Cavanaugh run into Milbank’s criticism of the iconoclast.
Milbank writes that ‘humans cannot escape from fetishisms because we always give
material content to signs and we always see material things as signifying.’27 Milbank
finds in desacralization the source of many problems of modernity: ‘One buys, sells
and exploits without reference to tradition, association, duty or end because things
and people are now secular and neutral and so the objects of exploitation.’28 Here
Milbank’s complaint is in the destruction of traditions which inscribed into culture
something sacred, which, once removed, opens up the material into neutral objects of
exploitation.
The differences here between Milbank and Cavanaugh are instructive. For
Milbank, one must not aim for a false neutrality, requiring the removal of all fetish
from objects, as there will always be some fetishistic remainder. This is where
Cavanaugh errs as he fails to see that he has essentially replaced the state as Christ
with the state as an Antichrist. This only mystifies it toward the other extreme.
Here, Bruno Latour’s analysis is a powerful critique of Cavanaugh’s iconoclasm: ‘Yet
somehow the fetish gains in strength in the hands of the anti-fetishists. The more you want
it to be nothing, the more action springs back from it.’29 And, ‘The only one who
is projecting his feelings onto the idol is he, the iconoclast with a hammer, not those
who by his gesture should be freed from their shackles.’30 If Milbank is right, then the
state will rarely be a mere neutral instrument.31 But this does not mean that the task
of desacralizing is invalid; the church certainly cannot tolerate the divine totalitarian
state that tries to be all things to all people. Nor can it believe the state to be an
Antichrist. Desacralization and deprofanization from both these options remains an
important ongoing project so long as the creation of idols is a temptation. The state
will always claim some transcendent meaning beyond its materiality; it is an ongoing
political task of the church to deny the state any easy self-sacralization.32
Scripture and the State
An important part of the theological task of desacralizing the state is to tease out the
relationship between sacralizing political ideologies, scripture, and the state. This is
26. On Jesus’s powerlessness see Thielicke, Theological Ethics: Vol. 1, 616.
27. Milbank, “Real Third Way,” 70; drawing on Bruno Latour, Pandora’s Hope: Essays on the Reality of
Science Studies (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999). Milbank’s italics.
28. Milbank, “Real Third Way,” 70.
29. Latour, Pandora’s Hope, 270.
30. Ibid., 271.
31. O’Donovan writes similarity that ‘government’ (along with literature and money) is no mere
neutral technicality, it is a dangerous power in human life ‘upon which idolatry, envy, and hatred easily
concentrate.’ A Conversation Waiting to Begin: The Churches and the Gay Controversy (London: SCM Press,
2009), 107.
32. The ongoing task of desacralization is recognized in Ellul, Ethics of Freedom, 160.
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important because, often, statist political theologians have found support in scripture,
while others, including Milbank and Cavanaugh, have all but ignored it. For a
mundane theological understanding of the state to prevail, neither a sacred nor a
profane reading of the state in scripture must predominate.
A well-known criticism of Radical Orthodox theologians is that they rarely interact
with scripture. David Ford, in a review article of the movement’s manifesto,
Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology, was genuinely puzzled at the lack of scriptural
engagement in that volume:
I find all this very disturbing, because I do not see a good theological
future for the movement unless this is urgently addressed. Scripture
is so intrinsic to the traditions, practices and theologians they espouse
that without it their claim to be in continuity with these is hopelessly
compromised. Further, it is unlikely that many of the doubts of critics
about matters such as attention to particularities, historical credibility, and
serious engagement with other disciplines will be allayed unless they can
be shown to be unfounded at least in relation to scripture. There is also the
church aspect: a theology that does not inhabit the Bible in lively ways is
very unlikely to be more than a set of ideas unable to reach beyond a very
limited ‘high culture’ milieu.33
Catherine Pickstock, who replied to Ford on behalf of the book’s editors, acknowl-
edged their lack of scriptural engagement, and stated that ‘all the editors intend that
this should be remedied in the future.’34 In a later passage, she strangely placed
‘the exposition of scripture’ in the middle of a paragraph on ‘other disciplines and
religions.’35 It is not clear whether scripture is the way into the other disciplines, or
whether the study of scripture is a discipline outside theology. Nevertheless, there is
little evidence since 2001 that Pickstock’s promised remedy has been forthcoming.
While ignoring or side-lining the scriptural commentaries of Augustine and
Aquinas, Radical Orthodox writers, including Milbank and Cavanaugh, have mined
them for their philosophical utility. The tearing apart of the seamlessness of biblical
study and doctrinal and philosophical work in the Fathers and Doctors of the
Church is hardly in line with Radical Orthodoxy’s wish to overcome dualisms in
theology. Radical Orthodox authors have no trouble incorporating a wide range
33. David F. Ford, “Radical Orthodoxy and the Future of British Theology,” Scottish Journal of Theology
54, no. 3 (2001): 398. R. R. Reno notes Radical Orthodoxy’s ‘overall ambivalence about the role of
Scripture’ in “The Radical Orthodoxy Project,” First Things, February 2000, <http://www.firstthings.
com/article/2007/01/the- radical- orthodoxy- project- 42> (accessed April 23, 2013). Also see
C. Rosalee Velloso Ewell, “The Word Made Silent: Reflections on Christian Identity and Scripture,” in
The Gift of Difference: Radical Orthodoxy, Radical Reformation, ed. Chris K. Huebner and Tripp York, with a
foreword by John Milbank (Winnipeg: CMU Press, 2010), 67–86.
34. Catherine Pickstock, “Reply to David Ford and Guy Collins,” Scottish Journal of Theology 54, no. 3
(2001): 411.
35. Ibid., 420.
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of texts into their work: from the Church Fathers to French post-modernists there
is apparently nothing that they cannot tell us about. Why then the reticence over
the Bible? Especially since Radical Orthodoxy promised the mingling of ‘exegesis,
cultural reflection and philosophy in a complex but coherently executed collage.’36
Furthermore, as James H. Olthuis points out, Radical Orthodoxy’s language of
participation, as just one example, can also be found in scripture.37 One must suspect
that another agenda is at work here in the privileging of scripture – not in its use, but
in its avoidance.
An important reason for the marginalization of scripture is political, with the rise
of the modern state affecting the way we read scripture today. Modern hermeneutics,
strongly shaped by the modern exclusion of participation in transcendence, also splits
the Bible from politics.38 Drawing on John Milbank’s and Jon Levenson’s criticism
of Spinoza, Daniel Bell has claimed that modern readings of scripture are ‘statist’,
being determined by the modern statist imagination.39 This remark is central to
the rejection/demotion of scripture in his political theology, and the dismissal of
others who might try to read scripture as a guide to a theology of the state and
social action. Bell suggests that the ‘theological interpretation of Scripture thereby
necessitates a recovery of the political vocation of the church.’40 Bell, believing
that all readings are political, wishes to recapture from the state a political reading
of scripture that is sited within the church as polis. In making this move, Bell
mirrors modern political hermeneutics, with our material politics largely determining
our readings. If one adopts such a materialist view, it is only by changing the
church that we can change our readings of scripture. To Bell, politics as statecraft
provides a problematic hermeneutic, and one that must be overcome by asserting
the church as polis; and only when this is achieved can the Bible be read safely.
Despite his disavowal of ‘foundationalist methodologism’, Milbank shares with others
within Radical Orthodoxy an ecclesiological foundationalism when it comes to the
interpretation of scripture.41 In their perspective, the church becomes the foundation
to the reading of scripture. Scripture cannot teach us anything until it is freed from
modernity’s grip on the hermeneutical imagination.
36. Milbank, Ward, and Pickstock, “Suspending the material,” 2. Original italics.
37. James H. Olthuis, “Afterword: A Radical Ontology of Love: Thinking “with” Radical Orthodoxy,”
in Radical Orthodoxy and the Reformed Tradition: Creation, Covenant, and Participation, ed. James K. A. Smith
and James H. Olthuis (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2005), 285.
38. Milbank hints at the sociological capture of the Bible in Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 9–10.
Named as the perpetrators of the modern hermeneutics, which split the Bible from politics are Thomas
Hobbes and Baruch Spinoza.
39. Daniel M. Bell Jr., “Jesus, the Jews, and the Politics of God’s Justice,” Ex Auditu 22 (Justice 2006):
88; Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 19-22; Jon Douglas Levenson, The Hebrew Bible, the Old Testament,
and Historical Criticism: Jews and Christians in Biblical Studies, 1st ed (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox
Press, 1993), 117.
40. Bell, “Jesus, the Jews,” 88.
41. John Milbank, “Ecclesiology: The last of the last,” in Being Reconciled: Ontology and Pardon (Oxford:
Routledge, 2003), 109.
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By placing the formation or rediscovery of the true church prior to the reading
of scripture, this approach demonstrates a dangerous ordinal fallacy. This is that
until the true church is incarnated we cannot do sound biblical work. This leaves
the Bible trapped until liberated by philosophy and an alternative politics. But if
the Bible is so trapped, is not God himself also ensnared? Furthermore, how is the
church to form, if not through the hearing of the Word? It is no escape from this
problem to answer that the church forms through the Eucharist, since the sacrament
is established in scripture. Another problem with this view is that scripture plays no
rôle, either in the proclamation of faith, or in the demolition of statist mythos. But,
in a truly theological politics, scripture can work to hinder the adoption of statism
and defend the Christian mythos. For instance, scripture, read through the tradition of
the Reformed confessions, can act as a bulwark against political ideology, as it did in
Hungary:
The Confessions constituted the standard and norm by which Bible inter-
pretation was judged. This constraint kept our church from being diverted
away from the firm foundation of the Holy Scripture by the different
philosophical movements and political ideologies that appeared over the
centuries.42
This assessment runs counter to the materialist claims that political ideology
inevitably shapes the reception of scripture. So, rather than the Bible being held
captive to the mythos of modernity, scripture can be used to demythologize theology’s
enslavement to modern thought. To have it any other way is to subordinate the Word
of God to human thought. Ellul, writing in the 1970s, when the demythologization of
scripture was a popular idea, suggested that contrary to this movement, scripture was
an essential tool in the demythologization of society:
How can we fail to realize that scripture, in precisely the same way in which
the myths contained in scripture itself are treated, is the true destroyer of
myths. How can we fail to see that one need only apply this to politics,
to nationalism, to communism, to science, etc., in order to reduce them all
to changeable undertakings which are meaningless in themselves?43
In conclusion, scripture not only offers the encouragement and tools to demytholo-
gise the state (as one among many idols and ‘so-called gods’ that humans have created
(see 1 Corinthians 8:4–6), but also offers positive encouragement to statecraft as well.44
42. Zsolt Gereb, “The Reflection of the Reformed Confessional Character in the Method Applied
in Twentieth-Century Transylvanian Hungarian Exegetical Work,” in Reformed Theology: Identity and
Ecumenicity II: Biblical Interpretation in the Reformed Tradition, ed. Wallace M. Alston Jr. and Michael Welker
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007), 117.
43. Ellul, False Presence, 206–207. Ellul’s italics.
44. On Paul’s description of the ‘so-called gods’, see Bruce W. Winter, Seek the Welfare of the City:
Christians as Benefactors and Citizens (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994), 131–132.
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Statecraft in Milbank and Cavanaugh
Within Radical Orthodoxy, it is Daniel Bell who most strongly rejects politics as
statecraft. He has two main reasons for this position. First, the state is now no
longer able to control the market, since the state is now the servant, and not the
master of capitalism.45 For Bell, believing that the state can provide justice in ways
that may conflict directly with the needs of capital is naïve at best and dangerous at
worst. Second, if the church accepts this definition of politics as statecraft, it accepts
a distinction between the political realm of the state and the spiritual realm of the
church.46 It is a denial of the church as having any political meaning intrinsic to itself.
On Bell’s definition, statecraft should be rejected by the church. But it is certainly
too simplistic to accept his account of statecraft, for, while the church rejects the notion
of the state as the only political actor, it cannot dismiss the state from the political stage
altogether. There is a dualistic understanding of the church’s approach to statecraft
here. If the church engages with the state, then, for Bell at least, its understanding
of politics is necessarily statist, resulting in the privatization of the church. In moving
to attend to Milbank’s and Cavanaugh’s positions on statecraft we find both more
nuanced and confused positions.
As will be shown below, Milbank has a slightly more favourable view of statecraft
than does Cavanaugh, but both stray towards making the state profane for Christians,
based in their theologies of the state and its violence. This section will then open
up some lines for developing the possibility of Christian statecraft, based in scripture
and tradition, not as a baptism of realpolitik, but as a permissible act which is neither
sacred nor profane, but in the realm of the indifferent.
Milbank’s Dialectical Relationship to Statecraft
Given Milbank’s largely negative assessment of the modern state, what relationship
does he think Christians and the church should have to it? To reiterate, Milbank sees
the secular as coming from bad theology, and the state as part of the secular that is
separated from God and existing on the basis of the ontology of violence. The state
is therefore directed to the ends of the government through its will, not to the glory
of God. As Milbank experienced in the Thatcher era, the state and its bureaucrats are
driven by rational immanent ends that are impervious to love. Nevertheless, Milbank
does allow some space for Christian politics to relate to the state.
The basis on which the church speaks to power receives its fullest treatment
in Milbank’s essay, “Body by Love Possessed.”47 Written during Thatcher’s rule,
the essay addresses the criticisms of politicians, journalists, and church-goers who
45. Bell, Liberation Theology, 17.
46. See Bell, “State and Civil Society.”
47. Milbank, “Body by Love Possessed.”
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questioned the right and competence of the church to speak out on matters of public
policy. Milbank defends their right to speak and affirms their courage not to be cowed
by fear of technical expertise when their moral criticisms demand to be heard. But for
Milbank, this is not enough; theology must earn and demonstrate its right to speak.
Milbank begins with an analysis of the traditional English Anglican form of
ecclesiastical encounter with secular political reality. This, he observes, is a union of
empiricism and Platonic ethical abstractions, with this approach reaching its apogee
in William Temple.48 Consistent with Milbank’s analysis in Theology and Social Theory,
he predicts that when church committees come to apply the will of God to public
issues, it will be the diagnoses of the situation that will determine the theological
response.49 Against this temptation, too often yielded to in ecclesiastical practice,
Milbank proposes calling into question the ‘terms in which secular analyses are
made.’50
The basis for this critique is a linguistic one, since Christ is logos, the communicated
word of God. The connection between the logos and economics is obscure here, but
Milbank suggests that since we can only speak of God through speaking of other
subjects, such as history and economics, the Word of God in relation to these is not
known to us until it is spoken. The implications of Milbank’s approach means that
the church has a duty to itself to speak on economic and political matters, since not to
do so entails accepting ‘a fact/value dualism’ and this, in turn, involves theology in
accepting a ‘whole series of buried affinities between the modern scientific approach
to politics and economics and the fideist-nominalist-voluntarist current in theology.’51
So Milbank endorses the church speaking from the basis of faith, provided it does not
legitimate bad theology and the secular. But not too much should be hoped for, as this
or that policy gain does little to challenge the status quo:
that while, here and there, more or less love and justice may be encour-
ageable in the state, with genuine local mitigations of certain aspects
of coercion, that nevertheless a power-based order continues to be held
together demonically. In their cumulative total the mitigations only
compose a more subtle order of power whose concealment is a further
violence and works more assuredly towards the catastrophe of final non-
participation.52
In this passage, Milbank almost completely concedes that the state is demonic, and
that love and justice have no place in it. Quite apart from the ontological questions
this raises for Milbank’s assertion of the Christian mythos of love over all of life,




52. John Milbank, “Critical Study,” Modern Theology 4, no. 2 (1988): 213.
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this passage is abstracted from any concrete reality. His remarks also echo the old
socialist and anarchist criticisms of reformism – that statecraft of this kind leaves
profane power in place, and merely tinkers with a corrupt system.53 Yet reforms
(even in a profane state) can be of use to real people. Devalued here are the tangible
differences to actual people and concrete situations which his abstract approach fails
to incorporate. From this point of view, Nigel Biggar poses this challenge to Milbank:
One of the reasons for the unsatisfactory abstract and unattractively
moralistic quality of Radical Orthodox theologians’ social criticism lies,
I think, in their tendency to reach for social, cultural, or political theory
when they want to mediate between theological premises and practical
judgments. If, instead, they were to spend more time reflecting on concrete
cases — whether presented in the press or in history books or in pastoral
experience — then their critical concepts would have to wrestle with
awkward particulars and, should they survive, become less self-righteous
and more discriminating, accurate, patient, and fair.54
While Milbank has an aversion to mere ‘facts’, Biggar’s criticism strikes the right
chord, as even in his more situationist moments, Milbank sounds abstract.
At times, Milbank sounds opposed to all politics. He writes that radical politics,
in recognizing the futility of ‘politics’, will not reach for ‘sovereign power’ but work
in a situationist fashion ‘against this power by seeking to save what can be saved
for every individual in every moment: for example, to ensure that every transaction
is as far as possible just and charitable, and as far as possible robs the capitalist of
his profits, the bureaucratic state of its domination.’55 This sounds more consistent
with Milbank’s overall negative appraisal of the modern state. It is an approach that
sounds almost Anabaptist, and one which finds critics who disapprove of such an
apparent withdrawal from explicit public engagement with the state. Hans Boersma,
for instance, affirms that justice can be found outside the church, and claims that it is
‘immoral to leave the realms of civil government and economics to the nonecclesial
society and that it is supercilious to claim that the church is the true polis and the only
place in which God’s hospitality and justice have any impact at all.’56
This theme of Milbank’s withdrawal has also brought out a more serious problem
of the consistency of Milbank’s political theology. Jeffrey Stout ponders whether
‘Christians . . . may join hands with others in the struggle for justice’ and in so doing
places Milbank on the horns of a dilemma. For, ‘If Milbank thinks they may, then he is
implicitly granting the legitimacy of what I am calling a secularized political sphere,
53. For instance, Niebuhr, Reflections, 30.
54. Nigel Biggar, Behaving in Public: How to Do Christian Ethics (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011), 99.
55. John Milbank, “Enclaves, or Where Is the Church?” in The Future of Love: Essays in Political Theology
(London: SCM Press, 2009), 143.
56. Boersma, Violence, Hospitality, and the Cross, 239.
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and his conclusions are much less radical than they are made to seem. If he thinks they
mustn’t, then he has little to offer besides nostalgia, utopian fantasy, and withdrawal
into a strongly bounded enclave.’57
Milbank answers clearly, believing that Christians may cooperate with ‘secular
co-workers: socialists, communists and anarchists’ in working for the City of God,
despite their problems in grasping counter-empire, which, for them, is ‘a matter of
simply unleashing more undifferentiated liberty’.58 Milbank finds common ground
for engagement in those things which secular people already believe, but which
‘aren’t completely unchristian’ or ‘residually Christian’, such as forgiveness and
reconciliation.59 But one may suspect that, if common ground is found in these few
things, there must remain some significant differences between Christians and non-
Christians. Does this mean that Stout is correct? Does this collective activism by
Christians alongside atheists mean that there is a secular space where diverse groups
of people and individuals can meet for common causes?
Ellul would claim Milbank’s enthusiasm for coalition politics as evidence for his
politicization thesis:
It is celebrated as a victory of the spirit when anti-Christian material-
ists and fervent Christians collaborate, when bourgeois intellectuals and
factory workers sit on the same committees, when Fascists and Mo-
hammedans, or Christians and Mohammedans work in fraternal harmony.
But it should first be asked, what is this powerful cement that permits
men to overcome race and class differences and eliminates the most violent
metaphysical and religious differences? There is only one: politics.60
Ellul questions whether this solidarity comes at too high a cost. Since the things
that binds diverse groups together is ‘a common enemy—a political enemy—and the
accord will be all the closer as the hatred against “the other” becomes more violent.’61
The paramount example of this in the Twentieth Century would be the International
Brigades who fought against the Francoists in Spain in the 1930s. A more ecumenical
movement would be the current anti-globalization activist coalitions. Furthermore,
both Stout and Ellul would have reason to think that Milbank’s celebration of coalition
politics poses serious questions to his denial of secular space in which politics can
operate.
Moving from politics in general to the state, David M. Craig, a critic of Milbank’s
reading of Ruskin, writes that Milbank does not follow Ruskin where he should, into
the world of regulation and enforcement by law to achieve one’s political-economic
57. Stout, Democracy and Tradition, 105.
58. Milbank, “Culture: The gospel of affinity,” 210.
59. Milbank, Oliver, and Shortt, “Radical Orthodoxy,” 121–22.
60. Ellul, Political Illusion, 20. Ellul’s italics.
61. Ibid., 20.
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vision.62 Milbank’s reply is that he has supported state action.63 ‘Like Ruskin,’
Milbank writes, ‘certainly I do not see state activism as the prime means to bring
about a socialist condition.’64 In opposition to state programmes, Milbank prefers local
trading schemes which relate producers directly to consumers. Yet he believes that
such action can only happen within a ‘wider institutional framework . . . culminating
in the state, which should appropriately have oversight in some areas . . . and a role
in others.’65 Milbank favours a pastoral rôle for a Christianized state as part of
the ecclesia. Milbank declares at the end of this section ‘I am an Anglican, not an
Anabaptist!’66 It is clear from this section on Ruskin that Milbank favours a state that
directs its power towards the good as understood by the church. This is no liberal
state, which is indifferent toward the good, but one which participates in bringing it
about.
With regard to public participation in the modern state, Milbank’s criticisms of
Matthew Arnold’s educational vision are highly pertinent. The Arnoldian vision
was deficient, according to Milbank, because Arnold assumed that the state could
nurture its citizens in human flourishing through political participation. But Milbank
found two reasons why this was wrong-headed. First, the modern state, with
its notion of ‘absolute sovereign power’, finds the notion of participation ‘alien’.
Not surprisingly, Milbank partly blames Arnold’s disdain for local government and
corporate associations, both of which stymie centralized state sovereignty. Second, a
paideia can only be sustained by a shared tradition, which the state does not possess,
and works to undermine.67 Elsewhere, Milbank believes that statecraft and the desire
for political participation works in supporting the state, irrespective of the position
advocated. At one point, he faults Gutiérrez for being ‘mainly interested in securing
inner-ecclesiastical rights to political comment and involvement’ which has the effect
of endorsing a ‘notion of a realm of secular autonomy guarded by human creative
power, without realising that this is to subscribe to the very model which from Grotius
and Hobbes onwards makes possible the notion of an autonomous natural law.’68
Such a call from Gutiérrez in favour of statecraft needs to be placed in the context of
Latin America, where systematic exclusion from participation in power structures is
correlated with poverty, oppression, and torture. Yet in Milbank’s opinion, statecraft,
or participation in the secular, is profane because it helps to reproduce the secular
62. Craig, “Naves and Nukes,” 335-336, 348, 353-354.
63. John Milbank, “The Invocation of Clio,” in The Future of Love: Essays in Political Theology (London:
SCM Press, 2009), 215.
64. Ibid., 216.
65. Ibid., 216. Milbank finds in Proudhon a willingness to accept a coordinating rôle for the state; see:
“Were the “Christian Socialists" Socialists?” in The Future of Love: Essays in Political Theology (London:
SCM Press, 2009), 66.
66. Milbank, “Invocation of Clio,” 216.
67. Milbank, “Religion, Culture, and Anarchy,” 32–33. ‘Paideia’ can be understood as a rounded system
of education designed to educate people to flourish in the cultural and public life of society.
68. Milbank, “Essay against Secular Order,” 206.
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state. Statecraft indirectly supports the violence and coercion of the state and helps to
justify its sovereignty. For Milbank, it is better to be political through the development
of pluralism and its intermediate organisations.
Yet it is not entirely clear, in Milbank’s formulation of the means by which this
is done, whether he escapes this problem of supporting the profane state. Previous
chapters have already outlined the challenge to state sovereignty that Milbank
believes can come though the Big Society, based on recycling the ideas of the English
pluralists and distributists.69 But when Milbank describes how this transition is
to happen, he is unable to avoid the means of the state to bring about this new
socialist society. In one of Milbank’s more recent essays, written as part of a
Christian response to the ‘credit crunch’ and financial collapse of 2008, he directly
advocates political and social activism, some of which involves statecraft. In his
seven proposals, Milbank directly calls for ‘Anti-usury legislation’, ‘just prices and just
wages’ that would fall under the purview of the ‘law courts’, ‘free guilds’ which do not
restrict trade (presumably requiring anti-trust laws), welfare provision through ‘state-
aided voluntary bodies’, localist ‘de-proletarianism and re-professionalism’ against
centralized statism (presumably implemented by legislative change), and business
participation in political governance (‘Christians should recommend that the House
of Lords be reformed as a representative body of corporations – businesses, religions,
universities, trade unions etc. and not as a second House of Commons.’).70 A problem
for Milbank with these suggestions is that statecraft is required for moving from where
we are now to where he wishes us to be. So while the state is part of his diagnosis of
the problem, the state is also part of his solution.
While there is no doubt some merit in his proposals, another of Milbank’s
ideas appears contradictory. Following Hilaire Belloc’s distributism, he proposes
a move toward ‘distributist socialism’ which necessarily entails the breaking up of
concentrated economic power. This follows a similar path to the undermining of state
sovereignty through intermediate associations.71 But here, Milbank is thin on detail.
However, while some of the aforementioned associations, such as credit unions, will
wield economic power, drawing some power away from large multinational banks,
this is not yet proved a tangible challenge to the vast inequalities of wealth and its
accumulation in the hands of the super-rich. Many people are still likely to think that
to make serious gains towards greater economic equality will require state power to
disinherit the wealthy and to transfer both the possibility and actuality of wealth and
property to the lower classes.
69. It remains a question whether the advocacy of the ‘Big Society’ by Prime Minister David Cameron
is an example of complex space ‘detached from socialism’ and ‘colonized by the political right’, Milbank,
“On Complex Space,” 272.
70. Milbank, “Real Third Way,” 83–84. Milbank’s final suggestion on ‘The primacy of land’ would seem
to have no obvious implications for state activism, save for not enclosing any more of it, perhaps through
the state putting land into the national estate and available for all to use.
71. See ibid., 54.
Chapter 6. The Political Church and Desacralized Statecraft 185
Milbank’s dialectical interrelationship of church and state is further developed in
his commentary on Pope Benedict XVI’s first encyclical Deus Caritas Est. Milbank
reads Benedict as insisting that welfare is properly the work of the Church, and should
not be abdicated to the state.72 Milbank’s target at this point are the ‘neoconservative
supporters’ of rightist world leaders who wish to see the privatization of welfare
or faith-based initiatives replacing state welfare. Milbank wishes to disallow this
interpretation of Deus Caritas Est, applauding the affirmation of Benedict’s willingness
for the Church’s ‘collaboration with state and international agencies pursuing the
genuine human good in every respect.’73 Yet such a task must be infused with charity,
which only comes from the church. The state can never displace the church in justice,
since true justice is not based in secular reason, or in calculation of what is owed to
whom, but is necessarily transcendent.
Milbank’s hope is that a political ecclesiology and a redevelopment of interme-
diary associations, such as cooperatives, mutual banks, housing associations, and
credit unions, would render the need for ‘reactive State “redistribution” mostly
redundant.’74 This anti-statist political action would be subversive from without,
rendering much of the existing welfare state functions and power irrelevant. This
may be understood as a clear return to the pre-modern form of politics, or as a
reiteration of early twentieth-century pluralism. But, at the level proposed, it is likely
to leave the boundaries of states intact and the power of the military unhindered.
This would not, as Milbank hopes, bring about a ‘break-up of central sovereignty
through the operation of intermediary associations.’75 One reason for this is because
of the connection between internal state power and the international state system,
with intermediary associations, even trans-national ones, posing no real threat to this
world order.
Milbank is opposed to the state, but also wishes to use it, even though this will
reinforce it. Reinforcing the state is intrinsic to any strategy that uses of the means
of the state as the way to bring about a socialist society. In conclusion, we find
Milbank shunning statecraft for legitimating the state, while at the same time he finds
the state useful for implementing his alternative third way between the exploitative
market and profane state. While some might see here a dialectic running through
Milbank’s assessment of statecraft, or perhaps a flat-out contradiction, it might be
that, on this issue, his thought has evolved over time. The problem is that in his
more abstract philosophical moments Milbank seems utterly opposed to the state and
statecraft. When dealing with concrete situations or the real positions of others he
appears more willing to concede to the state some limited rôle. An explanation of
72. John Milbank, “The Future of Love: A Reading of Benedict XVI’s Encyclical Deus Caritas Est,” in The
Future of Love: Essays in Political Theology (London: SCM Press, 2009), 368.
73. Ibid., 369.
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this is that Milbank’s position has changed over time. If we compare one of his most
strident anti-statist writings with a recent piece which endorses state involvement,
there is 23 years between them.76
Another clue to solving the problem of limited statecraft in Milbank could be his
discipleship of Belloc. In his essay, ‘The Real Third Way’, Milbank favourably cites
Belloc’s An Essay on the Restoration of Property. Belloc writes that, ‘The evil from which
we are suffering today is not the evil of State interference but the evil of the loss of
Freedom.’77 He goes on to suggest that, ‘All the powers of the State have been invoked
by Capitalism to restore servile conditions; we shall not react against servile conditions
unless we avail ourselves of the same methods.’78 In the same work, Belloc also writes
that ‘Parliaments are necessarily the organs of plutocracy’ and there is little hope
for positive economic reform until ‘political power is decentralized and rearranged
according to economic classes and interests.’79 These short quotations are enough to
show that we find the same confusion in Belloc as we find in Milbank: a necessity to
break the absolute sovereignty of the state that has been used for capitalist ends, but a
willingness to use the same state for the introduction of a distributist agenda.
Cavanaugh’s Undermining of Christian Statecraft
Since Cavanaugh’s position is more anarchist than Milbank’s, we would expect more
scepticism from him about statecraft. To reiterate his position, Cavanaugh sees the
state as something like an Antichrist figure, since its evil origins in violence means
that it can only be sustained through violence, and beget violence in turn. The state,
in its final mimicry of the triune God, offers a false salvation through the reunification
of fallen humanity into the Leviathan or body politic. For this reason, and more so
than Milbank, Cavanaugh is an out-and-out rejectionist of the state. But, rather than
rejecting politics, which he remains committed to, he redefines politics in non-statist
terms.
Cavanaugh’s criticism of modern Christian political thinkers is that they conceive
of political space as a single city characterized by a division of labour between church
and state. In this regard, he is especially critical of positions he links to Martin E.
Marty and John Courtney Murray: that church and state exist within one political
space.80 To Cavanaugh, seeing the city as unitary shapes the political imagination in
ways that reinforce politics as statecraft, since within the one city politics is handled
by the state, while the church looks after the soul. He writes that, ‘There is one polis
which the church can seek to rule, flee, serve, advise, or transform.’81 Understood
76. Here the comparison is between Milbank, “Essay against Secular Order.” and Milbank, “Real Third
Way.”
77. Belloc, Restoration of Property, 38.
78. Ibid., 39. Also see p. 56.
79. Ibid., 96.
80. Cavanaugh, “From One City to Two,” 299–308.
81. Ibid., 308.
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in this way, the church is not intrinsically political, but takes ‘political’ actions in
making policy recommendations to politicians. Within this one city, the church
and state ‘must manoeuvre for space’, with two ends of the church-state spectrum
being Constantinianism (the church using the state to rule the city), and the sectarian
solution (for the church to try to live apart from the city).82 This is a source of
statecraft: the church relating to the state within the one city, which contains a single
political body – the state. But, for Cavanaugh, the church’s acceptance of the one
city and its rôle of statecraft within it makes for a much diminished political rôle
for the church. On this model, statecraft takes for granted the church seeing itself
as existing in a spatial relationship to the state. It identifies the state as the political
body in the world, while the church can be political only in relation to the state within
this space. Cavanaugh’s project is to free the church from this way of imagining
politics. Cavanaugh tries to break this impasse by using Augustine’s notion of the two
cities, and opposing Pope Gelasius I as the divider of the one city into two realms.83
For Cavanaugh, it is Augustine who saves us from this spatial division in which the
church must find its place, by suggesting that two cities are performances within the
same time that enact their different loves, whether of self, or of God.84
Cavanaugh also attacks a commonplace impetus for Christian statecraft: that the
state should promote the common good and social justice. A strong motivation
for statecraft is Christian action for one’s neighbour, based in the story of the
Good Samaritan (Luke 10:25–37). This parable has inspired a variety of methods
of neighbourly care, including individual charity, church social services, and public
bodies ranging from cooperatives to the modern welfare state.85 Charity directed at
the victims of bad luck, indebtedness, poverty, or accident has also been matched
by the desire to strike out the root causes of social misery. Often, this call for social
justice has taken the path of statecraft, through promoting legislation to alleviate social
injustice. Christians have traditionally understood that people and their rulers should
promote justice, peace, the common good, and other divine goods for the human life.
Likewise, the Church has understood its rôle as promoting God’s justice and peace
to the nations. For Christians who believe that the state has responsibility for these
things, it is only natural that they advocate these to the state for greater attention.
A part of Cavanaugh’s criticism of statecraft is his undermining of the idea that the
common good is the responsibility of the state. But, before looking into Cavanaugh’s
critique of the common good, a parallel objection to the notion of justice from the
pen of his mentor, Stanley Hauerwas, will be briefly surveyed. By relocating these
82. Cavanaugh, “From One City to Two,” 308.
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85. Robert Wuthnow, Acts of Compassion: Caring for Others and Helping Ourselves (Princeton: Princeton
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concepts inside the church, they undermine action for these goods in and through the
state, making statecraft not only pointless, but also counter-productive.
All Christians are in favour of justice, with many seeking to promote their
understanding of justice to the state for the alleviation of poverty and other social
ills (often justified by Micah 6:8 and Amos 5:24). Such an emphasis on ‘justice’ has
been severely criticized by Hauerwas in his provocatively-titled article ‘The Politics
of Justice: Why Justice Is a Bad Idea for Christians’.86 His opinion is that, in the
absence of a coherent account of justice, Christians have latched onto liberal justice
that competes with, and undermines, Christianity. Or, in his words: ‘Christians
allow their imaginations to be captured by concepts of justice determined by the
presuppositions of liberal societies, and as a result, contribute to the development
of societies that make substantive accounts of justice less likely.’87 Such societies are
bureaucratic states, which limit our freedom and distort our humanity. Hauerwas
also suggests that cries for justice are counter-productive in this way: ‘Christian
appeals to justice on behalf of the poor and needy may only reinforce those practices
that are implicated in the creation of poverty in our society’.88 In other words, not
everything called ‘justice’ is what Christians ought to affirm as justice. Early in
his essay, Hauerwas implies that generalized calls for justice help to legitimate the
nation-state.89 Regrettably, Hauerwas is vague on these points, for it is not explicit
which ‘practices’ are being judged here, or how the nation-state is being legitimized.
Perhaps he means something like this: if Christians endorse a warped or liberal view
of what justice is, then it follows that any link between this justice and the state that
follows from it will also result in an unsound appreciation of what the state is meant
to do. The Christian understanding of justice and the state are intertwined and open
to distortion by the culture of modernity, which has an alternative story to tell. If
theology and liberalism cannot agree on the nature of justice, it is dubitable whether
they can agree on the essence and purpose of the state. Although he does not cite this
text, his criticisms of justice could be summarized by Proverbs 29:26: ‘Many seek the
favor of a ruler, but it is from the LORD that one gets justice.’ Or, in the words of one
commentary on this verse, a man gets justice ‘by waiting in trust for Yahweh to give it
to him, and not by lobbying a ruler.’90
Along with justice, many theologians hold the state responsible for the common
good, as Cavanaugh rightly observes.91 This is also the official position of the Catholic
Church, which is based on a long pre-modern tradition with roots in Aristotle and
86. Stanley Hauerwas, “The Politics of Justice: Why Justice is a Bad Idea for Christians,” in After
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Aquinas.92 That the state’s rôle is to promote the common good is also, in the opinion
of Cavanaugh, part of the state’s own political imagination and how it wishes to
present itself.93 Yet, Cavanaugh, following his mentor’s example on justice, wishes to
present the ‘case against seeing the state as the promoter and protector of the common
good.’94
In his disavowal of this important part of Catholic teaching on the rôle of the state
Cavanaugh finds supporting evidence from historical sources. In Joseph Strayer’s On
the Medieval Origins of the Modern State, he finds that the origins of the state made no
allowance for the common good.95 And from political philosophy, Cavanaugh takes
the view that the state is now neutral toward the good, meaning that ‘The body politic
does not pursue a common good, but seeks to liberate the individual to pursue his or
her own ends.’96 This is the result of the contractarianism of Hobbes and Locke, but
the story of the state’s relationship to the common good is much more complex than a
reification of social contract theories of the state would suggest. So, in his investigation
into the assumption that the state is a keeper of the common good, his search for the
origins of this view begin and end in the modern period, ignoring the Aristotelian and
Thomist roots of this notion.97
Cavanaugh acknowledges that the state can promote some goods, but writes that
the ‘nation-state is simply not in the common good business.’98 The problem for the
church, according to Cavanaugh, is when it believes the state’s false claims that it can
provide for the common good. Cavanaugh here cites Alasdair MacIntyre approvingly:
The modern nation-state, in whatever guise, is a dangerous and unman-
ageable institution, presenting itself on the one hand as a bureaucratic
supplier of goods and services, which is always about to, but never
actually does, give its clients value for money, and on the other as a
repository of sacred values, which from time to time invites one to lay
down one’s life on its behalf . . . it is like being asked to die for the
telephone company.99
MacIntyre may be right that this is what the state has become, but does it follow
that the state can no longer be a keeper of the common good, and should be treated like
a utility company, or worse? Cavanaugh, by looking at the specifically liberal modern
state, can easily ignore the pre-modern tradition in which politics was supposed to aim
92. Catholic Church, Catechism of the Catholic Church (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1994), § 1910.




97. See Mary M. Keys, Aquinas, Aristotle, and the Promise of the Common Good (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2006). Also see p. 92 above.
98. Cavanaugh, “Killing for the Telephone Company,” 266.
99. From Alasdair MacIntyre, “A Partial Response to my Critics,” in After MacIntyre: Critical Perspectives
on the Work of Alasdair MacIntyre, ed. John Horton and Susan Mendus (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994),
303. Cited in Cavanaugh, “Killing for the Telephone Company,” 263.
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at the good. It is widely agreed that the modern neutral state has foregone any idea
of a common good as telos, but this does not mean that the state is good for nothing,
or that the notion of the common good has nothing to contribute to where the state
may go in the future. Gary Dorrien, in writing of Reinhold Niebuhr’s criticism of the
notion of social justice, makes this criticism, which could also apply to Cavanaugh:
This disparagement of the “good society” idea was costly for Christian
ethics . . . To let go of it is to undercut the struggle for attainable gains
toward social justice, negating the elusive but formative vision of what is
worth struggling for. Without a vision of a good society that transcends the
prevailing order, ethics and politics remain captive to the dominant order,
restricted to marginal reforms.100
Here Dorrien indicates what effects Hauerwas’s and Cavanaugh’s criticisms may
have: undercutting attempts to direct the state toward greater justice or the common
good. To be fair to Cavanaugh, he does not give up the notion of the good altogether;
he simply believes that it resides in the church. Or, rather, it is the good that the
church pursues. Cavanaugh recognises that the two cities pursue different goods,
and even share some in common, but because these goods in common are used for
different ends, there is no common good between the two cities, which are governed
by different notions of the good. By wanting to have two cities, rather than one in
which church and state have different rôles, Cavanaugh encourages the notion that
the telos and the rôles of the two cities becomes distinct.
Milbank is also sceptical about locating the common good in the state, locating it
among ‘communities’.101 In this he is more in line with Catholic social teaching, in
which it is not only the political authorities that aim at the common good, but also
individuals and intermediate institutions. Christian thought affirms that the common
good exists within and through all social factors: individuals, communities, and the
state. Rerum Novarum reads: ‘But although all citizens, without exception, can and
ought to contribute to that common good in which individuals share so profitably
to themselves, yet it is not to be supposed that all can contribute in the same way
and to the same extent.’102 Just as it is recognized that individuals will make a range
of contributions in proportion with their abilities, perhaps it is also the case that the
state’s special concern for the common good is because of its power and means of
doing so, rather than an ideological affirmation that this should be so. The notion of
the common good remains central to Christian political thought, but it is a caricature of
Christian social thinking that it believes it is the sole domain of the state. Traditionally,
100. Gary Dorrien, Social Ethics in the Making: Interpreting an American Tradition (Chichester: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2009), 676.
101. Milbank, “Religion, Culture, and Anarchy,” 33.
102. Leo XIII, “Rerum Novarum,” § 34. Also see Pope John XXIII, “Pacem in Terris,” Vatican, April 11,
1963, <http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_xxiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_j-xxiii_enc_
11041963_pacem_en.html> (accessed April 23, 2013), § 53–66.
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seeking the common good is the task for all parts of the social body. But with the rise of
the state and the depoliticization of the church as having direct political involvement,
it is hardly surprising that the responsibility for the common good is largely projected
onto the state.
Finally, in response to Hauerwas and Cavanaugh, it is not enough to say that
liberal notions of justice and the statist form of the common good render void the use
of these motivational and aspirational concepts in the church. To do so would concede
that Christianity has suffered a major defeat at the hands of modern liberalism. While
this may be partly true, the church teaches that God’s good and justice will prevail,
and it is to this that Christians can always testify in their worship and social witness.
Furthermore, calls for social justice and care for the widow and orphan is a reminder
to both states and the church that states which ignore pleas for justice sit under divine
judgment. The case against politics as statecraft in Hauerwas and Cavanaugh are
based in the conflict between the ideologies of modernity and the politics of the
church as a politics in its own right. There is no space here for a fuller critique of
their positions. But here we can observe that Scripture is noticeably absent from their
accounts of politics.
For all his undermining of the basis of statecraft, and despite his professed
‘anarchism’, Cavanaugh does, surprisingly, allow some space for statecraft in his
writings. But these are minor sections and vague asides, and are not central to his
political theology. He affirms that, ‘The church’s job is to try to discern in each concrete
circumstance how best to embody the politics of the cross in a suffering world.’103
Elsewhere, he wishes to deny the claim that ‘some forms of ad hoc cooperation
with the government cannot be useful.’104 In some of his writings, Cavanaugh does
applaud some church engagement with the state. For instance, he praises the political
actions of Cardinal Roger Mahony (which included advocacy to President George
W. Bush).105 But, generally speaking, he thinks that the ‘role of the church is not
merely to make policy recommendations to the state, but to embody a different sort of
politics’.106
Cavanaugh’s final objection to statecraft is that it makes the church’s political
contribution to politics indirect through an assumption of the autonomy of politics
from ecclesiology. Non-ecclesial, post-Christendom political theologies fail, in his
view, for the indirect nature of their politics. Rather than imagine the church as a
political entity in its own right, with direct political importance, he observes that,
in trying to grapple with the political relevance of the church after Christendom,
103. Cavanaugh, “Church,” 405.
104. Cavanaugh, “Killing for the Telephone Company,” 266.
105. See William T. Cavanaugh, “Migrant, Tourist, Pilgrim, Monk: Mobility and Identity in a Global
Age,” Theological Studies 69 (2008): 356.
106. Cavanaugh, “Church,” 404.
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the mainstream accepts the depoliticization of the church and the normativity of
statecraft.107 Statecraft is far too indirect for Cavanaugh:
In modern secular societies, however, political theologies tend to operate
at an additional remove from the state, staking a claim to influence
the state only through the activities of Christian citizens in civil society.
Furthermore, most assume that, when addressing a pluralistic society,
theology cannot be directly politicized, but must first be translated into
some more publicly accessible form of discourse in order to have an
influence in civil society.108
Statecraft, on this account, involves a double remove from the politics of the
church. First, the church becomes too indirectly political and then, second, its political
language must be translated into the language of the state. Both of these have a
profaning influence on the church’s political imagination – we no longer see the church
as political, but see the state as our saviour.
Overall, Milbank and Cavanaugh leave little room for the church to engage with
the state, either as Christians holding office, or as advocates for greater justice and the
common good. The remainder of this chapter will examine the basis for the church
to engage in statecraft in order to recapture some ground for statecraft eroded by
Milbank and Cavanaugh.
For Christian Statecraft
The remainder of this chapter will advocate for Christian statecraft, with the dis-
claimer that this is not the whole Christian understanding of theopolitics, as some-
times caricatured by its critics. The following argument, based largely in scripture, is
that statecraft need not defile the Christian, either in holding office, or in seeking to
influence office-holders. While one does not find the word ‘statecraft’ in scripture, just
as one does not find the word ‘state’, what we do find in scripture and later traditions
are many examples of God’s people forming, working with, and confronting kings,
Pharaohs, emperors, judges, and other political figures. These examples of relation-
ships to political power can inform the church’s political imagination when it comes
to questions of statecraft in the twenty-first century. Before looking into some of the
scriptural evidence in more detail, there are many scriptures which seem to offer a
prima facie case for the positive value of statecraft in scripture, both from the side of
the wise ruler, and from that of the prophet.
Firstly, from the side of the ruler, it is a good thing to seek counsel from wise
advisers. The tradition of Christian political thought often followed the wisdom of
107. Cavanaugh states this problem in “Church,” in The Blackwell Companion to Political Theology (Malden:
Blackwell, 2007), 393.
108. Ibid., 399.
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Solomon in advising that rulers are wise to have good and varied counsel (Proverbs
11:14; 15:22).109 Also observed was that failure to listen to the words of the prophets
brings calamity.110 So, from the side of the ruler, it is sensible and necessary to have
good counsel, and to repent when they see the error of their ways. An exemplar of
such penitence is David, rebuked by Nathan for disposing of Uriah in order to have
Bathsheba (2 Samuel 11–12).111 Rulers ought to listen to good counsel and reject bad:
‘If a ruler listens to falsehood, all his officials will be wicked’ (Proverbs 29:12).
Then, from the side of those who provide counsel to rulers, we find this encour-
agement: ‘With patience a ruler may be persuaded, and a soft tongue can break
bones’ (Proverbs 25:15). But just because rulers ought to listen does not mean that
the church always has something to say. It risks looking foolish in its haste to speak
(Proverbs 29:20). The church needs to develop the wisdom of when to speak and
when to be taciturn, following the advice of James 1:19, a verse which Augustine
used to claim that Christians do not always have an obligation to speak or teach.112
That speaking to rulers is valued within scripture is shown by those cases where God
gave prophets words to speak. Examples include Moses, with God providing the
message and medium for his advocacy to Pharaoh (Exodus 4:10–17), and Jeremiah
(Jeremiah 1:4–9). Another is Nehemiah, who quickly prays before speaking his request
to King Artaxerxes (Nehemiah 2:4–5). Given that the words of such wise men are often
directed to rulers, we are encouraged to study them and in turn offer such service as
we are called to:
Do not slight the discourse of the sages,
but busy yourself with their maxims;
because from them you will learn discipline
and how to serve princes. (Sirach 8:8)
This tradition of statecraft is dominant in the churches, even if it is not theologically
grounded. The next section considers the opposing position, that of non-involvement
in state politics.
Ideological Non-involvement with the State
Today’s Christians have more freedom than the enslaved Joseph, Esther, or Daniel
of biblical times. In the West, at least, there exists the choice whether or not to
109. See, for commentary on these and related verses, Sedulius Scottus, De rectoribus Christianis (On
Christian Rulers), ed. and trans. R. W. Dyson (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2010), 85; and, Jacques-
Bénigne Bossuet, Politics Drawn from the Very Words of Holy Scripture, ed. and trans. Patrick Riley
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 135–137.
110. Scottus, De rectoribus Christianis, 97. Scottus illustrates this point with the examples of Pharaoh
(Exodus 14:23–28) and Antiochus (2 Maccabees 9:5–28).
111. See ibid., 119-121.
112. Augustine, “Exposition of Psalm 139,” in Expositions of the Psalms, 121–150, ed. Boniface Ramsey,
trans. Maria Boulding, The Works of Saint Augustine (New York: New City Press, 2004), 296.
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be actively engaged with the state. We can choose isolationism, compromise, or
something in between, with one’s disposition to any one option influenced partly by
our political context. In the increasingly politicized twentieth century, a strong sense
of social responsibility developed in the church. One reason for this should give anti-
nominalists pause for thought. If associations have legal personality, can they also
have a ‘Christian’ personality, or can only individuals be Christian? That the social
order could be more or less Christian lay at the heart of the developing notion of
Christian responsibility for the social order. If individuals being Christians is a good
thing, it is much better if our social institutions and law reflect the gospel too.113 But
there has been a reaction against this worldly responsibility, as H. Richard Niebuhr
outlines here:
The general tendency of the Church in the twentieth century has been
toward a conception of social responsibility which virtually made it an
agent of secular society. Under the circumstances it is not impossible that
a strong countermovement will arise and that Christians will seek forms
of church life that are independent of secular society not only in source
but also in purpose. The true measure of the Church’s responsibility is
not to be found, however, by attending to either extreme or by seeking for
a compromise position between them but rather by attending to the two
aspects of Christian responsibility in the right way.114
With these words, Niebuhr effectively predicted the rejection of statecraft in favour
of the political ecclesiologies represented by Milbank, Cavanaugh, and Hauerwas. Of
course, they would reject the label ‘isolationist’ (or ‘sectarian’), but this is only justified
because their ecclesiology is politicized. They do not see social responsibility as being
undertaken by the church through the organs of the state. To do this is to be worldly
and secular.
What Niebuhr rejects here are the absolutist ethics of isolationism and the temp-
tation of civil religion. Much political theology has been trying to find a middle way
to traverse these dangers. What is desired is a way for the church to be both political
and faithful, while not becoming intoxicated with political power. Cavanaugh aims to
achieve this by locating the true politics inside the church. The church is political by
being the church, without much concern about what the state is doing. Milbank, while
affirming the tie between ecclesiology and politics, differs in locating politics among
and within the associations of society, including the church. Both wish to be political,
as this is what makes one relevant in today’s world, where to be taken seriously one
must be political in a discernible way.
113. For the development of this notion see Stanley Hauerwas, “A Christian Critique of Christian
America,” in The Hauerwas Reader, ed. John Berkman and Michael Cartwright (Durham: Duke University
Press, 2001), 462–463, 465.
114. H. Richard Niebuhr, “The Responsibility of the Church for Society,” in The Gospel, the Church and
the World, ed. Kenneth Scott Latourette (New York and London: Harper & Brothers, 1946), 126.
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Those, such as Milbank and Cavanaugh, who propose that the church not be
involved with the state, can sometimes make it sounds as through this is a virtue
for all times. But sometimes obedience to the state and engagement with it might be
the prudent course. For those opposed to the state, Jeremiah 27 makes for difficult
reading. It is a hard text for, precisely at the point where we have to serve a foreign
King, our ‘prophets’ tell us not to serve him. But these are false prophets, ‘for they
are prophesying a lie to you’ (Jeremiah 27:10,14,16). For this reason, it comes as no
surprise that Calvin used Jeremiah 27 as evidence for an ethic of obedience.115 A better
name for the virtue upheld here might be forbearance, since the bondage is not eternal.
As Brueggemann observes in Jeremiah 27, serving the empire is only until; meaning
that it is ‘penultimate’ and provisional, until God’s ultimate judgment of Babylon.116
Brueggemann’s use of the word ‘penultimate’ is reminiscent of Bonhoeffer’s use of
the term. For Bonhoeffer, the state is the preserving, penultimate, and provisional
order, which is relative to the ultimate order and rule of God. He writes, ‘Ultimate
and penultimate stand in mutually exclusive opposition. Christ is the destroyer
and enemy of everything penultimate, and everything penultimate is the enemy of
Christ.’117 If Bonhoeffer can be claimed for the cause of desacralization then this
is based in the alteration of the human attitude toward the penultimate in light of
eschatological expectation. This is supported in Scripture by 1 Corinthians 7:29–31:
I mean, brothers and sisters, the appointed time has grown short; from now
on, let even those who have wives be as though they had none, and those
who mourn as though they were not mourning, and those who rejoice as
though they were not rejoicing, and those who buy as though they had
no possessions, and those who deal with the world as though they had no
dealings with it. For the present form of this world is passing away.
Here, those Corinthian Christians who deal with the world around them are not
commanded by Paul to stop dealing with the world, but to change their attitude to
it in the face of Christian eschatological expectation. This new understanding should
shape our approach to dealing with the things of this world that are passing away or
being redeemed to the glory of God. We are not to cling to them, nor put our hope in
them, but their place in our lives is rightly relativized under the imminent return of
Christ. As Reinhold Niebuhr states it: ‘The final victory over man’s disorder is God’s
and not ours; but we do have responsibility for proximate victories.’118 This limited
notion of responsibility permits selective or occasional involvement with the state, the
subject of the next section.
115. Calvin, Institutes, 4.20.27.
116. Walter Brueggemann, The Theology of the Book of Jeremiah (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2007), 108–109.
117. Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 153.
118. See Reinhold Niebuhr, “The Christian Witness in the Social and National Order,” in Christian
Realism and Political Problems (London: Faber & Faber, 1954), 111.
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For Selective Involvement
Against Cavanaugh’s withdrawal strategy, and Milbank’s anti-statism, the position
affirmed here favours the freedom of the Christian to engage with the state, provided
that it does so in a fashion that leaves the state in its proper place. This is similar to the
‘selective participation’ commonly found in Anabaptism.119 One of the best known
advocates of selective involvement is Stanley Hauerwas. Rejecting the extremes of
both ‘complete involvement’ with, or ‘complete withdrawal’ from, the state – options
he attributes to James Gustafason – Hauerwas circumspectly suggests that, ‘The
issue is how the church can provide the interpretative categories to help Christians
better understand the positive and negative aspects of their societies and guide
their subsequent selective participation.’120 Paul Ramsey, one of Hauerwas’s regular
interlocutors, advocated both ‘selective (perhaps radical) withdrawal’ and ‘selective
(perhaps deep) involvement’, since each has its place in its own time.121 It is this
occasional and contextual involvement that is defended here.
Selective participation requires discernment about how to select those moments at
which to participate and then further thought and reflection over how to participate.
Who can teach us this craft? Hauerwas says we need to learn from those who went
before, the saints (communio sanctorum). Who does he think we learn about ‘selective
participation’ from? In Christianity, Democracy, and the Radical Ordinary, Hauerwas and
his collaborator Romand Coles give several examples of people living radical lives.122
But from the two main characters Hauerwas discusses (Will D. Campbell and Jean
Vanier), there is more wisdom to be gained by avoiding statecraft than selectively
engaging in it.
Hauerwas believes that, ‘It obviously makes all the difference whether rulers are
more nearly just if they are to receive support from Christians. I do not believe,
however, that we know beforehand for all times and all places what set of procedures
or practices will insure such justice.’123 This is typical Hauerwasian rhetoric, which
sets an impossibly high standard for the position he opposes. In this case, he demands
that the practitioners of statecraft know in advance the universal conditions of justice.
He is partly right: attention needs to be paid to the particularity of the situation. But
this demand of Hauerwas’s is far from satisfactory. He rarely hesitates to inform
his audience how the rulers of America go about their business. In essay after
essay, Hauerwas tells readers how the state seeks to rule, and the American form of
119. From a position he calls ‘Anabaptist realism’, John Redekop advocates ‘selective involvement’ or
‘conscientious participation’, Politics Under God (Waterloo: Herald Press, 2007), 122, 124.
120. Stanley Hauerwas, Christian Existence Today: Essays on Church, World, and Living In Between (Durham:
Labyrinth Press, 1988), 11. Hauerwas’s italics.
121. Paul Ramsey, Speak Up for Just War or Pacifism: A Critique of the United Methodist Bishops’ Pastoral
Letter “In Defense of Creation” (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1988), 142.
122. Stanley Hauerwas and Romand Coles, Christianity, Democracy, and the Radical Ordinary:
Conversations Between a Radical Democrat and a Christian (Eugene: Cascade Books, 2008).
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government is well-known. But even if we grant that we cannot know everything
we need to in advance, it should be possible to look back into the past to discover
if anyone’s selective participation was exemplary in their own time. Not that this
would necessarily provide models for our own time, but it is central to Hauerwas’s
Christian virtue ethics to uphold past Christians as exemplars for current practice. If
Hauerwas cannot do this then it appears that his ethical framework can be called into
serious question. For if the present Christian community cannot educate its members
for future decisions and engagement with secular culture and politics, then it is of
limited use as a training ground in Christian virtue.
Finally, Hauerwas thinks that trying to influence the government is ‘corrupting’.
In the following quotation there is near universal condemnation of statecraft, leaving
little room for ‘selective participation’:
I have a quite critical attitude toward the Methodist lobbying effort in
Washington. They think they’re there to influence government. My
own view is that they should think of themselves as spies who reside
in Washington to report back to the troops what the sons of bitches are
planning to do to us. The whole image of influencing government seems
to me to be quite corrupting . . . I think nothing is more corrupting than the
notion of citizens participating in a democracy because that gives you the
idea that somehow we are the government.124
Hauerwas, even though he affirms ‘selective participation’, still considers the state
as profane along with Milbank and Cavanaugh. More nuanced than Hauerwas is
the American Episcopal lay theologian William Stringfellow, another advocate of
occasional participation. He writes on the theological grounding of advocacy on
behalf of the victim in these words:
If the church is called to advocacy, in a biblical sense, as a way of
expressing its imminent eschatological insight, then the church cannot
withdraw or retreat or escape from political involvement; it cannot indulge
equivocation or apathy or indifference . . . If in the witness of advocacy
there be circumstances where the church, or some members of the body
of the church, be found supporting incumbent political authority, that is
a matter of temporary gratuity and not of stupid allegiance to secular
thrones.125
So for Stringfellow statecraft is temporary, fleeting, and displays no change in
the church’s ultimate allegiance. This is in agreement with the account of Christian
124. Personal correspondence from Hauerwas to Keith Graber Miller in Miller, Wise as Serpents, Innocent
as Doves: American Mennonites Engage Washington (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1996),
268n30.
125. Stringfellow, Conscience & Obedience: The Politics of Romans 13 and Revelation 13 in Light of the Second
Coming, 97–98.
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freedom advocated here: that one may engage in statecraft without compromising
one’s faith. Whereas for Hauerwas and Cavanaugh statecraft was profaning in the
seduction of the political imagination, for Stringfellow participation need not profane
us, but is an opportunity for witness. This is surely a much sounder account since it
does not automatically assume the complete surrender of the church to statism when
it engages in statecraft.
Freedom and Indifference
The ‘indifference’ Stringfellow rejects in the above quotation demands qualification.
He is writing about callous indifference to the victims of oppression: the poor, the
widowed, and the orphaned. Such indifference was shown by the priest and Levite to
the robbed and beaten traveller in the Parable of the Good Samaritan (Luke 10:25–37).
While indifference to the plight of the victim or downtrodden can never be sanctioned
by the church, there are other forms of indifference in the realm of Christian freedom
that can relate to the state and the Christian’s use of it. One is the indifference that
Christians maintain toward political form. This section will argue for indifference
toward statecraft, meaning that Christian engagement with the state is adiaphora.
Being a matter of indifference, there are no scriptures relating directly to the use of
statecraft, but there are passages that have adiaphora as a motif, especially the letters
of Paul.126 An example that relates to the state is Paul’s statement that ‘it is a very
small thing that I should be judged by you or by any human court’ (1 Corinthians 4:3).
Also consider 1 Corinthians 6:12: ‘“All things are lawful for me,” but not all things are
beneficial. “All things are lawful for me,” but I will not be dominated by anything.’
Utilizing this passage in a discussion of freedom in Paul, Ellul writes of the danger of
losing our freedom in conforming to the ‘Spirit of the World’. He writes the danger is
two-fold:
It is the same when we think we can entrust ourselves to an objective
system in order to assure “the” freedom of human beings: when we think
that political or economic institutions will give freedom to people and will
render them free, when we consider that the obstacle to human freedom is,
for example, one [particular] authoritarian form of the State or economic
alienation, then we ourselves lose our freedom.127
As Ellul suggests, there are two dangers here. The first, as examined in Chapter 5,
is that we risk thinking the state is our redeemer. The second is that we think of
the state as standing objectively in the way of our redemption. Ellul suggests that
126. See James Jaquette, Discerning What Counts: The Function of the Adiaphora Topos in Paul’s Letters
(Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1995).
127. Jacques Ellul, “The Meaning of Freedom According to Saint Paul,” in Sources and Trajectories: Eight
Early Articles by Jacques Ellul That Set the Stage, ed. and trans. Marva J. Dawn (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
1997), 128–129. Square brackets in translation.
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the Christian is free from such speculation over political means, sitting above such
matters. To engage in such debates is a form of slavery to Christian morality, which
he rejects in this text, with support from 1 Corinthians 7:23.128
Elsewhere, Ellul argues against any binding doctrine of the state or defining true
Christianity as withdrawal from engaging with the state.129 If making the state a christ
sacralizes it, and making it an antichrist profanes it, then acting freely toward the state
both desacralizes and deprofanizes it from these two extremes and undermines the
slavery of a strict Christian social ethic. As shown throughout the previous chapters,
this is precisely the mistake that Milbank and Cavanaugh make when describing the
state as profane. In a similar vein to Ellul, Will D. Campbell and James Y. Holloway
write:
The dilemma of modernity and the apostasy of the Church are not
resolved by anarchy—in trying to abjure political responsibility by casting
politics as the one devil responsible for everything that ails us—any more
than politics-as-Baal can redeem us. The time may be upon us when
certain forms of political action, dear to those who glory in our 18th-
century traditions, will have to be rejected—perhaps temporarily, perhaps
permanently—in order to topple idols and thereby refocus upon political
reality.130
For Calvin, indifference is a part of Christian freedom: ‘regarding outward
things that are of themselves “indifferent,” we are not bound before God by any
religious obligation preventing us from sometimes using them and other times not
using them, indifferently.’131 As Calvin continues, matters of indifference free the
conscience, which can free today’s Christian from any perceived duty (such as voting)
to participate in the state. This only applies if the state is neither sacred nor profane;
for if it is sacred, then to reject it would be neglecting one’s duty; while if the state
is profane, to use it would be corrupting. Another Reformed way of looking at the
matters of indifference is to describe them as those things treated as unnecessary for
salvation.
An attitude of indifference to political form and statecraft, combined with the
desacralization of the state, radically relativizes the state, and in putting it in its place
reduces it to a tool which the Christian can approach without fear of profaning oneself.
Naturally, while a Christian shouldn’t unduly worry about statecraft, they should
approach it with caution, knowing that there may be unintended consequences of
128. Ellul, “The Meaning of Freedom,” 128. Recall, also, Bonhoeffer’s interpretation, see page 18 above.
129. Ellul outlines these three errors in detail in “Christian Faith and Social Reality,” in Sources and
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statecraft – such as increased state power and greater intrusion of the state into our
lives.
Conclusions
This final chapter has made a case for selective Christian statecraft. To establish the
case for this, the chapter began with proposals for desacralizing the state from its
being considered either sacred or profane. The state is neither the Christ nor the
Antichrist. While it has been presented as such by both secular and religious thinkers,
it is not our creator, preserver, nor redeemer. This does not mean that the state has
no purpose in God’s creative, preservative or redemptive work. Mature Christians
must remain open to the possibilities that the state may have some place in God’s
plans for humanity and creation. This may require recasting the Christian political
imagination, freeing the Christian to appreciate that both God and Christian are free
to engage with the state. This position is supported by the reading of scripture which
serves to demythologize and relativize the state.
This chapter has also examined calls from selected Radical Orthodoxy theologians
for the church to shun statecraft. Proponents of this view discussed here include Bell,
Hauerwas, Milbank, and Cavanaugh. They believe that to reduce politics to statecraft
is to depoliticize the church, while giving theological support to the bureaucratic
liberal state. As part of their protest against politics as statecraft, they have sought
to recapture the concepts of justice and the common good as the sole preserve of the
church. Their dismissal of statecraft rests largely on finding the state profane. The
differences that remain between Milbank and Cavanaugh in their assessment of the
state are not in the degree of its profanity, but in how close one can get to it. Whereas
Cavanaugh wishes to keep a far distance, Milbank is prepared to work with it in order
to undermine its absolute sovereignty.
Contrary to their position, this chapter advocates the view that the boundaries
between sacred and profane are much more hazy in politics than Radical Orthodoxy
would have us believe. Christians and churches can have faithful engagements with
the state, with both scripture and tradition providing examples of how such relation-
ships may be conducted in a spirit of Christian freedom. Scripture, in particular, has a
more nuanced approach to relating to political powers, one which always emphasizes
the absolute political power of God and the relative and penultimate power of human
political power. The state and statecraft are in the realm of indifference, with neither
participation nor non-participation being important for salvation.
From the church’s perspective statecraft is about witnessing to God’s rule of justice
and peace. Christians should, therefore, always question whether these goods can be
provided by the secular state alone. And in the situations in which we find ourselves,
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and using our gifts, we can advocate in small ways for the common good and justice,
as taught to us through God’s revelation in Scripture.
Chapter 7
Conclusions
This dissertation has assessed the political theologies of John Milbank and William
Cavanaugh. The special focus throughout has been their view of the modern state,
and secondarily the political ecclesiologies they pose as the locus of their politics in
place of politics as statecraft. In offering a sustained account and criticism of their
political theologies, a theological frame of reference was adopted which combined the
doctrines of creation, preservation, and redemption with the notions of sacred and
profane. This framework was used in assessing the strengths and weaknesses of their
positions on the state and to what extent they would be happy for Christian political
strategies to include engagement with the state.
In general, their rejection of the politics of statecraft rely on showing how the state
is profane and that the church is truly political in its own right. In depicting the
profanity of the state, they rely on showing how it both parodies and competes with
Christian doctrine. Assessing their positions, therefore, has been done by looking at
their positions through the doctrines of creation, preservation, and redemption, in
dialogue with Scripture and traditional Christian theological reflection on the civil
authorities. In both Milbank and Cavanaugh, the political church largely rests in
their close adherence to political pluralism, which seeks to undermine the sovereignty
of the state, and claims the real personality of associations, including the church.
Both Milbank and Cavanaugh propose that the church, in place of the profane state,
is the true locus of politics. Arguments for this position have been outlined, and
shortcomings in their approach have been highlighted.
In addition, each chapter offered a unique critique of their positions. Chapter 2
showed how Milbank and Cavanaugh have not escaped the movement toward the
politicization of theology which began in the twentieth century. In constructing a
political ecclesiology they also wish theology to be relevant to politics, which is a
modern obsession in church and society. Chapter 3 saw how Milbank and Cavanaugh
are selective in where they locate the origins of the state. This rhetorical strategy –
to place the origins of the state where it suits one’s argument – is used by them to
cast the state as profane by locating it in heretical philosophy and war. Chapter 4
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highlights where Milbank and Cavanaugh differ from the mainstream tradition on
the state. They ignore its function as an ordinance for the preservation of human
society. Here, Milbank and Cavanaugh simply do not value the temporal goods of
government, which is surprising, given that Augustine, one of their main primary
sources, does. In Chapter 5 on redemption, Milbank and Cavanaugh showed that
they see salvation from the political body of the state into the Body of Christ. They
share the position that salvation is to be found in associations and the church. But, as
shown, there are real problems with this. This three-fold doctrinal framework proved
useful in evaluating a theology of the state against a common understanding of the
works of God. It offers a powerful analytical tool for assessing political theologies
and would be able to be used to critique secular political theories in the same way. In
Chapter 6, we find that Milbank and Cavanaugh mostly condemn politics as statecraft,
with Milbank adopting a strategy of using the state for moving toward pluralism,
while Cavanaugh, being more anarchist, tries to undermine the Christian impetus for
statecraft altogether. This is consistent with their position on the profanity of the state.
But, as shown, they are too hasty in condemning statecraft.
In summary, the political theologians John Milbank and William Cavanaugh offer
fresh ways to describe the relationship between the church and the state. They base
this in the mythos or the theopolitical imagination Christians choose to adhere to:
either the city of man, or the city of God. Their political Augustinianism results in
their being very negative towards the state, making it a source of profanity in the life
of the church.
This thesis has described their projects and taken them further in the demythol-
ogization of Christian political thought through the doctrinal lenses of creation,
preservation, and redemption. This serves to desacralize sacred understandings of
the state and also to deprofanize profane interpretations of the state. One traditional
position Milbank and Cavanaugh heartily adopt is that in order to decide whether
to engage with the state, we need to know what the state is. Because they view it
as profane, they avoid it and wish to undermine it. They therefore reject statecraft
because they see it as based in a statism that has exalted the state into the position of
God. The argument here is largely in agreement with Milbank and Cavanaugh, that
Christians must reject this idolatrous position. Regrettably, Milbank and Cavanaugh
err at the other extreme, making the state profane, when a better position is to remain
open to the possibility that God uses the human creation of the state and remains
involved in its ongoing work.
Finally, in arguing for indifference to both political form and statecraft, this
dissertation stands open to the objection of being non-committal to any practical and
concrete politics. This is the result, however, of having maximal fidelity to a scriptural
political imagination, and a theology of freedom. The conclusion is therefore negative,
as described in these words of Bonhoeffer:
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The church is not able to proclaim a concrete earthly order that would
necessarily follow from faith in Jesus Christ. Nevertheless, it can and
must oppose any concrete order that represents an offense to faith in Jesus
Christ, and this it can and must at least negatively define the boundaries of
an order within which it is possible to believe in and to render obedience
to Jesus Christ.1
This via negativa is not only in relation to Jesus Christ, which that paragraph
might suggest. God is the Creator, Preserver, and Redeemer of life, and it has been
the argument throughout the foregoing chapters that anything, including political
thought and action that produces a rival to Father, Son, and Holy Spirit in any of
these tasks, must be challenged by the church.2 But we remain free to engage with the
powers that exist.
Graham Ward writes it is not the rôle of the theologian to solve complex economic,
political, or cultural problems. Rather, ‘The theologian’s task is to keep alive the vision
of better things – of justice, salvation and the common good – and work to clarify the
world-view conducive to the promotion of those things.’3 It is difficult to imagine
Milbank and Cavanaugh disagreeing with Ward on this point. The differences would
lie in the focal point of where justice and the common good is placed. Just where and
to whom does the theologian perform this necessary task? It has been the argument
here that the state can be a realm where the Christian voices can be heard. This does
not mean that the church is a politics, but only that we cannot rule out statecraft as a
way to witness to God and His Kingdom. Since we are free in Christ, statecraft need
not defile us; but it can kill us, as the history of prophecy and martyrdom shows. Such
is the risk of faithful evangelical political witness.
1. Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 360.
2. Ibid., 193.
3. Graham Ward, Cities of God (London; New York: Routledge, 2000), 260.
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